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The thesis examines European legitimacy and regulatory governance. The research 
analyzes the link between regulatory governance and legitimacy in EU regulation 
and evaluates whether governance tools in the form of qualitative administrative 
criteria can contribute to European regulatory legitimacy. Governance here refers to 
the exercise of delegated regulatory powers by the European Commission. The 
question of whether the adoption of qualitative regulatory governance practices can 
enhance the supranational regulatory legitimacy of the European Commission has 
been underexamined in the literature typically without distinguishing the analysis 
from the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU. Using a case study from the 
telecommunications sector, the thesis conducts such an examination using a 
documentary method.  
To create the analytical context, the thesis distinguishes the theoretical concept of 
legitimacy for a transnational regulator from that of a national regulator of a 
sovereign state. The choice is made to use a form of normative regulatory legitimacy 
drawn from the scholarship on regulatory governance theory. An analytical model is 
constructed that reflects criteria and values that bear upon legitimacy so as to 
constitute a meaningful alternative to democratic forms of regulatory accountability. 
Regulation was defined in the research to cover policy instruments, in the form of 
measures of positive and negative integration, adopted for the EU single market 
under Article 106(3) and Article 114 TFEU. The analysis evaluates the regulatory 
governance used by the European Commission over a twenty-three year time period 
in which the telecommunications sector was entirely liberalized and harmonized.  
Analysis revealed that, while the Commission has improved the quality of its 
regulatory governance in principle, its use of normative regulatory governance in 
practice requires further attention, notably in respect of improving the evidence base 
for policy proposals and in creating a meaningful form of empirical feedback in 
evaluating regulatory outcomes, corresponding to an ex post accountability 
mechanism. On the other hand, the research validated the premise that a transnational 
regulator could purposively use regulatory governance as a tool with which to 







I, Sandra Keegan, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 101,000 
words in length, has been written by me, that it is a record of work carried out by me, 
















First and foremost, it gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the roles 
played by, and convey my deepest thanks to, my supervisors, 
Professor Andrew Scott and Professor Niamh Nic Shuibhne. I cannot 
over-emphasize how much these two individuals contributed to 
completion of my research. Both have the most important inspirational 
qualities for a PhD supervisor, gave unstinting positive support and 
encouragement, and were willing generously to share their expertise 
and time. Without question, without them, I would not now be writing 
these words of acknowledgement and thanks. 
 
I would also like to thank the professors who played an important role 
in my research, as panel members, when I requested an extension of 
the period of study. Professor Graeme Laurie and Professor Jo Shaw 
discharged their role of questioning and reviewing my work with tact 
and professionalism, as would most, but also with a humanity and a 
kindly intelligence that significantly contributed to the completion of 
the research.  
 
Briefly, I would like to acknowledge the logistical help on finalizing the 
thesis provided by Dr Karen Baston, another equally professional and 
dedicated member of the Law School faculty. Her friendship soothed 
many a troubled organizational thought in the final months. Her calm 
competence produced a thesis whose professional presentational 
qualities can be credited to her.   
 
I feel privileged to have been supported throughout by my fellow PhD 
travelers, most of whom have completed this phase and begun their 
next. Yet they did not forget or fail to encourage whenever needed. I 
especially would like to mention Anja, Kasey, Julia, Mariola, Rebecca, 
Thomas, Tree and Wei.  
 
My Brussels contingent, no less supportive even if geographically 
challenged, also supported me in equally unstinting terms.  
 
Finally, I would like to thank my family, husband Ian, and sons, 
Alexander and James, whose patience and support have made this 
lengthy experience and process more enjoyable than it otherwise 
would have been. I would particularly thank Ian for his willingness to 
read and comment on various drafts of thesis chapters. Without his 

















AJIL American Journal of International Law 
CMLR Common Market Law Review 
Colombia LR Colombia Law Review 
Cornell ILJ Cornell International Law Journal 
CUP Cambridge University Press 
ECR European Court Reports 
EEC European Economic Community 
ELJ European Law Journal 
EL Rev European Law Review 
ELR Edinburgh Law Review 
Emory LJ Emory Law Journal 
EP European Parliament 
EU European Union 
European LJ European Law Journal 
Fordham ILJ Fordham International Law Journal 
German LJ German Law Journal 
Governance Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, 
and Institutions 
Harvard LR Harvard Law Review 
JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 
JEPP Journal of European Public Policy 
JPP Journal of Public Policy 
Michigan JIL Michigan Journal of International Law 
Nebraska LR Nebraska Law Review 
OJ Official Journal of the European Communities 
OJLS Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
OUP Oxford University Press 
Southern California LR Southern California Law Review 
UP University Press 
Virginia JIL Virginia Journal of International Law 
Wisconsin LR Wisconsin Law Review 
Yale JIL Yale Journal of International Law 
Yale LJ Yale Law Journal 













Signed Declaration 3 
Acknowledgements 4 
Abbreviations 5 
Table of Contents 6 
Introduction 7 
Chapter 1: Governance, Regulation, Legitimacy and the EU: Where to Start? 18 
Chapter 2: Regulatory Governance: Models, Methods and Mentors 47 
Chapter 3 87 
Chapter 4: The ‘Europeanization’ of Telecommunications Regulatory 
Policy 
107 
Chapter 5: Emerging Governance in Telecommunications, 1990-1999 146 
Chapter 6: Telecommunications Governance in the Twenty-First Century 183 
Conclusions 250 
Appendix: Timeline 257 
Bibliography 264 
Table of European Cases 264 
Cases from Other Jurisdictions 264 
Legislation 265 
European Commission Documents 267 

















It takes no great powers of observation to detect that the European Union (EU) is 
facing significant and systemic problems of confidence in its present state. The point 
of most contention currently lies within the depths of the Eurozone crisis that began 
to unfold in late 2009 and is ongoing. Few EU citizens are likely to understand the 
complexities of the regulatory arrangements and powers created by EU Treaty 
provisions on monetary union. But most will appreciate that the exercise of 
regulatory powers by the responsible institutions of the EU has been fraught with 
controversy. The popular media often turn this to journalistic advantage: horsemeat 
was recently discovered in food products that were meant to consist entirely of beef. 
One commentator wrote: ‘Why in a trading block notorious for regulating things like 
the shape of bananas and the font size on food labels, was something as simple as 
identifying the difference between a cow and a horse so difficult?’1 Such comments 
reflect associations with both excessive and ineptly enforced regulation.   
 My research engages directly with the challenge that a transnational regulator 
faces in establishing a credible and durable form of regulatory legitimacy. That the 
legitimacy of the system to which the regulator belongs is contestable makes it 
doubly difficult as a challenge. Legitimacy enquiries in the EU, often framed in 
terms of European governance issues, are legion, with well-known origins. The post-
Maastricht accretion of European powers and the proliferation of European 
regulation have furnished much fuel with which to flame the fires of the debates on 
an EU ‘democratic deficit’ and a so-called ‘regulatory state’. The political choice of 
retaining a set of non-majoritarian institutions and practices, while enlarging the 
supranationality and constitutional features of the Union, continues to produce a 
flourishing set of legitimacy discourses in which empirical and normative arguments 
have thrived.2 
                                                
1 A Higgins, ‘Recipe for Divided Europe: Add Horse, then Stir’ New York Times (10 March 2013) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/europe/recipe-for-divided-europe-add-horse-then-
stir.html?pagewanted=all> accessed 12 March 2013. 
2 Eg A Jordon, ‘The European Union: An Evolving System of Multi-level Governance….or 
Government?’ (2001) 29 Policy & Politics 193-208; R Bellamy, ‘Still in Deficit:  Rights, Regulation 
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 This thesis does not engage with ‘regime legitimacy’, but nor does it dismiss 
the question of a democratic deficit as one of insignificance. That issue cannot be 
addressed or resolved within a regulatory analysis. Moreover, there is no consensus 
on how the resolution of such a democratic deficit should be framed.3 The particular 
institutional practices with which the present analysis is concerned relate to 
regulatory governance i.e. the manner in which delegated regulatory powers are 
exercised by the European Commission (Commission). This is an under-examined 
but important part of the broader governance debate about the Union.  
 No single framing of EU legitimacy has yet proven normatively convincing. 
Regulatory governance as a formal EU policy emerged as an institutional response to 
the culmination of a series of crises (for the Commission and the Union) as well as 
political developments.4 The Commission’s response to its legitimacy crisis was to 
embrace regulatory governance as one tool among several to restore confidence in 
                                                                                                                                     
and Democracy in the EU’ (2006) 12 ELJ 725; L Conant, ‘Review Article: The Politics of Legal 
Integration’ (2000) 45 JCMS 45-66; A Follesdal and S Hix, ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the 
EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’ (2006) 44 JCMS 533; F Scharpf, Governing in Europe 
Effective and Democratic? (OUP 1989); G Majone, ‘Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: The Question of 
Standards’ (1998) 4 ELJ 5; D Coen and M Thatcher, ‘The New Governance of Markets and Non-
Majoritarian Regulators’ (2005) 18 Governance 329. 
3 The EU’s legitimacy ‘deficit’ can broadly be identified within two dimensions, even if these 
framings are contestable: first, a legitimacy ‘deficit’ in the EU’s ‘constitutional’ character is 
associated with the extensive nature of the delegated powers enjoyed by European institutions with 
the ‘constitutionalized’ legal effects of the European legal order. On this topic, the scholarship is vast, 
with little consensus. The following offer some indication of the variety of approach.  N Walker, 
‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies 519; K Lenaerts, 
‘Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism’ (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 205; J Shaw, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union’ (1999) 6 JEPP 579; P 
Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union’ (2001) 7 ELJ 125; JHH Weiler, 
‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?: Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision’ (1995) 1 
Yale LJ 219. The second deficit can be found in the absence of a recognizable form of democratic 
governance embodying the principle of the equality of citizens, rather than an equality of states, the 
latter of which characterizes an international or intergovernmental organization. A lack of 
reconciliation between the two principles has been highlighted as a structural element of the 
democratic deficit. See, eg I Pernice and K Pistor, ‘Institutional Settlements for an Enlarged European 
Union’ in GA Bermann and K Pistor, Law and Governance in an Enlarged European Union: Essays 
in European Law (Hart Publishing 2004). In a ruling on the constitutionality of the German act 
ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, the Second Senate of the German Constitutional Court referred explicitly 
to the ‘structural problem of the European Union‘, and highlighted the tension inherent in the 
principles of equality of states and equality of citizens reflected in the current composition of the EU. 
See the press release 72/2009 of 30 June 2009 of the Federal Constitutional Court anouncing the 
judgment of the same date of cases 
<http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg09-072en.html> accessed 3 
March 2013. 
4 The resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 was only one high-profile crisis of the relevant 
period.  Others concerned recurrent food scandals within the EU and refusal by some Member State 
governments to lift their bans on the import of British beef.  See G Majone, ‘The Credibility Crisis of 
Community Regulation’ (2000) 38 JCMS 273.   
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the EU institutions. Thus, regulatory governance needs to be seen as a tool of choice. 
Using a normative framing, I examine whether the legitimacy of the Commission as 
a regulator can be established using a constructed analytical model of normative 
regulatory governance. 
 Regulatory governance scholarship in the EU can fairly be described as a 
‘growth industry’. Political scientists, economists, sociologists and jurists all offer an 
interesting and illuminating explanation or analysis of the growth of governance 
practices and mechanisms in the EU. The ever-present problem of the ‘democratic 
deficit’ is a constant element of consideration, analysis or relevance. If the 
scholarship has already provided rich and diverse analyses of twenty-first century 
EU governance, then what is the added value of another? My claim is that very few 
existing analyses have tried to find a way of seeing if the regulation is any good or, 
in the terms of my research, have examined the issue of regulatory legitimacy within 
a framing of normative regulatory governance. 
With the creation of numerous regulatory agencies and supranational 
networks of regulators, and the delegation to the EU of greater regulatory authority, 
the EU has become a regulatory titan. This carries a politically loaded message of 
inefficient bureaucracy (‘eurocrats’) failing to focus on the essentials, a notion that 
the UK Prime Minister channeled to controversial effect in a speech at Bloomberg on 
the future of the UK in the EU in January 2013:  
I want us to be pushing to exempt Europe’s smallest 
entrepreneurial companies from more EU Directives. These should 
be the tasks that get European officials up in the morning – and 
keep them working late into the night. And so we urgently need to 
address the sclerotic, ineffective decision making that is holding us 
back.5 
The value of the research is found in the need to find responses to the challenges 
facing the Commission in exercising its regulatory powers for the valid purpose of 
discharging its Treaty remit. 
                                                
5  D Cameron, ‘EU Speech at Bloomberg’ (23 January 2013) 




Methodology and Research Questions 
The present research separates the ongoing discourse, on whether and what kind of 
legitimacy deficit afflicts the EU, from an enquiry into whether the legitimacy gap in 
the EU regulatory regime can be bridged in theory by recourse to the mechanism of 
regulatory governance, specifically by using normatively defined governance criteria 
as a proxy for the legitimacy gap resulting from non-democratic regulatory 
processes. The thesis is a discourse on the legitimacy of EU and wider transnational 
regulatory governance through the lens of a specific case study. I construct from the 
theoretical literature a series of normative benchmarks of legitimacy in the context of 
regulatory activism against which the EU approach can be assessed and I select 
telecommunications as the case study to which I apply these normative tests of 
legitimacy in order to generate conclusions from that in-depth exploration. 
 Using my model, I evaluate the regulatory legitimacy of EU 
telecommunications regulation from 1987 to 2010. Telecommunications regulation 
offers a lengthy period in which European regulation was developed, proposed, 
adopted, implemented and refined, thus reflecting several regulatory cycles and 
providing an empirical basis for a comparative evaluation of the evolution of 
regulatory governance in the EU. Telecommunications is a technology that scales 
well beyond the territory of a single Member State thus supporting the case, prima 
facie, for a European level regulatory regime. But it is also a sector where technology 
can outpace the regulators. Pressures from impulsion of technology can pressure the 
Commission to react rapidly in order to adapt to the pace of technological 
development, which engenders the risk of impairing the quality of regulatory 
governance. Furthermore, this is a sector where technological expertise is crucial. 
This makes it particularly challenging for regulators to get substantive decisions right 
or even to understand the premises underpinning the choices they can make.   
 I used a documentary method for the case study, which means that I 
examined and analyzed the relevant documents published by the European 
institutions, especially the Commission, that relate to the policy development and 
adoption processes at European level. Given the voluminous materials published by 
the EU institutions on issues of electronic communications, some selectivity was 
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used for economy of focus.  The analysis offers a basis on which to draw conclusions 
about the link between regulatory governance and legitimacy.  
 For the narrow premise that all economic regulation requires a robust form of 
normative justification, I theorize that an appropriate evaluative model of regulatory 
governance could be an effective tool in constructing and defending the 
supranational regulatory legitimacy of the Commission on an ongoing basis case-by-
case. A regulator's legitimacy is never definitive but must be demonstrated 
systematically. While national regulators typically face independent mechanisms of 
accountability, the Commission is not subject to meaningful evaluations of its 
performance as a regulator, nor are the regulatory assessments that are carried out by 
the Commission itself subject to authoritative or independent verification. 
The question of whether the adoption of qualitative regulatory practices can 
enhance the supranational regulatory legitimacy of the European Commission has 
been under-examined in the literature. The idea of qualitative regulatory governance 
is not new. Ample literature exists on why governments regulate. But one size does 
not fit all. Nor can different models be compatibly combined. I construct an 
analytical model that draws upon governance methods often used in national 
contexts of delegation, as well as research on transnational regulators, and adapt the 
meaning of the qualitative value of these criteria to the supranational context, such as 
the meaning of a normative regulatory mandate. The research thus examines several 
related questions. The primary question is:   
1. Can a regulatory governance model be constructed for a   
 transnational regulator that reflects criteria and values bearing  
 primarily upon legitimacy so as to constitute a meaningful   
 alternative to democratic forms of accountability?  
 
Secondary questions are: 
2. Could such a model be based on criteria found in national   
 regulatory systems? 
3. Does the Commission's regulatory governance policy, or do two  
 models found in the literature, offer a meaningful alternative  
 basis for assessing regulatory legitimacy? 
4. Does an analysis of the regulatory governance practices in a  
 selected sector over a 20 year period, using the constructed   
 regulatory governance model, provide a basis on which to draw  
 meaningful conclusions about the normativity of the regulatory  






There is a general consensus that the Commission’s prerogative to propose 
legislation for the internal market broadly shapes the form and content of the 
measures adopted. Chapter 1 sets the stage by defining the context of analysis, and 
defining the principal terms used in the analysis. These are EU supranational 
regulatory governance; normative regulatory legitimacy; and negative and positive 
integration measures.  
 In the 2000s, the Commission adopted modern techniques of policy 
development, associated with good governance, and these are examined in Chapter 2. 
Given the well-established track record of using regulatory governance techniques in 
most OECD countries, the Commission's ‘Damascus moment’ came surprisingly 
late. Before the programs on ‘better regulation’ and ‘smart regulation’ were adopted, 
the Commission enjoyed considerable discretion in how it consulted on policy 
proposals and ideas, gathered and evaluated evidence, developed policy measures, 
chose regulatory instruments, adopted draft legislation and coordinated with Council 
and Parliament. All of these aspects of its regulatory roles are now covered by 
specific governance measures that are intended to deliver high quality regulatory 
measures. So it is opportune to take stock of the contribution of regulatory 
governance to legitimacy.  
The Commission documents never use the word ‘legitimacy’ in the context of 
improving the quality of regulatory measures. This is surprising for three reasons. 
First, good governance is positively associated with regulatory legitimacy and offers 
a basis for the Commission purposively to construct its institutional legitimacy as a 
regulator without detracting from the legitimacy of other institutions. Secondly, it is 
surprising because the purposive approach of the present research can be used 
without any changes to the institutional powers of the institutions as currently 
constituted. That means that linking good governance with regulatory legitimacy 
need not raise any political hackles and can be presented simply as a matter of good 
administrative practice if that is more politically palatable. Third, using good 
regulatory governance as a basis for establishing that the Commission’s exercise of 
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its regulatory powers for the single market is a defensible discharge of its remit need 
not use the politically contentious notions of input and output legitimacy as such. 
Input legitimacy is by definition not currently capable of being claimed in any form 
by the EU, because of the very limited role that direct elections have on the policy 
choices of the institutions. Output legitimacy is much more flexible and carries 
notions of legitimacy that do not require democratic institutional forms and 
participation in order to be deemed valid. However, on its own, output legitimacy is 
insufficient to establish a normative form of legitimacy. Other values need to be 
present. Otherwise, a harsh, inefficient and unfair set of rules could be justified by 
reference to the outcomes they produce and that is certainly not normative enough as 
a basis for supranational regulation.  
Chapter 2 also examines the role of the Commission as a pro-active regulator 
which began in earnest with the ‘the 1992 Programme’. The chapter follows the 
evolution of the Commission’s regulatory role from its modest beginnings into its 
current form as a regulatory titan. The chapter examines regulatory governance 
theories to lay the groundwork for a constructed analytical model. The chapter also 
highlights scholarship on transgovernmental regulation, legitimacy and governance 
and analyzes its relevance to the research. The theories of two noted scholars on EU 
regulatory legitimacy, Majone and Scharpf, contribute theoretical aspects to be used 
to compare their analysis with the constructed model to identify different analytical 
outcomes. Chapter 2 sets out their premises and contentions.  
Chapter 3 briefly examines and analyzes the EU’s own ‘governance turn’ in 
2001 with the adoption of a White Paper on Governance. By concentrating on 
ensuring and improving communication between the private sector and EU 
institutions, while strengthening the ‘Community method’, the White Paper gave 
little indication that the Commission would shortly thereafter adopt robust regulatory 
design tools. As such, the White Paper offered little for a normative analytical model 
of regulatory legitimacy. It is notable that the criteria that were included in the 
formal governance policy of the EU, although broadly those found in regulatory 
governance scholarship or national models (such as accountability, expertise and 
openness) largely lacked meaningful operational content. The chapter then constructs 
an analytical model that draws upon scholarship on national regulatory systems as 
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well as on some of the framings found in the scholarship on international regulatory 
governance, which is an area of considerable current research. The criteria selected 
are: (1) a valid regulatory mandate: (2) appropriate regulatory expertise; (3) 
regulatory efficiency; (4) procedural due process; and (5) accountability 
mechanisms.  
Chapter 4 then introduces the early trajectory of the telecommunications 
regulation which started with a big bang of liberalization in 1988 and rapidly became 
a regime of positive harmonization. During this early phase of regulation, the 
Commission adapted as a regulator, progressively by emphasizing less of its role as 
an independent enforcement authority for competition policy, and more of its role as 
an institutional partner engaged in regulatory dialogue with other institutions. This 
may have resulted from the legislative negotiations for the first harmonization 
directive as well as the level of political opposition to the direct use of Treaty 
legislative powers for liberalization. The Commission responded to the ‘Realpolitik’ 
of the times by linking telecommunications liberalization to the 1992 single market 
programme, by accepting the fait accompli of a shift in political power to the 
legislator, rather than the regulator, and by downplaying but not neglecting the role 
of a competition enforcement authority.  
More importantly, the regulatory governance of the period reflected a 
significant level of normativity, much of which could be based on the highly 
normative Treaty-based aim of establishing a single market. This appreciation 
covered both negative and positive integration measures, both of which were needed 
for the creation of the single market following the abolition of national monopolies 
and the necessity of harmonizing widely varying national regulations. The chapter 
finds a robust level of regulatory legitimacy but does not draw this conclusion on the 
basis of a single criterion. Regulatory legitimacy results from a cumulative 
appreciation of the context and policy development practices. The evaluation of a 
specific factual and legal regulatory context will vary from context to context, which 
underscores the point that legitimacy is a matter of degree and appreciation using the 
criteria in combination.  
Chapter 5 covers the second regulatory cycle where regulation was 
rationalized and modernized. The Commission successfully simplified the unwieldy 
16 
 
legislation of the 1990s and introduced a regulatory principle of technological 
neutrality to reflect the growing reality of the digital world and the convergence of 
data, voice and media services. The imposition of ex ante regulatory obligations on 
undertakings shifted to a test of market power based on the notion of ‘dominance’ as 
defined in EU case law. Rather than apply rules mechanistically, national regulators 
needed to assess their national markets in order to impose obligations within their 
territories. 
The chapter shows the pitfalls confronting a regulator trying to balance 
dynamism and legal security. Undertakings in a dynamic sector should be regulated 
only when necessary, that is, when market failures are found, and regulation should 
be removed when markets are competitive. But that flexibility creates its own risks. 
The Commission recognized a need for flexibility but also for legal security. Another 
part of the problem to be addressed was the difficulty for Member States initially to 
transpose and subsequently to implement the harmonization measures in a correct 
and timely fashion. The Commission’s regulatory solution for flexibility and legal 
security was to use soft law for itself and hard law – a legally binding Commission 
veto – over national analyses. Both measures were controversial. Putting pragmatism 
aside, the chapter evaluates the normativity of important measures to find that there 
were significant weaknesses in certain areas of regulatory governance but that the 
legitimacy of the measures of modernization and rationalization was considerable. 
Here again, the aim of establishing a single market remained an important 
justification and contributed a considerable degree of normativity to the overall 
assessment.   
Chapter 6 examines the last cycle of regulatory policy development where 
significant regulatory changes were made. By this time, the sector had been 
liberalized for many years and the internet-linked economy was significant. 
Broadband services had acquired political and economic importance. Much 
regulatory analysis focused on the long-term regulatory ambition of encouraging the 
kinds of investment in infrastructure and innovation that would lead to competition 
between different networks as well as encouraging short-term low-cost market entry. 
The regulatory assessment and proposals for new legislation were accompanied by 
two impact assessments.  
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In the last cycle, an intensified centralization of ex ante procedures was 
agreed, creating bureaucratized cooperation but no additional Commission veto 
powers de jure. However, the agreed legislation blurred the line between hard law 
and soft law, by making Commission recommendations ‘binding’ on national 
regulators with no explicit provision for sanction in case of non-compliance. An 
additional burdensome ex ante obligation, that could in principle be imposed on 
undertakings in the form of functional separation, was adopted yet the rhetoric of 
withdrawing regulation persisted, as did that of transitioning from monopoly to 
competition. A formal European regulatory authority was created, with a budget of 
€4 million and a headquarters in Riga, but was given largely advisory tasks.  
The arguments in favor of these regulatory measures lacked credibility. The 
evidence base relied upon was weak, particularly for the European regulatory 
authority. The Commission had created a European Regulators Group in 2002 which 
could have performed, and had performed, an advisory role. When evaluated overall, 
the agency was meant to appear to counterbalance the additional veto powers over 
NRAs that the Commission proposed along with the regulatory authority. With the 
failure of the Commission to obtain full veto powers during legislative adoption, the 
creation of the authority should have been reconsidered but was not. An independent 
study, which concluded that the establishment of such an authority was justified, had 
relied upon highly speculative aims for the authority, contestable premises and 
unreliable, even incomplete, data. Thus the regulatory legitimacy of the latest 
generation of economic regulation in the telecommunications sector falls below an 
acceptable standard and raises questions about the correct use of regulatory 
governance measures adopted in the EU, along with questions as to the true nature of 
the trajectory that regulation is taking.  
The last regulatory cycle benefitted from an internal assessment for analytical 
quality control that was conducted by the Commission's internal examination board 
(IAB). It showed an inability to exert the kind of oversight needed. A negative 
assessment by the IAB of an analysis of legislative proposals merely provoked a 
rapidly-commissioned and executed study for the added value of a regulatory 
authority, but did nothing to make the services reconsider their substantive proposals. 
The IAB did not challenge the Commission services with a ‘prove to me that we 
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really need these specific measures using the norms laid down in the guidelines on 
conducting impact assessments’; rather, the board found that the justification for the 
proposals needed improvement.   
For as long as there is no external authority independent of the institution to 
vet the regulation in practice, the Commission will be able to prepare reports on 
implementation, control the regulatory discourse and avoid confronting a skeptical 
interlocutor. The Commission needs to be independent so that the credibility of its 
commitment to the aims of the Treaty remains robust. But the Commission also 
needs to confront real outcomes and not succumb to well-known regulators’ traps, 
which include an inability to think ‘agnostically’ outside of the existing regulatory 
configuration.  
The thesis concludes that the Commission needs to improve its quality 
control procedures in regulatory development and design. One recommendation is 
that the Commission should follow up on the tentative step taken in 2012 to develop 
an ex post mechanism for verifying and evaluating regulatory outcomes. One can 
understand that the Commission would find such a step daunting. Regulating the EU 
is one of its principal raisons d’être. But the Commission is a public body of the EU 
which is confronting unprecedented levels of loss of confidence. Whatever the 
Commission does, debates about its legitimacy will continue.  The Commission 
should enter into these debates more actively and adroitly than previously. An 
instrumental use of regulatory governance offers the Commission the opportunity to 
engage with legitimacy communities in constructing, enhancing and defending its 









Governance, Regulation, Legitimacy and the EU:  Where to Start? 
 
Introduction 
This thesis is about European legitimacy and regulatory governance. Much scholarly 
attention has been lavished on each.1 This research analyzes the link between 
regulatory governance and legitimacy in EU regulation to evaluate whether 
governance tools in the form of qualitative criteria can contribute to European 
regulatory legitimacy. Governance in this context refers to the exercise of delegated 
regulatory powers by a non-state regulator, notably the European Commission 
(Commission). The question of whether the adoption of qualitative regulatory 
                                                
1 Only a small selection of the literature in different areas can be mentioned here. See eg, L Hooghe 
and G Marks, Multi-level Governance and European Integration (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
2001); D Wincott, ‘Looking Forward or Harking Back?: The Commission and the Reform of 
Governance in the European Union’ (2001) 39 JCMS 897; U Mörth, ‘The Market Turn in EU 
Governance: The Emergence of Public–Private Collaboration’ (2009) 22 Governance 99; A Scott, 
‘The Role of Concordats in the New Governance in Britain: Taking Subsidiarity Seriously?’(2001) 5 
Edinburgh Law Review 21;  J Scott and D Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to 
Governance in the European Union’ (2002) 8 ELJ 1; C Scott, ‘Regulation in the Age of Governance: 
The Rise of the Post- Regulatory State’ in J Jordana and D Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of 
Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2004); G Marks, L Hooghe and K Blank, ‘European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. 
Multi-level Governance’ (1996) 34 JCMS 341; M Jachtenfuchs, ‘Theoretical Perspectives on 
European Governance’ (1995) 1 ELJ 115; O Trieb, ‘Implementing and Complying with EU 
Governance Outputs’ (2008) 3 Living Reviews in European Governance 5; E Hysing, ‘From 
Government to Governance?: A Comparison of Environmental Governing in Swedish Forestry and 
Transport’ (2009) 22 Governance 647; D Esty, ‘Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law’ 115 Yale LJ 1490; A Yee, ‘Cross-National Concepts in 
Supranational Governance: State–Society Relations and EU Policy Making’ (2004) 17 Governance 
487; B Finke, ‘Civil Society Participation in EU Governance’ (2007) 2 Living Reviews in European 
Governance 2; D Wincott, ‘European Political Development, Regulatory Governance, and the 
European Social Model: The Challenge of Substantive Legitimacy’ (2006) 12 ELJ 743. As a sample 
of the varied scholarship on legitimacy, see R Bellamy, ‘Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation and 
Democracy in the EU’ (2006) 12 ELJ 725; J Black, ‘Legitimacy and the Competition for Regulatory 
Share’ (2009) Law Society Economy Working Paper 14/2009, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, Law Department <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/ > accessed 12 
September 2012; D Curtin and AJ Meijer, ‘Does Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?’ (2006) 11 
Information Polity 109; A Héritier, ‘Elements of Democratic Legitimation in Europe: An Alternative 
Perspective’ (1999) 6 JEPP 269; A Moravcsik, ‘In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”:  Reassessing 
Legitimacy in the European Union’ (2002) 40 JCMS 603.  
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practices can enhance the supranational regulatory legitimacy of the Commission has 
been under-examined in the literature.  
 Using a case study from the telecommunications sector, this thesis sets out to 
conduct such an examination. Telecommunications regulation offers a relatively 
lengthy period in which European regulation was developed, proposed, adopted and 
refined, re-initiating the regulatory cycle, and thus providing a significant basis for a 
comparative evaluation of the evolution of regulatory governance in the EU. Before 
undertaking such an analysis, in the terms set out in Chapters 2 and 3, this chapter 
describes the contours of the intellectual landscape within which the research is 
conducted. A first section addresses the concept of legitimacy for a supranational 
regulator which, by definition, will never enjoy the native legitimacy of a regulator 
within a sovereign state. Thus, the kinds of legitimacy to which a non-state regulator 
could realistically aspire are explored in the first section, with the choice being made 
to use a form of normative legitimacy drawn from the scholarship. 
The range of usages for the notion of governance is addressed in the second 
section of this chapter. So many meanings have been ascribed to the concept of EU 
‘governance’ that there is a risk of confusion. In order to situate the analysis in 
context, the chapter defines EU supranational regulatory governance narrowly to 
reflect the definitional elements of (1) the exercise of regulatory powers; (2) that 
have been formally and constitutionally delegated by state actors; (3) to an unelected 
non-state actor that is institutionally distinct from any form of government.   
Thereafter, the chapter addresses the concept of regulation, another term with 
widely varied meanings. For purposes of the research, it is narrowly defined to 
reflect regulatory powers for the common market that have existed since the creation 
of the European Economic Community. Regulatory powers are key institutional 
powers of the EU, over which the Commission exerts considerable control, and are 
broadly subject to judicial oversight by the Court of Justice. Different kinds of 
regulatory measures are identified and analyzed.  
In an EU context, several under-examined aspects of EU regulation are 
important to regulatory legitimacy, one of which is the distinction between positive 
and negative harmonization measures. These are associated with different levels of 
regulatory normativity due to their impact on national policy initiatives. Thus, much 
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of the discussion in this section on regulation analyzes concepts that are not new to 
the Treaties or to EU law but uses a framework that highlights the challenges for 
supranational legitimacy in the exercise of delegated positive regulatory powers. 
These distinctive features of regulation are distinguished in order to lay the 
groundwork for an analysis of regulatory governance in the narrow context of 
positive legislative measures for the internal market, over which the Commission 
enjoys the exclusive right of initiative.   
The growth in European regulation, regulatory networks, mechanisms and 
institutions has given rise to regulatory governance issues reflected in a growing 
scholarship.2 Over the past decade, the European Commission has embraced a more 
modern approach to regulatory design that would be commonplace in the 
administrative processes of most Western countries, including the UK.3 The 
Commission relies on these new tools to make some contestable claims for its 
European regulatory role: 
The better regulation agenda has already led to a significant change in 
how the Commission makes policy and proposes to regulate. Stakeholder 
consultations and impact assessments...have increased transparency and 
accountability, and promoted evidence-based policy making.4  
 
In the twenty-first century, stakeholder consultations can hardly be considered a 
significant regulatory innovation. Moreover, the Commission has used public 
consultations since its inception and has merely relabeled them as ‘stakeholder 
consultations’.   
On the other hand, impact assessments are more recent in Europe. The 
Commission announced its intention to adopt the use of impact assessments to 
improve the ‘quality and coherence of the policy development process’ in 2002,5 
making good on its commitment to Member States to implement a series of better 
                                                
2 Such is the level of interest in governance that entire journals have been established addressing 
governance issues. See eg, Living Reviews in European Governance, 
<http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/> accessed 10 October 2012. See also Jordana and 
Levi-Faur (n 1). The scope of the literature is vast and covers legal, political, economic and social 
analyses.  
3 The UK was an early adopter of an evaluative approach to policy development in the Better 
Regulation Task Force of 1997, now the Better Regulation Commission, using five principles as a 
basis for designing policy proposals: proportionality, accountability, consistency, transparency and 
targeting. See the UK Better Regulation home page ,http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/better-
regulation/index.htm>.  
4 Commission, ‘Smart Regulation in the European Union’ (Communication) COM (2010) 543 final, 2. 
5 Commission, ‘Impact Assessment’ (Communication) COM (2002) 276 final, 2. 
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regulation principles, including a regulatory impact assessment mechanism.6 There is 
some scope for doubt as to whether the Commission has genuinely achieved the 
transparency, accountability and evidence-based policy making that it claims for its 
regulatory governance policy, although it certainly does conduct stakeholder 
consultations and impact assessments, albeit selectively. Why there may be a 
contradiction in the Commission’s assertion and the reality on the ground will be 
analyzed in this research.   
The Commission’s ‘governance turn’ began in 2001 with the adoption of the 
Governance White Paper.7 The discourse begun in the White Paper reflected an 
institutional recognition that the EU faced challenges to its legitimacy. While that 
initiative elicited considerable comment, much of which was critical, more recent, 
workmanlike, regulatory governance and design measures adopted by the European 
Commission over the past decade have elicited less comment and analysis.8  
 
1.1. Can European regulatory legitimacy be constructed? 
The factors that have given rise to a thriving legitimacy discourse in the EU have 
been well identified in the literature. Three major contributing factors can be 
identified:  (1) an erosion of the principle of strictly enumerated powers;9 (2) the 
judicial constitutionalisation of European law with parallels to the constitutional 
order of a federal state;10 and (3) a move to qualified majority voting in the 
                                                
6 ibid. 
7 Commission, ‘European Governance’ (White Paper) COM (2001) 428 final.  
8 There are a few notable exceptions, such as Radaelli. See C Radaelli, ‘Regulating Rule-making via 
Impact Assessment’ (2010) 23 Governance 89; C Radaelli, ‘Whither Better Regulation for the Lisbon 
Agenda?’ (2007) 14 JEPP 190; C Radaelli, ‘The Diffusion of Regulatory Impact Assessment – Best 
Practice or Lesson-Drawing’ (2004) 43 European Journal of Political Research 723; C Radaelli and F 
de Francesco, ‘Better Regulation and the Lisbon Agenda’ in C Radaelli and de Francesco, Regulatory 
Quality in Europe: Concepts, Measures and Policy Processes (Manchester UP 2007). See also A 
Renda, Impact Assessment in the EU-The State of the Art and the Art of the State (CEPS 2006) 
<http://www.ceps.be/book/impact-assessment-eu-state-art-and-art-state> accessed 11 
November 2012. 
9 JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale LJ 2403.   
10 Constitutionalism is the process by which European treaties evolved from a set of legal 
arrangements binding upon sovereign states, into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring 
judicially enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private.  JHH 
Weiler and JP Trachtman, ‘European Constitutionalism and Its Discontents’ (1996-97) 17 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 354, 356. For discussion and analysis, see 
generally, T Christiansen and C Reh, Constitutionalizing the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 
2009); L Dobson and A Follesdal, Political Theory and the European Constitution (Routledge 2004); 
D Grimm, ‘Treaty or Constitution?’ in E Eriksen, J Fossum, and A Menendez, Developing a 
Constitution for Europe (Routledge 2004); N Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the 
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legislative adoption procedure.11  All of these factors interact with the increase of 
formally delegated powers thus expanding the number and scope of binding 
regulatory measures.   
Some fear that competences have now been transferred to the EU beyond 
what might have been considered strictly necessary for the establishment of a 
common market.12 Even so, the establishment of an internal market remains 
important and continues to motivate many regulatory measures.13 The present 
analysis focuses on the processes involved in the current design and adaptation of 
these regulatory measures for the internal market, while recognizing that the initial 
emphasis on economic integration that epitomized the European Economic 
Community (EEC) Treaty, and whose legitimacy was unquestioned, has now been 
folded into a European Union with a rich and complex mix of economic, social, 
political and financial features.14  
The extent of changes since the founding of the EEC in the 1950s can be 
recognized in the evolution of the structures, powers and measures of supranational 
governance seen in the political, executive and judicial institutions of the Union that 
                                                                                                                                     
Problem of Translation’ in JHH Weiler and M Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the 
State (CUP 2003); P Eleftheriadis, ‘Aspects of European Constitutionalism’ (1996) 21 EL Rev 32; P 
Eleftheriadis, ‘Begging the Constitutional Question’ (1998) 36 JCMS 255. JHH Weiler, The 
Constitution of Europe (CUP 1999) 4-8; K Lenaerts and P van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the 
European Union (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004). For a particularly trenchant critique of the 
judicial approach of the European Court of Justice, see H Rasmussen, On Law and Policy at the 
European Court of Justice (Martinus Nijhoff 1986); E Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a 
Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 AJIL 1; N MacCormick, ‘Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-
sovereign State’ (1996) XLIV Political Studies 553. For the European case law that transformed the 
legal system from one based on international law to a new legal order characterised by the doctrines of 
direct effect and supremacy, see Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 (nature of Union law; rights and obligations of individuals);  Case 6/64 
Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 1251 (nature of Union law; direct applicability, primacy of Union law); 
Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891 (interpretation of 
national law in line with Union law).     
11 The initial move to qualified majority voting (QMV) took place with changes introduced by the 
Single European Act. Subsequent treaty amendments have enlarged the scope of measures that are 
adopted under QMV. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the ordinary legislature 
procedure of the Union is the co-decision procedure with QMV. See art 294 TFEU.  
12 G Majone, Regulating Europe (Routledge 1996) 61. 
13 The Single European Act included the creation of powers in the areas of social policy, 
environmental protection and foreign policy.  Beginning with the Maastricht Treaty (entry into force 
1993) and ending with the Lisbon Treaty (2009), new EU competences have been created in 
education, culture; sport; cooperation and development; employment policy; civil protection, 
humanitarian aid and public health.   
14 For a thoughtful insider’s analysis of the historical and political contexts of the Lisbon Treaty, its 
impact on the democratic framework of the EU and its provisions in relation to substantive law, with a 
legal analysis of the EU’s functions and powers as well as the treaties which govern it, see J-C Piris, 
The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (CUP 2010).  
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have been created and the shift of some political discourse from the national to the 
European level.15 Treaty amendments, including those in the Lisbon Treaty, have 
vested additional powers in the EU institutions, thus increasing the supranationality 
of the EU, yet regulatory legitimacy, among other things, remains problematic.16   
The thesis explores two questions: can a normative form of regulatory 
governance constitute a normative form of regulatory legitimacy for a supranational 
regulator that enjoys little democratic legitimacy of its own? Second, could a 
transnational or supranational regulator use governance instrumentally to bridge the 
perceived legitimacy gap of extensive regulatory powers?  I start with the theoretical 
premise that regulatory legitimacy can be examined, analyzed and evaluated through 
the normative lens of regulatory governance as defined herein.   
Numerous approaches exist in the literature as to the legal nature and 
legitimacy of transnational and supranational regulators.17 In order to situate the 
present research in the literature on legitimacy and regulatory governance, a 
definition is needed of what legitimacy represents in theoretical terms for purposes of 
this research. It also needs to be distinguished from other kinds of legitimacy 
analyses. The same will be true for the term ‘governance’ which takes many usages 
in the scholarship.18   
                                                
15 For the proposition that the national political discourse in EU Member States has moved away from 
ignorance and apathy towards greater salience of European policies and decision-making mechanisms, 
see L Hooghe and G Marks, ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive 
Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’ (2008) 39 British Journal of Political Science 6-9. This 
exposition is sociologically oriented, and focuses on identity as a constraint on integration:  ‘Our aim 
has been to draw on recent advances in the study of public opinion, political parties and identity in 
order to frame hypotheses about preferences, strategies and outcomes of regional integration.’ ibid 21. 
16 Bellamy (n 1) 725-42; Moravcsik (n 1) 603-24; D Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the 
European Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces’ (1993) 32 CMLR 17; R Dehousse, ‘Constitutional 
Reform in the European Community: Are There Alternatives to the Majoritarian Avenue?’ (1996) 
West European Politics 118; PP Craig, Democracy and Rulemaking within the EC: An Empirical and 
Normative Assessment, Jean Monnet Program, Paper 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-02.html>.   
17 The variety of theoretical framings in the legitimacy literature on supranational and transnational 
regulators is considerable.  See eg, A Follesdal and S Hix, ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the 
EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’ (2006) 44 JCMS 533; a particularly synthetic analysis of 
supranational regulation and legitimacy is found in E Randall, ‘Not that Soft or Informal: A Response 
to Eberlein and Grande’s Account of Regulatory Governance in the EU with Special Reference to the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)’ (2006) 13 JEPP 402-19; Weiler challenges some of the 
implicit assumptions of supranational legitimacy within the post-Maastricht EU in JHH Weiler, ‘Does 
Europe Need a Constitution?: Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision’ (1995) 1 Yale LJ 
219. 
18 For an introduction to the different meanings and modes that European governance may take, see R 
Eising and B Kohler-Koch (eds), The Transformation of European Governance in the European 
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1.1.2. Disentangling the legitimacies 
As a concept, legitimacy has both sociological and normative dimensions.19 
Normatively, it has constitutional (legal) and political (democratic) dimensions.20 
These dimensions need not co-exist. Normative legitimacy refers to whether a claim 
of authority is well-founded, by reference to an acceptable normative basis usually 
involving one or more criteria.21 Legitimacy based on normative factors is generally 
a determination in an impartial or logical sense, and as such it has an evaluative 
dimension. This is the analytical underpinning of the approach of the present 
research. 
Normative theories of legitimacy attempt to specify what normative factors 
may serve to support claims of authority. Constitutional claims refer to compliance 
with written norms, conformity with constitutional principles and respect for legal 
values of procedural justice.22  This basis of legitimacy has also been described as 
‘formal’ in the sense that all of the requirements of the law have been observed in the 
creation of the system, thus making it similar conceptually to the juridical concept of 
formal validity.23 Social legitimacy is a broad empirical acceptance of a system by 
the society to which it is addressed.24 Social legitimacy for a system or process may 
arise even if no claims of authority are made.25 Claims for social legitimacy can be 
made but will be contestable.26 When claims of authority are successful, the resulting 
general acceptance is an uncoerced social, empirical and cultural outcome.27 The 
                                                                                                                                     
Union (Routledge 2005).  
19 Sociological dimensions relate to social factors that induce a willingness to accord or acknowledge 
a legitimacy claim. See J Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in 
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 137. Normative dimensions 
relate to formal factors that logically induce a willingness to accept legitimacy claims. See D 
Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 AJIL 596-624. 
20 Black (n 19) 145. 
21 Bodansky (n 19) 601. 
22 Black (n 19) 145-46. 
23 Weiler (n 10) 80. 
24 ‘Legitimacy means social credibility and acceptability...within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values beliefs and definitions.’ Black (n 19) 144. 
25 Those accustomed to the spontaneous and orderly process of queue-forming in the UK quickly learn 
that this widely practiced custom is far from the norm outside of the country.   
26 Black (n 19) 144. 
27 See eg, Black (n 19) 137-164; see also Bodansky (n 19) 600; TM Franck, The Power of Legitimacy 
among Nations (OUP 1990) 24. Weiler limits legitimacy to two types, formal and social. See Weiler 
(n 10) 80. 
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analysis of the Governance White Paper of 2001 in Chapter 3 reveals that the initial 
aspiration of the Commission concentrated mainly on this form of legitimacy. 
Democratic claims of legitimacy rely on satisfaction of some model of 
democracy, whether representative, participative or deliberative.28 This basis of 
legitimacy is central to the model of Scharpf that will be examined in Chapter 2, but 
it is not the exclusive basis. Scharpf also acknowledged output legitimacy, or 
legitimacy achieved by results, to be a valid basis for claims to legitimacy, but only 
in limited circumstances. I analyze this further in Chapter 2. In sociological analyses, 
functional claims of legitimacy are also called ‘output legitimacy’, and likewise are 
based on claims by reference to the results of the activities engaged in by the 
regulatory authority, making them empirical.29  This aspect of legitimacy claims is 
central to the economic model of Majone examined in Chapter 2 which conveys 
legitimacy beyond the limits imposed by Scharpf’s model.  
 
1.1.3. Input and output legitimacy  
Exercising governmental powers and public authority finds its legitimacy in the 
democratic theory of consent of the governed.30 Democratic self-determination 
requires that political choices should be based on the ‘authentic’ preferences of 
citizens.31 A chain of accountability between those governing and those governed 
                                                
28 F Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic (OUP 1999) 6-23; TM Franck, ‘The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AJIL 46-91; E Stein, ‘International Integration 
and Democracy: No Love at First Sight’ (2001) 95 AJIL 489-534. 
29 G Majone, ‘Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: A Question of Standards’ (1998) 4 ELJ 28; Scharpf (n 
28) 10-12; Black (n 19) 145-46. 
30 ‘…the consent of the people…is the only lawful basis for government.’ J Locke, Second Treatise of 
Government, Preface to ch 1. Within this general proposition, there is considerable disagreement as to 
the normativity of various forms of democratic governance, and the relationship of politics to law and 
of legitimate use of sovereign power.  See, for a discussion of liberal versus republican 
constitutionalism, eg, A Tomkins, ‘In Defense of the Political Constitution’ (2002) 22 OJLS 157-75. 
His conclusions echo those of Scharpf in finding that both forms of constitutionalism attempt to 
secure responsible (normative) government.  One approach characterizes the relationship between 
governed and governors as one of contract, the nature and terms of which are enforced by the 
judiciary; the other as a relationship of trust where those who occupy positions of power must be 
subjected to the processes of political scrutiny.   
31 A Menon and S Weatherill, ‘Legitimacy, Accountability, and Delegation in the European Union’ in 
A Arnull and D Wincott (eds), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (OUP 2003) 
115; Scharpf (n 28) 6. 
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gives rise to government by the people and thus, in democratic theory, to input 
legitimacy.32   
Since purely majoritarian governments give rise to normative problems of 
‘tyranny of the majority’, a second form of normative legitimacy, that of outcome or 
output legitimacy,33 complements the former, in order to satisfy the democratic 
requirement of government ‘for the people’.34  When a democratically elected 
government delegates powers to a national regulator for the purpose of applying 
statutory regulation, normative criticisms focus on public accountability, because of 
the loss of the traditional constitutional framework of controls, checks and balances 
between institutions of government.35  Empirical criticism of regulation has focused 
on its failure to achieve its regulatory objectives and thus its failure to satisfy the 
wider social interests at stake.36  
Much of the literature on regulatory legitimacy uses terms such as 
‘successful’ or ‘good’ or ‘effective’ as a basis for evaluation.37 Different strands of 
output legitimacy theory locate the validity of creating and exercising public 
regulatory authority in the democratic means by which regulatory authority is 
created, the conditions under which and by whom it is applied, and the results of 
regulation.38 In Chapter 2, I will revisit some of the normative issues associated with 
input and output legitimacy in a discussion of the theories of Majone and Scharpf. 
                                                
32 ibid.  See also eg, S Smismans (ed), Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2006) 290-300; A Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
(Macmillan Publishers 1902) 214.  
33 Menon and Weatherill (n 31) 115; Scharpf (n 28) 6.   
34 Scharpf (n 28). 
35 Majone (n 12) 284; C Veljanovski, ‘The Regulation Game’ in C Veljanovski (ed), Regulators and 
the Market (Institute of Economic Affairs 1991) 16. Delegation in accordance with constitutional and 
legal requirements was challenged as such for undermining the democratic process in three ways:  (1) 
by the act of delegating powers from accountable branches of government to national regulators; (2) 
by the absence of any form of public accountability of regulators; and (3) by the impairment of public 
welfare resulting from uncoordinated action by different regulators.    
36 See eg, RC Felleth, The Interstate Commerce Omission: The Public Interest and the ICC 
(Grossman 1970); J Turner, The Chemical Feast (Grossman 1970); MJ Green (ed), The Monopoly 
Makers (Grossman 1973); JR Michael (ed), Working on the System: A Comprehensive Manual for 
Citizen Access to Federal Agencies (Basic Books 1974),.  See also The President’s Advisory Council 
on Executive Organization, A New Regulatory Framework: Report on Selected Independent 
Regulatory Agencies [The Ash Council Report] (Government Printing Office [Washington DC] 1971) 
<http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/search/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_Sear
chValue_0=ED058086&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=ED058086>. 
37 R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (OUP 1999) 76. 
38 Consistent normative issues found in the literature address the origin and development of 
regulation; reform of regulation; the standards of regulation; what body chooses the rules; 
enforcement; styles of regulation; accountability and measurement.  See eg, R Baldwin, C Scott and C 
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In light of experience in US regulation in the first half of the twentieth century, 
some authors began to criticize not only the theoretical, democratic, objections to 
delegation but also the economic inefficiency of regulatory regimes.39 As to the 
democratic critique, some scholarship called into question the premise that national 
governmental legitimacy necessitated both input and output legitimacy for all 
regulatory activities. Other empirical scholarship concluded that majoritarian 
government was not a prerequisite to regulatory legitimacy.40 These normative and 
empirical arguments influenced the development of alternative framings of what is 
capable of constituting acceptable normative regulatory legitimacy.  
Different approaches using different theoretical preconditions for legitimacy 
allow different normative propositions about the legitimacy of non-majoritarianism 
as a principle to be advanced. This, alongside the empirical finding that genuine and 
pure majoritarian democracy is the exception rather than the rule, highlights two 
conclusions: not only are legitimacy claims for purely majoritarian models of 
governance contentious, but also that legitimacy and democracy are not normatively 
the same concepts.41 If the theoretical premise, that legitimacy requires that there 
must be electoral (majoritarian) control over both ex ante and ex post regulatory 
activities, is not well-grounded, then different models of regulatory legitimacy can be 
developed, using different framings of input and output legitimacy, within regulatory 
governance theory. 
	  
1.1.4 The legitimacies of transnational regulators: narrowing the focus 
Transnational regulators typically rely on arguments based on international law for 
their legitimacy, pointing to state consent and legality.42 Their claims are supported 
                                                                                                                                     
Hood (eds), A Reader on Regulation (OUP 1998) 8.   
39 RB Horwitz, The Irony of Regulatory Reform (OUP 1989) 27. 
40 ‘Every advocate of democracy…and every friendly definition of it, includes the idea of restraints on 
majorities.’ R Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago UP 1956) 36. In a 1988 study of 
twenty five North American, European and southern hemisphere democracies, only two (New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom) were found to be ‘mainly’ but not ‘pure’ majoritarian democracies. 
A Lijphart, ‘Majority Rule in Theory and Practice: The Tenacity of a Flawed Paradigm’ (1991) 129 
International Social Science Journal 488. The discussion here is necessarily compressed for economy 
of focus.  
41 For the proposition that democracy and legitimacy are conceptually distinct, see Weiler (n 10) 79. 
42 Bodansky (n 19) 600; also Weiler (n 10) 80.  Weiler observed that the foundation of the EU system 
rests on the formal approval by democratically elected parliaments in Member States but it still suffers 
from a weakness of legitimacy because of the undemocratic ways in which powers are exercised 
within the system.  
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by arguments of inter-governmentalism.43 However, when the boundaries between 
international law and domestic law are blurred, as in the EU, claims for legitimacy 
based on state consent and legality are debatable.44 From a pluralistic perspective, the 
EU is simply one of many transnational arrangements that have been constructed as 
cooperative responses to common problems or norm conflicts that cannot be dealt 
with effectively at national level.45 In effect, these multi-state systems constitute 
transnational regulatory regimes and, as such, they face legitimacy challenges to 
their regulatory powers, but they do not all embody the same organizational goals. 
This distinguishes other regimes from the EU.   
Uniquely, the EU aspires to, in an open-ended manner, something 
qualitatively beyond a transgovernmental regulatory governance system found in 
international law.46 With such seemingly unbounded goals as reflected in the 
Preamble to the Treaty on European Union,47 arguments about transnational 
legitimacy that rely on an interpretation of state consent theory under international 
law carry only limited normative weight. But such arguments address foundational 
issues of whether the existence of such a supranational system is legitimate. The 
issue of whether an institution such as the Commission is legitimately exercising the 
delegated regulatory powers with which it has been endowed is a different analysis, 
and even less is it an analysis of whether the Commission is appropriately  
exercising its regulatory powers to facilitate the internal market relative to achieving 
objectives.  
While it is based on, inter alia, the values of democracy,48 the EU does not 
claim to constitute a recognized form of democracy and thus to enjoy legitimacy on 
                                                
43 ‘The basic claim...is that the EC can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed 
to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination.’ A Moravcsik, 
‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’ 
(1993) 31 JCMS 474. 
44 Scharpf (n 28) 6-23; Weiler (n 10) 80. 
45 TA Aleinikoff, ‘Transnational Spaces: Norms and Legitimacy’ (2008) 33 Yale JIL 488. 
46 Art 3 TEU reads in part:  ‘[The Union shall]…promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, 
and solidarity among Member States.…’ 
47 ‘Resolved to mark a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the 
establishment of the European Communities.’ 
48 Art 2 TEU reads:  The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which 




that basis. However, democratic values are relevant to any regulator, whether 
national, transnational or supranational. Regulation here is an activity carried out 
under public authority, whether directly or indirectly, and whether carried out by a 
national or a transnational regulator, thereby engaging the political issues related to 
the legitimate exercise of power. In democratic theory the legitimate exercise of 
power should be subject to some form of control by the society that is governed. 
Where a regulator is not subject to the political process in some form or another or to 
some form of electoral or political oversight, other mechanisms must be present in 
order to render the exercise of delegated regulatory power legitimate. I return to the 
values inherent in democratic systems of regulation in Chapter 3 because these are 
relevant to the regulatory governance model constructed there. 
The present research is not the first attempt at framing an analysis of regulatory 
legitimacy. In Chapter 2, the theories of two scholars who have written extensively 
on their approach to regulatory legitimacy are analyzed for their relevance to the 
regulatory governance model used in the case study.  
 
1.1.5 What's the problem with legitimacy? 
According to some authors, a legitimacy deficit can be discerned in how the 
Commission has exercised the powers conferred by the Treaties, in effectively 
creating something that resembles a ‘regulatory state’.49 An analysis of the 
legitimacy of the Commission as a regulator differs from the question of whether the 
conferral of extensive supranational competences in overall terms is legitimate. The 
concern about an overall EU ‘democratic deficit’ forms part of broader constitutional 
questions on which the scholarship significantly diverges.50 
                                                
49 The seminal article was that of G Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’ (1994) West 
European Politics 77. His was followed by others. See eg, F McGowan and H Wallace, ‘Towards a 
European Regulatory State’ (1996) 3 JEPP 560; B Eberlein and E Grande, ‘Beyond Delegation: 
Transnational Regulatory Regimes and the EU Regulatory State’ (2005) 12 JEPP 89. Lodge captures 
the institutionalist and political aspects of the overall ‘rise’ of European regulation but finds that the 
nation-state is alive and well, in M Lodge, ‘Regulation, the Regulatory State and European Politics’ 
(2008) 31 West European Politics 280. Some commentators argue that a regulatory state in the EU is 
inevitable, given the resources and powers conferred on the EU institutions. See eg, Majone (n 12) 64-
66. That the European Union is not a state is a self-evident proposition. Calling it a regulatory state 
conveys the idea that EU regulation is overly intrusive.  
50 See eg, JHH Weiler and J P Trachtman, ‘European Constitutionalism and Its Discontents’ (1996-
1997) 17 Northwestern Journal of Law and Business 354; Follesdal and Hix (n 17); K Featherstone, 
‘Jean Monnet and the “Democratic Deficit” in the European Union’ (1994) JCMS 149; C Lord, A 
Democratic Audit of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2004); A Moravscik, ‘Is there a 
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The legitimacy examined in this thesis is relatively simple and 
straightforward: the legitimacy of the Commission as a regulator when exercising its 
Treaty-created powers to propose legislation for the internal market, using a case 
study in the area of telecommunications regulation. Some analysis of the 
Commission as an enforcement authority for negative integration measures 
(liberalization) is useful to reveal the relative differences in two kinds of measures 
and the differences in achieving normative legitimacy for the former. As a 
preparatory step to analyzing regulatory legitimacy, an appreciation of the analytical 
focus of the research provides a grounding for understanding the concept of the 
legitimate exercise of duly delegated powers and how that can be constructed or 
enhanced. This thesis does not dismiss the question of the existence of a democratic 
deficit as one of insignificance. That issue cannot be addressed or resolved within a 
regulatory analysis, nor is there any consensus on how the resolution of such a 
democratic deficit should be framed.51 The particular institutional practices with 
which the analysis is concerned relate to normative regulatory governance and its 
effect on the legitimacy of the Commission as a regulator, which is an under-
examined but important part of the broader governance debate about the Union.   
 
1.2. Governance 
To distinguish the meaning from other framings in the scholarship, the term 
‘governance’ is used here to describe (1) the exercise of regulatory powers; (2) that 
have been legally delegated by sovereign states;  (3) to an unelected, non-state, 
institution that is formally separate from any form of government.52 My focus is on 
                                                                                                                                     
“Democratic Deficit” in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis’ (2004) 39 Government and 
Opposition 336; C Crombez, ‘The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much Ado About 
Nothing?’ (2003) 4 European Union Politics 101. 
51 The EU’s legitimacy ‘deficit’ can broadly be identified within two dimensions, even if these 
framings are contestable: first, a legitimacy ‘deficit’ in the EU’s ‘constitutional’ character is 
associated with the extensive nature of the delegated powers enjoyed by European institutions with 
the ‘constitutionalized’ legal effects of the European legal order. On this topic, the scholarship is vast, 
with little consensus. The following offer some indication of the variety of approach.  N Walker, 
‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies 519; K Lenaerts, 
‘Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism’ (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 205; J Shaw, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union’ (1999) 6 JEPP 579; P 
Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union’ (2001) 7 ELJ 125; Weiler (n 17). 
52 There is no agreed framing in the scholarship on a definition of governance.  Frequent references 
are made to ‘modes’ of governance, such as statism, corporatism, pluralism and network governance. 
A generic definition might be ‘governance is the structured ways and means in which the divergent 
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the manner in which such regulatory powers are exercised by the Commission as a 
supranational regulator in relation to economic market regulation, which plays a 
central role in regulating the internal market. The ‘establishment and functioning of 
the internal market’ language found initially in the Treaty of Rome53 remains a 
principal aim of the EU Treaties.54  Regulating markets, inter alia, has come to be 
known as ‘governance’.55   
Using this definition, market regulation is a governance activity. The governance 
practices to be examined in the case study focus on the range of regulatory practices 
related to policy formation, proposal and adoption for purposes of the internal 
market. An ample literature has developed on post-adoption aspects of regulatory 
governance in the EU, which is not examined here.56 In regulatory scholarship, the 
regulatory process can be disaggregated into policy stages and examined using 
                                                                                                                                     
preferences of inter-dependent actors are slated into policy choices to allocate values, so that the 
plurality of interests is transformed into coordinated action and compliance of actors is achieved’. See 
B Kohler-Koch and R Eising, The Evolution and Transformation of Governance in the European 
Union (Routledge 1999) 5. 
53 Art 100 of the Treaty of Rome reads as follows: ‘The Council shall, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission, issue directives for the approximation of such provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly affect the establishment or 
functioning of the common market’.  
54 Art 114 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union contains the latest version of 
the article which reads as follows: ‘The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market’. The original ‘or’ in the Treaty of Rome has been replaced with an 
‘and’. Whether this represents a substantive change is not addressed here nor does there appear to be 
much analysis of the change.  
55 Governance can refer, eg, to the act of governing; to the managerial processes for guiding a 
business, ie corporate governance; to the formal and informal relationships and processes between 
states, organisations, markets and citizens, ie global governance.  Other meanings exist. See eg, JN 
Rosenau, ‘Toward an Ontology for Global Governance’ in M Hewson and T Sinclair (eds), 
Approaches to Global Governance Theory (SUNY Press 1999).  
56 M Thatcher, ‘The Creation of European Regulatory Agencies and its Limits: A Comparative 
Analysis of European Delegation’ (2011) 18 JEPP 790; H Hofman, ‘Legislation, Delegation and 
Implementation Under the Treaty of Lisbon: Typology Meets Reality’ (2009) 15 ELJ 482; J Blom-
Hansen, ‘The Origins of the EU Comitology System: A Case of Informal Agenda-Setting by the 
Commission’ (2008) 15 JEPP 208, 217; A Ogus, ‘Better Regulation - Better Enforcement’ in S 
Weatherill (ed), Better Regulation (OUP 2007) 107-22; F Vibert, ‘Better Regulation and the Role of 
Agencies’ in S Wetherill (ed), Better Regulation (OUP 2007) 387-404; EO Eriksen, ‘Governance 
between Expertise and Democracy: The Case of European Security’ (2011) 18 JEPP 1169; S Wilks, 
‘Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization 
of Competition Policy?’ (2005) 18 Governance 431; M Flinders, ‘Distributed Public Governance in 
the European Union’ (2004) 11 JEPP 520; M Rhinard, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of the European 
Union Committee System’ (2002) 15 Governance 185; K Armstrong and S Bulmer, The Governance 
of the Single European Market (Manchester UP 1998) 255-74; Kohler-Koch and Eising (n 52).  
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different analytical framings.57 Increasing criticism of the past few decades has 
highlighted the contestability of international and supranational governance,58 the 
latter of which some regard as a significant aspect of the EU’s general decision-
making and policy-development activities.59 
The Commission began to engage directly with regulatory governance in a 
2001 White Paper in which it adopted a formal regulatory governance policy for the 
EU.60 It remains active in regulatory governance terms.61 From 2002, new 
governance practices were adopted and existing regulatory practices were revised 
thus implementing many of the recommendations of the 2001 Mandelkern Report.62 
Such regulatory design tools are meant to improve the quality of European regulation 
and to simplify existing regulation.  
Western countries in the latter part of the twentieth century experienced a 
significant growth in both domestic and transnational regulatory regimes, which 
created concerns about governance without government, and problems of legitimacy 
                                                
57 For a flavour of the arguments on institutional arrangements for policy formation see Majone, (n 
29) and Scharpf (n 28) ch 2. For an interest-based state-centred analysis see A Moravcsik and F 
Schimmelfenning, ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’ in A Wiener and T Diez (eds), European 
Integration Theory (OUP 2009) 67; for an analysis that challenges both Majone and Moravcsik’s 
treatments of democracy, efficiency, welfare and citizenship see Wincott (n 1). At the opposite end of 
the regulatory spectrum, for a normative analysis of the system of ‘comitology’ committees that 
advise and supervise the Commission’s exercise of delegated powers see Rhinard (n 56). For a recent 
synthesis of the governance consequences of European agency formation, including normative 
assessments of legitimacy and accountability, see B Rittberger and A Wonka, ‘Introduction: Agency 
Governance in the European Union’ (2011) 18 JEPP 780.  All of these contain extensive references to 
the scholarship.      
58 For a variation of legitimacy challenges and framings, see eg, Bodansky (n 19) 596; Scharpf (n 28); 
Follesdal and Hix (n 17) 533-62; Bellamy (n 1) 725-42; Moravcsik (n 1) 603-24; C Carter and A 
Scott, ‘Legitimacy and Governance beyond the European Nation State: Conceptualising Governance 
in the European Union’ (1998) 4 ELJ 429-45.    
59 European Commission (n 7); D Coen and M Thatcher, ‘The New Governance of Markets and Non-
Majoritarian Regulators’ (2005) 18 Governance 329; Flinders (n 56) 520-44.  
60 Commission (n 7). 
61 The Commission embraced ‘better regulation’, ‘better lawmaking’ and more recently ‘smart 
regulation’, with the intention of improving the quality, clarity and intelligibility of EU rules and 
legislation. For relevant documentation see 
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm> accessed 1 October 
2012.   
62 See The Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation, Final Report (13 November 2001) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/documents/mandelkern_report.pdf
> accessed 15 August 2012. For an overview of the Commission’s better regulation agenda, see the 
key documents of the policy at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/key_docs_en.htm - _br> accessed on 
15 September 2012.  
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and authority.63 Discourses on governance emerged to conceptualize and to 
distinguish modern governance, in the context of the ‘regulatory state’ phenomenon, 
from traditional notions of government.64 Despite the modern sound of governance, 
the examination of the notions of authority, legitimacy and governance did not 
originate with the rise of the ‘regulatory state’ even if recent analysis may be more 
narrowly framed.65  The turn to regulatory governance studies reflects a desire to find 
normative analyses and explanations for regulation, particularly at regional and 
global levels. Some political science scholarship frames the enquiry as one of 
seeking normative mechanisms of accountability.66 Others seek to explain and justify 
the emergence of regulatory governance as an adjunct to the changing role and 
structures of the nation-state from exogenous factors, equating governance with the 
rise of the ‘regulatory state’ phenomenon.67 The complexity of EU governance 
discourse evolved from the initial economic and legal theories of neo-functionalism, 
‘integration through regulation’, towards analyses drawn from several social 
sciences, such as sociology, anthropology and political economics. Concepts such as 
‘poly-centric regulatory regimes’,68 ‘directly deliberative’ models69 and ‘nodal 
governance’70 have emerged to characterize multi-actor entities like the EU.   
 The Commission's response to the EU's late 20th century legitimacy crisis was 
to select regulatory governance as one tool among several to address the variety of 
challenges faced by the EU's institutions. Thus far, relatively little, and generally 
critical, scholarship has examined the institutional choice of governance to enhance 
                                                
63 Bodansky (n 19) 596. 
64 K Armstrong and S Bulmer, ‘The Governance and Regulation of the Single Market’ in The 
Governance of the Single European Market (Manchester UP 1998).    
65 The question of the legitimacy of state regulatory governance was examined in construing the 
conceptual limits of the term ‘police power’ as applied to private interests in the 19th case of Lawton v 
Steele 152 US 133 (1894) where the Court’s statement of the limits of legitimate governance remains 
a classic formulation:  ‘[t]o justify the State in… interposing its authority in [sic] behalf of the public, 
it must appear, first, that the interests of the public…require such interference; and second, that the 
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive 
upon individuals’. Latter-day students of the EU principle of proportionality will recognise this 
formulation.  
66 See eg, PJ May, ‘Regulatory Regimes and Accountability’ (2007) 1 Regulation & Governance 8. 
67 Armstrong and Bulmer (n 64).   
68 Black (n 19) 137-64.  
69 J Cohen and C Sabel, ‘Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy’ (2001) 3 EL Rev 313. 
70 C Shearing and J Wood, ‘Nodal Governance and the New “Denizens”’ (2003) 30 Journal of Law 
and Society 400. 
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the legitimacy of the EU.71 There seems to be little research that examines the still-
emerging corpus of EU regulatory governance practices within a normative framing 
of regulatory legitimacy. Political choices of the EU over the past twenty years have 
retained non-majoritarian institutions and practices at the same time as they re-
enforced the supranational and constitutional features of the Union.72 Not 
surprisingly, a flourishing set of legitimacy discourses with empirical and normative 
concerns remains.73 The challenge for the supranational regulator is clear: any 
system that is systematically confronted with legitimacy challenges will find it 
difficult to achieve its objectives. Where its objectives are not met, further challenges 
to legitimacy will continue.  
Unless the Commission can robustly establish a defensibly normative form of 
regulatory legitimacy, challenges will continue to undermine its authority. The 
Commission as a supranational regulator to date has not explicitly sought regulatory 
legitimacy via regulatory governance practices it adopted since 2001. Nonetheless, 
the present research explicitly links them by framing the enquiry in terms of whether 
the former can be constructed or enhanced by the latter. Theories of regulatory 
governance will be further explored in Chapter 2.  
2.1. Defining regulation  
Differently from many other contexts, regulation is used here in a narrow sense to 
refer primarily to European harmonizing legislation, along with the associated 
Commission measures created or authorized by such legislation, adopted under the 
Treaty for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.74 This notion of 
                                                
71 Scott and Trubek (n 1); P Magnette, ‘European Governance and Civic Participation: Can the 
European Union be Politicised?’ 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram/org/papers/01/010601.html> 3-4. 
72 After the near-failure of the Nice Treaty’s ratification, the European political response recognized 
and tried to redress the democratic deficit, in the adoption of the Charter on Fundamental Rights.  At 
the same time, it began to reform the European institutions, to demarcate EU-Member State 
competences, and to establish a constitutional convention on the future of Europe. These steps were 
separate from, but driven by, the same concerns as the launch of a formal policy on European 
governance.  See eg, G de Burca, ‘The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European 
Union (2003) 28 EL Rev 821. See also N Walker, ‘Legal Theory and the European Union: A 25th 
Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 OJLS 599.  
73 A Jordon, ‘The European Union: An Evolving System of Multi-level Governance….or 
Government?’ (2001) 29 Policy & Politics193; Bellamy (n 1) 725-42; L Conant, ‘Review Article: The 
Politics of Legal Integration’ (2000) 45 JCMS 45; Follesdal and Hix (n 17) 533-62; Scharpf (n 28); 
Majone (n 29) 5-28; Coen and Thatcher (n 59) 329-46. 
74Regulation has many meanings in the literature and it takes many forms. Even within the EU, there 
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regulation is central to the present research which analyzes the use of Commission 
powers to develop regulatory policy measures that are harmonized by European 
legislation. The legislation thus adopted is generally implemented at national level by 
national authorities. This form of measure, i.e. secondary law, is considered to be 
‘hard law’. It is legally binding and falls within the definition of ‘legal acts’ in 
Article 288 TFEU.75 Traditional literature on regulation is extensive and often 
incompatible theoretically.76 Depending on the social science concerned, the 
meaning of regulation varies from mere social conditioning to a coercive hierarchical 
‘command and control’ (C&C) behavioral control.77 Some meanings of regulation 
broadly recognize all mechanisms of social control and include social norms and the 
effects of markets in changing behaviors.78  
The notion of regulation as ‘control’ includes non-public actors.79 Private 
actors that engage in self-organized and effective self-regulatory activities, between 
other actors, with no government involvement, approval or sanction, can also be said 
to regulate.80 Variations within this model include voluntary codes of practice;81 self-
                                                                                                                                     
are several forms that policy measures may take, depending on the political will, the objectives to be 
achieved, and the provisions of the Treaties. For a general idea of how the subject has been treated see 
eg, Baldwin and Cave (n 37); BM Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, 
Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms (Columbia UP 1980); R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, 
The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2011); N Nic Shuibhne (ed), Regulating the Internal 
Market (Edward Elgar Publishing 2006); R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, Understanding 
Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (2nd edn, OUP 2012);  S Weatherill (ed), Better 
Regulation (Hart Publishing 2007). 
75 Article 288 TFEU reads: ‘To exercise the Union's competences, the institutions shall adopt 
regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. A regulation shall have general 
application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. A directive 
shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but 
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. A decision shall be binding in 
its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them. 
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.’ 
76 ‘The study of regulation is characterised by a kaleidoscope of lenses, notably economics, cultural 
anthropological theory, institutionalism and systems theory, through which regulation is viewed, 
though little work has been done on how they might be integrated, or whether they are instead 
‘incommensurable paradigms’…..[T]he incommensurability or otherwise of different theoretical 
paradigms applied to regulation is a debate ….that is needed in regulatory theory.’ J Black, 
‘Regulatory Conversations’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 163-64. 
77 ‘The essence of command and control regulation is the exercise of influence by imposing standards 
backed by criminal sanctions.’ Baldwin and Cave (n 37) 35-39.  
78G Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’ in W Müller and V Wright (eds), The State 
in Western Europe, Retreat or Redefinition? (Frank Cass 1994) 78. 
79 ‘…government does not have a monopoly on the exercise of power and control, rather that is 
fragmented between social actors and the state’. J Black, ‘Decentring Regulation:  Understanding the 
Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a Post-Regulatory World’ (2001) 54 Current Legal 
Problems 103, 108. 
80 Black (n 19) 137-64. 
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auditing in which assessments of compliance are made by regulated entities or third 
parties;82 performance-based regimes which emphasize results rather than specific 
actions;83 and management-based systems that are intended to limit regulated harms 
but wherein the norms are self-enforced.   
Regulation can also refer to any means used to achieve regulatory goals.84 
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in the EU represents a primarily 
voluntary form of regulation using policy learning and benchmarking.85 The OMC 
emerged within the EU alongside the traditional legislative forms of directives and 
regulations, seemingly aimed at areas of political coordination and social policy. The 
OMC reflects a desire, if not to improve regulatory governance, then at least to 
diversify it.86 A discussion of OMC is outside the scope of the present thesis. It is 
nonetheless a rich source of scholarship.87 However, the fact that it was thought 
appropriate to create softer regulatory mechanisms, outside of the traditional 
hierarchical approach to regulation in the EU, can be seen as an implicit conclusion 
that the traditional approach of formal methods was deemed inadequate to address 
the requirements and challenges of policy-making in the EU.88 
Regulation adopted for the purposes of the internal market is designed to 
remove the obstacles to freedom of movement of goods, persons, services and 
                                                                                                                                     
81 TP Lyon and JW Maxwell, ‘Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Regulation’  in M Franzini 
and A Nicita (eds), Economic Institutions and Environmental Policy (Ashgate 2001) 75-120.  
82 M Potoski and A Prakash, ‘The Regulation Dilemma: Cooperation and Conflict in Environmental 
Governance’ (2004) 64 Public Administration Review 152-63. 
83 C Coglianese, J Nash and T Olmstead, ‘Performance-based Regulation:  Prospects and Limitations 
in Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation’ (2003) 55 Administrative Law Review 705. 
84 C Hood, H Rothstein and R Baldwin, The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation 
Regimes (OUP 2001); PJ May, ‘Social Regulation’ in LM Salamon (ed), The Tools of Government: A 
Guide To the New Governance Handbook (OUP 2002) 156-87; M Lodge ‘Accountability and 
Transparency in Regulation: Critiques, Doctrines and Instruments’ in Jordana and Levi-Faur (n 1) 
124-44. 
85 The open method rests on soft law mechanisms such as guidelines and indicators, benchmarking 
and sharing of best practice. The method’s effectiveness relies on a form of peer pressure and policy 
learning. S Regent, ‘The Open Method of Coordination: A New Supranational Form of Governance?’ 
(2003) 9 ELJ 190.  
86 ‘The OMC aims to unleash the EU’s social dimension from the constraints of the Community 
method.’ S Borrás and K Jacobsson, ‘The Open Method of Co-ordination and New Governance 
Patterns in the EU’ (2004) 11 JEPP 185, 186. 
87 See eg, M Büchs, New Governance in European Social Policy: The Open Method of Coordination 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2007); C de la Porte, ‘Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for 
Organising Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?’ (2002) 8 ELJ 38; Regent (n 84). 
88 For a discussion of the meaning of the ‘shift’ from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ see eg, Jordana 
and Levi-Faur (n 1). For a discussion of the significance of what new governance means see, eg, C 
Kilpatrick and K Armstrong, ‘Law, Governance and New Governance: The Changing Open Method 
of Coordination’ (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of International Law 519.  
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capital, as well as to harmonize conditions of competition to the extent necessary for 
the functioning of the internal market.89 The three formal legal methods for 
developing European regulatory policy have remained consistent over the course of 
the evolution of the EEC into the EU. These are laid down in the Treaty and 
comprise three main forms: regulations, directives and decisions.90 In the next 
section, I describe the two principal types of integration measures in the EU, positive 
and negative.   
 
1.2. Positive and negative integration measures  
Both positive and negative economic integration measures for the internal market, 
relating to two different modes of economic integration, are foreseen in the 
Treaties.91 Negative integration results in the removal of intra-state trade barriers and 
allows the inter-penetration of national markets; it can be understood as ‘market-
making’ or ‘market-creating’.92 Positive economic integration involves interventions 
in markets, ex ante, with the aim of achieving an identifiable form of market 
                                                
89 Art 26 TFEU is the current version of the mandate for achieving the internal market which reads in 
part ‘The Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning of the 
internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties...’ 
90 The current version of the article defining the three legal forms of policy measures is art 289 TFEU, 
which reads in part:  ‘1. The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the 
European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the 
Commission. This procedure is defined in art 294. 2. In the specific cases provided for by the Treaties, 
the adoption of a regulation, directive or decision by the European Parliament with the participation of 
the Council, or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament, shall constitute a 
special legislative procedure. 3. Legal acts adopted by legislative procedure shall constitute legislative 
acts....’ Art 288 TFEU reads in part: ‘A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in 
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. A directive shall be binding, as to the result 
to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods. A decision shall be binding in its entirety. A decision 
which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them’.  
91 Art 26 TFEU prescribes the adoption of positive measures for establishing or ensuring the 
functioning of the internal market. Some Treaty articles, such as art 28 TFEU that directly proscribes 
‘duties on imports and exports and...all charges having equivalent effect...’, are said to be legally 
enforceable at national level. This follows from the holding of the Court of Justice that such articles 
are directly effective, and operate to prevent the enforcement of national rules in contradiction with 
the EU rules. They thus constitute negative integration measures. However, other equally potent 
measures of negative integration foreseen in the Treaties concern the Commission’s power directly to 
enforce Treaty rules and principles as against the Member States. This is examined further below.  
92 H Wallace, W Wallace and M Pollack (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union (5th edn, OUP 
2000) 102. The well-known case of Dassonville is an example of a negative integration measure. See 
Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
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integration by harmonizing regulation, which may be described as ‘market-
correcting’.93  
Negative integration may result from Commission actions or from judgments 
of the Court of Justice. They are unilateral decisions of an independent European 
institution with no need for or assurance of a broad political consensus for adoption. 
In contrast, the adoption of positive integration measures requires that there be some 
majority consensus in the EU legislature on the nature of the problem impairing the 
internal market and the adaptations needed. The establishment and functioning of the 
internal market required both negative and positive integration measures. The 
tensions in the use of these two different types of measure began to emerge with the 
1992 programme to complete the single market.94 A brief examination of the legal 
nature of these two instruments will reveal why this is so.  
Whereas ‘negative integration’ is defined as removing rules or policies that 
have the effect of impeding intra-Community trade,95 positive integration refers to 
the harmonization of national regulations to the extent necessary for the functioning 
of the internal market under Article 114 TFEU.96 Negative integration results from 
the application of primary Treaty law, such as the principle of free movement of 
goods, while positive integration measures are a result of the EU legislative adoption 
process and are in consequence subject to ‘consensual intergovernmental and 
pluralist policy-making’.97   
The problematic features of positive integrationist measures are found in the 
primary and secondary nature of the legal bases for their adoption. Treaty law is 
                                                
93 See B Kohler-Koch, ‘The Evolution and Transformation of European Governance’ (ECSA, Sixth 
Biennial International Conference, Pittsburgh, June 1999) < aei.pitt.edu/2312 > p 5, n 10. 
94 The scope and ambition of removing material, tax and technical barriers, so as to create a frontier-
free internal market required Member States to concede to the Community more than they had ever 
been ready to do in the past. K-D Ehlerman, ‘1992 Project: Stages, Structures, Results and Prospects’ 
(1989-1990) 11 Mich JIL 1097, 1099. ‘…the legislative process...has progressively relaxed both the 
intergovernmental and the unanimity rules, most notably in areas relating to the Internal Market.’ M 
Pollack, ‘Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community’ (1994) 14 JPP 
95, 104. 
95 Rewe-Zentral AG (n 91). 
96 Art 114 TFEU reads in part: ‘The European Parliament and the Council shall...adopt the measures 
for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market’. 
97 Scharpf (n 28) 51. 
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primary and enjoys a ‘constitutional’ character;98 EU legislation is secondary law, 
and is adopted by institutions and processes that do not satisfy a traditional model of 
democratic government, and where considerable discretion is facilitated by the terms 
and conditions under which the EU pursues the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market.99 In the internal market area, the Commission, exclusively, proposes 
harmonizing legislation and exercises its discretion in this respect without more than 
general oversight by the European Parliament (EP) and without any meaningful 
oversight by any other institution or body. 
With the 1992 programme to complete the single market, the Commission 
significantly shifted its approach to negative and positive integration. The 
Commission’s earlier, highly prescriptive, approach to removing barriers to the 
establishment and functioning of the common market had proved unsuccessful. Such 
laborious and time-consuming methods were abandoned in favor of a ‘new 
approach’ that facilitated economic integration using market liberalization, building 
on an interpretation by the Court of Justice of the principle of freedom of movement 
in the well-known case of Cassis de Dijon.100 The Cassis interpretation of primary 
European law has been repeatedly endorsed by the Court since then.101 
                                                
98 In Case 294/83 Partie Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, the Court found that 
the European Community is ‘a community based on the rule of law’ and, in particular, the Treaty had 
to be recognized as its ‘basic constitutional charter.’ A broad consensus now exists that European law 
has a constitutional character. 
99 Art 114 TFEU is the current version of a broad legal basis for the adoption of positive 
harmonization measures in furtherance of the internal market. Paragraph one reads in part: ‘The 
European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure... adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.’ 
100 The ‘new approach’ elaborated on the reasoning of the Cassis de Dijon decision of the Court of 
Justice that upheld the right of freedom of cross-border movement for products legally manufactured 
and marketed in an exporting Member State, where the public interest at stake in the importing State 
could be fulfilled by less restrictive measures. The principle of mutual recognition was qualified by 
the admission that a regulating (importer) State is entitled to show a proportionate justification in the 
public interest for its rules even if they impede inter-State trade. Rewe-Zentral (n 91); S Weatherill, 
Cases and Materials (OUP 2007) 588. 
101 There are more than 300 European court judgments endorsing this proposition. See J Pelkmans, 
‘Mutual Recognition Rationale, Logic and Application in the EU Internal Goods Market’ (XIIth 
Travemuender Symposium, March 2010) [on Oekonomische Analyse des Europarechts: Primaerrecht, 
Sekundaerrecht und die Rolle des EuGH]. For European court case law see eg, Case C-192/01 
Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR I-9693; Case 270/02 Commission v Italy [2004] ECR I-1559; 
Case C-41/02 Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375; Case 178/84 Commission of the 
European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany [1987] ECR 1227 (purity requirement for 
beer); Joined cases 51 to 54/71, International Fruit Company and Others v Producktschap voor 
groenten en fruit [1971] ECR 1107 (licenses required for import); Case 34/79 Regina v Henn and 
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Applying the judicial doctrine of ‘mutual recognition’ as a measure of 
negative integration, the Commission successfully neutralized national rules that 
acted as barriers to the free movement of goods.102 The principle of mutual 
recognition renders unenforceable an otherwise lawful national measure that 
hampers cross-border trade, whether or not the underlying aim of the measure is 
protectionist.  Such otherwise valid national rules are expected to be disapplied by 
the relevant national authorities charged with the application and enforcement of 
national rules.103 The legal doctrine of mutual recognition, part of the principle of the 
right to cross-border free movement of goods, and the doctrine of a judicial duty 
correctly to apply European law in national tribunals, are examples of negative 
integration.104  
However, the principle of mutual recognition was only one facet of the 
strategy in the White Paper on completing the internal market.105 In addition, an 
unprecedented number of positive integration measures, just under 300 measures of a 
legislative nature, were thought necessary in order to remove physical, technical and 
fiscal barriers to free movement.106 This expansion of European regulation launched 
a regulatory trajectory that discomfited Member States as evidenced in the 
                                                                                                                                     
Darby [1979] ECR 3795 (ban on import of pornographic materials); and Case 286/86 Ministère 
Public v Deserbais [1988] ECR 4907. See generally D Chalmers, G Davies and G Monti, ‘The 
Internal Market’ and ‘The Free Movement of Goods’ in European Union Law Cases and Materials 
(2nd edn, CUP 2010); P Craig and G de Burca, ‘The Single Market’ and ‘Free Movement of Goods:  
Quantitative Restrictions’ in EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (4th edn, OUP 2011) 668-95. 
102 The Commission drew the following conclusions from the Cassis judgment:  ‘Any product 
imported from another Member State must in principle be admitted into the territory of the importing 
Member State if it has been lawfully produced, that is, conforms to rules and processes of 
manufacture that are customarily and traditionally accepted in the exporting country, and is marketed 
in the territory of the latter’. Communication from the Commission concerning the consequences of 
the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 ‘Cassis de Dijon’ 
[1980] OJ C256, 2. The current version of the relevant Treaty article is art 34 TFEU which reads as 
follows: ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be 
prohibited between Member States’. 
103 The Court of Justice explicitly found this legal effect resulted from the primacy of European law in 
Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA  [1978] ECR 629, para 24. 
104Applying the principle of mutual recognition acts to neutralise or render unenforceable a national 
barrier to intra-Community trade in a manner that allows market forces to come into play in those 
markets from which they were previously excluded, because of the existence of national measures. 
The term ‘negative integration’ was introduced into the literature on integration by J Tinbergen. 
Kohler-Koch (n 92) 5, n 10. 
105 Commission, ‘Completing the Internal Market’ (White Paper) COM (85) 310 final, 18-29.  
106 ibid. The simultaneous change to QMV in the European legislative adoption procedure introduced 
by the Single European Act of 1986 removed the formal threat of a Member State veto in the Council, 
thus facilitating the adoption of positive integration measures in the form of legislation.    
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codification of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the conclusions 
of the Edinburgh Presidency.107 
The Single European Act introduced a definition of the internal market into 
the Rome Treaty that has remained relatively stable for a period of twenty-five years 
and remains faithful to the notion of the four economic freedoms (good, persons, 
services and capital).108 However, the Treaties give no indication of any preference 
for one form of integration measure over the other nor do they indicate to what 
degree the four economic freedoms must be given effect. These questions are left to 
the decision-making institutions of the EU. This creates considerable policy-making 
discretion particularly for the Commission to determine what positive integrationist 
measures are needed for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.   
Thus far, the Treaties have created no mechanism to oversee the exercise of 
that discretion by the Commission. Recently adopted regulatory governance 
measures are therefore all the more welcome in that they create a basis and use some 
externally developed benchmarks against which the Commission’s execution of its 
regulatory powers may be evaluated.  
Whereas negative integration measures reduce barriers to trade and thus to 
integration, positive integration measures create a new legal instrument and a legal 
regime that replaces the national one.109  Negative integration measures can be seen 
as deregulatory policy measures that remove barriers between separate markets, thus 
combining and enlarging them, while positive integration measures can be seen as 
                                                
107 See particularly the annex to the Presidency conclusions on the ‘overall approach to the application 
by the Council of the subsidiarity principle and art 3b of the Treaty on European Union’. The latter 
reads as follows:  ‘The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by 
the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty.’ 
108Art 8a EEC reads: ‘The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty.’ Art 26 TFEU is similar. It reads in part: ‘1. The Union shall adopt measures 
with the aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Treaties. 2. The internal market shall comprise an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance 
with the provisions of the Treaties…’ 
109 A Stone Sweet and J Caporaso, ‘From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and 
Integration’ in W Sandholtz and A Stone Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational 
Governance (OUP 1998) 121.  
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re-regulatory, market-correcting, policy measures that do not necessarily alter the 
size of the market, although frequently the aims of regulation are to facilitate 
economic growth.110  
 
1.2.1. Problematic features of positive integration 
Part of the criticism leveled at both forms of integration, and especially positive 
integration measures, is that the EU legal system reinforces the centralizing and 
expansionist tendencies to regulate within the EU.111 The real or apparent loss of 
national control over policy processes becomes problematic for Member States.112 
Scharpf observed that  
...from a neoliberal point of view most legitimate aspirations of economic 
integration are realized with the completion of the common market, and 
further moves towards positive integration are generally considered 
unnecessary and dangerous. From an interventionist perspective, by 
contrast, the common market as such appears as a constraint that reduces 
the capacity of national political systems to pursue democratically 
legitimized policy goals.113 
 
Whether seen from a neoliberal or an interventionist stance, positive integration 
measures carry considerable political costs. There may be a link between the 
disillusionment of European citizens about the benefits of the EU and the weakening 
of national social contracts resulting from the pressures of asymmetric negative and 
positive regulation.114 
Removing every possible economic frontier to an integrated economic space 
is not inherently more important than other considerations that may be of a social, 
                                                
110 Much of current EU policy and politics is meant to contribute to the aims of economic growth and 
job creation, two aims espoused explicitly and over-archingly since the adoption of the Lisbon 
Strategy for Growth and Jobs in 2000, subsequently updated in 2010 with Europe 2020. See Europe 
2020 <http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm> accessed 15 October 2012. Linking 
regulatory governance to the aim of economic growth, the Commission noted that ‘In the context of 
the renewed Lisbon Strategy, refocused on growth and jobs, [it] launched a comprehensive strategy on 
better regulation to ensure that the regulatory framework in the EU contributes to achieving growth 
and jobs’. See the better regulation website 
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm> accessed 21 October 2012.   
111 Stone Sweet and Caporaso (n 108) 121. 
112 Pollack (n 93) 110. 
113 Scharpf (n 28) 49 footnotes omitted. 
114 ibid 122. He furthermore identifies a risk of political disaffection at national level, a subject not 
addressed in the present thesis.  
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cultural or even religious value (one could think of the ‘Sunday trading’ cases),115 
nor does such harmonization remove the non-economic reasons that produce 
imperfections in economic mobilities and transactions.116   
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, an even broader set of 
values has become part of the regulatory aspirations for the European project. A 
broader view of the internal market and thus of the public interest may be discerned 
in documents of the Commission and the European Council where ‘[t]he internal 
market is conceptualized in more holistic terms, to include not only economic 
integration, but also consumer safety, social rights, labor policy, and the 
environment’.117 Is this broader view real or merely apparent? Criticisms of the 
economic order of the EU relate to the perception of incompatibility between 
extensive economic integration measures and national preferences that may be of a 
non-economic nature.118 The creation of an internal market in European countries 
required some level of positive harmonization, that is, the approximation of national 
rules to minimize the differences that impeded cross-border trade, in order to achieve 
a common market.  However, the nature and extent of positive economic integration 
measures and supranational institutionalization are not foreordained.   
The original approach to positive economic integration measures in which all 
Member States enjoyed control by veto over the regulatory measures that were 
adopted at the European level changed with the Single European Act.119  In the early 
years of the Community, the limited policy program of the Treaty and the unanimity 
rule in the Council reconciled the competing tensions between inter-
governmentalism and supranationalism in order to achieve political legitimacy, but 
                                                
115 The Sunday trading cases started with Case 145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B & Q PLC [1989] 
ECR 3851. The Court found that a ban on Sunday trading in England and Wales under the Shops Act 
1950, the effect of which was to restrict the volume of imports to the shops trading in breach of the 
rules, was prima facie contrary to article 34 TFEU. See also C-312/89 Union Departementale des 
Syndicats CGT de l’Aisne v Sidef Conforama [1991] ECR I-997 and C-332/89 The State of Belgium v 
André Marchandise [1991] ECR I-1027. 
116 J Pelkmans, Market Integration in the European Community (Martinus Nijhoff 1984) 3. 
117 P Craig and G de Burca, EU Law Texts Cases and Materials (4th edn, OUP 2008) 632.  
118 The post-war developments in many EU Member States mediated the competitive pressures of the 
forces of a globalising economic liberalism by developing systems of protection for their nationals. 
Scharpf  (n 28) 122. 
119 The Single European Act amended, inter alia, the voting rule of the Treaty of Rome for the 
purposes of adopting of harmonisation legislation to complete the internal market from unanimity to 
qualified majority voting. This was the first amendment to the Treaty of Rome since its initial entry 




this consensus no longer holds.120 The move to QMV for the vast majority of 
positive integration measures in the context of a ‘constitutionalised’ European legal 
system and extension of competences to the EU, changed the legal and political 
balance of power of the Union.122  
 Some critics found that European positive integration measures impinged on the 
prerogatives of the European welfare state and on the individual national settlements 
within each Member State.123  The normative economic proposition - that effective 
economic liberalization, despite using a non-majoritarian model, benefitted all 
citizens and could thus legitimate the institutional arrangements by results - was 
contested on the basis that economic interventions have distributional consequences, 
which necessarily render them political in nature.124 Some challenged the proposition 
that legitimacy would be a consequence of regulation, that is, that neo-liberal market 
imperatives were compatible with other values that were not represented in the 
European policy processes.125 The efforts of European leaders to increase democratic 
legitimacy through institutional reforms and successive Treaty amendments, 
including the mechanism of a citizens’ initiative;126 the right to petition the European 
Parliament and the right to apply to the Ombudsman;127 and an early consultation 
mechanism of national parliaments (the ‘yellow card’ system)128 have not yet 
produced much evidence that such efforts have been successful.  
In Chapters 2 and 3, I will argue that an alternative model for creating or 
enhancing the native legitimacy of positive regulatory measures that is not based on 
tweaking EU institutional arrangements can be found in a normative use of 
regulatory governance. 
                                                
120 Kohler-Koch (n 92). 
122 JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1990) 100  Yale LJ 2403; D Wincott, ‘European 
Political Development, Regulatory Governance and the European Social Model:  The Challenge of 
Substantive Legitimacy’ (2006) 12 ELJ 743, 763. 
123 Scharpf (n 28) 41-42. 
124 F Scharpf, ‘Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State’ (1997) 4 JEPP 18, 19. 
125 See eg, Wincott (n 1).  
126 The citizens’ initiative was created in art 11 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU); the right 
of any citizen to apply to the European Parliament and to the Ombudsman appears in art 24 TFEU.  
127 Art 24 TFEU.  
128 A Protocol on enhanced subsidiarity and proportionality was attached to the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which came into force in December 2009. The Protocol provides for a ‘yellow/orange card’ 
mechanism that gives national parliaments an opportunity to object to legislative proposals with a 




1.3. Conclusion  
This chapter has identified the terms, context and questions that will be used in the 
remainder of the thesis. EU supranational regulatory governance therefore means (1) 
the exercise of regulatory powers in furtherance of the internal market; (2) that have 
been formally and constitutionally delegated by state actors; (3) to the European 
Commission as an independent non-governmental institution. Normative regulatory 
legitimacy refers to an evaluative determination that regulatory authority was 
properly exercised, by reference to normative criteria. This form of legitimacy is 
based on neither input legitimacy, which requires democratic policy-formation 
institutions, nor output legitimacy, which depends on empirically tested and verified 
outcomes. It is effectively a defensible conclusion that a regulator merits to be 
considered legitimate when evaluated against normative criteria. 
The term ‘positive integration measures’ refers to European legislation that 
creates binding European norms which prevail over inconsistent national norms. 
Regulation as used herein is an example of a positive integration measure referring 
specifically to European harmonizing legislation for the internal market and any 
related soft law measures. The principal question of the research is whether 
regulatory governance, using normatively defined governance criteria, can contribute 
to greater regulatory legitimacy. Questions about the legitimacy of the Commission 
as a regulator are distinct from those related to whether the conferral of extensive 
supranational competences can be deemed democratically legitimate. The latter 
concern forms part of the broader constitutional questions of the EU. 
The value of the present research may offer some part of a response to the 
challenges facing the EU, and particularly the Commission, in discharging what was 
initially uncontroversial: regulation to facilitate the establishment and functioning of 
an internal market. The expansion of European regulatory competences and the 
development of European governance institutions and agencies have led some to 
label the EU pejoratively and misleadingly as a ‘regulatory state’.129 Although not a 
state, the EU is nonetheless viewed with some misgivings in light of the sheer 
growth in regulation, regulatory mechanisms and regulatory institutions.  
                                                
129 Majone (n 49); McGowan and Wallace (n 49); G Majone, ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory 
State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance’ (1997) 17 JPP 139. 
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Such doubts have caused popular, political and academic concerns, if not 
disillusionment and disaffection, thus creating a regulatory governance dilemma for 
the Commission, to which it has begun to respond - with some prodding from 
Member States - in the form of its better regulation initiatives. The Commission is 
still on a learning curve with regulatory governance. For most of its existence, the 
Commission has been able to exercise its prerogatives with a somewhat superficial 
regard to the concerns of its normative legitimacy and regulatory authority. Although 
they are discretionary, the present initiatives on the part of the Commission to be 
examined in Chapter 3 provide an important but insufficient first step in establishing 
a basis for evaluating the Commission as a regulator.   
The present research offers an alternative approach for the Commission to 
achieve regulatory legitimacy to that of both input and output legitimacy theories. 
Moreover, it remains within the institutional powers and limitations as these are 
currently constructed. It may be considered a contribution to the now urgent need to 
find a methodology to redeem the perception of, variously, inappropriate, sub-
optimal and excessive European regulatory activity, in political, popular and 
academic circles, in a way that responds to some of these criticisms and offers a 
normative basis to attribute a robust and defensible form of regulatory legitimacy to 
the development of positive harmonization measures at the EU level.  
In the next chapter, I discuss regulatory governance theories and their 
contribution to the governance model constructed herein. I also examine and analyze 
the regulatory governance theories of Majone and Scharpf, contrasting their 
underlying premises, and showing why neither is an appropriate basis on which to 






Regulatory Governance:  Models, Methods and Mentors	  
 
Introduction 
Thus far, I have described and defined legitimacy, governance and European 
integration measures, both negative and positive. In this chapter, I relate them to 
regulatory governance. The definitional and contextual discussion of the first chapter 
laid the basis for this chapter and defines regulatory governance for the purposes of 
the research. Regulatory governance mechanisms used in other contexts, such as 
national and international regulatory regimes, offer models and values from which 
the governance model of this research draws.  
This chapter begins by examining the role of the Commission as a regulator. 
In the mid-1980s, the Commission succeeded in re-focusing and refining the 
institutional mechanisms and national political will to commit to the completion of 
the internal market by 1992 (‘the 1992 Programme’). That Programme was largely 
successful from the Commission’s point of view. The processes that led to its 
endorsement also created an intergovernmental and supranational consensus on the 
importance of completing the internal market and on the methodology for achieving 
it. In the first section of the chapter, I trace the evolution of the Commission’s role as 
a regulator from its modest beginnings into its current form as a regulatory titan. The 
chapter then examines traditional regulatory governance theories. In general terms, 
these theories relate to legitimacy shortfalls associated with national regulatory 
systems. Recent developments in transgovernmental regulation, legitimacy and 
governance, of limited direct relevance, are included briefly.  
As a basis for comparison with the constructed model, I use two contrasting 
approaches to EU regulatory legitimacy developed by two prominent scholars, 
Giandomenico Majone and Fritz Scharpf. The chapter examines their theoretical 
premises and contentions, the theories on which they are based, and their relevance 
for the governance model that will be used in the case study. The normative 
regulatory governance model developed in Chapter 3 will draw upon criteria 
developed in national regulatory regimes and in recent international regulatory 
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scholarship, as a framing for analysis. The chapter finds that alternative mechanisms 
to national forms of democratic accountability, such as normatively constituted 
governance policies, offer a defensible basis on which to construct or enhance 
supranational regulatory legitimacy. That proposition will be tested in the case study.  
 
2.1. The Commission as Regulator 
In the decades following 1992, the Commission’s role as a regulator was 
strengthened by further delegation of regulatory powers through successive Treaty 
amendments.1 As the number of European harmonization measures grew, the 
regulatory activities and structures at both the national and European levels 
correspondingly expanded in tandem with the Commission’s growing responsibility 
for oversight of the acquis communautaire.2 The powers of the Commission are set 
out in Article 17 TEU.3  They include four types:  legislative, administrative, 
executive and prosecutorial.4  One of the Commission’s exclusive powers is to 
propose harmonizing legislation for the internal market.5 
The European Commission is a unique creation in the world of transnational 
regulators. It does not operate under the aegis or mandate of a government that 
                                                
1 See P Craig and G de Burca, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (OUP 2011) ch 1 on the trajectory 
of the evolution of delegated competences. 
2 ‘The [Single European Regulatory Space] is composed of standing committees, committees of wise 
men, working groups, programmes and task forces, ad hoc high-level expert groups, forums, agencies, 
networks and Directorates-General (DGs) - all operating in a multi-level and multi-spatial 
architecture.’ D Levi-Faur, ‘Regulatory Networks and Regulatory Agencification: Towards a Single 
European Regulatory Space’ (2011) 18 JEPP 810, 810; see also, eg D Coen and M Thatcher, ‘The 
New Governance of Markets and Non-Majoritarian Regulators’ (2005) 18 Governance 329 and M 
Thatcher, ‘The Creation of European Regulatory Agencies and its Limits: A Comparative Analysis of 
European Delegation’ (2011) 18 JEPP 790. 
3 Art 17(1) TEU: ‘1. The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take 
appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures 
adopted by the institutions pursuant to them. It shall oversee the application of Union law under the 
control of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It shall execute the budget and manage 
programmes. It shall exercise coordinating, executive and management functions, as laid down in the 
Treaties. With the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for 
in the Treaties, it shall ensure the Union’s external representation. It shall initiate the Union’s annual 
and triannual programming with a view to achieving inter-institutional agreements.’ 
4 For a detailed discussion of the range of roles accorded to the Commission and the other major 
European institutions in the Treaties, see Craig and de Burca (n 1) ch 4.  
5 Art 26 TFEU reads: ‘1. The Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the 
functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties. 2. The 
internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties. 3. The 
Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall determine the guidelines and conditions necessary 
to ensure balanced progress in all the sectors concerned.’ 
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prevailed in the last election. The law governing the institution is derived from an 
amalgam of legal traditions, based initially on the Treaty of Rome (as amended, now 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union), and which is interpreted by a multinational judicial system. Whereas in 
national environments the roles of civil servants, members of Parliament, 
governmental ministers, judges and other stakeholders are constitutionally rather 
stable, in the EU, the sources of influence are constantly evolving.  
The impact of Member States’ preferences on the policy process is now 
strong but this was not always the case. Inter-institutional relations have always been 
dynamic and the roles of major actors, most notably the European Parliament, and 
latterly the European Council, have evolved considerably since the initial creation of 
the EEC. The Commission’s two roles as a regulator, proposing harmonizing 
legislation and enacting legislative measures under Treaty powers or under delegated 
powers, have always formed part of the institutional set-up. However, it is doubtful 
that the intention of the founders of the European Economic Community was for the 
Commission to turn into a supranational regulatory overlord. That it has become so is 
no longer open to dispute, but whether it can discharge its extensive regulatory 
responsibilities appropriately, convincingly and accountably is indeed contestable.  
Whereas national civil servants operate under a quite well-defined set of rules 
and conventions and are answerable through ministers to an elected government, 
European civil servants are not democratically accountable in the same manner.6 To 
the extent that EU action is necessitated by differences in Member State policy or 
practice, the Commission often seeks a compromise. The extent to which the 
                                                
6 The Commission as a College is subject to censure by the European Parliament. See art 234 TFEU. 
It requires a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of Parliament’s component 
members, in which case the Commission must resign as a body. Individual members of the 
Commission may be removed from office by the Council for breach of their duties. See art 245 TFEU. 
Whereas previously the Council decided unanimously on the members and President of the 
Commission without input from the EP, the Parliament began to be consulted in 1993 and obtained a 
right to veto the choice for President in the Treaty of Amsterdam.  The Parliament currently elects the 
Commission President on the nomination of the Council. See art 17(7) TEU. Art 17(8) TFEU states 
that the Commission ‘as a body’ shall be responsible to the European Parliament.  However, the only 
institutional mechanism for parliamentary oversight of the Commission is that of a global motion of 
censure under article 234 TFEU. The Legal Affairs Committee of the EP produced a report on Impact 
Assessments in 2004 that recommended an audit body reporting to the Commission president to 
monitor the quality of impact assessment processes and outcomes, and to carry out impact 
assessments on amendments proposed by the EP to regulatory proposals. See CM Radaelli and F de 
Francesco, Regulatory Quality in Europe (Manchester UP 2007) 134. 
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regulatory processes under which the Commission operates are sufficiently 
transparent is a matter of contention.8  Brussels insiders can navigate the process, but 
civic society may find it very difficult. Majone commented presciently on the shift in 
the Commission’s role towards regulatory functions that has gathered momentum 
with the Treaty amendments adopted over the following two decades.9  
Many of the concerns about the Commission as a regulator relate to the thick 
mesh of positive economic integration measures and their enforcement that are 
justified by reference to the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 
Several strands of concern have emerged, and were noted in chapter 1, about the 
Commission's construction of an empire-like arrangement of regulatory governance 
agencies, networks, consultative committees, and other bodies that characterize a 
centralizing trajectory of regulatory governance. Thatcher and Coen and others 
detect, but do not defend, the gradual centralization of EU regulatory enforcement in 
an environment of greater regulation generally.10 The perception of an emerging 
‘regulatory behemoth’ seems to corroborate Malone’s earlier prediction. However, 
rather than create a sense of progress in furthering European integration, the growth 
of the Commission's regulatory empire has generated considerable malaise. It has 
become the ‘received wisdom’ that Brussels is a source of excessive and intrusive 
regulation. Rarely does public discourse suggest that the EU is a net positive factor 
for Europeans, even less so in the current Eurozone crisis. Nor does it alleviate the 
concern to note, as Majone did, that most of the positive regulation originated from 
the Member States themselves.11 
Chapter 1 established significant qualitative differences between negative 
integration and positive integration measures and a correspondingly different 
normative appreciation of legitimacy. Positive harmonization measures constitute 
secondary law, whose satisfaction of democratic norms is trenchantly contested, in a 
context of considerable regulatory and legislative discretion as to how the EU 
                                                
8 See D Curtin and AJ Meijer, ‘Does Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?’ (2006) 11 Information 
Polity 109; B Westerdorf, ‘Transparency - Not Just a Vogue Word’ (1998) 22 Fordham ILJ 900; L 
Stirton and M Lodge, ‘Transparency Mechanisms: Building Publicness into Public Services’ (2001) 
28 Journal of Law and Society 471.  
9 Majone launched this scholarship in his seminal work: G Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State 
in Europe (Routledge 1996). 
10 M Thatcher and D Coen, ‘Reshaping European Regulatory Space: An Evolutionary Analysis’ 
(2008) 31 West European Politics 806. 
11 Majone (n 9) 266.  
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facilitates the establishment and functioning of an internal market. It is precisely the 
Commission’s power at the very centre of the positive regulatory model for the EU 
as the primary interpreter of the public interest that requires a high level of normative 
analysis and a correspondingly higher level of justification when exercising such 
power. The neo-functionalist, institutionalist and pragmatic (inter-governmentalist) 
explanations for the evolution of the European regulatory space offer no basis for an 
intellectually and normatively defensible evaluation of EU regulatory measures in 
order to determine if they should be considered legitimate, as opposed to popular. 
Since the Commission has assiduously pursued the establishment and functioning of 
the single market since the early 1990s, there is much to examine.  
 
2.2. Disillusionment with the Project and/or the Architect? 
However politically successful the 1992 Programme, the same was not the case for 
its implementation, with important implications: 
The 1992 Programme was rapidly confronted with difficulties that 
revealed the limits of the harmonization model....by the end of [1990] the 
Commission realised that only a handful of the internal market directives 
[a total of almost 300] had been duly transposed into domestic law by the 
member states....[W]rongful or incomplete transposition was only the tip 
of the iceberg....The capacity of national regulators to cope with the 
requirements introduced by European legislation [was] far from being 
uniform...[T]he single market programme thus revealed the existence of 
gaps of a new kind:  although the EC was there in a growing number of 
areas, its interventions were often sub-optimal...12 
 
Simple harmonization of the ‘rules-of-the-road’ cannot effectively remove all 
barriers to cross-border trade, thus making some form of administrative coordination 
unavoidable to achieve an internal market. The Commission’s response to its 
increased responsibility was twofold:  to intensify the use of regulatory networks that 
were primarily composed of national officials and Commission representatives, and 
to create an increasing number of European regulatory agencies.  
The use of agencies by the Commission before the 1990s was no more than 
‘marginal’ but ‘boomed’ in the post-2000 decade.13 In 1997, there were ten 
                                                
12 R Dehousse, ‘Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role of European  
Agencies’ (1997) 4 JEPP 246, 251. 
13 Levi-Faur (n 1) 811. 
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agencies.14  By the end of 2010, there were twenty-eight.15  Most of these agencies 
are ‘specialized administrative authorities or bodies, provided with legal personality, 
governed by a management board mainly composed of Member States’ 
representatives and operating outside supranational institutions....’16 Their functions 
are largely executive, informational and coordinative with virtually no rule-making 
powers.17 They are primarily intended to facilitate convergence of administrative 
practices and approaches between the national regulators under the supervision of the 
Commission as a controlling agent. Agencies can replace or complement pre-existing 
regulatory networks.18 Given the budgetary, institutional and political constraints of 
the 1990s, recourse to agencies may have been rational, considering the pre-existing 
comitology committees represented only an ‘ad hoc’ approach, when what was 
needed was a ‘true community of views’ to establish a ‘community of action’.19 The 
creation of agencies to oversee and cooperate with pan-European networks of 
national regulators can thus be seen as a response to the functional needs of 
consistency and uniformity of application. But they come at a price.  
Over the years, the Commission has progressively migrated more informal, 
often pre-existing, arrangements for implementation and enforcement principally 
into the two forms mentioned above: agencies and networks.20 This growth has 
altered the regulatory dynamic into one where the Commission as ‘chief regulator’ 
exerts a controlling influence over the work performed within these forums, typically 
composed of national officials from domestic regulatory authorities. Given that the 
internal market acquis communautaire now consists of a vast array of rules requiring 
consistent and uniform approaches to be effective, a networked agencies approach 
                                                
14 A Kreher, ‘Agencies in the European Community - A Step towards Administrative Integration in 
Europe’ (1997) 4 JEPP 225, 227. 
15 Levi-Faur (n 1) 811. 
16 Kreher (n 14) 227. 
17 For example, the tasks of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC) are largely advisory in two dimensions, between national regulators and between the 
Commission and BEREC. See <http://berec.europa.eu/> accessed 6 March 2013. 
18 Levi-Faur (n 1) 823. 
19 Dehousse (n 12) 254. 
20 For example, in the telecommunications sector, the Commission created a European level 
regulatory network (the European Regulators Group) in 2003 that eventually replaced the pre-existing 
informal network of national regulatory authorities. In 2010, this group was dissolved and a European 
agency for telecommunications was created. See Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators 
for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office OJ L337/1.  
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gives the Commission the means of discharging its responsibility of oversight using 
both cooperative and hierarchical relationships in the European regulatory space.21 
Such developments characterize the transformation of the Commission’s role as a 
regulator in that space and highlight its complexity.  
The European regulatory space now contains numerous formal and informal 
arrangements. Furthermore, these structural developments occurred across all policy 
areas.22  The complex picture of the European regulatory space has been described 
thus:   
The patchwork of regulatory institutions, instruments, committees, 
observatories, directives, rules, and networks at various levels and 
various arenas that together make up the [Single European regulatory 
space] is diversifying and expanding. The scale, depth and scope of 
agencification create the world’s largest and probably most complex 
transnational regulatory system.23  
These complex polycentric arrangements put the Commission at the centre of a 
vastly increased regulatory corpus and infrastructure as compared to thirty years 
ago.24  
 EU developments in governance are problematic in three ways:  first 
European centralization of an increasing number of regulatory powers; second, the 
number and scope of positive integration measures that impact upon national 
prerogatives; and third the construction of Commission-controlled (centralized, non-
transparent) extensive enforcement structures whose activities are not directly open 
to the public. Some critics have claimed that the role, powers and trajectories of 
European agencies put the propriety of regulatory governance from political and 
constitutional perspectives into doubt.25 A primary concern is that of lack of 
accountability. In strong contrast to Majone’s premise of depoliticizing regulatory 
governance that will be analyzed below, the rise of European agencies that either 
subsume or control regulatory networks may reflect a transfer of power to the 
                                                
21 See T Borzel, ‘European Governance: Negotiation and Competition in the Shadow of Hierarchy’ 
(2010) 48 JCMS 191.  
22 Dehousse (n 10) 247. 
23 Levi-Faur (n 2) 826. 
24 How agencies and regulatory networks inter-operate and with what capacities is now a source of 
some concern as to their effects on overall governance. Such concerns reflect the view that such 
extensive and pre-emptive regulatory regimes may not accord with notions of legitimate government. 
This topic is outwith the research but, on this point, see eg B Rittberger and A Wonka, ‘Introduction: 
Agency Governance in the European Union’ (2011) 18 JEPP 780, 783. 
25 M Flinders, ‘Distributed Public Governance in the European Union’ (2004) 11 JEPP 520. 
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Commission that impinges on national capacities for governing.26  However, this 
view is not universal.27 
Although addressed to a different level of the policy process, a 
recommendation from one commentator neatly echoes the starting point that I adopt 
herein:  
...the importance of a coherent and explicit governance framework within 
which [the European agencies and networks] can operate cannot be over-
stated.28   
 
As an institution, the Commission gave little outward indication until 2001 that its 
regulatory governance policy was an issue of any concern. In light of the 
considerable increase in positive harmonization measures adopted since the launch of 
the 1992 Programme and further amendments to the Treaties, together with the 
construction of a complex matrix of enforcement authorities, that the Commission 
was engaging in regulatory governance practices is no more than a truism. It seemed 
to be institutionally unaware of it, and thus missed an opportunity during the early 
stages of the regulatory infrastructure building processes to develop a meaningful 
and normative policy of regulatory governance. That the Commission has begun to 
make up for lost time is to be welcomed, but progress has been piecemeal and sub-
optimal. This theme will be developed further in chapter 6 when the Commission’s 
regulatory governance policy is examined in greater detail.  
The issue of whether the use of extensive positive integration measures is 
justified frames the discourse on EU regulatory legitimacy. The use of negative 
integration has been less controversial for the Commission.29  It will be seen in the 
case study that the Commission’s use of negative integration (liberalization) to 
initiate the reform of telecommunications so as to create a European market in the 
                                                
26 ibid 541. 
27 ‘...the establishment of European agencies can indeed appear as a net gain in terms of legitimacy.’  
Dehousse (n 12) 258. 
28 Flinders (n 25) 541. 
29 The use of Commision legislative powers is less controversial only because rarely used to 
deregulate European markets. It will be seen below that the Commission’s singular and unilateral use 
of negative integration to de-monopolize the telecommunications sector in the late 1980s caused 
considerable political controversy and resentment, such that the Commission has never resorted to 
unilateral measures, but has always relied on harmonization, in subsequently liberalized sectors. 
Negative integration is more typically associated with the Court of Justice in interpreting the 
provisions of the Treaties in relation to economic freedoms. The Court’s judgments upholding the 
European norm over the inconsistent national norm have not been without controversy. But the 
Commission has not suffered from the controversy attached to such holdings.  
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sector was singularly controversial, but was largely an inter-institutional battle that 
the Member States effectively lost, although a pyrrhic victory in some respects for 
the Commission.  
 
2.3. National Regulatory Governance and Legitimacy  
National regulators face challenges as to the legitimacy of legislative regulatory 
delegation, notwithstanding the fact that the process of delegation may satisfy 
national constitutional requirements for legislative adoption.30 The loss of legitimacy 
is said to result from a loss of public accountability and democratic control, by 
operating outside the traditional constitutional framework of controls, checks and 
balances.31 Delegation in this sense therefore constitutes a violation of constitutional 
settlements. The comparison between legitimacy discourses for national and 
transnational regulators is enlightening. 33 In a national regulatory context, two forms 
of normative legitimacy are available to a regulator: input and output legitimacy, as 
seen in chapter 1. Empirical criticisms of national regimes focus on the failure of the 
regulator to achieve its regulatory objectives and thus a failure to satisfy the wider 
social interests at stake.34   
                                                
30 Theories of democratic legitimation are beyond the scope of the present research. For a start on the 
vast literature, from various communities, on theories of legitimate government and democracy as a 
legitimate form of social and governmental organization, see A Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political 
Constitution’ (2002) 22 OJLS 157; A Lijphart, ‘Majority Rule in Theory and in Practice: The 
Tenacity of a Flawed Paradigm’ (1991) 129 International Social Science Journal 483; N 
MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 MLR 1; JHH Weiler, The Constitution of 
Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?’ and Other Essays on European Integration (CUP 
1999) 10, 317-18; N Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ in R Bellamy, V Bufacchi and D 
Castiglione (eds), Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (Lothian Foundation 
Press 1995); S Smismans (ed), Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2006) 290-300; A Menon and S Weatherill, ‘Legitimacy, Accountability, and Delegation 
in the European Union’ in A Arnull and D Wincott D (eds), Accountability and Legitimacy in the 
European Union (OUP 2003) 113- 32; A Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (6th edn, Macmillan 1902) 214; D Gaus, ‘Legitimate Political Rule Without a State?’ 
(ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo RECON Online Working Paper 2008/12) 
<www.reconprojecteu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html>. Gaus submits a 
contentious and courageous premise: since the European Union system violates all of the traditional 
principles for formal legitimacy, he proposes that the criteria for assessing legitimacy simply be 
changed. 
31 G Majone, Regulating Europe (Routledge 1996) 284; C Veljanovski, ‘The Regulation Game’ in C 
Veljanovski (ed), Regulators and the Market (Institute of Economic Affairs 1991) 16. 
33 The closest analogue to this issue in the EU context may be the theoretical disputes between 
intergovernmentalists, proto-federalists, constitutionalists and Euro-statists. 
34 See eg, RC Felleth, The Interstate Commerce Omission: The Public Interest and the ICC 
(Grossman 1970); J Turner, The Chemical Feast (Grossman 1970); MJ Green (ed), The Monopoly 
Makers (Grossman 1973); JR Michael (ed), Working on the System: A Comprehensive Manual for 
Citizen Access to Federal Agencies (Basic Books 1974). See also The President’s Advisory Council 
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 In the EU, it is not at all a matter of consensus as to what is represented by 
the public interest and how it should be analyzed. Thus, with respect to the internal 
market, the definition of the ‘public interest’ has no fixed meaning. This has major 
implications for how the public interest should be reflected in the EU regulatory 
space, that is, in the extent of negative and positive integration that should apply 
within the internal market. If an underlying premise justifying delegation in the 
context of national regulation is that all those who are concerned have common 
interests, but that their judgments may differ for one reason or another,35 then a 
major premise inherent in national delegation is absent in the EU context. Not only 
do judgments differ as to what problems to address, there is an absence of common 
interest on the part of those who are concerned or affected by EU regulation.36 The 
most notable current example is the parlous state of the debtor Mediterranean 
Member States in the euro crisis, as compared to the position of the creditor Member 
States further north.37 
In the EU, the issue of whether regulation has satisfied the public interest 
brings out the distinction made earlier between negative, ‘market making’, 
integration and positive, ‘market correcting’, integration measures. What should be 
understood by the notion of the ‘public interest’ in the EU that is satisfied by 
European legislative measures? Any formulation of the public interest to be served in 
the EU is inherently subjective even if couched in terms related to the objectives of 
the Treaties, whose provisions give no guidance for interpretation or for 
determinations of consensual agreement. The question of how much positive 
integration is needed in order to satisfy the public interest at stake in the EU is highly 
                                                                                                                                     
on Executive Organization, A New Regulatory Framework:  Report on Selected Independent 
Regulatory Agencies [Ash Council Report] (Washington DC Government Printing Office 1971) 
<http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/org/origins/ash.html> accessed on 23 March 2009. 
35 R Bellamy, ‘Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation and Democracy in the European Union’ (2006) 12 
ELJ 725, 736. 
36 Europe is characterized among other things by differences in the size of Member States, in social 
welfare models, in languages, geography and in approaches to macroeconomic management.  
37 While creating financial stability as an objective cannot be contested, the measures imposed upon 
the debtor states have caused contraction and deflation in those economies to the point of provoking 
civil unrest, severely high unemployment and the emergence of extremist politicians and political 
parties. Nor is it obvious that the measures adopted to date have equitably balanced the competing 
interests of the creditor and debtor Member States, or that the national public interest of the debtor 
countries genuinely corresponded to the measures adopted. The measures have undermined the 




contestable. Precisely because there is no broad consensus on what constitutes the 
public interest in the EU, the Commission’s view of positive integration represents 
one among many; it is far from consensual; and can be challenged by those whose 
view differs from that of the Commission and whose interests may be under-
represented in the Commission’s interpretation. When the Commission exercises its 
Treaty powers to adopt a legal act, the mechanism of judicial review provides 
oversight and accountability, even if the Court has come in for trenchant criticism of 
its own when reviewing Commission decisions and administrative actions.38  
With respect to positive integration measures, does the Commission 
genuinely seek to discover the overall EU ‘public interest’, or does it pursue a 
particular institutional view of the internal market?39 It is doubtful if a shared view of 
the public interest even exists. If there is no consensus on what the public interest 
means in the EU, then there is equally no - or only a weak - basis to conclude that the 
Commission’s unilateral institutional views of and priorities for positive integration 
should be considered legitimate. Given this consensual weakness, a possible solution 
to redress the weak legitimacy of the Commission as a regulator that is attributable to 
its prerogative of proposing harmonizing regulation under the Treaty would be for 
the Commission to use regulatory governance policy explicitly to address the lack of 
a broad consensus on what constitutes the public interest while remaining within its 
Treaty remit.40     
                                                
38 The standard of review often attributed to the Court when appraising the Commission’s discretion is 
said to be overly ‘deferential’. One author noted: ‘the current EU competition enforcement regime, 
which is characterized by an administrative decision-maker with no guarantees of independence and 
impartiality and deferential judicial review, is unconstitutional’.  R Nazzini, ‘Administrative 
Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A Comparative 
Contextual-Functionalist Perspective’ (2012) 49 CMLR 971, 1005. For the proposition, inter alia, that 
the Court takes an overly lax stance in evaluating Commission decisions in competition policy 
enforcement, see also I Forrester, ‘A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of “Light 
Judicial Review”’ in C-D Ehlermann and M Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2009: 
The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Hart Publishing 2011) 407; 
and I Forrester, ‘Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A distinguished Institution with Flawed 
Procedures’ (2009) 34 EL Rev 817.  
39 In addition to the consensual weakness of the Commission’s views, institutional incentives 
encourage the Commission to engage in positive regulatory activities through the legislative process. 
See Majone (n 31) 61-79. 
40 Majone’s solution was a system of multiple controls, using an amalgam of the US agency model, 
with criteria unlikely to be practicable in the EU context, eg clarity of legislative objectives combined 
with clear performance (output) standards. My solution preserves the institutional allocation of 
powers and requires no Treaty amendment or legislation to put into practice.  
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 National regulators operating within a national political environment at least 
have a claim that their regulatory appreciations reflect a broadly consensual view of 
the public interest, in addition to which the national regulators are not designing their 
own remit. Moreover, where the activities of national regulators do not reflect a 
broad consensus, the national political processes in principle offer democratic 
corrective mechanisms.41 No basis exists for the Commission to claim a consensual 
view of what constitutes the public interest in the EU, nor is there any equivalent 
correction mechanism at the EU level, for which a political consensus would be 
needed, and which is far from the case at present.42   
 The Commission’s judgments and choices may reflect institutional and 
structural factors that reflect incentives for the Commission to regulate, which are 
not present in the national context or, if present, do not significantly distort the public 
interest choices of national regulators, or are correctable within national political 
processes.43 The existence of a broad national consensus on what constitutes the 
public interest in no way alleviates the need for national governments to address the 
point of principle of delegation. Delegation dilutes the input legitimacy of the 
national regulatory regime.44 This is problematic because legitimate national 
government requires both input and output legitimacy. So how do national 
governments address the issue? 
States often use regulators, for reasons related to transaction costs, policy 
commitment and asymmetric levels of information. Alternatives to electoral 
accountability, such as binding administrative codes of conduct and judicial review 
                                                
41 Considerable scholarship is devoted to public interest and regulatory failure theories. See B 
Horwitz, The Irony of Regulatory Reform (OUP 1989); JO Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy: The 
Administrative Process and the American Government (CUP 1978). In the 1930s, US government 
reports began to identify structural regulatory failures in numerous reports on investigations of 
regulatory performances. Horwitz 27. See also President’s Advisory Council on Executive 
Organization (n 33). 
42 In the current climate of euro crisis, much discourse focuses on survival of the EU and certainly 
none at all on fine-tuning its regulatory prerogatives. That is likely to continue for many years to 
come, given the uncertainty of the draft Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union. See ‘Editorial Comments: Some Thoughts Concerning the Draft 
Treaty on a Reinforced Economic Union’ (2012) 49 CMLR 1. 
43 The Commission’s powers are primarily regulatory. It has few or no powers in the budgetary 
(disbursement) and social welfare areas.  
44 Scharpf conceded that it may be possible to use functional alternatives to electoral accountability 
where its use could lead to undesirable outcomes or would be insufficiently effective because the 
social and institutional preconditions for legitimacy were lacking. See F Scharpf, Governing in 
Europe Effective and Democratic? (OUP 1999) 14-15.  
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of regulatory decisions, were created in national regulatory space to ensure the 
effective control of the use of discretionary rules by national regulators.45 These 
alternatives were first adopted in the US and are now widespread in Western 
administrative and regulatory practices in various regulatory constellations. The 
administrative procedural approach in the US relies on elaborate forms of due 
process and judicial oversight.46 The US model of regulatory governance is far from 
ideal though, plagued as it is by long delays, and with no more certainty of serving 
the public interest than other approaches. Nonetheless, the US model and experience 
have heavily influenced the development of governance scholarship and practices 
elsewhere in the industrialized world.47 
 Two distinct but related notions should be clarified at this point. While 
legitimacy is a normative characteristic of a regulator,48 effectiveness is an empirical 
feature of regulation.49 Social scientists and economic theories of regulation tend to 
infer the former from the latter. Both conclusions are highly contentious especially 
for a transnational regulator like the Commission. Determining the legitimacy of a 
regulator requires a balancing of different factors, different forms of gains and losses, 
and different interests.50  
Lack of consensus on what constitutes regulatory legitimacy has not prevented 
states from adopting notionally ‘good’ regulatory governance criteria.51 Baldwin and 
                                                
45 R Baldwin, Rules and Government (OUP 1995) 36-37. 
46 RB Stewart, ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’ (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 
1669.  
47 M Lodge and L Stirton, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ in R Baldwin, M Cave and M 
Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010) 351. Delegation to independent federal 
agencies was premised on excluding policy-makers/politicians from following their short-term 
preferences. Independence, not accountability, was the normatively desirable criterion for agencies. 
Accountability could actually undermine their effectiveness. These premises are clearly reflected in 
Majone’s work, below. 
48 See eg J Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric 
Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation and Governance 137. 
49 Considerable debate characterises the notion of what constitutes ‘effectiveness’. See eg R Baldwin 
and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (OUP 1999) 76; R Baldwin 
and C McCrudden, Regulation and Public Law (Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1987) ch 3; Baldwin (n 
45) ch 3. In Rules and Government, Baldwin noted that the attempts to establish effectiveness are 
essentially looking for a ‘coherent’ basis for evaluating governmental and administrative procedures, 
which he characterised as serving a broad array of values, at 37. Many authors bemoan the lack of 
effectiveness studies as they are seemingly something of a ‘Cinderella’ in regulatory scholarship.   
50 Coen and Thatcher (n 1) 339. 
51 OECD, ‘Regulatory Policy and Governance: Supporting Economic Growth and Serving the Public 




Cave identified five benchmarks to determine the legitimacy of regulatory action and 
what constitutes ‘good regulation’, by asking the following questions, (the higher the 
number of positive answers, the greater the legitimacy):  
• is there a legislative authority or mandate for the regulation? 
• is there some form of accountability? 
• are procedures fair, accessible and open?  
• is the regulator acting with sufficient expertise? 
• is the regime or action efficient?52 
Baldwin and McCrudden identify the same five criteria for identifying legitimate 
agency action.53 By satisfying some or all of the above criteria, in whole or in part, 
regulatory legitimacy has come to mean ‘worthy of support’ in governance theory 
rather than ‘entitlement to rule’.54  Thus the premise, that control mechanisms in the 
national regulatory space may be regarded as alternatives to purely democratic 
accountability mechanisms, has come to be broadly accepted.55  
Modern scholarship tends to focus on several normative criteria that 
contribute to, but do not alone constitute, regulatory legitimacy. In economic theory, 
regulatory credibility and policy commitment are linked with independence but 
regulation may lack control and accountability mechanisms or these may be 
ineffective. Other criteria of legitimacy than those above may be included but would 
be contentious for different reasons. The output legitimacy of a regulatory regime 
would necessarily depend on the effectiveness of the regulatory intervention, that is, 
by reference to the results it achieved.56 However, Baldwin and Cave found 
effectiveness was too contentious a criterion to measure and thus excluded it. By 
using all of the five criteria together, those to whom the national regulator is 
accountable may make reasonable inferences.57  
                                                
52 Baldwin and Cave (n 49) 76-85. 
53 Baldwin and McCrudden (n 47) 33-52. 
54 R Baldwin, ‘Regulation Lite: The Rise of Emissions Trading’ (2008) LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 3/2008 (London School of Economics and Political Science, Law 
Department) 25 n 125 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091784>.   
55 Baldwin (n 45) 36-37. 
56 Majone referred to this as ‘accountability by results’. See G Majone, ‘From the Positive to the 
Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of the Changes in the Mode of Governance’ (1997) 17 
JPP 139, 161. 
57 Effectiveness as a concept has accepted meaning, and depends entirely on the frame of analysis, and 
what specific aims are intended to be achieved. Regulatory mandates are notoriously broad and 
considerable discretion is accorded to regulators, thus undermining the ability to reach incontestable 
conclusions about effectiveness. See eg, Baldwin and Cave (n 49) 78. 
62 
 
 With few exceptions,58 most models of regulatory evaluation do not include 
the criterion of proportionality, that is, the principle that the means to be employed in 
regulation should be proportionate to the objective pursued.59 This is a 
constitutionally important principle for the EU.60 Proportionality is difficult to 
evaluate in a regulatory context as it involves a subjective appreciation of relative 
values. For national regulators, it can be regarded simply as an aspect of efficiency, 
that is, of achieving the objectives of the regulatory mandate with the least use of 
input resources for maximal output.61 However, the objectives of the regulatory 
mandate for the Commission, ie the establishment and functioning of the single 
market, are singularly open-ended, leaving much room for discretionary 
appreciation. Furthermore, even though the Court has jurisdiction to determine if a 
legislative act has infringed the principle of proportionality,62 earlier case law 
suggests that the Court is generally willing to accord wide discretion to the European 
legislator, thus making a finding of infringement of the principle highly unlikely, 
other things being equal.  
 Of course, policy instruments should generally reflect the use of minimally 
effective measures in the achievement of regulatory objectives. The problem with the 
EU regulatory design process is the level of Commission control or influence over all 
phases of regulatory policy development and refinement. With institutional 
incentives to define single market problems in ways that require European rules and 
structures of enforcement, and with a vague definition of the principle, 
proportionality can generally appear to be satisfied. Nonetheless, the perception of an 
                                                
58 One such exception is the UK.  
59 Proportionality is one of the Principles for Good Regulation identified by the UK Better Regulation 
Task Force (BRTF). Five principles comprise the UK model: (1) transparency; (2) accountability; (3) 
proportionality; (4) consistency; and (5) targeting. See Regulation – Less is More Reducing Burdens 
Improving Outcomes: A BRTF Report to the Prime Minister (March 2005) 11 and Annex B <  
http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file22967.pdf>. 
60 It was codified in the Maastricht Treaty reflecting a desire on the part of Member States to avoid 
over-regulation when harmonization was thought to be needed. There is little guidance and even less 
restraint on the application of this principle in relation to harmonization legislation. ‘Only legislative 
choices that verge on the absurd are likely to be condemned as manifestly inappropriate.’ S 
Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court’s Case Law has become a “Drafting Guide”’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827, 844. 
61 Baldwin and Cave (n 49) 83 n 26. 
62 Treaty of the European Union, Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity 
and Proportionality [2010] C83/206, art 8. 
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emerging ‘regulatory state’ phenomenon remains that is problematic for European 
legitimacy.  
A key premise in all regulatory theories for national regulators is that 
regulatory control mechanisms make the regulator accountable to a recognized 
legitimacy body or community, independent of the regulator, such as a national 
executive, parliament or ombudsman. The EU presents particularly difficult issues of 
accountability. Regulatory accountability is important in three contexts all of which 
are observed in the EU. The first is in situations where the regulator’s mandate is 
imprecise. The second is where the interests of those who are affected by or 
interested in the regulation are diverse. Accountability becomes crucial in the third 
instance, when there are ‘fundamental disagreements about the purposes of 
regulation - whether, for instance, economic efficiency should be the sole aim...or 
whether social objectives should be taken on board’.63   
The above three factors are all present in the European regulatory context in 
different but still significant degrees. The Treaty lays down broad, open-textured 
aims, and not only fails to give the Commission any guidance on how to exercise its 
discretion in initiating regulatory policy, but also gives no guidance on integrationist 
priorities, or on how to balance the widely diverging interests of states, regions, 
industry and citizens, whether as public actors, or workers, consumers or private 
individuals. With the introduction of broader objectives into the Treaties, the 
prerogative of interpreting the meaning of the public interest relative to the single 
market becomes fraught with uncertainty. Despite repeated amendments of the 
Treaties from 1992 to 2009, no accountability mechanisms for regulatory discretion 
have ever been introduced into the Treaties, on how to use positive integration 
measures, or how to balance the interests that may be affected by such measures. The 
dilemma is substantially one of design.  
A tension between regulatory independence and accountability is an inherent 
part of the setup of national regulators and is a consistent theme in regulatory 
governance.64 When a regulator is seen as unduly close to the national government or 
the oversight body, it risks being considered unreliable. When a regulator is seen to 
be independent to a degree that its decisions are tainted by ideological policy-making 
                                                
63 ibid 286. 
64 See eg, Majone (n 31). 
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concerns, this undermines its accountability. Regulators have to walk a kind of 
‘tightrope’ between an excess of independence that jeopardizes their accountability, 
on one side, and excessive forms of accountability that jeopardize their professional 
independence, possibly even their effectiveness, on the other. Good regulatory 
governance tries to address the inherent tension by including elements that take 
account of both of these values.  
The purpose of using normative criteria to construct a legitimacy analysis is 
to create a defensible basis for having public confidence in a regulator; it is not a 
basis for creating public popularity. No single criterion would be sufficient to 
establish the legitimacy of a national regulator but satisfaction of these criteria in 
whole or in part heightens the regulatory legitimacy of the regulator. Not all of the 
criteria can be completely satisfied given inherent tensions between some of the 
underlying values, for example, between efficiency and due process. Nonetheless, 
the combination of these criteria can be considered justificatory to an extent that is 
greater than the individual parts. Combining the criteria leads to a ‘collective 
justificatory power’ that underpins a normative assessment that a regulator is entitled 
to be regarded as legitimate.65 In effect, normative legitimacy may justifiably be 
attributed to a regulator, whether or not it is popular or socially acceptable.  
  
2.2. Criteria of appreciation 
This section analyzes five qualitative criteria linked to values associated with 
legitimacy for reasons which I explore in this chapter.66  I explain the regulatory 
criteria below, bearing in mind that the economic regulation to be evaluated in the 
European context is simply one of many different types of regulation bearing 
different justificatory rationales.67 I return to the relevance of the point that the 
present research evaluates the legitimacy of European economic regulation in the 
sections below.  
                                                
65 Baldwin and Cave (n 45) 78-84. 
66 ibid ch 6. 
67 Examples of other types of regulation would be environmental protection legislation, public safety 
regulations, health and safety at work regulations, and data and consumer protection regulation. These 
are by no means exhaustive. For a review of the types of regulation and strategies that may be used to 




In a regulatory context, authority has a normatively different meaning from that of a 
democratically established government.68  In the national regulatory governance 
context, authority principally refers to the right or prerogative to exercise powers of 
regulation which are delegated, generally taking a statutory form in national law.69  
Authority responds to the question of whether regulatory power can be justified by 
reference to an identifiably normative basis.70 All regulators require some form of 
authority.71 Regulatory authority is important, even if no consensus exists on the 
fundamental nature of the regulator’s authority or the locus of its origin, that is, 
whether a regulator’s authority comes from a social or normative basis.73 Whatever 
the nature of the authority that is recognized, regulators that do not enjoy some form 
of authority will constantly encounter resistance or challenges to their regulatory 
choices and decisions. Even the coercive resources of a sovereign state would 
struggle to overcome a systemic failure of compliance with the applicable norms.  
In the EU, authority is crucial for the Commission because it enjoys a 
monopoly on positive policy proposals.75 The Treaty formulation of its mandate, 
however, as well as the definition of the internal market are both open-textured and 
the Commission uses its prerogatives with no guidance or mechanisms of meaningful 
accountability. The Commission rightly enjoys a high level of authority, as a general 
                                                
68 A traditional Western consensus is that states enjoy supreme power above which there is ‘no higher 
or superior authority’. N MacCormick, ‘Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of 
Europe’ in R Bellamy and V Bufacchi (eds), Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of 
Europe (Lothian Foundation Press 1995) 198. Governments therefore enjoy authority and legitimacy 
in the political science sense, roughly expressed as the ‘people’s consent to the structures of power 
and the processes for exercising power’. Weiler (n 30) 80. 
69 Baldwin and Cave (n 49) 77; Baldwin and McCrudden (n 49) ch 3.  
70 An early statement of the proposition that all federal regulatory activity must be mandated was laid 
down by the US Supreme Court for purposes of US administrative law, to the effect that the national 
constitution creates ‘no inherent administrative powers over persons and properties. Coercive controls 
on private conduct must be authorized by the legislature….[which] must promulgate rules, standards, 
goals, or some ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the exercise of administrative power.’ JWHampton & 
Co v United States 276 US 394, 409 (1928).  
71 D Bach and AL Neuman,‘The European Regulatory State and Global Public Policy: Micro-
Institutions, Macro-influence’ (2007) 14 JEPP 827, 831. These authors also argue that three factors 
are essential to a regulator: authority (usually statutory), expertise and coherence.   
73 Freedman (n 41) 10 note omitted. In this regard, Freedman cited and concurred with Weber’s 
argument that the authority of any institution ultimately rests upon a popular belief in its legitimacy. 
This reflects a sociological analysis:  an examination not of whether a regulator should be considered 
legitimate, but whether a regulator was as a matter of empirical determination actually considered to 
be legitimate.  
75 Currently, the Commission’s legislative mandate to propose positive harmonisation measures for 
the internal market is found in art 26(3) TFEU.  
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principle, for the achievement of the internal market. Without the constitutional 
value of its independence to pursue that general aim, the importance of the regulatory 
task assigned to it would be undermined and other institutional actors or even 
Member States acting alone might be tempted to thwart the Commission's focus on 
the internal market. It is another matter entirely for the working out of its single 
market commitment, for the nature and number of specific legislative proposals. 
These are a matter of institutional judgment, which are subjective appreciations of 
the individuals concerned, and require careful balancing of interests. When the 
Commission's judgment is disputed, as it routinely now is, it weakens the 
Commission’s authority and legitimacy. 
National regulators frequently have to demonstrate to their executives or 
parliaments how they have complied with national criteria of governance, laid down 
by a body that is independent of the regulator, such as the Better Regulation 
Commission in the UK.76 In the EU, regulatory governance practices in respect of 
the Commission’s role as a regulator have been defined and applied by the 
Commission itself and that only recently. Current Treaty provisions fail to create 
mechanisms to give either meaningful ex ante guidance or ex post feedback 
specifically on the Commission’s discharge of its regulatory duties.77  
2.2.2. Expertise 
Expertise is the possession by regulators of professional competence and any 
specialized knowledge or skills needed either to pursue the regulatory aims that have 
been prescribed, or to serve the interests that have been identified.78 Expertise is 
usually accompanied by a regulator’s independence, for the same reason that 
expertise is valuable in the economic model of regulation, ie in order to minimize 
political bias from regulatory decision-making.79 Much justificatory power for 
                                                
76 Better Regulation Commission 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/better-
regulation/reviewing-regulation/better-regulation-commission>accessed 28 March 2013. 
77 In the US, the Office of Management and Budget, among other things, evaluates the effectiveness 
of federal agencies’ programmes, policies and procedures. It is a cabinet-level body reporting to the 
US President. See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/>. Discussion of these extra-Treaty possibilities 
is beyond the scope of the thesis.  
78 Baldwin (n 45) 45-46; Freedman (n 41) 52. 
79 Majone links expertise, independence and credibility as crucial to the effectiveness and legitimacy 
of economic regulation pursued for public interest, general welfare creating, purposes. He refers to 
this as ‘the logic of delegation’. See G Majone, ‘Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: A Question of 
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economic regulation rests on the theoretical premise that intervening in markets 
needs to be carried out for long-term benefits that do not correspond well with short-
term political agendas and that regulators should be isolated from short-term political 
pressures.80 Independent expert regulators are said to be better at problem-solving in 
their decision-making.81  
Better problem solving skills combined with political neutrality theoretically 
produce greater levels of overall fairness in the economy.82 Thus, in an economic 
model of regulation, expertise is important because of its association with regulatory 
rationality, and with impersonal, non-partisan, assessments based on scientific 
knowledge.83  However, these theoretical assumptions may not be reflected in actual 
practice since:   
Experts have an unfortunate tendency to overlook issues that are 
legitimate worries for ordinary folk. People’s everyday contact with 
doctors, lawyers, and other professionals means they are well aware that 
experts can make mistakes or overlook the dilemmas facing those they 
are supposed to serve. Their use by politicians to bolster unpopular 
decisions has also resulted in their being scarcely distinguishable from 
their political masters. Certainly, episodes such as [bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy, ie ‘mad-cow disease’] and the French blood scandal 
have somewhat tarnished technocracy in the eyes of European citizens.84  
 
Thus theoretical assumptions about the positive qualities of experts are not 
necessarily empirically confirmed.85 Real-world critique of regulatory outcomes is 
relevant to regulatory governance by showing that regulation requires empirical ex 
post assessments, discussed below. It also highlights the necessity of using several 
                                                                                                                                     
Standards’ (1998) 4 ELJ 5, 16-19. I discuss expertise and its relevance to the economic theory of 
regulation below. 
80 Three examples of the desirability of independent regulators can be seen in the constellation of 
agencies and regulators in the UK: the Office of Communications (Ofcom), responsible for regulating 
the media and communications industry; the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), responsible for protecting 
consumer interests; and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), responsible for all aspects of civil 
aviation in the UK. For a complete list of the regulatory bodies in the UK see 
<http://regulatorylaw.co.uk/List_of_regulatory_bodies.html> accessed 19 November 2012.  
81 Majone (n 9) 56. 
82 The theory argues that faith in the neutral administrative process protects powerless consumers, 
effects rationality and achieves greater fairness in the economy. See Horwitz (n 39) 25-26. 
83 This normative association is particularly linked with public interest theory. See ibid 24-25.  
84 Bellamy (n 35) 740. 
85 Freedman identified several problematic issues with experts as:  the expert regulator as a person 
who is out of touch with the common reality; the expert regulator as a distant participant in daily life 
such that a practical understanding of the job to be done eludes him/her; the expert regulator as 
embodying paternalism; and the expert regulator as being strong on rhetoric and short on 
performance. See Freedman (n 41).  
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criteria in combination for regulatory evaluations and, where needed, adjusting the 
value ascribed to each in different regulatory contexts, for example, in a situation 
such as that currently in the UK in respect of press regulation.86    
Expertise is typically associated with economic theories of regulation in 
which allocative efficiency is the objective.87 This is reasonable because economic 
analyses are required for regulators to carry out a proper evaluation of how to 
construct and apply economic regulation, that is, regulation in furtherance of macro-
economic public interest, where the benefits accrue to all in theory.88   
The contribution of expertise to regulatory legitimacy can be enhanced in 
some circumstances. This is the case, for example, (1) when the issues at stake are 
polycentric, and opinions and values differ, but where a balanced judgment is 
needed; (2) where the applicable rules or guidelines cannot be overly prescriptive, 
nor can the reasoning and justifications given for regulatory choices be exhaustive; 
(3) where the performance of the expert regulators improves over time with 
experience; and (4) where non-specialists find the underlying premises of regulation, 
and determining success in applying expertise, difficult.89 These considerations are 
all relevant to economic regulation in the EU and will be considered within the 
analysis of regulatory governance practices examined in chapters 4 to 6.  
2.2.3. Efficiency 
Efficiency as a criterion is usually found in economic theories of regulation but these 
do not entirely agree on its precise meaning.90 It refers either to the twin premises 
                                                
86 Note that this example is currently (but may not be in future) a relevant example of the 
ineffectiveness of the current regulatory framework for the print media and more particularly 
newspapers. The Press Complaints Commission as of December 2012 is an independent body through 
which the British press regulates itself. The final report of the Leveson enquiry can be found at 
<http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/about/the-report/> accessed 7 March 2013. 
87 The term allocative efficiency is a concept of industrial productivity referring to the choice of a 
combination of labour and capital inputs so as to produce a given quantity of outputs at minimum 
cost. See eg TJ Coelli and others, An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity Analysis (Springer 
2005) 5. 
88 For a description of the traditional model, see Stewart (n 46). For a rebuttal see C Velajanovski, 
‘Economic Approaches for Regulation’ in R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010).  
89 Baldwin (n 45) 45. 
90 Velajanovski (n 88) 19. Moreover, the economic theory of regulation has many detractors. For a 
start on the critical literature, see eg M Feintuck, ‘Regulatory Rationales Beyond the Economic’ in  R 
Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010); M Feintuck, 
The ‘Public Interest’ in Regulation (OUP 2004); AV Katz (ed), Foundations in the Economic 
Approach to Law (OUP 1998); C Leys, Market-Driven Politics: Neoliberal Democracy and the 
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that ‘no-one-is-harmed’ by the application of the regulatory measures and that 
resources are optimally allocated as an outcome of regulation, or to the premise that 
a cost-benefit test is satisfied by reference to the gains exceeding the harm done by 
regulation.91   
In public interest theory the State acts in the public interest to remedy market 
failures or imperfections.92 Economic regulation generally is justified by the public 
interest in enhancing overall economic welfare.93 Economic regulation, as a 
systematic form of state intervention in markets and the economy, first developed in 
the US in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and expanded considerably 
during the period that industrial processes, as well as large-scale capitalism, were 
evolving in scale and complexity.94 Horwitz noted that many businesses supported 
federal regulation during this period, not for reasons of controlling the content of 
regulation, but, inter alia, to remove inconsistent State and local regulations.95 This 
point of view parallels that of European industry in the period to complete the 
internal market by 1992.   
Occasionally regulatory efficiency may be defined within the regulatory 
mandate itself. More often, mandates are insufficiently precise or entirely neglect the 
value. Thus a finding of efficient regulation within regulatory governance can be 
both difficult to establish and contestable.96 Likewise, in situations where the 
mandate includes a broad scope for regulatory discretion, and where one regulator’s 
mandate overlaps or is adjacent to another’s, efficiency will be difficult to 
determine.97 
                                                                                                                                     
Public Interest (Verso 2001); BM Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing 
and Removing Regulatory Forms (Columbia UP 1980). 
91 Velajanovski (n 88) 19-20. 
92 Baldwin and Cave (n 49) 19. 
93 Public interest theory developed to explain the origins of much US economic regulation that began 
in last quarter of the nineteenth century. Horwitz (n 41) 23-24. Feintuck challenges the premise of 
economic theory that economic regulation coherently and systematically pursues values based on 
public welfare rationales and urges that regulatory rationales for economic and other kinds of 
regulation should explicitly expand beyond market economics. See Feintuck (n 87). 
94 Initially, economic, and particularly anti-monopoly, regulation was adopted as a response to popular 
perceptions of unremedied wrongs and abusive market behaviours; in addition, the courts of the 
period could be and were pressured or politicized. Horwitz (n 41) and E Glaeser and A Schleifer, ‘The 
Rise of the Regulatory State’ (2001) 41 Journal of Economic Literature 401. Public interest theory 
developed during this period to explain the origins of much US regulation. Horwitz (n 39) 23-24. 
95 Horwitz (n 41) 33.  
96 Baldwin and Cave (n 49) 81; Baldwin (n 45) 81. 
97 Baldwin and Cave (n 49) 81; P Craig, ‘The Monopolies and Mergers Commission: Competition and 
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Baldwin and Cave identify two kinds of efficiencies that may be ascribed to 
national regulation.98 In the first, efficient regulation is that which uses the least 
possible level of inputs and costs and achieves productive efficiency. The second 
kind of efficiency derives from an evaluation of regulatory results on the basis of 
criteria that are developed independently of the specific regulatory mandate. The first 
kind of efficiency suffers from distinctive weaknesses associated with public interest 
theories,99 imprecise legislative mandates and incoherent regulatory objectives.100 
The second involves recourse to arguments about allocative efficiency and dynamic 
efficiency.101  
The efficiency challenges for the Commission as an economic regulator are 
multiple:  the mandate for the internal market provides no precise guidance on how 
to serve the public interest by balancing conflicts of interest. When pan-European 
markets are created, there are inevitably undertakings that thrive and others that 
decline, thus creating winners and losers. Unless the circumstances of the market are 
so unambiguous before and after market intervention, so as to render the changes 
therein readily detectable and attributable to regulation, any evaluation of efficiency 
will be contentious.102 Some contend that regulation particularly in the area of 
utilities, to which telecommunications belongs, should in no case be evaluated 
against any standard of efficiency.103 Notwithstanding, it will be seen in following 
                                                                                                                                     
Administrative Rationality’ in Baldwin and McCrudden (n 47).  
98 Baldwin and Cave (n 49) 81. 
99 All theories of the origin of regulation are theories of ‘interest’ - although the term ‘interest’ has no 
single agreed meaning - and all theories assume that satisfaction or attainment of some “interest” is 
sought through the mechanism of public regulation. BM Mitnick, The Political Economy of 
Regulation: Creating, Designing and Removing Regulatory Forms (Columbia UP 1980) 84. Public 
interest theories have corresponding regulatory failure theories. These are outwith the scope of the 
thesis. For discussion, see Horwitz (n 41); M Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent 
Commission (Princeton UP 1955); T Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of 
Public Authority (WW Norton & Co 1969) 31; G Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: a 
Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (Free Press 1963), 3.  
100 On the latter see CG Veljanovski, ‘Cable Television: Agency Franchising and Economics’ in 
Baldwin and McCrudden, Regulation and Public Law (Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1987).  
101 Baldwin and Cave (n 49) 94. See also R Cooter and T Ilen, Law and Economics (Pearson 1988) 
17-18; R Baldwin and M Cave, Franchising as a Tool of Government (Centre for the Study of the 
Regulated Industries 1996) s 4.1.  
102 A principal task in the early decades of the European Economic Community was to construct an 
internal market. In market-creating contexts, efficiency may be easier to detect than in re-regulatory 
contexts, where changes to the structure of the market can less readily or less reliably be attributed to 
market intervention. 
103 T Prosser, Law and the Regulators (OUP 1997) 15-24. 
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chapters that efficiency can indeed play a role in regulatory governance analysis for 
telecommunications.  
Relative to efficiency, a national regulator will be assumed to share a view of 
what constitutes the public interest in exercising his regulatory discretion.104 The 
Commissions inability to claim that the positive integration measures that it proposes 
represent a broadly shared consensus on what constitutes the public interest makes 
the application of efficiency as an evaluative criterion even harder than for national 
regulators.  
The Commission faces a fourfold dilemma in achieving efficiency in its 
regulatory governance practices:  first, its general regulatory mandate is broader than 
most national regulators, and given without guidance; second, as an institution, its 
status guarantees its independence, thus running counter to the important value that 
regulators exercising delegated authority should receive some form of feedback;105 
third, because its authority as a legitimate regulator is derived from the democratic 
credentials of the Member States, the Commission is susceptible to being influenced 
in its judgments by the views of national authorities, a vice that its independence was 
meant to pre-empt. Finally, without consensus among citizens and states of the 
Union as to what constitutes the public interest, a link between regulating and 
serving that interest is difficult to establish.  
Despite its theoretical drawbacks, efficiency can contribute positively to a 
coherent model of regulatory governance for the Commission if its weaknesses can 
be strengthened in combination with other governance criteria and if its value, 
relative to other criteria, is adjusted to take account of any non-economic 
considerations if appropriate. This requires a specific governance approach to each 
regulatory case and its unique commercial, social and structural contexts.  
 
2.2.4. Procedural due process and transparency 
Rules and procedures are well-established benchmarks used in evaluating the 
legitimacy of a national regulator and its regulation.106  Policy processes necessarily 
                                                
104 I am grateful to Professor Andrew Scott for this observation (August 2009). 
105 Baldwin and Cave (n 49)78-79. 
106 Some commentators combine transparency and due process. Others separate them. Baldwin and 
Cave identified five tests in total for legitimacy of which the combination of procedural fairness and 
openness was third. Other normative values such as participation are said to be facilitated in open 
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involve methods of carrying out regulatory activities by a variety of public and 
private actors who define problems, identify solutions, evaluate policy, propose 
harmonizing measures, adopt binding legislation, apply or enforce the norms thus 
established and then re-start the policy process. It can be thought of as a regulatory 
‘life cycle’. Procedure and practice determine who participates, in what capacities 
and with what influence over the aspect of policy that is involved at any given stage 
of the cycle.  
 A regulator is largely responsible for the quality of the executive processes 
over which it has control. Therefore qualitative due process enhances regulatory 
authority. Furthermore, aspects of due process such as transparency, accessibility and 
fairness align with authority and fit with values associated with democracy. A 
process is legitimate or illegitimate in the sense that certain values are said to be 
satisfied or not.107 A legal theory of regulatory legitimacy posits that clear, pre-
established norms and rules, complemented with judicial processes to protect 
individuals’ procedural and substantive rights, with no particular emphasis on 
efficiency, conveys a maximum of legitimacy.108 Within this framing in a national 
setting, a legislature delegates its powers, but constrains the exercise of regulatory 
discretion using administrative processes. This contributes to regulatory legitimacy 
on the basis that those affected by the rules have been treated fairly and given a right 
to be heard, and that interested parties  are entitled to provide input into a transparent 
rule-making process. Openness, ie the level of visibility within regulatory processes, 
and transparency, ie access to relevant regulatory information used in regulatory 
processes, are both important.109  
 Can there be too much emphasis on procedure? Criticisms of procedural due 
process as a major rationale for legitimacy focus on the possibilities of sub-optimal 
decision-making by impairing regulatory expertise and independent judgment.110 
Reliance on procedure does not guarantee that norms and procedures actually 
                                                                                                                                     
procedures. All of these facets of regulatory procedures are relevant to an evaluation of the 
contribution of due process to regulatory legitimacy. See Baldwin and Cave (n 49) 79 for a largely 
procedure-based rationale to regulatory legitimacy see Stewart (n 46).  
107 Baldwin (n 45) 42. 
108 ibid 17. 
109 Some authors make little distinction between openness and transparency. See eg Baldwin and Cave 




address the collective or social issues involved; nor does it necessarily ensure that 
regulation in practice corresponds to the legislative mandate: it may distort the 
development of expertise and the exercise of expert judgment.111   
The importance of due process within regulatory governance derives from its 
actual use within regulatory policy processes. An evaluation of the fairness, 
accessibility and transparency of policy processes is the basis for attributing greater 
or lesser legitimacy to the regulation that emerges from the process. In this respect, 
the legitimacy conferred by due process can be imputed along the entirety of the 
regulatory processes of problem definition, assessment and refinement. This will be 
seen through the empirical examination of the case study.  
 Legitimacy based on procedural transparency and accessibility resonates with 
the notions of input and output legitimacy seen in Chapter 1. Transparency can 
operate to introduce democratic values in developing positions and taking 
decisions.112 Openness can contribute authoritative weight to the legitimacy of 
regulatory decisions taken. But due process should be used meaningfully. The value 
of the contribution of due process in the form of transparency and accessibility 
depends on how and when used and the resulting impact on the regulatory outcome.  
 Allowing free public access to information collected and relied upon by 
public authorities enhances transparency. Few would want to reproduce the heavy 
administrative machinery of the US agency system, and its associated delays and 
costs. Yet the influence of the American model cannot be doubted.113 More openness 
could be introduced into the EU procedures of regulatory formulation.114 The 
institutions, and notably the Council, have relinquished the privacy of their 
deliberations, albeit only partially.115  
                                                
111 Baldwin (n 45) 44. 
112 D  Curtin and AJ Meijer, ‘Does Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?’ (2006) 11 Information 
Polity 109, 114. 
113 For a critical view of the heaviness of US administrative procedures, see Stewart (n 46). For a 
positive view of US agency practices, see G Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The 
Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth (OUP 2009) 85-88. 
114 European governance practices will be examined in greater detail below. Prior to 2001, the 
Commission services varied widely in their approach to open policy making and legislative drafting.  
115 Art 15 TFEU, previously art 255 TEC, requires institutions and agencies to ‘work as openly as 
possible’. The provision reads: 1. In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of 
civil society, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as 
possible. 2. The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council when considering and 
voting on a draft legislative act. 
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2.2.5. Effectiveness 
Effectiveness is another criterion found in the scholarship on regulatory 
governance.116 Effectiveness has been used to mean compliance, implementation, 
enforcement and impact.117 For some authors, effectiveness means that the defined 
policy objectives of regulation are achieved.118 It is different from standards-setting 
regulation or performance-based rules.119 Frequently empirical effectiveness is either 
equated to or constitutes the basis for a conclusion of output legitimacy.120 Such a 
conclusion requires an empirical demonstration of a positive relationship between the 
market outcomes and the market intervention measures.  
Effectiveness is not universally a normatively necessary criterion of 
regulatory governance.121 Without an examination of effectiveness ex post, some 
authors argue that regulation can be ‘justified’, that it carries a significant level of 
authority, even if it is not necessarily ‘right’.122 This over-relies on the contestable 
premises of the economic theory of regulation, that no one is harmed and that 
properly executed economic regulation creates overall welfare benefits. Regulatory 
                                                
116 PJ May, ‘Regulatory Regimes and Accountability’ (2007) 1 Regulation and Governance 8-26; G 
Skogstad, ‘Legitimacy and/or Policy Effectiveness?: Network Governance and GMO Regulation’ 
(2003) 10 JEPP 321. Majone theorised that the prima facie substantive legitimacy of a regulator 
depends on several factors, all of which must be present to create and maintain regulatory legitimacy. 
These factors are:  precision in relation to defining the efficiency-enhancing purposes of the regulator; 
regulatory expertise; credibility; fairness and independence. A regulator can thereafter be made 
accountable by results. See Majone (n 31) 294; Scharpf also accepted that output could constitute a 
mechanism for legitimation of regulation, in theory, but argued that the legitimizing force of this 
approach was more contingent and more limited than that for thick identity-based majoritarian 
systems. See Scharpf (n 42) 10-11. 
117 F Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques’ (1993) 56 MLR 19, 24-25. Snyder noted that the scholarship often considers this 
criterion as a distinct phenomenon whereas these values may refer to different perspectives of the 
same thing. He nonetheless observed that there is no consensus on what it means, notably in relation 
to European law, with little empirical research on the subject of the effectiveness in the EU.  
118 Skogstad (n 116) 322. 
119 The criterion of effectiveness as an empirical assessment of traditional governmental regulation is 
distinguishable from regulation that sets performance-based standards, which may or may not be 
subjected to empirical evaluations. See C Coglianese, J Nash and T Olmstead, ‘Performance-Based 
Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation’ (2003) 55 
Administrative Law Journal 705. 
120 See eg,Skogstad (n 116) 325; Majone identified a traditional model of regulation as one where 
delegation to independent regulators was justified for reasons of efficiency and effectiveness. See 
Majone (n 79)16; Scharpf (n 42) 11. 
121 ‘Certain arguments have force in debating whether this or that regulatory action or regime is 
worthy of support (is ‘legitimate’). These arguments involve reference to one or more five key tests.’ 
None of the tests mentioned concern empirical effectiveness. See Baldwin and Cave (n 49) 77. 
122 ibid 82. 
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governance should reduce the contestability of regulation. If regulation is justifiable 
with reference to criteria and democratic values that resonate with the broader 
society, regulation is less contestable. Nonetheless, at the re-evaluation and feedback 
stages of the policy processes, effectiveness is relevant and its total absence would be 
problematic.  
The policy development phase could be used to define a relevant legislative 
meaning of effectiveness, using defined values and priorities. This re-enforces the 
point that a regulatory governance model is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. For the 
purposes of my case study, for example, because of the focus on policy development, 
the criterion of effectiveness initially offers little that would enhance the 
Commission’s legitimacy as a regulator. However, as regulation evolves, 
effectiveness should become more relevant, along with clearly defined regulatory 
objectives. I return to this point in Chapter 6.  
 
2.2.6. Concluding Remarks for Regulatory Criteria 
The above criteria reflect a broad consensus that reliable benchmarks exist for 
evaluating regulation. They are used to engage with issues of regulatory quality, 
accountability and legitimacy. The criteria offer a normative assessment, not a social 
one. How the criteria are used and weighted is not pre-determined. Views on how 
they are used in an assessment, as well as how trade-offs between different criteria 
are handled, will certainly vary. The tensions inherent in the legitimacy of the 
Commission-as-a-regulator are particularly striking. Regulatory governance is an 
administrative tool that can be used instrumentally but it cannot establish the 
Commission’s regulatory legitimacy in a ‘once-and-for-all’ definitive construction. 
Rather, if used rigorously in adapting national experiences of what constitutes ‘good’ 
regulation, and applied to the EU context, regulatory governance criteria could 
enhance the Commission's regulatory legitimacy in specific regulatory regimes. In 
my construct, supranational regulatory legitimacy results from the positive 
contribution of several factors.      
In the next section, I examine the scholarship of two leading authors in the 
field of transnational regulatory governance, particularly their criteria for regulatory 
governance. The purpose of this discussion is to identify and compare the 
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implications of their approaches for my construction of a governance model for the 
Commission. Designing accountability mechanisms to evaluate how a regulator has 
discharged its mandate requires an appreciation of what mechanisms are useful and 
what level or stage of the regulatory process is under evaluation.  
 
2.3. Majone’s Model: No Democracy Please, We’re Economists 
Giandomenico Majone is one of the most prolific authors writing on European 
regulatory affairs. His work covers much more than regulatory governance. He has 
written extensively on the EU democratic deficit, the link between the lack of 
democratic legitimacy and regulatory legitimacy in the EU, and historic inter-
governmental, non-traditional, and non-democratic sovereignty-sharing precedents. 
The present research focuses on Majonian scholarship that is based on an economic 
theory of regulation to justify the delegation of powers to an independent and non-
majoritarian supranational regulator such as the Commission.  
Although this research does not examine the numerous structural models of 
political governance used by Majone when analyzing the ‘democratic deficit’ of the 
EU and its regulatory activities, a notable and somewhat unusual feature of Majone’s 
work is his argument that the EU does not require a democratic arrangement for its 
legitimacy, neither for its regime, nor its regulatory, legitimacy.123 Thus, his political 
governance models, which are outside the remit of the present research, are not 
variations of majoritarian democracy, as is suggested by some authors,124 but an 
alternative to it.  
Majone’s model reflects a form of technocratic legitimacy that is independent 
of democratic institutions, these being not only unnecessary in the EU context, but 
also undesirable. In this area, Majone’s work draws heavily on the US administrative 
law system that was developed in relation to US federal regulatory agencies, which 
relies heavily on procedural due process and judicial review. A simplified way to 
                                                
123 Variously, Majone analogizes the EU to relational contracts, a mixed government model, a 
consociational model, and an agent-trustee model for, inter alia, the proposition that the EU is not 
genuinely sui generis. Majone (n 113) ch 4. Majone eschews a democratic model in any EU 
legitimacy context, unless and until the European states are ready and willing consensually to move to 
a federal majoritarian model impelled by economic, legal and market integration. ibid 64. 
124 The contrasting model with Majone that is used in the present research, that of Fritz Scharpf, who 
argued precisely for more majoritarian and democratic structures in the EU.  
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frame Majone’s model is to ask ‘Does technocracy convey more legitimacy than 
democracy in the supranational regulatory realm?’  
2.3.1. Integration Theory and Regulatory Criteria 
Majone follows a considerable body of scholarship that identifies neofunctionalist 
reasoning125 as the point of departure for delegating regulatory powers in the 
foundational period of the EEC: ‘The grant of autonomous powers to the European 
institutions, too, is best understood in functional terms....In particular, the important 
powers given to the Commission are justified by the functions attributed to that 
body’.126 Moreover: 
the Commission’s right of legislative initiative – which...is regarded by 
many as the root cause of the democratic deficit – is best understood as a 
way of ensuring that EC policies are directed towards the advancement 
of the general interests of the Community.127 
 
Delegation to independent institutions was thus a deliberate choice by the European 
founders to create and convey policy credibility and commitment.128  
In the context of economic regulation in the interest of overall greater 
welfare, Majone argued that:  
  [R]eliance upon qualities like independence and credibility has 
more importance than reliance upon majority rule...we must look 
for new standards of legitimacy and accountability.129  
He answers the question of whether government by technocratic experts and judges 
is compatible with democratic accountability in the following terms: yes, provided 
the relevant courts require the regulatory process to be open to public input (i.e. 
                                                
125 Functionalism and neofunctionalism comprise a considerable scholarship of integration theories. 
For some varieties of treatment and analysis, see eg L Hooghe and G Marks, ‘A Postfunctionalist 
Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’ (2008) 39 
British Journal of Political Science 1; W Sandholtz and A Stone Sweet, ‘Neo-functionalism and 
Supranational Governance’ in The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (OUP 2012 ); M Pollack, 
‘Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community’ (1994) 14 JPP 95; I 
Bache and M Flinders, Multi-level Governance  (OUP 2004). The fundamental flaw in neo-
functionalism was the failure to distinguish between different policy types and between regulatory and 
direct expenditure programs, particularly in relation to their structural costs and characteristics. 
Regulatory policies’ costs are borne by firms, individuals or governments in complying. Thus, the 
economic, political and administrative costs of implementation are borne by Member States or parts 
thereof. L Conant, ‘Review Article: The Politics of Legal Integration’ (2007) 45 JCMS 45. 
126 Majone (n 79) 23 
127 ibid. 
128 Majone (n 113) 64. 
129 Majone (n 79) 18.  
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accessible) and to public scrutiny (ie transparent), and to act on the basis of 
competent analyses, that is, expert and independent judgments.130  
Efficiency and effectiveness are important here. A commitment to efficiency 
in problem-solving, rather than a bargaining style of decision-making, and to 
accountability by results substantially legitimates the choice of politically 
independent regulators. Thus delegation in such circumstances is democratically 
justified in Majone’s framing.131 Majone’s model of normative economic regulation 
substantially relies on output legitimacy, or accountability by results.132  
2.3.2. Substantive and Procedural Legitimacy 
Majone deconstructs regulatory legitimacy into substantive and procedural elements. 
For substantive legitimacy, Majone refers to  
 ...the expertise and problem solving capacity of the regulators, their 
ability to protect diffuse interests, a rational selection of regulatory 
priorities, the congruence of agency actions with statutory objectives 
and, most important, the precision of the limits within which 
regulators are expected to operate.133 
Nothing in Majone's model requires these important regulatory capacities to be 
demonstrated as such separately from outcomes. Procedural legitimacy requires 
independent regulators to be created by democratic methods, enjoy a defined legal 
authority, and pursue legislatively mandated objectives.134 Regulatory decision-
making should follow the US model which is characterized by:  
• public participation and deliberation;  
• peer review;  
• policy analyses that justify regulatory priorities coupled with elaborated 
 regulatory reasoning of decisions;  
• judicial review; and 
• monitoring by political principals.135  
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Majone identified two modes of controlling the regulatory discretion of regulators: 
(1) oversight mechanisms, such as hearings, parliamentary reviews, non-partisan 
investigations, budgetary evaluations, and sanctions; and (2) procedural constraints 
in regulatory processes.136 The first type of control creates considerable costs for the 
overseers and risks undermining the credibility of the regulators, while the second 
although indirect is less costly.137  Majone endorses the latter. 
In Majone’s framing, when the creators of the EEC created the institutional 
set-up, there was little or no concern about the potential for over-regulation. The 
tendency towards regulatory expansion was part of the neofunctionalist design to 
create a process where economic integration would lead to political integration. The 
founders explicitly rejected parliamentary democracy and the separation of powers 
model, and thus created no accountability structures.138 The European polity was 
simply too politically immature to be ready for a more federalist arrangement.139  
Majone identified considerable risk in expanding the European regulatory 
remit:  
...the Treaties are considerably more explicit than national constitutional 
documents in identifying the public good: the four economic freedoms, a 
system of undistorted competition, prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of nationality or gender and, since the Single European Act, the 
protection of non-commodity values like environmental quality. By the 
same token, an unlimited expansion of Community competences is the 
most serious threat to the legitimacy of EC institutions since it 
undermines the credibility of such functional justifications [emphasis 
added].140 
 
In terms of economic theory, the regulatory objectives for the internal market are to 
correct some form of market failure or imperfection, whether from market 
organization or regulatory differences in Member States. Regulation at the EU level 
can thus be justified by improving market efficiency or ensuring the viability of 
markets.141 As long as the tasks assigned to supranational levels are both limited and 
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140 Majone (n 79) 23. It will be seen below that Scharpf’s model of regulatory legitimacy also 
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precisely defined, non-majoritarian sources of legitimacy - expertise, procedural 
rationality, transparency, and accountability by results - are theoretically sufficient to 
justify the delegation of powers.142 
2.3.3. Qualifications to the Majone Model 
Majone also identified a troubling trajectory increasingly to centralize powers and 
implementation structures to the European level with an assortment of EU agencies, 
working groups and committees such that an ‘urgent’ case existed for creating a 
single set of rules and procedures to be followed in regulatory decision-making.143  
Thus Majone saw a need for some form of common regulatory practices to be 
developed and applied across the board in EU regulatory activities. Nonetheless, 
differing from the US procedural-constraints-as-accountability model, Majone’s 
model accords regulatory legitimacy by results. This highlights the tension between 
accountability and effectiveness. Majone’s point here is that the task of applying 
economic regulatory policies can legitimately be delegated to regulators, provided an 
appropriate system of accountability is in place which, in the EU context, he posits as 
effectiveness.  
 He does not argue for political accountability as would be the case in a national 
context, but rather equates the outcome to the normative equivalent of political 
accountability. This is simply an output legitimacy model to which is added the 
qualitative criteria of the regulator (independent expert) and procedural rules as 
trappings. Sources of legitimacy that are grounded in the technocratic approach, ie 
expertise, procedural rationality, transparency and accountability by results, should 
be sufficient to justify the delegation of the necessary powers. This analysis can only 
go so far in the EU. Bellamy asserts that Majone ‘overplays’ the domestic 
independent regulator analogy.144 In practice, national politicians do find ways to 
influence national regulators. In the EU context, Bellamy finds the ‘plurality of 
principals and the ability of the Commission to develop a complex network of 
overlapping agencies, all reduce this [political] influence while introducing the 
dangers of conflicting forms of accountability. Meanwhile, the possibilities for 
                                                                                                                                     
eg, Baldwin and Cave (n 59) 15-16. 
142 Majone (n 79) 28. 
143 ibid 22. 
144Bellamy (n 35). 
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regulatory capture are increased by the closeness of EU regulation to various 
“stakeholders”—notably business and unions’.145 Thus Bellamy contests the premise 
that qualitative criteria can overcome the dangers of regulatory influence and failures 
that have arisen elsewhere. However, my purpose is not to analyze whether Majone’s 
governance criteria can themselves be validated. The model of regulatory 
governance developed in Chapter 3 uses the concept that regulatory criteria can 
genuinely contribute to a normative form of regulatory legitimacy for a supranational 
authority.  
 In Majone’s technocratic vision of what good governance should mean in the 
EU, delegation to a body independent of the government serves an important 
interest:  it is way of signaling credible policy commitments. For Majone, this point 
is especially relevant in the EU to bolster the reputation of EU regulation. This 
overcomes to some extent a lack of credibility of some national authorities as seen in 
their domestic markets and as perceived by their regulatory peers in other states. 
However, all that integration in the EU seems to require is uniformity, achieved 
largely by positive integration measures.146 In other words, the EU needs to define 
and verify what is a 'successful' outcome.  
 Majone is partly right: it is precisely in those areas where the credibility of 
policy commitment is most important that the logic of delegation is strongest. Few 
disagree that delegation can be justified. When that is the case ‘then we must look for 
new standards of legitimacy and accountability’.147 However, no consensus exists on 
how much delegation to independent supranational authorities is legitimate. Majone 
argued that democratic theory plays a positive role by assigning political 
responsibility for identifying which tasks may legitimately be delegated to 
independent bodies, and which tasks should remain under the direct control of 
political principals.148 This argument resolves to a formal definition of legitimacy. 
 Overall, Majone’s approach offers only some ‘bits and pieces’ for a robust 
model of regulatory governance for the Commission as a policy making regulator. 
His model bears too much resemblance to its American administrative forbearer and 
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it fails to address the inadequacies of the US model. Procedural justice cannot 
guarantee substantive justice.149 The US administrative law is not plausible as a 
defensible model of regulatory governance for the EU. Nor does Majone analyze the 
different phases of regulation. The US model has some strengths but it also suffers 
from considerable weaknesses particularly the procedure-as-accountability 
rationale.150 These gaps will be outlined in more detail in the next section where I 
analyze the regulatory theory of Fritz Scharpf and compare some of the implications 
of his views with Majone’s. 
 
2.4. Scharpf’s Model  
Much of Scharpf’s scholarship analyzes the legitimacy relationships in the EU 
primarily from a political science perspective using republican political philosophy 
and liberal political philosophy.151 The republican concept focuses on government as 
acting primarily in pursuit of the common good of the polity (from classical 
thinking), and equal participation in collective choices to create representative 
democracy (from Rousseau).152 The liberal concept focuses on the inclusive aspect of 
government, where maximizing inputs from civil society contributes to legitimacy.153 
Scharpf accepts the premise that, from the perspective of economic theory, trade 
liberalization is always justified by the benefits that accrue to consumers but, he 
argues, from a political perspective, the conclusion may be more ambiguous.154 
While Scharpf considers negative integration measures as market-making, in 
agreement with many authors, he regards positive integration as a ‘reconstruction of 
a system of economic regulation at the level of the larger economic unit’, such that 
positive integration measures may be either market-making or merely market 
correcting.155  
                                                
149 Baldwin (n 45) 27. 
150 A recent argument of procedure-as-accountability was formulated by Prosser who asserted that 
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established by recourse to ‘procedural values’ to produce a process of ‘regulatory deliberation’. T 
Prosser, The Regulatory Enterprise: Government, Regulation and Legitimacy (OUP 2010) 7-9. 
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In the early years of the Community, the limited policy programme of the 
Treaty, in combination with the Commission’s right of initiative and the unanimity 
rule in the Council, could reconcile the competing paradigms (of inter-
governmentalism and supranationalism) in order to achieve political legitimacy, but 
this consensus has long since unraveled.156 The changes to the Treaties and the 
deepening of the original Community into the EU re-calibrated the calculation and 
the logic of European legitimacy. Sharpf found a loss of political legitimacy in many 
Western countries since the historic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the so-called 
‘triumph’ of Western democratic values in the inability of political systems to solve 
problems, the latter of which was caused by two related phenomena of European 
integration and economic globalization.158 Recognizing that there are shared 
problems that require transnational cooperation, Scharpf accepted many of the 
premises inherent in the rationality and legitimacy of delegated powers to a 
supranational authority, but notably limited the type of legitimacy to which such 
delegated systems could aspire to output-based legitimacy . 
 
2.4.1. Output and Input Legitimacy159 
Scharpf associated democratic values with input (government by the people) and 
output (government for the people) legitimacy.160 Input legitimacy reflects the will of 
the governed in political choices. Output legitimacy promotes communal welfare in 
political choices. Thus the preconditions differ in respect of each.161 Input legitimacy 
is undermined when decisions are taken simply by majority rule, thus removing the 
normativity of consensus through participation. Majority rule leads to indefensible 
outcomes on its own due to its tendencies to aggregate the self-interest of individuals 
and to ignore the interests of minorities.  
 The legitimacy claims for political choices that are made by majority decision 
cannot be based solely on input legitimacy unless a collective belief exists of a duty 
                                                
156  B Kohler-Koch, ‘The Evolution and Transformation of European Governance’ (ECSA – Sixth 
Biennial International Conference, Pittsburgh, June 1999) <aei.pitt.edu/2312>. 
158 Scharpf (n 42) 2.  
159 Scharpf’s views in this section are largely drawn from ibid 6-42. 
160 ibid 6. 
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to accept personal sacrifices in the interest of the collective welfare of all.162 Such 
willingness to accept collective, majoritarian, choices made on behalf of all, but 
which are sub-optimal for some individuals in the group, requires the existence of a 
‘thick’ collective identity between the people in a society.163  Weiler described this 
thick identity as a ‘demos’ or a ‘volk’.164 The precondition of a collective identity for 
legitimate majority rule is not present in the EU and this lacuna underpins the 
democratic deficit which constrains the extent of output legitimacy.165  
While Majone’s theory of regulatory legitimacy extends in principle to 
properly constructed economic regulatory measures, Scharpf belongs to a group of 
skeptics that doubts the premises of a pure economic theory of regulation based on 
public welfare.166 These authors disagree with the assumptions that economic 
regulation in the public interest is cost free; that it is capable of achieving optimal 
allocative efficiency; and that it has few distributional consequences, thus justifying 
the premises that only experts isolated from politics should be responsible for its 
application.167  
Efficiency cannot be used as an evaluative benchmark of regulatory 
legitimacy in as much as efficiency as a value is not independent of distributional 
considerations.168 Unless the value of efficiency is legislatively mandated, the 
requirements of efficiency and the distributional implications of regulation are likely 
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to conflict. Scharpf and others find clear-cut theoretical distinctions between 
regulation and redistribution difficult to accept.169  
2.4.2. A Political View of Output Legitimacy 
Scharpf’s initial premise for the scope of output legitimacy is one that Majone would 
endorse: output legitimacy results from and reflects beneficial effects of 
governmental measures that solve a collective social problem not otherwise 
addressable.170 Thus, Scharpf agrees that a public welfare justification is applicable 
to at least some economic regulation in the EU context. But Scharpf identifies 
structural limits to output legitimacy: the collective identity of those on whose behalf 
the measures are adopted must be linked to a recognizable class of problem-solving 
concerns and must be territorially limited.171 This means that there is ‘no conceptual 
difficulty in defining the European Union as the appropriate constituency for the 
collective resolution of certain classes of common problems [emphasis added].’172 In 
this formulation, Scharpf implicitly captures the legitimacy dilemma for the 
Commission in its institutional interpretation of the meaning of the public interest 
inherent in the internal market.  
Scharpf strongly doubts that the breadth of interests to be served in the EU can 
be satisfied with a technocratic approach to economic regulation. The interests and 
preferences in the Member States vary hugely. Thus:  
...if European policy networks173 [could] assure win-win solutions that 
satisfy all interests affected, output-oriented legitimacy would be assured 
and the democratic deficit would cease to matter….however, the range of 
policy problems for which this can be expected tends to be severely 
limited.174 
 
According to Scharpf, significant weaknesses in both policy formation and 
regulatory legitimacy follow from this feature of the EU regulatory landscape: 
                                                
169 While not contesting the broad construction of differences in regulation for the general welfare and 
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...output-oriented legitimacy depends on institutional norms and 
incentive mechanisms that must serve two potentially conflicting 
purposes. They should hinder abuse of public power and they should 
facilitate effective problem-solving - which also implies that all interests 
should be considered in the definition of public interest, and that the 
costs and benefits of measures serving the public interest should be 
allocated according to plausible norms of distributive justice.175 
 
The Commission does not try to claim either that its view of the public interest is  
democratically valid, or that European regulatory measures necessarily accommodate 
all interests equally, even assuming that it could identify them. The costs and 
benefits of European regulatory measures are meant to increase overall welfare and 
economic regulators do not engage with norms of distributive justice, by assuming 
they need not be addressed.  
The democratic and electoral mechanisms that prevent abuse of public power 
in national regimes are not available in respect of the Commission. Furthermore, 
irrespective of output legitimacy, and somewhat presciently in light of the current 
Eurozone crisis, Scharpf noted the risk to continued popular commitment to 
European integration if the national settlements in Member States were to be 
jeopardized by positive integration: 
In most member states of the European Union, citizens have come to 
consider these achievements [social welfare benefits] of post-war welfare 
states as constitutive elements of a legitimizing social contract. If they 
should now be revoked under the pressures of economic globalization or 
the asymmetry of negative and positive integration in the European 
Community, there is indeed a danger that rising political disaffection will 
again undermine either the political legitimacy of democratic 
governments or their political commitment to economic integration. It 
may not be by accident, therefore, that the radical ring-wing opposition 
in several European countries is also radically anti-European.176   
 
This implies that aspirations for positive integration measures should reflect the fact 
that European capacities for greater integration are inhibited in areas where national 
interests diverge because no consensus exists on the meaning of the public interest at 
EU level. The legitimacy of positive integration measures rests on a contestable 
meaning of what constitutes the public interest in the EU. Getting to the essence of 
what the public interest means is something all regulators do, by engaging with their 
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‘legitimacy communities’ in numerous and interactive ways.177 Legitimacy discourse 
plays an important role in defining, refining and revising rules as circumstances or 
needs change. Not only is this equally true at the national and supranational levels, it 
is also a necessary part of effective policy design. If a regulator fails to appreciate 
how the public interest has evolved, either as a result of regulation or as a result of 
external factors over which it had no control, then its policy analyses may be 
impaired, if not fundamentally flawed.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
Messieurs Baldwin, Cave, Majone and Scharpf have provided this chapter with a 
regulatory smörgåsbord of methods and models for interrogating the legitimacy of 
transnational market regulators. Baldwin and others established the basic premise 
that regulators can be evaluated by reference to a number of benchmarks, both 
qualitative and procedural, in order to reach a conclusion not that the regulation is 
right but that the regulation is justified. Majone provided the premise that insulation 
of economic regulators from the political process is necessary for their legitimacy. In 
the case of a supranational regulator, democratic structures such as political 
accountability mechanisms, would be detrimental to the regulator's effectiveness, and 
this in turn would jeopardize its ability to achieve the aims of regulation, and thereby 
undermine its sole claim to legitimacy, ie successful regulatory outcomes of higher 
overall public welfare. Scharpf’s political analysis established a sharp cleavage 
between the legitimacies of positive and negative integration, finding that the 
political consequences of extensive European regulation that deprived national 
governments of policy options were toxic for Member States’ own democratic 
legitimacy. Some limited positive integration measures can be justified to establish a 
single market even in supranational regulatory arrangements. Beyond that, the EU 
does not enjoy the political legitimacy needed to regulate further because of the 
redistributive effects of economic regulation in practice, as opposed to theory. Thus, 
the legitimacy of much economic regulation beyond market creating measures 
carries a Sharpfian presumption of illegitimacy.  
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The next chapter takes forward the qualitative criteria identified in the 
scholarship as elements of a constructed model of regulatory governance analysis. 
Before that, the chapter looks briefly at the ‘governance turn’ taken by the 
Commission in the 2000s and the regulatory governance practices that it adopted 




This chapter bridges the theories of regulatory governance in Chapter 2 and the 
empirical examination of the case study in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 by constructing an 
analytical model of regulatory governance that draws upon those theories. The 
chapter also bridges three phenomena to which the Governance White Paper of 2001 
was a response: (1) the academic discourse launched by Majone and Scharpf who 
focused on European governance in critical terms; (2) the implicitly critical political 
discourse of the Member States; and (3) explicitly disaffected EU citizens a 
phenomenon reflected in low voter turnouts for European elections and the Irish ‘no’ 
vote in a 2001 referendum on the Treaty of Nice (signed on 26 February 2001).  
 The model of regulatory governance developed in this chapter will be used as 
a template empirically to examine the Commission's regulatory governance practices 
in developing European telecommunications policies. The model consists of 
substantive and procedural criteria against which the changes over time in the 
Commission’s practices in the sector are analyzed. The chapter first evaluates the 
regulatory governance criteria of the White Paper and concludes that they offer little 
for analyzing the regulatory governance of the Commission in any normatively 
meaningful way. The Chapter finds that a more meaningful examination can be 
undertaken by using a regulatory governance policy that is ‘tailor-made’ for the 
Commission as a transnational regulator using normative governance criteria. The 
constructed model consists of five criteria: (1) authoritative regulatory mandates; (2) 
regulatory expertise; (3) efficiency; (4) due process; and (5) accountability 
mechanisms. While overlap exists with the criteria of Chapter 2, these are adapted in 
light of the differences between national and supranational regulatory arrangements.  
 
3.1. The Governance White Paper of 2001 and an Analytical Model 
Before 2001, the Commission gave little indication that its institutional practices in 
respect of regulatory governance required attention or were sub-optimal. It addressed 
these issues in the Governance White Paper.1 The regulatory governance model there 
overlapped with several qualitative criteria found in regulatory governance theory 
seen in Chapter 2. When examined closely, however, its approach reflected a 
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fundamental misunderstanding of how to construct normative regulatory governance. 
I will combine the analysis here with the discussion in Chapter 2 before constructing 
the model to be applied to the case study.  
 
3.2. The White Paper of 2001: Origins 
In the 1990s, the Commission focused on improving the quality of drafting in 
European legislation, simplifying and codifying the acquis.2 Many elements dealt 
with the implementation of regulation, including a call for European regulatory 
agencies. Few aspects of that focus concerned policy development practices. The 
quality of legislation remains the focus today.3 But what changed the Commission’s 
orientation from concerns about quality of regulation to focus more on the qualities 
of the regulator and resulting regulation?  
 The scholarship of Majone, Scharpf and others in the 1980s and 1990s 
augured a gathering storm of political and public debate about the emerging 
regulatory landscape of the late twentieth century EU. The debate still continues and 
the scholarship on governance grows, some of which was seen earlier. Codifying the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality was a political signal that Member 
States had become uncomfortable with the Commission’s regulatory activism as 
early as 1992.  The Tobacco Advertising case reflected an unwillingness to accept the 
proposition that the power existed at EU level to harmonize virtually anything that 
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touched upon free movement of goods, a challenge that came from Germany, a 
Member State unreservedly committed to European integration. While the 
Commission did not engage with the academic debate launched by Majone et al, it 
was ultimately unable to avoid the political difficulties when national referendums 
periodically rejected an amending EU treaty, particularly the Treaty of Nice signed 
in February 2001. A sense of political and popular disillusionment, along with 
growing academic criticism, finally provoked an institutional response in 2001.   
In the aftermath of the controversial ratification of the Nice Treaty, however, 
the Governance White Paper of 2001 emerged as a major framework within which to 
engage European civic society with the EU institutions and suggested that 
improvements were needed in regulatory governance:  
Reforming governance addresses the question of how the EU uses the 
powers given by its citizens. It is about how things could and should be 
done. The goal is to open up policy-making to make it more inclusive 
and accountable. A better use of powers should connect the EU more 
closely to its citizens and lead to more effective policies.4 
 
While the White Paper explicitly sought greater popular support for the Union, to 
date, there is not much evidence of success.5 In this section, I examine the principles 
that the Commission sets out in the White Paper and whether and how they might be 
relevant to a model of regulatory governance for the case study. The Commission’s 
approach to these principles as outlined in the White Paper offered few elements for 
constructing a normative tool regulatory for policy development and contributed 
little to a conceptual model for analyzing the regulatory legitimacy of the 
Commission in the telecommunications sector. The Commission has since begun 
more seriously to use regulatory governance tools, as discussed in Chapter 6 below.   
3.1.2. EU Governance Principles: Much Ado About Nothing? 
The principles adopted for EU regulatory governance policy codified in the White 
Paper were: (a) accountability; (b) coherence; (c) effectiveness; (d) openness; and (e) 
                                                
4 COM (2001) 428 final 8. 
5 A survey from 2010 commissioned by the Directorate General for Communication revealed a trend 
of dissatisfaction with the EU as follows: ‘The latest results show that support for EU membership has 
fallen to 49% (-4 points since autumn 2009), which is close to the lowest levels recorded in the last 
decade. The proportion of Europeans who consider their country’s membership a bad thing now [ie 
August 2110] stands at 18% up from 15% in autumn 2009.’ See ‘Eurobarometer 73, Public Opinion in 




participation.6 These criteria are intended to operate as ‘political principles to guide 
the Union in organising the way it works’.7 It will be recalled that the major 
benchmarks identified in national regulatory theory were regulatory authority, a 
legislative mandate, expertise, efficiency, procedural due process, and mechanisms 
for accountability. The apparent overlap between national and EU criteria is 
eliminated, however, when EU governance principles are examined closely in 
relation to the definition and function of the criteria. 
 
3.1.2.1. Accountability 
For the EU to define accountability as a principle of governance is potentially a 
powerful basis on which to claim legitimacy.8 As defined by the Commission, 
accountability is a ‘light-touch’ control mechanism, intended primarily to clarify the 
roles of the EU institutions in the legislative and executive processes and to require 
each institution to ‘take responsibility for what it does’ [emphasis added].9 When 
defined in this manner, accountability could be construed simply as a measure of 
communication and clarification. Although some flexibility must be inherent in the 
notion of accountability at a supranational level, even a flexible notion of 
accountability does not remedy fundamental definitional weaknesses.  
Nonetheless, even within the Commission’s open-ended definition of 
accountability, ie each institution taking responsibility for what it does, there is scope 
for that to be further elaborated more meaningfully, especially in relation to the 
Commission’s role as regulator. In policy development for positive integration 
measures, the Commission’s responsibility for what it does could reflect the need to 
account for its discharge of duty in determining the public interest within the broader 
aims of the Union. Governance of the internal market is decisive for the legitimacy 
of the European Union as well as the Commission. The current Treaty remit is to 
establish ‘a highly competitive social market economy’.10 If the Commission pursues 
                                                
6 COM(2001) 428 final, 10. I have re-arranged the criteria into alphabetical order to de-politicize their 
presentational aspects. The White Paper presented them as: (1) openness; (2) participation; (3) 
accountability; (4) effectiveness; (5) coherence.  
7 ibid 32.  
8 Two benchmarks were associated with accountability earlier, ie output evaluations and due process, 
meaning regulatory procedures that are non-discriminatory, accessible and open. 
9 COM (2001) 428 final, 10. 
10 Art 3(3) TEU reads in part: The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the 
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the neo-liberal model of achieving an internal market in a ‘perfectionist’ way,11 then 
taking responsibility for what it does within its governance policy should include 
explaining how it addresses the criticisms that question its implicit neo-liberal 
economic model of what constitutes the public interest, as well as how it satisfies the 
non-economic and social interests in the Treaty.  
3.1.2.2. Coherence 
Coherence is not much found in the literature as a regulatory governance criterion 
but it does appear with regard to regulatory discourse used by sociologists.12 The 
way it is used by both is identical. The Governance White Paper defines it as: 
[Union] policies and action must be coherent and easily understood…. 
Coherence requires political leadership and a strong responsibility on the 
part of the Institutions to ensure a consistent approach within a complex 
system.13   
 
The reference to comprehensibility and consistency here fits with the long-standing 
Commission goals of improving the quality of regulation and the regulatory 
environment, both of which were subsumed within the governance agenda. In this 
formulation, coherence is not a result of an assessment of the Commission’s – or 
even the Union’s – regulatory philosophy as it relates to implementing the internal 
market, which would be fraught with political risk. The meta-theme of the 
Governance White Paper is European integration:  stability, peace and economic 
prosperity, that is, the founding vision of the European Economic Community. 
Economic integration in Europe has given way not only to larger, more open-ended 
goals, but the Treaties acknowledge explicitly the democratic value of taking 
decisions ‘as closely as possible to the citizen’.14 But the vision of the White Paper 
seems to translate into citizens watching closely, rather than participating directly.  
                                                                                                                                     
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly 
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level 
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and 
technological advance. 
11 F Scharpf, ‘Democratic Legitimacy under Conditions of Regulatory Competition: Why Europe 
Differs from the United States’ (2000) Estadio, Working Paper 2000/145, 16 
<http://www.march.es/ceacs/publicaciones/working/archivos/2000_145.pdf> accessed 8 March 2013. 
12 V Schmidt, ‘Democracy and Discourse in an Integrating Europe and a Globalising World’ (2000) 6 
ELJ 277. 
13 COM (2001) 428 final,10.  
14 Art 1 TEU. 
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 Coherence is used by the Commission as a criterion of regulatory governance 
when it should more properly be used by the Commission as a tool within the 
regulatory narrative of the Union. Genuine coherence in policy design could have a 
beneficial effect of re-aligning the institutional approach to policy development, 
what might be called in the UK ‘joined-up government’, meaning that the 
combination of activities and regulations occurring at the EU level and interacting 
with national actors, would reflect regulatory consistency across all areas. This 
ambition is certainly unrealistic in the abstract. Even national governments are 
susceptible (presumably unintentionally) to undermining their own policies, such as 
subsidizing non-renewable energy production while under-stimulating the production 
of renewable energy production.15 Regulatory coherence is more generally evaluated 
as a result of a cumulative use of the regulatory benchmarks of national governance, 
linking logically to the value of efficiency, ie achieving regulatory aims using a 
minimum of resources.  
Coherence is a meaningful value within legitimacy discourse because 
regulatory incoherence implies that the regulatory mandate and the problem are 
mismatched, or that the regulator has followed inconsistent patterns or procedures of 
decision-making, or that the mechanisms of accountability to evaluate the regulator's 
performance have been erratic. Because regulatory incoherence can take many 
forms, and because coherence has no fixed meaning in regulatory governance theory, 
it usually fails to merit a separate appreciation.16 The inclusion in the EU governance 
policy and particularly the definition of the concept, pointing to ‘political leadership’ 
and institutional responsibility for ‘coherent and easily understood’ policies, reveal 
the true intention as being one of political and popular persuasion. The lack of a 
normative content makes the concept inappropriate for a normative model of 
regulatory governance. 
                                                
15 ‘Recent estimates suggest that worldwide consumption subsidies amount to more than US$400 
billion....On the other hand,...The IEA has estimated that global renewable-energy subsidies increased 
from $39 billion in 2007 to $66 billion in 2010.’ L Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsides 
for Renewable Energy, the SCM Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform’ (2012) 15 Journal of 
International Economic Law 525, 526-27. 




The third principle is effectiveness, which was identified but not uniformly endorsed 
as a criterion of regulatory evaluation in national governance models, although it is 
important to some economic models where regulators are legitimated by results.17 In 
the White Paper effectiveness was conflated with expertise such that the former 
meant that: 
policies must be effective and timely, delivering what is needed on the 
basis of clear objectives, an evaluation of future impact and, where 
available, of past experience. Effectiveness also depends on 
implementing EU policies in a proportionate manner and on taking 
decisions at the most appropriate level.18 
 
When this meaning is broken down, effectiveness contains several layers. EU 
policies should deliver ‘what is needed’ on the basis of clear objectives. It also 
means that policies being considered should be evaluated for their future impact and 
in light of past experience. Finally, effectiveness means that implementation of 
regulatory policies should be proportionate and decisions taken at the most 
appropriate level. When scrutinized, the definition is problematic in several respects 
all of which highlight tensions with the Commission’s power as a regulator. ‘What is 
needed’ is open-textured. What the ‘clear objectives’ will be are for the Commission 
to identify. The language was meant to reassure the wider public but also concealed 
an underlying controversy of institutional politics.  In the EU, the Commission itself 
largely defines what the single market ‘needs’ and what the regulatory objectives 
will be, and is only constrained by the provisions of the Treaty for a legal basis.19 But 
that constraint seems more apparent than real.  
 Identifying regulatory impact assessments as a desirable design tool was 
positive. However, an evaluation of future impacts and past experiences with 
regulation forms part of the criterion of expertise which does not appear in the White 
Paper. Conclusions about regulatory effectiveness based on outcomes have proved so 
                                                
17 Majone’s model offered as a matter of theory the proposition that political principals could use the 
results achieved by regulators exercising delegated powers as a matter of ex post control and 
accountability.  
18 COM (2001) 428 final 10. 
19 For the proposition that the limits of EU legislative competence are dangerously vague, see S 
Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court’s Case Law Has Become a “Drafting Guide”’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827.  
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contentious that leading authors have simply declined to include the criterion in 
regulatory governance models. If it is at all appropriate to be part of the regulatory 
governance model of the EU, effectiveness would be a conclusion to be drawn by the 
body or person charged with evaluating the Commission's performance as a regulator 
and the specific regulation under consideration. I return to this in chapters 6 and 7.   
  As to the Commission's follow up on this aspect of effectiveness, thus far, 
only an ex ante regulatory assessment procedure, which will be examined in chapter 
6, was introduced in 2002.20 An equally important measure, ex post assessments, 
seems to have disappeared entirely from the regulatory agenda. The White Paper 
elsewhere called for a reinvigoration of the Community method,21 ie strengthening 
the Commission’s policy-defining role. In effect, the role of Commission as 
regulator-in-chief would be re-enforced using such a definition. This would add to 
the normatively problematic features of the EU, in terms of regulating the single 
market.  
 The White Paper also bundles the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity into the notion of effectiveness,22 but the resulting formulations add little 
to existing Union law. The Commission remains the institutional actor making the 
assessment of subsidiarity, with the attendant normative weakness of its views on the 
meaning of the public interest, and the bias in institutional incentives that favor 
harmonization measures. Although Parliament and the Council may disagree with 
the Commission, its view is decisive, but subject to judicial review by the Court of 
Justice with subsidiarity now a codified Treaty principle (Article 5 TFEU). The 
principle that implementation of regulatory policies should be done in a 
proportionate manner is no more than a truism; to do otherwise would violate the 
acquis.  
When these points are compared to national regulatory criteria, there is only a 
modest substantive overlap. The role of the criteria in national governance is directly 
                                                
20 The Commission impact assessment that was introduced in 2002 replaced the previous single-sector 
type assessments. See Commission, ‘Governance, Better Regulation, Impact Assessment’ < 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/impact_en.htm> 6 December 2012. Ch 6 will 
identify a growing consensus on the need to improve the quality of the Commission’s ex ante 
assessments. 
21 COM (2001) 428 final, 34. 
22 ‘Effectiveness also depends on implementing EU policies in a proportionate manner and on taking 
decisions at the most appropriate level.’ ibid. 
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linked to more general assessments of whether the regulation is well suited to solving 
the problems it was designed to address. Many strands of meaning can be unpacked 
from the notion of effectiveness in the White Paper. It inappropriately bundled 
expertise with effectiveness and made effectiveness dependent on subsidiarity and 
proportionality, which are concepts meant to inform the policy process ex ante, not 
to form part of ex post assessments of effectiveness. Via effectiveness, the White 
Paper proposed to strengthen the Community method and solidify the Commission’s 
position as regulator-in-chief. Such an approach smacks of regulatory politics rather 
than regulatory governance.  
3.1.2.4. Openness 
Openness in the White Paper is seen primarily as the quality of communications 
between European institutions and the wider world that brings about public 
confidence in the institutions themselves.23 The definition suggests the primary 
agenda here is communications:  a repeated emphasis on improving communication 
with wider civic society reflects a perception that the real problem lies in getting the 
public relations message right. The White Paper recommended four practices for 
implementing openness:   
(1) to provide timely online information on the ‘preparation of policy’ 
through all stages of decision-making;  
(2) to enhance dialogue with regional and local governments at ‘an early 
stage in shaping policy’;  
(3) to adopt minimum standards for consultations on EU policy, as 
defined centrally by the Commission; and  
                                                
23 In the White Paper the Commission stated ‘[EU institutions and Member States] should actively 
communicate about what the EU does and the decisions it takes. They should use language that is 
accessible and understandable for the general public. This is of particular importance in order to 
improve the confidence in complex institutions.’ COM (2001) 428 final, 10. The notion of openness 
recurs throughout EU documents and overlaps with ‘better regulation’ and ‘better lawmaking’ policies 
promoted by the Edinburgh European Summit (Dec 1992) which endorsed the Commission initiative 
on ‘better regulation’ and ‘better lawmaking’. Guidelines were agreed at the 1992 summit to 
implement ‘measures to increase transparency and openness in the decision-making process of the 
Community’. The White Paper’s proposed measures to increase transparency amounted to creating 
opportunities for greater outreach to and communication with constituent parts of the Community  
which, until then, would have had limited influence in the determination of most Community policies, 
ie the national parliaments, the Council of Ministers itself, and the general public, using a variety of 
consultative mechanisms. The more ‘open’ Community would be achieved by public access to the 
work of the Council, information on the role of the Council and its decisions, and simplification of 
and easier access to Community legislation. Subsequent summits endorsed these principles. The 
White Paper comprised the more elaborated measures to improve the different stages of the legislative 
development cycle, from policy conception to implementation, including the principle of openness.  
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(4) to include more flexibility in EU legislation by considering regional 
and local conditions.24 
 
Starting with the last proposal, the White Paper gave no indication of how this would 
be done in practice, or how to square such flexibility with the legal principle of the 
primacy of EU law; nor how this approach would be compatible with the uniformity 
rationale for harmonization measures in the internal market. Any view of what the 
Commission meant or how it intended to apply this feature of openness was 
conjectural. If it is true that the Commission considers flexibility in implementation 
of harmonization to be a legitimate aim of regulatory governance - with the potential 
that it might have to undermine, at least the appearance if not the reality, of the 
principles of uniformity and primacy of EU law - then it has also introduced the 
possibility of flexibility as to how it more directly exercises its powers as a policy 
developer. By calling into question at least implicitly the ‘holy grail’ that EU law 
must be uniformly interpreted and applied to take precedence over national law, the 
White Paper created an opening to question other fundamental aspects of the 
working of the EU legal system in the pursuit of regulatory openness. When properly 
considered, openness has little to do with regulatory flexibility. To the extent that 
flexibility properly defined is a desirable feature of regulation, it would need to be 
considered within a framing of regulatory expertise, related to problem definition, 
identifying suitable regulatory options, and evaluating the best mix of substantive 
and procedural measures to achieve regulatory objectives.  
A final criticism of openness is to contrast it with transparency. Transparency 
is important to governance because it facilitates informed participation and decision-
making. In the Commission’s framing of openness, a key conceptual value of 
transparency found in national models has been removed, that of transparency as a 
way of participating in decision-making. Participation is discussed in the next 
section. It will be seen there that the White Paper takes a traditional approach to non-
institutional participation in EU regulatory development, so the criterion plays, at 
most and as usual, only a modest advisory role in the EU. The White Paper separated 
the concepts of openness and participation but gave neither of them a normative 
meaning. 
                                                





The White Paper calls for greater involvement of national actors to shape, apply and 
enforce Community rules and programmes to create more confidence in the end 
results and in the institutions which deliver policies.25 This means that national and 
regional actors participating in policy processes should be prepared to inform the 
public about those policies thus reinforcing the communication dimension.26 The 
European Parliament should play a prominent role in a Europe-wide culture of 
consultation and dialogue by reinforcing its use of public hearings, another 
communication dimension.27  
Member States should follow ‘an inclusive approach when developing and 
implementing EU policies’.28 But the relevant actors in the EU policy development 
phase are not Member States. The European Council sets broad overarching goals for 
the EU which are more visionary than regulatory.29 Thus, while the European 
Council provides political guidance, Member States do not formulate regulatory 
policy measures. As to participation by national actors in applying and enforcing EU 
norms, it would appear to suggest no more than their traditional roles and duties 
under the Treaties. 
Participation in civic society means being consulted as part of the regulatory 
process. Emphasizing the non-political and primarily communicative objectives of 
the criterion, the White Paper stated that ‘Participation is not about institutionalising 
protest. It is about more effective policy shaping….’30 The model of participation 
reflected in the White Paper is one where civic society participants contribute to a 
                                                
25 ‘The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide participation 
throughout the policy chain – from conception to implementation. Improved participation is likely 
“[to] create more confidence in the end result and in the Institutions which deliver policies”.’ 
Participation crucially depends on central governments following an inclusive approach when 
developing and implementing EU policies.’ ibid 10. 
26 ibid 34. 
27 ibid 16. 
28 ibid 10. 
29 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and the creation of the offices of the President of the 
European Council, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
the European Council has evolved towards a more operational institution. Its powers in relation to 
positive integration measures remain in the realm of overall guidance. Art15(1) TEU reads: 1. The 
European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall 
define the general political directions and priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions.  
30 COM(2001) 428 final, 15. 
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discursive, but not a decisional, process. Even in most national regulatory regimes, 
such views are not binding on the regulator. However, by comparison, US federal 
agencies are held to a high factual standard in justifying a decisional outcome that 
does not accord with the evidence and comments submitted.31  
The White Paper unsuccessfully sought to re-frame the legitimacy discourse 
of the EU. The failure lay mainly with the Commission's problem definition, ie that 
European citizens did not adequately understand the system that was set up for their 
benefit. Even though the Commission identified several important principles of 
regulatory governance theory, the meanings that it ascribed to them fell far short of a 
normative standard, thus depriving them of the capacity to contribute to regulatory 
legitimacy.  
 
3.2. A Regulatory Governance Model for the Commission 
In this section I bring the discussion of the White Paper criteria together with the 
analysis in Chapter 2 and construct a regulatory governance model to be used in the 
case study. Regulatory governance, it will be recalled, addresses the dimension of 
impaired democratic accountability when governing powers are delegated to non-
accountable bodies. Where a transnational regulator such as the Commission is 
subject to little or no institutional accountability, then regulatory governance itself 
becomes part of an evaluative mechanism. Admittedly this is contestable as a self-
referencing set of criteria, caricatured as an accountability mechanism that the 
Commission establishes with itself. This criticism is valid, but incomplete. If the 
model of governance were limited to the Commission’s own definition of the 
meaning and value of the criteria, which the White Paper reflected, then the model's 
value is minimal. I suggest that the Commission should self-define the meanings, 
                                                
31 There, all information used by the regulator in a rule-setting procedure must be publicly available. 
If a decision of a federal agency were to rely on considerations or factual elements that were not in the 
public record, or if the decision failed to explain why facts that appeared in the record were not 
considered relevant, it would constitute grounds for judicial reversal. The court reviews the 
information relied upon by the agency which, by law, must be available to the public. See 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC s 556, s 556(d), s 557 and s706(a)(2). See generally D 




usage and application of such criteria in a way that takes account of the relevant 
scholarship on regulatory governance theory.  
Three stages of policy development need to be distinguished: design, 
enforcement and revision. The analysis in my case study focuses on the design stage. 
Revision of policy is analytically similar to design but the evidence base relied upon 
should be somewhat different, because of experience with enforcement. Not all 
governance criteria can apply equally within these phases. Each requires 
consideration of, or emphasis on, different factors in light of the contextual 
circumstances. The five regulatory criteria of my analytical model are: (1) a valid 
regulatory mandate; (2) regulatory expertise; (3) regulatory efficiency; (4) procedural 
due process; and (5) accountability.  
 
3.2.1. Regulatory Mandate 
A national regulator exercises delegated governing powers from a national 
parliament and therefore typically has a legislative mandate. In the national context, 
this is a crucial basis for its authority and therefore for its legitimacy. The equivalent 
principle for the Commission is the mandate in the Treaties. Starting with the aims of 
the Union, the TEU states: ‘The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the 
well-being of its peoples’.32 The Union’s values are stated as: ‘respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’.33 The economic 
aims of the Union, commingled with social and environmental aspirations, are 
currently that 
The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic 
growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. 
It shall promote scientific and technological advance.34   
 
                                                
32 Art 3(1) TEU.  
33 Art 2 TEU. 
34 Art 3(3) TEU. 
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The original Treaty mandate of 1957 has evolved with the repeated amendments of 
the Treaties.35 The current formulation of the aims for the internal market states:  
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers 
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.36 
 
However, the formulation of the Treaties, specifically with regard to the positive 
harmonization measures for the internal (or common) market has changed 
remarkably little and remains extremely broad. Compare the provision of the Treaty 
of Rome:  
The Council shall... issue directives for the approximation of such 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the 
common market.37 
With the current mandate: 
  
The European Parliament and the Council shall....adopt the measures for 
the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.38 
The regulatory mandate is open-ended with only general indications of how the 
Commission’s discretion should be exercised.39 Given the Court’s jurisprudence on 
the scope of Union competence to adopt positive integration measures, this discretion 
is broad.40 In terms of its regulatory mandate, the governance issue for the 
Commission is not whether it has a legitimate mandate for regulation but if the 
                                                
35 The 1957 Treaty of Rome referred to a ‘common market’ rather than an internal market. That 
Treaty laid down foundational measures, inter alia, for a common commercial policy and a common 
customs tariff, thus reflecting the considerably different starting circumstances of the TEU and TFEU 
Treaties, compared to the Treaty of Rome. 
36 Art 26(2) TFEU. 
37 Art 100 EEC. 
38 Art 114(1) TFEU. I have deliberately removed the provisions related to the respective legislative 
processes which have changed considerably but are not the focus of the present research.  
39 Art 26 TFEU states in part: ‘1. The Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or 
ensuring the functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Treaties...’Also relevant to the Commission’s mandate is Article 27 TFEU which states in part: ‘When 
drawing up its proposals with a view to achieving the objectives set out in Article 26, the Commission 
shall take into account the extent of the effort that certain economies showing differences in 
development will have to sustain for the establishment of the internal market and it may propose 
appropriate provisions. If these provisions take the form of derogations, they must be of a temporary 
nature and must cause the least possible disturbance to the functioning of the internal market.’ 
40 For cases endorsing this point, see eg Wetherill (n 19).  
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Commission’s interpretation of its mandate can be considered legitimate by reference 
to normative standards. This evaluation needs to be made at each stage of policy 
development. The question of whether the Commission legitimately exercises the 
powers that have been delegated to it - the focus of the present research - is not the 
same as whether or not the Commission is exercising legitimately delegated 
regulatory powers. This distinction was implicitly part of Scharpf’s critique of EU 
positive integration powers and measures. The construction of a regulatory 
governance model in order to analyze the legitimacy of the Commission as a 
regulator needs to focus on the former in terms that I discuss below.  
3.2.2. Expertise 
Certain regulatory functions positively require expert judgments to evaluate complex 
issues related to, eg competition, science, health and consumer protection. 
Consideration of multiple or conflicting aims, such as those involved in technical and 
financial issues or risk assessments, in order to come to a balanced judgment 
supports the necessity of an expert regulator. The context in which the Commission 
exercises its regulatory functions is one of complexity and enormous variation. 
However, the existence of variation is not sufficient on its own to justify recourse to 
positive harmonization measures. Expertise should play a considerable role in 
evaluating the value of harmonizing measures. The quality of such evaluations 
should reflect a capacity for understanding the complexities of regulation.  
Expertise nonetheless has limitations. The broad discretion of a regulator and 
the expertise required for a proper consideration of some of the specialized aspects of 
regulation should not pre-empt an assessment of whether decisions reached by the 
regulator are appropriate.41 It is hardly controversial to suggest that a regulator 
should have the discretion both to interpret its mandate and to make use of any 
expertise needed in discharging that mandate. Expertise is particularly useful in 
individual decisions where complex and technical arguments must be evaluated. 
Less, but nonetheless considerable, reliance on expertise should be placed on rule-
                                                
41 For example, in October 2011, the UK offshore oil exploration industry expressed strong 
reservations about the Commission’s proposals for offshore regulatory safety, arguing that replacing 
decades of global experience with centralized EU regulation would be unacceptable, a position with 
which the UK Government agreed. The industry particularly criticized the Commission’s impact 




setting decisions if there are complex issues of analysis or competing values to be 
weighed. This is the case in the EU where the Treaties are imprecisely drafted and 
simultaneously aspire to different economic and social objectives, not all of which 
are mutually compatible.42      
 
3.2.3. Efficiency 
Efficiency and effectiveness are quite different by definition but they share the 
quality of being empirical features of regulation, not qualities of a regulator. 
Majone's model inferred the existence of several positive features of a regulator from 
its expertise and (economic) efficiency in achieving regulatory goals.  
Considerations of efficiency should extend to more than the achievement of 
the internal market, using the breadth of the Treaty objectives as a reference. 
Contentious definitional and evaluative questions would need to be considered, 
which involve an appreciation of what constitutes the public interest of the EU. The 
use of regulatory discourse here should bring out the variable and contestable 
meaning of the public interest. The Commission requires regulatory discretion for its 
broad mandate but refining the meaning of the public interest inherent in the mandate 
can be more openly determined, more participatively, even if the public view is not 
decisive. Giving attention in regulatory discourse to views contesting a neo-liberal 
approach to the internal market is a legitimating measure. How this discourse is 
constructed and reflected would require both expertise and political maturity, to 
appreciate the underlying purpose of using regulatory discourse as a legitimating 
action.    
Efficiency can contribute positively to a model of regulatory governance for 
the Commission in combination with other governance criteria. A particular 
difficulty with efficiency in the national context is the lack of precision as to what 
efficiency means and therefore a difficulty in constructing evaluative metrics. The 
Commission itself initiates proposals for economic regulation and could include in 
its proposals some indications of efficiency by reference to the objectives of the 
regulation concerned. Adoption by the EU legislature would increase the 
legitimating value of the criterion.  
                                                
42 Consider the wording of art 3(3) TEU in relation to sustainable development based on economic 
growth and price stability and a highly competitive social market economy.  
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The preparation of an independent audit evaluating how well the regulation 
satisfied the legislative definition of efficiency would add more weight. The case 
study will analyze whether regulatory measures reflect a meaningful level of 
efficiency in achieving the Treaty mandate.   
3.2.4. Procedural Due Process 
Due process is related to both openness and transparency. The underlying value links 
to the democratic influence that participation can have over regulation which 
contributes to legitimacy. Particularly in the US, the rule-making function is 
characterized by high levels of regulatory participation that may lessen efficiency 
and effectiveness in achieving the regulatory mandate. A normative standard of 
procedural due process for the Commission as a regulator should include this factor, 
but the US approach is neither comparable nor transferable to the Commission 
context. US governance is directed towards legal and procedural safeguards in 
constraining the discretion of federal regulators, thus emphasizing the accountability 
function of governance. The Commission context is not directed towards substituting 
procedure and judicial or parliamentary oversight for the exercise of delegated 
governing powers. It discharges a supranational mandate for economic and other 
forms of integration in a system of delegated powers where there is more than one 
sovereign, where there is huge diversity of interests between Member States and 
where there is no consensus on the meaning of the public interest.    
The White Paper emphasized public consultations; current practice combines 
public consultations, updating and simplifying the acquis, improving accessibility 
and simplifying and improving the regulatory environment.43 Systematic public 
consultations in the rule-making phase of European regulation have only been 
introduced recently. At this advanced stage of the internal market, regulatory 
governance should reflect both regulatory independence that signals a credible policy 
commitment and a willingness to construe the public interest more broadly. The 
Treaty gives the Commission the authority to pursue values and objectives that are 
broader than those defined by economic efficiency. The impact assessment 
guidelines recognize that one of the ‘problems calling for a solution’ would be a 
                                                
43 See Commission, ‘Governance, Better Regulation, Impact Assessment’ < 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/impact_en.htm> 6 December 2012. 
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conflict between an existing situation and one of the fundamental objectives of the 
Union.  
Where possible, regulatory problems should be framed as broader than that of 
allocative efficiency, so the policy options identified include measures with 
objectives broader than the primarily economic even if this carries risks.44 Using the 
tool of discourse, and without diminishing its status as an independent regulator, the 
Commission could calibrate the broad goals of the Treaties more participatively and 
reflect these in its regulatory policies, within the limits of its powers. For policy 
development, a combination of a broader framing of the problem-identification phase 
could contribute to a more inclusive consultation phase. A widening of the terms by 
which problems are identified could address two related criticisms: the lack of 
flexibility of the Commission’s appreciation of what level of positive integration is 
appropriate for the internal market and the consensual weakness inherent in the 
Commission’s view of the public interest, the reverse side of which is the positive 
value of its independence. This richer approach to discourse would be a more 
effective regulatory governance tool in the context of public consultation.  
 
3.2.5. Control/Accountability 
Control and accountability are fundamental to national regulatory governance. 
Delegation to a national regulator is usually based on a desire to avoid the high 
information and transaction costs of decision-making. Fundamentally it is an 
appreciation of relative efficiencies. The logic of delegation to the Commission 
follows a somewhat different rationale. The Commission’s regulatory raison d’être 
is based on the premise that, without independence, little credence could be given to 
the policy commitments in the Treaties made by national governments because 
Member States would succumb to short-term political pressures. The independence 
of the Commission as a principle is central to the credibility of the system. Does 
regulatory governance need to address the issue of control and accountability? I 
argue that it needs to engage with the criticism that its interpretation of the public 
                                                
44 Scharpf’s remedy for the redistributional effects of economic regulation focused on limiting the 
scope for national regulatory competition rather than trying to find mechanisms within the regulatory 
governance practices of the Commission that permit the Commission to validate its views of what 
constitutes the public interest. There may well be merit in Scharpf’s approach, which reflects a 
preference for negative rather than positive integration measures. I do not discuss it further here.  
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interest is ideologically biased. And that it should be subject to some meaningful and 
independent feedback.  
Equally importantly, regulatory governance needs to engage with the issue of 
legitimacy. The Commission continues to adopt new and adapt existing regulatory 
governance measures. In doing so, it does not seek explicitly to establish or enhance 
its regulatory legitimacy. This research links the two and argues that the Commission 
should do likewise. I suggest that normative governance tools that could usefully 
contribute to creating a broader consensus are already present in the regulatory mix 
but need to be assembled into a coherent discourse and set of normative practices. A 
properly constructed discourse can open the policy discussion by asking in what 
terms problems can be identified and analyzed by reference to the wider goals of the 
Union. The level of civic disillusionment with the EU has increased significantly in 
recent years.45 While it is true that the EU is characterized by deep cleavages of 
economic development, of public values and of notions of social justice, there is now 
a clear, post-Lisbon, mandate for the Union to aspire to aims beyond the economic 
within the limit of its powers.  
 
3.3. Conclusion 
The Commission should use its developing regulatory and managerial capacities to 
construct a broader discourse of regulatory policy and a wider framing of the 
problems that may or may not require a regulatory solution. Even more importantly, 
the Commission needs to construct a coherent and rigorous model of regulatory 
governance reflecting the standards expected and practiced in national regulatory 
regimes. The model of regulatory governance that I have constructed to analyze the 
Commission’s legitimacy within the case study combines the substantive criteria of 
authority, expertise and efficiency, in the senses that I have used them above, with 
the procedural due process standard of open public consultation, all of which use a 
                                                
45 The Eurobarometer Survey from May 2012 reflected on average a 50% disapproval rating of the 
EU; only 12% of respondents from the 27 Member States associate the EU with economic prosperity 
while 41% attribute most importance to the freedom of movement to study and work. See 
Eurobaromètre Standard 77, ‘Printemps 2012, L’Opinion Publique Dans L’Union Européene’ 
[Spring, 2012, Public Opinion in the European Union] 54-56 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77_publ_fr.pdf> accessed 10 December 2012. 
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regulatory discourse that reflects the wider aims of the Union and the issue of how to 
interpret the mandate for those aims.  
Nonetheless, the essential element of accountability must also form part of 
supranational regulatory governance, while recognizing the importance of 
independence in the exercise of institutional discretion. I consider that there is scope 
in regulatory governance for an ex post evaluation of the empirical outcomes of 
regulation that need not impinge on the independence of the institution. Like the 
Commission’s ‘name and shame’ approach to identifying transposition shortfalls by 
Member States, an empirical ‘regulatory scorecard’ could be fashioned for EU 
regulation, not by the Commission, but by an independent body whose assessment 
would affect the credibility of the Commission. Given the contestability of methods 
of evaluation, as Baldwin and others showed, such an assessment would also be 
subject to challenge but it would have the merit of an outside view. For a 
supranational regulator whose credibility is a primary asset, and whose legitimacy is 
systematically contested, control via reputational damage may be sufficient.  
In the next chapter, and the two following, I will apply these criteria in 
combination, and analyze the Commission’s use of regulatory governance 
throughout. 
Three distinct phases of policy development can be distinguished in 
telecommunications. The first, covered in the next chapter, begins in 1987 and ends 
in 1990. During this short period, national telecommunications monopolies were 





The ‘Europeanization’ of Telecommunications Regulatory Policy 
 
Introduction  
This chapter examines the first phase of telecommunications regulation, from the 
initial stage of State-owned monopoly industries in all Member States to the creation 
of a partially liberalized sector with partially harmonized regulation. This was the 
transformational phase of European policy: the sector was brought within the Treaty 
principles applicable to other commercial sectors. The chapter examines the 
emerging governance practices of the Commission as a regulator, distinguishing 
between the Commission’s actions as a positive regulator and a competition policy 
enforcement authority, the latter of which is outside the scope of this research. At the 
initial stage of policy development, the Commission’s strategy blended the two types 
of regulatory action and thus blurred regulatory governance aspects.  
 The chapter describes both negative and positive integration measures with 
emphasis on the regulatory governance practices. Autonomous competition policy 
enforcement was a catalyst that created the political conditions to agree positive 
regulatory measures. When its initial regulatory strategy of using competition policy 
enforcement proved highly controversial politically, the Commission shifted its 
emphasis away from unilateral negative integration to positive integration measures. 
This politically informed choice to adapt its regulatory strategy and its regulatory 
discourse is not always apparent in the narrative of transformational liberalization.  
 Using the regulatory governance framing that was defined in Chapter 3, the 
chapter analyzes the normativity of the first phase of regulatory governance in this 
sector. A robust level of the normativity of regulatory governance of the initial phase 
of policy can be inferred, given the Treaty mandate, Commission powers, and the 
changing circumstances of the sector, all of which supported the aim of creating an 
integrated market, even in a traditionally monopolized sector like 
telecommunications. The chapter concludes that the regulatory governance 
procedures of the initial policy phase were sufficient to accord normative legitimacy 




4.1. Regulatory Strategies and Policy Shifts 
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, European economies were in decline. 
Microelectronics created competitive pressures from outside of Europe.1 European 
industry lost ground while Member States supported their national industrial 
champions. Post-War France had adopted economic dirigisme, in which the State 
intervened or influenced the economy either by guidance or control.2 The 
Commission’s early telecommunications policy embodied a classic, corporatist, 
French-style approach.3 Following the creation of the European Economic 
Community in 1957, the Commission considered that competition arising within 
newly integrated European markets would suffice to achieve appropriate levels of 
industrial restructuring. Until the end of the economic growth period of the 1960s, 
and the episodes of oil price rises in the 1970s, overall growth in Europe was robust, 
standards of living rose, European industry prospered and the wider public 
benefitted. 
 For many years, European interventions in telecommunications markets were 
limited to collaborative transnational projects between companies.4 In a 1979 
                                                
1 See eg TR Reid, The Chip: How Two Americans Invented the Microchip and Launched a Revolution 
(Random House 2001).  
2 See eg VA Schmidt, ‘The Decline of Traditional State Dirigisme in France: The Transformation of 
Political Economic Policies and Policymaking Processes’ (1996) 9 Governance 375; SS Cohen, 
Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model (University of California Press 1997). 
3 At this stage of European integration, the Community enjoyed no Treaty competence to engage in or 
formally to propose European-wide policies for industrial promotion or development of European 
industry. A European competence in the area of industrial policy was created in the Treaty of 
Maastricht, now art 173 TFEU. Before Maastricht, Member States pursued largely uncoordinated and 
unilateral national industrial policies, using a ‘wide-ranging ill-assorted collection of micro-based 
supply-side initiatives…designed to improve market performance in a variety of...ways...directed (in 
the main) at firms’. See PA Geroski, ‘European Industrial Policy and Industrial Policy in Europe’ 
(1989) 5/2 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20, 21. From the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s, the 
Commission focused on restructuring industrial sectors in crisis. The adoption of the Single European 
Act in 1986 re-focused the Commission’s priorities on achieving a single market within a decade, 
gave the Commission more flexibility to pursue integration, and carried the seeds for a radical 
revision on policy thinking in the Commission, albeit with the potential for ideological conflicts. See 
W Sauter, Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the EU (Clarendon Press 1997) 70-72. 
4 See eg Commission, ‘Recommendations on Telecommunications’ COM(80)422 final; Commission, 
‘Communication from the Commission to the Council on Telecommunications - Lines of Action’ 
COM(83)573 final; Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council on the Status 
of Community Telecommunications Policy’ COM(85)276 final; Commission, ‘European Society 
Faced With the Challenge of New Information Technologies: A Community Response’ COM(79) 650 
final; Commission, ‘Telecommunications, Communication from the Commission to the Council’ 
COM(83) 239 final; Commission, ‘Progress Report on the Thinking and Work Done in the field and 
Proposals for an Action Programme’ COM(84) 277 final. 
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Communication the Commission described the challenges and made suggestions for 
actions:   
European society will be obliged to apply [electronic] technologies on an 
immense scale. They are essential to the competitiveness of its industry 
in world markets ... But whether the process is a painful one, or a positive 
one that generates new economic growth, new social possibilities and 
hope will depend on how the new revolution is handled, on the social, 
industrial and political choices that are made.....[T]here is a need to 
mobilise and coordinate the efforts made by Member States ...to make 
use of the Community’s normative powers and the purchasing power of 
public authorities to catalyse bilateral and trilateral industrial 
collaboration... It is therefore proposed that the Community: ... (b) create 
a...European public market for telematic equipment and services through 
Council decisions [emphasis added] which:  
- commit the telecommunications administrations to introduce common 
harmonised services on the new digital networks from 1983, and to 
purchase for them only harmonised equipment from 1985;  
- establish the principle of an open Community market for terminals...  
- commit the....Member States from 1983 to buy informatics equipment 
and software only when it conforms to harmonised standards.... 
(d) Foster industrial and user collaboration by:  
... - providing a catalytic framework for ad hoc collaboration between 
industrial companies on a bilateral or trilateral basis, with a view to 
specialisation agreements or joint development of products such as 
peripherals 
- ensuring that Community industry has access to the latest micro-
electronic technology in the mid 1980s by promoting development of the 
key equipments and computer aided design technologies....5 
 
The measures of technical harmonization, coordinated public procurement, 
collaborative, transnational, subsidized research and specialization agreements 
between undertakings constituted a fundamentally industrial policy approach to 
telecommunications policy.   
 
4.2.1. Policy Shift: Industrial to Regulatory 
In a 1987 Green Paper (the ‘Green Paper’), the Commission introduced a new, and 
legally significant, interpretation of the EEC Treaty:  
While provision of network infrastructure [ie the equipment that carried 
signals over a physical infrastructure, that is, the Public Switched 
Telephone Network] generally requires the physical presence of the 
provider in the geographical area in question, provision of services and 
                                                
5 COM(79) 650 final, 2-7. 
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equipment [such as, telephone terminals and handsets to receive and 
convert the signals at origin and destination] in most cases does not, with 
the result that the latter [ie equipment and services] are largely tradable 
[emphasis added]....6   
 
For the first time, the Commission suggested that the general Treaty principles of 
economic freedom were applicable to some telecommunications markets. ‘While 
provision of network infrastructure generally requires the physical presence of the 
provider in the geographical area in question, provision of services and equipment in 
most cases does not, with the result that the latter are largely tradeable....’ A 1985 
judgment of the Court of Justice, in a case dealing with abuse of dominance by 
British Telecommunications (the ‘BT case’), had endorsed the principle of the 
applicability of competition rules even to State-owned national utility monopolies 
when engaging in commercial activities.7 The Green Paper reiterated the Court’s 
finding:    
[National telecommunications operators are]....commercial undertakings 
since they supply goods and services for payment which are subject to 
the application of Community competition law, an opinion confirmed by 
the Court of Justice...8 
If telecommunications services and equipment were ‘tradable’, then the competition 
provisions of the EEC Treaty, the economic freedoms, the common commercial 
policy and the harmonization of national laws for the establishment and functioning 
of the common market were applicable.9  
The Commission found that, with changing markets and technologies, the 
Treaty rules on free movement and competition were fully applicable to the services 
and equipment of the telecommunications sector, where national incumbents enjoyed 
a complete monopoly and where different national standards effectively insulated the 
national markets. These needed to be addressed and dismantled. The legal analysis of 
economic freedoms was softened with a discourse on gradualism, on cooperation and 
                                                
6 COM(87) 290 final, 180. 
7 Case 41/83, Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities [1985] ECJ 873, in which 
the Court held that the business activities of a national telecommunications undertaking could be 
subject to the prohibition of art 102 TFEU. The Court’s judgment was handed down in March 1985. 
8 COM(87) 290 final, 181. 
9 ibid 8. 
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collaborative standard-setting activities in forums with the major industrial and 
political actors and reassurances about revenues.10  
 
4.2.2. Regulatory Mandate Endorsed 
The Green Paper launched an extended consultation.11 The Commission’s use of a 
Green Paper followed the highly successful White Paper on completing the internal 
market.12 The extended consultation gave experts, industry, Member States and users 
an opportunity to provide comments. The proposals in the Green Paper were broadly 
endorsed across the board.13 Not coincidently, the Commission’s policy agenda 
meshed with the programme and timetable to complete the single market by 1992.14 
Linking the 1992 programme to the newly defined pro-competitive aims of the 
telecommunications sector coincided with consideration in national capitals of how 
to address the continuing decline of national telecommunications and IT industries; 
for example, the UK had already begun a liberalization process.15  
In 1988, the Commission outlined an extensive policy programme.16 The 
strategy was to open up the industrial and competitive potential of a continental-sized 
                                                
10 Eg ‘[T]he current and future integrity of the basic network infrastructure must be maintained or 
created. This implies in particular a continuing strong role for Telecommunications Administrations in 
the provision of network infrastructure and strong emphasis on Europe-wide standards in this area. It 
also implies safeguarding the financial viability of Telecommunications Administrations in order to 
ensure the build-up of the new generations of telecommunications infrastructure and the necessary 
level of investment.’ ibid 11. 
11 The Commission published the telecommunications Green Paper in June 1987 and then reported on 
its conclusions in a follow-up communication in February 1988. The intention behind the consultation 
was clearly to engender a broad debate at all levels of the interested communities and to give 
stakeholders an opportunity to digest the 250 plus pages of the consultation documents.  
12 COM(1985) 310 final. 
13 ‘...the Commission has received a wide range of comments. The broad consensus apparent from 
these comments now seems to give a strong basis on which to define further a determined campaign 
to  develop the Community s telecommunications market, with the overall objective of fully achieving 
a Community-wide open competitive market by 1992.’ Commission, ‘Towards A Competitive 
Community-wide Telecommunications Market in 1992, Implementing the Green Paper on the 
Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment: State of 
Discussions and Proposals by the Commission’ COM(88) 48 final, 4.  
14 ‘Given the overriding aim of achieving the Internal Market before the 31st December 1992, the 
obligation fully to apply the Treaty to the sector and the broad consultation process, a strong basis 
now exists for the opening of the Community’s telecommunications market, according to defined 
deadlines and according to the following principal measures [emphasis in original].’ COM(88) 48 
final, 16.  
15 See Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Communications Liberalisation in the UK: Key Elements, 
History & Benefits’ (March 2001) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/symp_mar02_uk_com_e.pdf> accessed 
13 December 2012. 
16 COM(88) 48 final, 4. 
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market for new telecommunications and IT services underpinned by standardized 
equipment and technology. The Commission announced an intention to use Treaty 
authority to liberalize terminal equipment in 1988.17 Adopted shortly thereafter, a 
Commission directive liberalized the entirety of the European terminal equipment 
market (hereafter the ‘Terminal Equipment Directive’), by abolishing all special and 
exclusive rights18 to import, market, connect, bring into service and maintain 
terminal equipment.19 The Directive was vigorously challenged,20 notwithstanding an 
explicit Council endorsement to promote liberalization of terminal equipment.21 In 
legal terms, the Terminal Equipment Directive was a straightforward exercise of the 
Commission’s competition enforcement powers, albeit without precedent as to its 
legal scope. The Court of Justice subsequently upheld the action as a legitimate 
exercise of the legislative powers conferred upon the Commission in the Treaty.22  
 
4.2.3. A Regulatory Authority Develops 
The significance of the Terminal Equipment Directive for the Commission as a 
positive regulator lay in its catalytic effects. It was adopted outwith the control of the 
Member States that created a new dynamic for a European regulatory space in 
                                                
17  ‘...the Commission will, before end-March of 1988, [emphasis in original] issue a Directive under 
Article 90 (3) regarding the liberalisation of the terminal equipment market. The progressive opening 
of telecommunications services from 1989 onwards and the problem of separation of operational and 
regulatory functions will be dealt with by a Commission Directive to be presented before mid-1988 
and to be adopted before end-1988 [emphasis in original]. COM(88) 48 final, 22.  
18 The rationale was a legal analysis that did not find such rights to be compatible with Treaty 
provisions on free movement of goods and with art 37 of the EEC Treaty, now art 37 TFEU.  
19 Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on competition in the markets in 
telecommunications terminal equipment [1988] OJ L131/73. The relevant Treaty provisions, art 37(1), 
now art 34 TFEU, read in part: ‘1. Member States shall progressively adjust any State monopolies of a 
commercial character so as to ensure that when the transitional period has ended no discrimination 
regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of 
Member States’.  
20 Even with a general consensus on the desirability of liberalising terminal equipment, the 
Commission’s use of Treaty powers in this manner represented a challenge to the Council’s role as 
European legislator, as France, Italy, Belgium, Germany and Greece argued before the Court of 
Justice. If the Commission enjoyed such legislative powers, other monopolised public services could 
equally be the object of such Commission initiatives. See Case C-202/88 French Republic v 
Commission of the European Communities [1991] ECR I-1223. 
21 Council Directive 86/361/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the initial stage of the mutual recognition of type 
approval for telecommunications terminal equipment [1986] OJ L217, 21. Some language in the 
preamble suggests the intention may have been more gradualist than the Commission intended: 
‘Whereas it is necessary to set up a Committee, with the task of assisting the Commission in 
implementing this Directive and in progressively implementing the mutual recognition of type 
approval for terminal equipment’.  
22 French Republic (n 20).  
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telecommunications. The Commission’s adoption of a liberalization Directive 
crystallized a willingness for Member States to agree positive harmonization 
measures. Such willingness may have been intended to modulate the Commission-
controlled negative integration measures.  
 Inter-institutional consensus emerged that both harmonization and 
liberalization were needed and the Commission combined both regulatory roles. In 
1990, the Commission adopted a second liberalization directive23 and simultaneously 
the Council adopted the first harmonization directive (the ONP Directive).24 Both 
dealt with telecommunications services, liberalizing services and harmonizing the 
regulation of access (using the concept of ‘Open Network Provision’ (ONP)).25 The 
harmonization Directive created a broad framework for further adoption of detailed 
measures.26 
The Commission’s governance practices as a regulator using both 
harmonization and liberalization were initially conjoined.27 With a move towards 
harmonized regulation, discussions shifted to a formulation of rules and norms for 
liberalized markets. The public and the private sectors, industry, incumbents and 
Member States had an interest in shaping the outcome of the legislative process, as 
well as the detailed rules elaborated thereafter. Positive harmonized regulatory 
measures for a functioning competitive market in telecommunications were treated 
as a matter of setting some basic principles of access to infrastructure and delegating 
the detailed working out of the norms to technical experts.28 As a policy 
entrepreneur, the Commission combined the roles of an enforcement authority and 
                                                
23 Commission Directive was 90/388/EEC on competition in the markets for telecommunications 
services [1990] OJ L192/10. 
24 This was Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal 
market for telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision 
[1990] OJ L192/1 (ONP Directive). The Commission Directive was 90/388/EEC. 
25 The Commission had used the term ‘workable competition’ drawing on case law. The meaning was 
that network infrastructure operators would be obliged to offer access to anyone without 
discrimination, including subsidiaries and divisions within their own corporate entities. N Higham, 
‘Open Network Provision in the EC: A Step-by-Step Approach to Competition’ (1993) 17 
Telecommunications Policy 242, 243.  
26 ONP Directive, annex III. 
27 For an analysis of the competition policy aspects of liberalisation of telecommunications and other 
utility industries, see eg Sauter (n 3) 170-200.  
28 The widely criticized EU comitology committee system was introduced into telecommunications 
regulation during the early legislative phase for the elaboration of detailed norms to be applied by 
national regulators on a case-by-case basis. See ONP Directive, arts 9-10.  
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regulator to link widespread support for the programme to complete the Internal 
Market with telecommunications. 
The 1990 ONP Directive committed in general terms to liberalize all 
telecommunications equipment and services yet restrained the Commission’s 
prerogative by ensuring that any further measures of a meaningful nature would 
follow the legislative harmonization procedure.29 Principles were introduced into the 
legislation as general criteria30 to be used by technical regulatory committees 
(‘comitology committees’) to determine the specific terms of access.31  The pace of 
liberalization was conducted through harmonization. Under the terms of the two 
legislative instruments adopted in 1990, all services but voice were liberalized, while 
access principles for new entrants were harmonized.32 These provisions provided a 
framework to be developed and applied. 
 
4.2.4. Policy Gives Way to Politics 
The Commission’s regulatory focus throughout the initial regulatory period remained 
full liberalization as identified in the 1987 Green Paper. The Services Directive 
(1990) excluded only voice telephony from liberalization, and even that was subject 
to re-consideration. In 1992, the Commission proposed liberalization of the highly 
remunerative retail voice services.33 A compromise was reached in 1993 to liberalize 
voice telephony in 1998.34 Setting the later date for full liberalization of all 
                                                
29 See ibid arts 4-6, in which the principles of open access (ie liberalization) were defined by 
legislation and comitology procedures, and specific services were liberalized by subsequent Council 
directives. 
30 The relevant provision read: ‘1. Open network provision conditions must comply with a number of 
basic principles set out hereafter, namely that:  
- they must be based on objective criteria,  
- they must be transparent and published in an appropriate manner, [and] 
- they must guarantee equality of access and must be non-discriminatory, in accordance with 
Community law’. ONP Directive, art 3(1). 
31 ibid arts 4 and 9. 
32 These covered:  access to technical interfaces; third-party access to frequencies and interconnection 
with networks; and defined tariff principles for interconnection between network infrastructure and 
new entrants. See ibid art 2(10). 
33 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on the application of open network provision (ONP) 
to voice telephony’ COM (92) 247 final.  
34 Council Resolution of 22 July 1993 on the review of the situation of the telecommunications sector 
and the need for further development in that market, [1993] OJ C213/1. It established, inter alia, the 
liberalization of all public voice telephony services as a major goal for Community 
telecommunications policy by 1998. It has been reported that the Commission used its leverage as a 
competition enforcement authority charged with approval of a proposed joint venture between 
Siemens and Honeywell-Bull to extract the concession of setting a definite date. See H Ungerer, ‘EU 
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telecommunications services disconnected the telecommunications regulatory 
strategy from the momentum of the 1992 single market programme and thus 
undermined the strategy of rapid liberalization.35 However, even with the later date, 
the telecommunications sector was effectively liberalized between 1990 and 1998. It 
was a considerable achievement to have transformed the legal framework of an entire 
European industry from monopoly to managed competition and market entry within 
eight years.  
A move towards positive harmonization measures and greater deference to 
Member States’ opposition to the use of competition law highlight the inter-
institutional tension that characterized that early period. The following comment 
from the Commission in 1990 - reporting on the adoption of a second liberalization 
directive - revealed the extent to which the Commission was willing to exercise its 
forbearance, as a competition enforcement authority:  
In the telecommunication sector, the year [1989] was marked by the 
Commission’s adoption of a new Directive, based on Article 90 of the 
EEC Treaty on competition in the markets for telecommunications 
services. The Directive will be notified to the Member States 
concurrently with the entry into force of the Council Directive on an 
open network provision which is designed to harmonize the conditions 
governing access to telecommunications networks.36  
 
In effect, the Commission had adopted (in 1989) but not notified the Services 
Directive to the Member States and only did so when the ONP Directive entered into 
force (1 January 1991). That the Commission pragmatically avoided confrontation 
may reflect a political and institutional sensitivity to the exercise of its Treaty 
powers. However, such sensitivity sits uneasily with normative regulatory 
                                                                                                                                     
Competition Law in the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors’ (22nd 
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy, New York, October 1995) 12 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1995_041_en.pdf> accessed 11 September 2012. If 
true, this would raise problematic aspects of a lack of transparency in setting a significant part of the 
regulatory agenda, and would underscore the hybrid nature of the Commission’s role in the early 
phase of the sector.  
35 New technologies and services, such as satellite and mobile communications, were emerging with 
no legacy issues. Positive regulation could be adopted to facilitate cross-border transactions and 
communications more easily. 
36 Commission, Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy (Brussels1990) 13 (Published in 
conjunction with the XXIIIrd General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 1989) 
<http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-
/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=CB5890546> accessed 11 March 2013. 
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governance if a regulator is meant to be authoritative and independent, as the 
Commission is. This did not unduly undermine its regulatory legitimacy in the initial 
regulatory phase, however, where market creation was the over-riding policy goal. I 
return to this below. 
 
4.3. Governance Aspects of the Early Period: a Retrospective 
Appreciation 
This section analyzes the regulatory practices of the Commission during the initial 
policy development phase. Analysis of the normativity of European governance 
within the enforcement of competition law, as such, is outside the scope of the 
present research.37 But, given the entwined nature of the Commission’s initial 
regulatory strategy and governance practices, the analysis in this chapter focuses on 
the combined regulatory governance features observed in the initial regulatory phase.  
Prior to 1988, Member States had made little progress in adapting their 
national arrangements to cater for the Treaty principles on competition and free 
movement in telecommunications despite repeated calls for such adaptation. All 
major actors in the telecommunications environment, including Member States, 
agreed that greater competition at the European level was needed. Thus consensus 
existed on what constituted the public interest. What differed between the major 
institutional actors were views on the powers, measures and timing to bring about the 
changes that were needed. Member States had virtually ignored the Commission’s 
urgings to collaborate on their national industrial policy approaches and, until 1987, 
the Commission acted solely as a facilitator.  
                                                
37 Some scholars have suggested that the European competition policy enforcement practices, 
particularly in light of entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the incorporation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights into EU law, but also in light of the European Convention of Human Rights, art 
6, do not meet some of the normative standards applicable to administrative and judicial protection of 
human rights. See eg I Forrester, ‘Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution 
with Flawed Procedures’ (2009) EL Rev 817; WPJ Wils, ‘The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, 
Judicial Review, and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2010) 33World Competition 5; D 
Waelbroeck and D Fosselard, ‘Should the Decision-Making Power in EC Antitrust Procedures be Left 
to an Independent Judge?: The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on EC Antitrust 
procedures’ (1994) YEL 111, 124-25. 
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Then, the Commission opportunistically translated a judicial precedent in a 
competition policy case38 into a new policy agenda announced in the 1987 Green 
Paper on telecommunications. The combination of the Court's decision, the 
commercial pressures from technology itself, and the political will to complete the 
single market created a basis for the Commission to claim regulatory authority to 
take action, which it did in 1987 (in the Green Paper), and followed through with the 
Terminal Equipment Directive in 1988. 
4.4. Regulatory Context and Initial Policy Assumptions 
Regulation was only one part of the overall strategy to achieve a European market 
for the freer movement of equipment and added-value services where both 
harmonization and liberalization would be in play. A key policy assumption then was 
the continued monopoly for network infrastructure operation, which meant that 
national incumbents would be obliged to make their network available to new market 
entrants who wished to offer added-value services, almost as a variation of an 
‘essential facility’. The public telephony network of the period was a copper-based 
infrastructure and offered only analogue (voice, fax and data) services. It was 
assumed at the time that only one network infrastructure would be viable, until a 
more advanced hybrid (capacity for analogue and digital communications) was 
available and that this would gradually overtake and replace the earlier infrastructure 
as new data-based services developed. Support for research into and standardization 
of such a new network infrastructure, called the Integrated Services Digital Network 
or ISDN), was part of the Commission’s classic industrial policy of the initial period 
and continued thereafter.39 The key regulatory objective was to create the potential 
for competition which, once established, would result in new markets for equipment 
and services. A competitive momentum to achieve an internal market system in 
which competition in telecommunications services was not distorted would be 
generated.41  
                                                
38 A Court judgment found that State-owned monopolies could be subject to the principles of the 
Treaty and, notably, the competition rules, when engaging in commercial activities. Case 41/83 Italy v 
Commission [1985] ECR 873. 
39 See C Turner, Trans-European Telecommunications Networks: the Challenge for European 
Industrial Policy (Routledge 1997) 65-80.  
41 The theory of contestable markets posits that markets in which even a small number of firms 
operate can nonetheless exhibit competitive equilibriums, along with desirable welfare outcomes, 
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In the Commission's initial framing, detailed ex ante economic regulation 
would be needed only on a temporary basis for access conditions to network 
infrastructure, and complemented with a basic set of users’ rights.42  This premise 
proved to be wrong.43 At this stage of regulatory policy development, the 
Commission services generally had little experience with the use of regulatory 
governance as a tool with which to enhance their legitimacy. Prior to the 1992 
Programme, the Commission had proposed a significantly smaller number of 
harmonization measures than previously.  
 During the initial policy development period, some of the most notable 
governance practices were: (1) the decision to initiate a broad public consultation 
through the publication of the 1987 Green Paper; (2) the explicit call for comments 
and feedback from as wide a spectrum of public opinion as possible; (3) the 
subsequent publication of the conclusions drawn from comments received; and (4) 
the publication of the regulatory implications of the conclusions including a detailed 
description of specific measures to be adopted.  
The Commission services were experienced in different ways and contexts 
with engaging in public consultations when taking decisions in specific cases under 
the competition rules. When adopting interpretative instruments such as block 
exemptions, the Commission services followed the governance procedures 
prescribed by the Council.44 These practices likely shaped the Commission’s 
approach to regulatory governance initially. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
because of the potential for competitive entry by new market entrants. Contestable markets are those 
with low barriers to entry and exit; no sunk costs (ie irrecoverable once made); and equal access by all 
market operators to relevant technology. See WJ Baumol, JC Panzar and RD Willig, Contestable 
Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1982) and WA Brock, 
‘Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industrial Structure: A Review Article’ (1983) 9 Journal of 
Political Economy 1055-66. Some commentators have suggested that perfectly competitive markets 
would indeed behave in the way Baumol and others outlined, but that they do not exist in practice. In 
empirical terms, the performance of imperfectly contestable markets (ie real world markets) depends 
on actual rather than potential competition. See S Martin, ‘The Theory of Contestable Markets’ 
(Purdue University, Department of Economics, July 2000) 36ff (footnotes omitted) 
<http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/smartin/aie2/contestbk.pdf>. 
42 This was exactly the framework agreed in Council Directive 90/388/EEC (n 24).  
43 Regulatory assumptions could be re-considered. The legislation provided for a periodic legislative 
review. See ONP Directive, art 8. 
44 See Council Regulation (EC) 19/65/EEC of 2 March 1965 on application of Art 85 (3) of the Treaty 




4.5. Regulatory Governance Discerned 
When the manner in which the Commission established the draft legislative 
framework for harmonized access conditions is examined, several distinctive 
regulatory governance practices are apparent. In the establishment of an ad hoc 
group of expert advisors that was itself convening hearings with various actors in the 
private sector, both the Commission and the ad hoc advisory group were setting 
regulatory standards. The Commission’s decision to use the group implicitly 
endorsed the need for a regulator itself to have or to have access to sufficient 
expertise to define relevant standards competently and appropriately. Neither the 
1987 Green Paper nor the 1988 follow-up Communication explained why the 
creation of an advisory group was necessary, or why the group conducted hearings. 
The discourse of its public statements implicitly endorsed the value inherent in 
expertise to enhance the exercise of its regulatory authority but never stated so 
explicitly.  
As a first exercise of its regulatory authority in an area governed by both 
technicity and exclusivity, the Commission discourse reflected recognition of the 
need to establish its competition authority and expertise for dismantling exclusive 
rights, but not the equivalent for establishing the norms by which the liberalized 
markets would be governed. Similarities between the governance practices used in 
competition enforcement powers and the practices used in exercising powers for 
harmonization measures can be seen. One similarity related to the Commission's 
conception of its regulatory authority relative to the authority of national regulators. 
In its initial proposal to the Council for a telecommunications directive in 1988, the 
Commission followed the precedent found in the measures adopted for Commission 
enforcement of the competition provisions of the Treaty for consultation of national 
experts in an advisory capacity.45  
The Commission proposed a purely advisory comitology committee, 
composed of the informal advisory group (SOG-T) used earlier, for elaborating 
detailed implementation rules and measures, with the Commission's proposal 
stipulating that the advisory committee would be composed of the same ad hoc 
                                                
45 Council Regulation (EC) 17, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty [1962] 
OJ L13/204.  
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group.46 This was an attempt to replicate within the telecommunications legislative 
framework the same authority enjoyed by the Commission in competition policy 
enforcement, as well as to involve the same officials who had previously contributed 
to policy development on an ad hoc basis.47 The Commission succeeded in retaining 
an advisory committee procedure for some, but not all, implementing measures but 
entirely failed to ensure a provision stipulating the composition of the comitology 
committee.48   
 
4.6. The Initial Regulatory Procedures   
An important aspect of regulatory governance with parallels to competition 
enforcement practice relates to the due process or procedural character of 
administrative action. Before the Commission may take a decision finding an 
infringement of the competition rules, it must give the undertakings concerned an 
opportunity to be heard and, in its discretion, the Commission may choose to hear the 
views of third parties that have a ‘sufficient interest’.49 When the Commission 
proposes to take a decision condemning one or more undertakings, or take a decision 
finding no infringement, it must give ‘all interested parties’ an opportunity to give 
their views.50 Similar procedures can be observed in the Commission's regulatory 
governance for telecommunications. In addition, the Commission had successfully 
used a ‘White Paper’ approach to policy development for market integration in 1985. 
In 1987 the Commission combined its success with the use of a White Paper for the 
internal market programme with its pre-existing experience in managing competition 
                                                
46 Detailed elaboration was required of the legislative principles (ie objectivity of access criteria, 
transparency of conditions of access, and non-discriminatory conditions guaranteeing access) that 
created a right of access in principle to network infrastructure. Art 9(1) of the Commission’s proposal 
for a Council Directive read: ‘The Commission shall be assisted by a committee of an advisory nature 
composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by the representative of the 
Commission. This committee shall be the Senior Officials Group on Telecommunications (SOG-T)’. 
47 Art 9 of Council Regulation 17/62 read: ‘The Commission shall be assisted by a committee of an 
advisory nature composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by a representative of 
the Commission’. In the Regulation prescribing the rules for competition policy enforcement, the 
Commission is assisted by a committee of an explicitly advisory nature in almost identical terms to 
those proposed by the Commission. 
48 See ONP Directive, art 9.  
49 Regulation 17/62, art 19(2). The 1962 Regulation was replaced by Regulation 1/2003. See Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [now arts 101 and 102 TFEU] [2003] OJ L1/1. 
50 ibid art 19(3) [now Regulation 1/2003, art 27(3)]. 
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cases to develop regulatory governance practices that incorporated several of the 
procedural aspects used elsewhere.  
The regulatory governance features that characterized the subsequent legal 
framework emerged in some of the final provisions of the adopted legislative texts 
(1990). The creation of a comitology procedure diluted some of the Commission’s 
control over certain aspects of legislative implementation.51 The Commission’s 
initial proposal to guarantee harmonization of the entire value chain of 
telecommunications, perhaps as an indirect guarantee of liberalization, was similarly 
diluted.52  Much unilateral competition power on the part of the Commission became 
rather an empty weapon once the ONP Directive was adopted. This indirectly 
appropriated the liberalization power of the Commission by tying it to future 
harmonization measures to be adopted by the Council. While ceding authority to the 
Commission to engage in post-legislative regulatory rule-setting activities, the 
Member States ensured that they would be closely involved in or in ultimate control 
of the rule-setting activities via the comitology procedures.  
4.7. First criterion: Regulatory Authority and Mandate 
This section analyzes the Commission’s authority for liberalization and the methods 
for establishing its regulatory mandate. In the liberalization of the 
telecommunications sector, the Commission’s authority for legislative competence 
under the competition rules was resolved in its favor by the Court rulings on its two 
liberalization Directives.53  The reaction of the Member States, who were the 
addressees of these instruments, constituted a ‘worst-case scenario’ for a regulator 
                                                
51 Areas that required a majority of Member States’ representatives to agree prior to application were: 
(1) adoption of rules to ensure interoperability; (2) a decision to mandate a technical standard for 
achieving interoperability and cross-border service provision; and (3) adoption of rules for the 
protection of data. This meant that the Commission would be required to submit a proposal to the 
Council where the measures proposed to the comitology committee had not meet with a majority 
approval. See ONP Directive, arts 3(5) and 5(3).  
52 The Commission’s proposal read ‘Areas for which open network conditions are to be drawn up’ 
was redrafted to read ‘Areas for which open network conditions may be drawn up’. See Proposal for a 
Council Directive on the establishment of the internal market for telecommunications services through 
the implementation of open network provision (ONP)’ COM(88) 825 final, annex I and  ONP 
Directive, annex I. 
53 Case C-202/88, France v Commission [1991] ECR I-1223; Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 and 
C-289/90, Kingdom of Spain, Kingdom of Belgium and Italian Republic v Commission of the 
European Communities [1992] ECR I-5833. 
124 
 
since if addressees do not accept a regulator’s authority, its legitimacy is 
significantly compromised.  
The entire process was called into question when Member States initially 
rejected the Commission’s authority to adopt such directly applicable legislative 
measures. The Commission was controversially willing to exercise both its 
autonomous competition enforcement authority and to cooperate with the Council to 
agree harmonized measures. The Commission insisted at this time on using its 
competition powers, possibly as a political signal that it was prepared to cooperate, 
even coordinate, its actions with the Council, but not entirely to relinquish its 
powers.54  Relations between the EU institutions of the Council and the Commission 
changed in 1988. The Council endorsed the overall aims of the programme laid down 
in the 1987 Green Paper, immediately after the adoption of the Terminal Equipment 
Directive.55 With this act, the Council validated the Commission’s policy mandate. 
Once the principle of liberalization was accepted politically, harmonized regulation 
became inevitable, since each Member State had its own national standards and 
policies.  
This validation can be evaluated in governance terms. Was there a legitimate 
authority for the policy pursued by the Commission? In the context of the period, this 
was contentious. Exercising its regulatory powers in the field of competition policy 
on a unilateral basis to conclude that the monopoly regimes of all Member States 
were uniformly unenforceable was precedent-setting. In developing its views, the 
Commission benefitted from its reflections for the Internal Market overall, and for 
the sector specifically, as reiterated in a series of communications on the 
telecommunications industry.56 The Commission identified the public interest as an 
                                                
54 An insistence by the Commission on the use of its competition powers can be seen from the Press 
Release issued by the Commission coincident with the adoption of the Framework Directive (by 
Council) and the Services Directive (by Commission) on the same day. See Dawn of a New Era in 
Telecommunications, IP/90/59 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/90/589&format=HTM
L&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>. See also Ungerer (n 34) 12.  
55 Council Resolution of 30 June 1988 on the Development of the Common Market for 
Telecommunications Services and Equipment Up to 1992 [1988] OJ C257/1.  
56 These were: that European industry needed to develop advanced technology skills and research 
capacities urgently, that national markets needed to evolve into a pan-European market and that 
existing monopoly provision of telecommunications equipment and services was detrimental to the 
achievement of a common market in which competition was not distorted. The most salient 
communications were Commission, ‘Recommendations on Telecommunications’ COM(80) 422 final; 
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independent institution and pursued a controversial and contested liberalization and 
re-regulatory agenda. The Commission’s unilateral action precipitated a political 
dynamic, which had been missing from the ‘digital revolution’.57  The Member 
States adapted to the new regulatory space created by the Commission to offer a 
more cooperative approach but they also introduced governance measures that 
constrained the Commission’s discretion in the implementation of harmonized 
measures.  
Obtaining a valid mandate for the Commission requires the Commission to 
seek political endorsement from the legislature. The Commission is obliged to put 
forward policy proposals, with little or no guidance on interpreting crucial aspects of 
its regulatory mandate, particularly to such questions as  ‘what is the minimum 
degree of “undistorted competition” required for the internal market?’. Nor does it 
answer the question of ‘how to balance the desire for a “social market” with the 
requirement of a system of undistorted competition? The absence of guidance in the 
Treaties on the balance needed or desirable for achieving the wider public interest 
constitutes one of the basic normative challenges facing the Commission as a 
regulator.  
In 1988, the analyses concerned fundamental Treaty objectives of market 
creation. But, even in an environment where no real internal market as yet existed, 
there were many aspects of harmonized regulation where a balance needed to be 
struck. It is hardly surprising that both the Commission and the Member States 
sought to influence both the pace and outcomes of harmonization and liberalization. 
What will become problematic in later phases of regulation will be the Commission’s 
tendency as a regulator to centralize, to micro-manage and to neglect the value of 
efficiency in achieving regulatory aims while interpreting its regulatory authority. 
These features will emerge in the analysis in Chapter 5. 
Successfully establishing its regulatory authority with Member States 
represented a significant challenge to the Commission.58 The process of establishing 
                                                                                                                                     
Commission, ‘Telecommunications’ COM(83) 289 final; Commission, ‘Telecommunications - Lines 
of Action’ COM(83) 573 final; Commission, ‘Progress Report and Work Done in the field and initial 
Proposals for an Action Programme’ COM(84) 277 final. 
57 See eg D Tapscott and A Carston, Paradigm Shift: The New Promise of Information Technology 
(McGraw-Hill 1992).  
58 That the Commission has refrained from exercising its competition enforcement authority 
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a regulatory mandate at the EU level recurs periodically. The process is somewhat 
inverted within the EU: the Commission proposes the terms of harmonized 
regulation and then negotiates with its legislature. This continues to be an area of 
contention. It was seen in Chapter 2 above that establishing a valid regulatory 
mandate is only the first step in creating a defensible claim to normative regulatory 
legitimacy. The next criterion of governance analyzed against the early governance 
practices is expertise which, in telecommunications, plays a significant role in 
constructing legitimacy.  
4.8. Second criterion: Expertise 
Telecommunications technology and its use evolved rapidly and continue to do so.59 
The Commission possessed few resources internally to evaluate technological 
advances and specific technologies.60 Input from experts was indispensable. The 
Commission acquired expertise by creating advisory bodies, drawn from national 
telecommunications ministerial experts, rather than representatives of national 
                                                                                                                                     
unilaterally to liberalise other utility sectors perhaps reflects its institutional confidence that it enjoys a 
broad regulatory authority for such sectors and need only maintain the potential to use such powers 
within the inter-institutional dynamic as a mechanism of negotiating leverage. 
59 See Ivan Huang, Roc Guo, Harry Xie, and Zhengxiang Wu,  ‘The Convergence of Information and 
Communication Technologies Gains Momentum’ in S Dutta and B Bilbao-Osorio (eds), The Global 
Information Technology Report 2012: Living in a Hyperconnected World, INSEAD, World Economic 
Forum, Geneva [p 35] <http://www3.weforum.org/doc/Global_IT_Report_2012.pdf.> accessed 9 
January 2013.  
60 This was shown when the Commission sought to generate a single European technical standard for 
future integrated pan-European networks, an initiative that failed spectacularly, due to the 
Commission's misreading of the potential for network innovation beyond the copper-based 
infrastructure. The technical standard concerned related to the Integrated Services Digital Network 
(ISDN). The working assumption of the Commission services dealing, not with competition but with 
research in IT, was to merge the transmission of voice, video, data and other network services all the 
while retaining copper-based networks designed for analogue transmission (‘circuit-switched’ in 
engineering terminology). The standard was defined by a technical committee of the ITU (the 
International Telecommunications Union, an agency of the United Nations) in 1988. See CCITT Red 
Book, vol 4 (1986) 320-25. The Commission took steps to have this standard agreed for the next 
generation of European public networks. The promotion of this technology formed part of the 
traditional approach to telecommunications in which the Commission’s efforts focused on bringing all 
relevant European actors in the standardisation process together. Until relatively late in the regulatory 
cycle, the Commission continued to pursue this approach. See eg Council Resolution 89/C 196/04 of 
18 July 1989 on the strengthening of the coordination for the introduction of the Integrated Services 
Digital Network (ISDN) in the European Community up to 1992 [1989] OJ C196/4; European 
Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the overall evaluation of a set 
of guidelines for the development of the Euro-ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) as a Trans-
European Network (TEN-ISDN), COM(2000) 267 final; and G Fuchs, ‘Policy-making in a System of 
Multi-Level Governance: The Commission of the European Community and the Restructuring of the 
Telecommunications Sector’ (1997) 1 JEPP 177, 179-90.  
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telecommunications administrations (who still combined regulatory and operational 
competences).61 While experts in these groups presumably represented considerable 
expertise, they generally operated in closed networks, organizing hearings at their 
discretion, thus significantly reducing the transparency of setting the relevant 
standards and principles of access. The Commission also established two advisory 
bodies from the private sector to comment on developments emerging in technology 
and market changes that could be effected by liberalization.62 The regulatory 
governance practices reflect the criterion of expertise, an important value in 
governance generally, more so in telecommunications.  
Working with the internal and unpublished reports of the advisory groups, the 
Commission prepared the 1987 Green Paper and its 1988 follow-up communication, 
the latter concluding that the Commission’s structural analysis and proposals for 
reform had been broadly endorsed. That the views of the advisory groups were never 
subject to public review or comment raises issues of openness which are addressed in 
relation to due process below. During this period the Commission used expertise 
opaquely. According to some reports, the Commission worked with the private 
sector groups to ensure that it received the technology-based pro-competitive market 
messages it wanted to hear.63 This manipulation of expertise in the context of a lack 
of transparency – for information that could be considered neither confidential nor 
sensitive – undermined the authoritative value of the expertise.64  
 It was seen in Chapter 2 that expertise constituted a major legitimating factor 
in Majone’s model of regulatory legitimacy, together with regulatory independence, 
in order to achieve robust and defensible regulatory decisions. What Majone’s 
argument does not address – in the telecommunications context – is the aspect of 
                                                
61 Fuchs, ibid 182. 
62 The Information Technology Users Group (INTUG) and the European Communications 
Technology Users Group (ECTUA).  
63 See Fuchs (n 60) 188.  
64 An example of a particularly problematic aspect of the use of expertise related to the user group 
created by the Commission for the creation of the Integrated Services Digital Network. This group 
enjoyed privileged access to the Commission services which in turn used their views to formulate 
European technical standards for European-wide deployment of network technology that failed to 
happen. The Commission’s unsuccessful use of expertise for a pre-determined outcome is the 
antithesis of regulatory legitimacy for a regulator. Both the process and its outcomes are contestable 
and undermined the legitimacy of its policy decisions.  See C Turner, Trans-European 




competing values when market conditions are subject to rapid change. When a 
regulator claims regulatory expertise, it may seek to rely on that criterion rather than 
justify its decisions and explain how it balanced competing interests to a wider 
public. Since the wider public had access only to the views as prepared and 
published by the Commission, it is not possible to determine what spectrum of views 
was expressed nor how the Commission balanced these.  
Expertise can be contested if opinions and technical assessments can be 
debated. Where there is little public access to the views expressed by experts, 
selectivity of reporting and emphasis can convey a stronger message than might 
otherwise be objectively merited. For example, it would have been helpful to an 
appreciation of the expertise relied upon by the Commission to know whether there 
were any conflicts of opinion between experts and, if so, of what nature and how 
these were taken into account; or whether the experts representing national ministries 
were also reflecting national views. If the its tactics or proposals were controversial, 
the Commission resorted to having a broad consensus on the substantive content of 
its policy, while minimizing the controversy with Member States of its unilateral 
initiative.65 While the Commission reported broad consensus on its policy 
programme for telecommunications, access to the comments received by the 
Commission during the public consultation on the Green Paper (1987) was only 
available on request.66 
Different experts may represent different levels of experience, objectivity and 
credibility. This should affect an appreciation of their analytical independence and 
thus the normative reliability to be placed on their views. It is also difficult to 
evaluate expertise in such a context from the point of view of what alternative 
decisions were available or debated. Impact assessment procedures adopted by the 
                                                
65 An example of this appears in the latter part of the follow-up Communication to the 1987 Green 
Paper in which the Commission explicitly stated its intention to adopt a Commission Directive under 
Art 90(3) EEC [now art 106(3) TFEU] to de-monopolise the terminal equipment sector. The 
Communication (dated 9 February 1988) stated ‘the Commission will, before end-March of 1988, 
issue a Directive under art 90 (3) regarding the liberalisation of the terminal equipment market’. The 
Communication announced a further directive: ‘The progressive opening of telecommunications 
services from 1989 onwards and the ...separation of operational and regulatory functions will be dealt 
with by a Commission Directive to be presented before mid-1988 and to be adopted before end-1988. 
[emphasis in original]’. See COM(1988) 48 final, 22. 
66 ibid 11.  
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Commission in 2002 were intended in part to address this deficiency.67 I return to 
this issue in Chapter 6 below. The Commission used expertise that it had identified, 
controlled and interpreted to assert its authority under the Treaty to determine what 
constituted the public interest within the meaning of the principles and aims of the 
EEC Treaty. This allowed it to signal implicitly to those inclined to resist, such as 
telecommunications administrations, national equipment manufacturers and national 
ministries that its own expertise and appreciation in this regard were authoritative 
and valid.  
The ONP Directive created a harmonized but skeletal system that required 
further work and elaboration. That the Commission would have preferred, when 
adopting implementing measures, to make discretionary use of the expertise of 
experts with whom it had already established a working relationship evokes the 
practice of officials engaged in competition policy enforcement. There, considerable 
confidentiality attaches to the internal deliberations of the Commission and to the 
consultations with national competition authorities on matters under review. 
However, from a regulatory governance perspective, confidentiality in the use of 
regulatory expertise is highly undesirable.  
The use of comitology committees in a regulatory space where markets were 
absent and needed to be created offered the Member States an opportunity to 
participate in, shape and sometimes control, the process of elaborating the specific 
measures to which their telecommunications administrations would be subject. In 
regulatory governance terms, this not only correlates with the criterion of due 
process, discussed further below, it also offered the addressees of regulatory 
measures an opportunity to contribute to the formulation of regulatory norms. 
Comitology committees create their own problems of regulatory governance.68 
 It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that Scharpf contested the normative value 
of expertise within a system of positive economic regulation that went beyond a 
minimalist standard. His view was based on the premise, exactly contrary to that of 
Majone’s, that economic regulation, even by experts, carries distributional 
                                                
67 Commission, ‘Impact Assessment’ COM(2002) 276 final.  
68 The present research is addressed to regulatory processes of policy development. For analysis of the 
legitimacy of comitology procedures, see M Rhinard, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of the European 
Committee System’ (2002) 15 Governance 210. 
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consequences that are political in nature. Thus, such regulation should be embedded 
within a political process that has some form of democratic legitimacy.69 Without a 
definition or criteria to determine unacceptably distributional regulation, the 
Scharpfian analysis remains largely a political critique rather than a framing for 
empirical regulatory governance analysis. Much regulation at the EU level goes 
beyond Scharpf’s limitative standard.70  Both Majone and Scharpf’s theories concur 
with the narrow premise of a necessity for expertise in market creation and re-
regulation in the European context. Such re-regulation was required in order to create 
a more unified market space than previously. Although the Commission lacked 
technical skills, it possessed sufficient expertise in other dimensions, related to the 
institutional, legal and economic dimensions of needed regulation. For example, 
communications from the early 1980s, even with corporatist industrial policy 
approach to the sector, nonetheless clearly reflected an understanding of the potential 
of the technology for market disruption.71  The Commission understood at an 
institutional level that mere discourse was insufficient to induce the Member States 
to adopt the type of measures that were needed to effect the regulatory changes 
needed to create conditions for competitive market access and entry.  
 
4.9. The Importance of Legal Expertise 
The Commission’s legal expertise was reflected in its ability to combine an 
economic appreciation of the technology with a willingness ambitiously to use the 
provisions of the Treaty to overturn a pre-existing interpretative consensus. The 
quality of legal expertise within the Commission represents a particularly important 
value of regulatory governance at this time. The strategy of unilateral liberalization 
was highly risky in political terms, as was borne out by subsequent challenges. The 
single precedent of the Court, finding European competition provisions applicable to 
                                                
69 Scharpf based this analysis on ‘output legitimacy’ which he argued is sufficient to justify the use of 
EU-type processes and institutions in order to resolve common problems. But output legitimacy is 
more limited in its ‘substantive reach’ and ‘more demanding’ institutionally. F Scharpf, Governing in 
Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP 1999) 11-12. 
70 For a sceptical, if not cynical, view of the absence of meaningful limits on EU competences, see S 
Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court’s Case Law has become a “Drafting Guide”’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827. 
71 See eg Commission, ‘Faced with the Challenge of New Information Technologies: A Community 
Response’ COM(79) 650 final; Commission, ‘Telecommunications: Communication from the 
Commission to the Council’ COM(83) 329 final. 
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telecommunications in some instances, could not be directly relied upon.72 But an 
important principle was established and subsequently applied: a statutory monopoly 
engaging in activities of an economic nature constitutes an undertaking within the 
meaning of the competition rules.  
What the Court had not established was the proposition that the existence of 
monopoly rights could themselves constitute an infringement of the principles of 
Article 106(1) and (2) TFEU.73  Yet this proposition was the basis for the adoption of 
the Terminal Equipment Directive. In what now seems utterly defensible, the 
Commission newly reasoned that exclusive rights prevented the development of 
Community trade and impacted negatively upon cross-border trade, violating the 
Treaty. The Commission’s extrapolations from the narrower holding were 
subsequently vindicated by the Court of Justice, but were legally uncertain and 
politically controversial at the time. It was also legally uncertain that the 
Commission’s Treaty powers under what is now Article 106(3) TFEU extended to 
the adoption of a legislative measure in which national statutory rights were 
nullified. Such powers were politically sensitive.74 If upheld, the Commission would 
have the authority to repeal national, democratically adopted, laws, touching upon 
the constitutional relationship between the Commission, Member States, 
governments and national legal entities. The Commission’s single previous use of the 
                                                
72 The Court established in 1985 that three propositions were pertinent to the exercise of the 
Commission's competition authority: (1) that a national telecommunications monopoly is subject to 
the obligations imposed by Community competition rules when it engages in a business activity in 
which the undertaking itself determines its contractual terms; (2) that the application of Community 
competition rules to a State-owned monopoly did not infringe the principle that the Treaty shall in no 
way prejudice the rules in Member States governing property ownership [art 345 TFEU]; and (3) that 
the application of Community competition rules to a statutory monopoly is not incompatible with its 
status as a monopoly. Case 41/83, Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities 
[1985] ECR 873, paras 18, 20, 22, 48. 
73 The current provisions read as follows: ‘1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to 
which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor 
maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to those 
rules provided for in art 18 and arts 101 to 109.  
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the 
character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in 
particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must 
not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union.’ 
74 The Commission’s initial use of the power to adopt a directive requiring disclosure of financial 
information between Member States and public undertakings was challenged by France, Italy and the 
UK with supporting interventions by the Netherlands and Germany. See Joined Cases 188 to 190/80, 
French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v 
Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 2545.  
132 
 
relevant provision had not touched upon or affected the validity of national legal 
rights.75  
The Commission’s reliance upon narrow legal precedents to liberalize a 
sector with strong and historic national statutory rights, associated with a high degree 
of national interest, highlighted the Commission’s ability to extract the implications 
of narrow holdings and apply its legal analysis to a broader legal context using legal 
inferences based on Treaty principles and textual exegesis. This reflected 
considerable institutional and legal expertise within the Commission. Such legally 
innovative and interpretive expertise underpinned the policy unilaterally to abolish 
exclusive rights but this was only part of its regulatory strategy. Positive integration 
measures would also be needed which required sound economic expertise.  
4.10. The Importance of Economic Expertise 
Economic regulatory expertise enables an appreciation of the level at which 
regulation needs to intervene and what types of measure are needed to correct a 
problem or to remove a barrier to trade. A harmonized norm that maximizes the 
potential for market access must be developed. With sub-optimal norms, over-
regulation or under-regulation takes place, the effect of which is to skew regulatory 
outcomes and processes by reference to what is desirable or what is aspired to.  
The Commission’s initial approach to the rules for economic regulation was 
minimalist, covering two categories that related to (1) conditions for access, and their 
exceptions;76 and (2) harmonized commercial terms and conditions of access by 
market entrants to networks and services, reflecting four general principles 
applicable to all trading activities.77 The approach to market access regulation 
attempted to frame the legislative rules so as to avoid complexity, legalism and lack 
                                                
75 The Directive required Member States to keep available for five years information concerning 
public funds made available by public authorities to public undertakings. The intention was to 
facilitate application of State aid rules.  
76 These were based on requirements that could be imposed as a condition for access, meaning 
technical rules to ensure network integrity, data security and protection, and inter-operability features 
that allowed exceptions to the principle of market access. Council Directive 90/387/EEC (n 24) art 
3(2). 
77 The legislative text defining the economic market access principles provided that open network 
provision conditions must comply with a number of basic principles, namely that: they must be based 
on objective criteria; they must be transparent and published in an appropriate manner; they must 
guarantee equality of access; and they must be non-discriminatory, in accordance with Community 
law. See ONP Directive, art 3(1).  
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of flexibility.78 Inevitably, most of the detailed work of applying the principles and 
exceptions fell to the implementation phase. The economic and technical aspects of 
expertise in policy development were difficult to separate, especially where access to 
the views of external expertise relied upon was not available. Once market creation is 
no longer the primary focus of policy analysis, expertise required for market 
regulation is clearly discernible and is analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
4.11. Efficiency 
If the least possible levels of inputs and costs are expended in regulatory execution, a 
regulator satisfies the criterion of efficiency.79 When the early period of European 
telecommunications regulation is considered, some features of the governance 
process reflect a high level of efficiency, relative to the purely economic regulatory 
aims defined in the Treaty of Rome. Two Treaty powers were available to the 
Commission as a positive economic regulator to intervene in national markets: 
competition enforcement and the adoption of draft legislative measures. No 
consensus existed that the Commission could intervene in national utility markets. 
Once this consensus was eroded within Commission circles, the Internal Market 
completion programme was able to offer a larger framing within a Commission 
strategy for telecommunications to achieve the aims of the Treaty. The value of 
efficiency would be highly represented in using Commission de-monopolization 
directives as a form of negative integration with support from positive integration 
measures, as the inputs and the costs for carrying out the regulatory agenda.  
To have the appropriate level of outcomes at the European level, the actions 
that needed to be taken were at the national level. Yet the actions at the national level 
necessarily had to be simultaneous, congruent, and mutually agreed, to be efficient. 
Persuasion in the 1970s and 1980s had failed to achieve the aims of market 
integration. Using coercive regulatory measures generated a different political 
environment, which in turn created political momentum for the liberalization and re-
regulation strategy that the Commission pursued. From the perspective of efficiency, 
the Commission’s use of its competition policy enforcement powers represented an 
                                                
78 See eg R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (OUP 
1999) 37. 
79 ibid 81 n 15.  
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efficient use of the regulatory opportunities that were available to it and formed the 
major part of its regulatory strategy of the period.  
The second aspect of efficiency during the early phase of telecommunications 
policy development was interaction between the regulatory strategy for 
telecommunications and the timetable of the programme to complete the Internal 
Market. This meant that the regulatory strategy for telecommunications was tied to 
the creation of a common market by 1992, and drove efficiency to a high value 
within the regulatory strategy. A strategy for achieving competitive conditions in 
telecommunications by relying solely on enforcement of competition law would have 
produced an unpredictable, and insufficiently credible, strategy. Far from suggesting 
a long-term or credible policy commitment, the use of competition powers alone 
would have produced an incomplete strategy with significant design flaws (and 
called regulatory expertise into question), or it might have suggested that the strategy 
was devised more for political purposes than for purposes of regulatory credibility 
and policy commitment. For example, New Zealand’s initial reliance on competition 
law alone produced an unwieldy explosion of judicial cases and chaotic market 
outcomes. 80 Similarly, the outcome in the EU of using competition law alone would 
have required high profile and politically controversial enforcement actions against 
national undertakings, requiring considerable resources on the part of the 
Commission to conduct and presumably would have taken years to resolve. Thus, 
completion of the single market by 1992 introduced a time criterion into 
telecommunications that facilitated a rapid adoption of positive regulation creating a 
realistic prospect of achieving a common market in telecommunications by 1992.  
A final aspect of efficiency relates to the redistributive effects of economic 
regulation. Market regulation causes redistribution effects and creates winners and 
losers. Analysis of regulatory governance in policy design cannot entirely avoid non-
economic factors. Any assessment of the fairness of distributional outcomes will in 
part be determined by the pre-existing distribution of wealth in the market and 
                                                
80 Among the industrialised countries in the world, very few attempts were made to achieve 
competitive liberalization in telecommunications using the regulatory strategy of competition law 
alone. When tried, regulatory failure occurred which was followed by resort to the kind of mixed 
strategy approach used by the Commission. See eg  RJ Ahdar, ‘Battles in New Zealand’s Deregulated 
Telecommunications Industry’ (1995) 23/2 Australian Business Law Review 77; P Spiller and C 
Cardilli, ‘The Frontier of Telecommunications Regulation: Small Countries Leading the Pack’ (1997) 
11/7 Journal of Economic Perspectives 127. 
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society generally.81  This linkage affects the normative value of efficiency since the 
concept of efficient regulation is linked to market outcomes by reference to what 
distribution of wealth and income existed prior to regulation. The primary ‘losers’ in 
the process of liberalization and deregulation were the national incumbents and the 
equipment manufacturers that supplied them, yet even the latter might have regarded 
a larger market as a price worth paying for liberalization.  
State-owned incumbents were ‘losers’ in the sense that they were confronted 
with competition in newly emerging ‘added-value’ markets. Nonetheless, the 
monopoly on voice telephony, and thus the source of approximately 90% of the 
incumbents’ revenue, continued until 1998. At the same time, the incumbents could 
compete in markets other than their own national markets to offer cross-border 
services. Even as ‘losers’, they enjoyed potentially compensatory gains. The State 
treasuries may have been ‘losers’ by reference to the downward pressure that 
competition could exert on market prices for ‘added-value’ services and for terminal 
and infrastructure equipment. However, allowing IT technology to be deployed 
widely and competitively would normally be expected to produce significant macro-
economic effects thus growing the national economies of the States. Economic 
growth would correlate with a higher level of tax revenue in consequence, in addition 
to the additional beneficial effect on the standard of living. In theory, even national 
governments and incumbents could benefit in terms of allocated efficiency from 
liberalization.  
In terms of competition policy, the inputs and costs of the early policy seem 
commensurate with the aims. The efficiency value for the initial positive integration 
measures to be adopted was high. It was part of a coherent regulatory strategy in 
which ex ante regulation was ancillary but necessary to ensure the effectiveness of 
the competition policy component of the strategy, so that a more powerful economic 
driver, that of market forces, could be deployed throughout telecommunications 
markets to achieve a single market by 1992. Positive regulation was needed to 
establish proxy conditions of competition allowing market entrants to acquire market 
share of their own and become competitive. Once the liberalized markets were 
                                                
81 C Veljanovski, ‘Economic Approaches to Regulation’ in R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010) 23. 
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sufficiently competitive, in theory the need for positive regulation would diminish 
and ultimately disappear.  
The Commission used positive regulation primarily to complement the role of 
competition policy and not as an alternative to achieving competitive markets. The 
Green Paper and other communications of the period systematically reiterated the 
competitive potential of the telecommunications markets once liberalized. Efficiency 
at this stage therefore strongly underpinned a conclusion of legitimate use of Treaty 
powers to remove national barriers to cross-border commerce. Efficiency can also be 
ascribed to the Commission as a positive regulator, as the legislation and associated 
rules were conceptualized as being temporary, flexible and minimalist.  
 
4.12. Procedural Due Process 
No meaningful difference in regulatory governance emerges between competition 
policy enforcement and positive regulatory development. The treatment of meetings 
and discussions is one example. Rule-setting activities were conducted in one of two 
ways, either by the Commission meeting with national telecommunications experts 
in private, or meetings were convened directly by the ad hoc advisory groups. The 
Commission’s reports referred to these meetings as ‘hearings’ with stakeholders, but 
did not mention ‘public hearings’, a fact that would likely have been mentioned.82  
The narrative reporting on the work with the advisory group and the hearings 
with stakeholders implied that, while expertise was necessary to the exercise of 
regulatory authority, the transparency of the procedures used in rule-setting activities 
need only meet a minimal standard effectively analogous to that provided in 
competition policy. This strongly contrasts with a highly interactive, fact-based, 
procedure-oriented rule-setting practice that characterizes US federal agencies’ 
regulatory practices.83       
                                                
82 For example, reporting on its own public consultation in 1988, the Commission noted that the 
Green Paper consultation was the ‘very first time in the Community that an in-depth broadly based 
discussion between all actors involved in the future of the sector has taken place’. COM(88) 48 final, 
11. 
83 All information used by the regulator in a rule-setting procedure must be publicly available in the 
US. If a federal agency’s decision relies on considerations or factual elements that are not in the 
public record that provides significant grounds for judicial reversal. See Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 USC s 556, s 556(d), s 557 and s706(a)(2). See generally D Hall, Administrative Law 
Bureaucracy in a Democracy (4th edn, Pearson 2009).  
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The development of provisions for positive harmonization was also flawed. 
Initial rule-defining activities were carried out behind closed doors between the 
Commission and an ad hoc group of experts, who were never identified. That is not 
to suggest that the norms agreed were flawed. But normative regulatory governance 
requires that the means through which such norms are laid down must be seen to be 
open and transparent. The initial practices of the Commission as a positive regulator 
failed to satisfy that standard. The definition of principles of access might arguably 
be said to relate to technical areas where expertise and even efficiency are more 
important than participation. However, the important element of procedural due 
process in which certain values can be seen to be validated was missing. Discourse is 
not a substitute for transparent participation in rule-making; the Commission used 
consultation procedures to establish the proposition that a broad social consensus 
existed on controversial policies and thereby blurred the boundaries between 
competition policy enforcement and regulatory practices.  
Nowhere does the narrative explain why the governance practices of the 
negative and positive integration measures were so blurred. The Commission’s 
intention may have been to forestall Member States’ resistance. Some language in 
the Green Paper suggested that different policy options were under consideration 
based on some important assumptions. The Commission acknowledged, for example, 
that the use of enforcement procedures under individual Treaty articles to achieve a 
liberalized and harmonized market would be problematic as the reason for engaging 
in harmonization since:  
If a series of contentious cases and lengthy conflict (which would have to 
be resolved by the Commission under Articles 52, 59, 85, 86 and 90 of 
the Treaty [now, respectively arts 49, 56, 101, 102 and 106 TFEU] is to 
be avoided, the Community will have to develop common principles 
regarding the general conditions for the provision of the network 
infrastructure by the Telecommunications Administrations to users and 
competitive services providers, in particular for trans-frontier provision 
[emphasis in original].... 84  
Thus, unilateral liberalization of services without agreement on harmonized access 
terms and conditions would have created a considerably uncertain market 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
84 COM(87) 290 final, 69. 
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environment, where national regulatory authorities, while still providing 
telecommunications services, would have set the commercial and technical terms for 
access by new market entrants, with no binding European norms and standards. The 
Commission would have been enmeshed in a burdensome series of infringement and 
enforcement cases. The creation of an Internal Market in telecommunications by 
1992, or even 1998, would hardly have been realistic in such circumstances.  
The Commission explicitly mentioned both negative and positive legislative 
integration measures but neglected to specify what its intentions were:  
The transition towards a Community-wide competitive services market 
could therefore be substantially accelerated by Community Directives on 
Open Network Provision (ONP), based on Articles 100A [art 114 TFEU] 
and 90(3) [art 106(3) TFEU] respectively.85 
Both Council and Commission measures would be needed but it was unclear what 
the content, scope and role of these would be.86  
Regulatory procedures during this period suggested that the consultative 
procedures were meant to convey the impression that a self-contained and complete 
regulatory policy had been developed which simply required endorsement and little 
political input, or ‘rubber stamping’. This comes across notably in the Green Paper’s 
description of the access conditions that would need to be laid down in European 
harmonization directives. A typical green paper will discuss alternatives along with 
the advantages and disadvantages of a possible solution, inviting comments to refine 
the policy thinking. This ‘Green Paper’ extensively prescribed the access conditions 
to be defined, harmonized and elaborated.87   
                                                
85 ibid. 
86 The ‘hidden bombshell’ in this narrative was the reference to art 90(3) EEC [art 106(3) TFEU] with 
no clarity as to its specific nature (ie decision, directive or recommendation), scope, addressees, or 
provisions.  
87 Appearing in the narrative of the Green Paper, and implicitly resulting from the internal reflections 
between the Commission and the advisory groups, was an identification of the scope of measures that 
harmonized access provisions would need to cover. These related to harmonized conditions for three 
network ‘layers’ involved in the use of the telephony network by new entrants. These were: (1) 
technical interfaces, ie specifications of facilities and mandatory standards, including the conditions 
under which radio frequencies needed to be made available; (2) tariff principles, in particular separate 
tariffing (‘unbundling’) of ‘bearer’ [meaning mere carriage or transmission services] and ‘value-
added’ capabilities; and (3) restrictions of use which could be imposed because a particular service 
had not yet been liberalised. But any such restrictions for the third ‘layer’ would have to be ‘reviewed’ 
according to the Green Paper, ‘within given time intervals’. Since the only service excluded from the 
scope of future harmonisation in the Framework Directive was voice telephony, in practice this 
constituted only one class of service. See COM(87) 290 final, 69-70.  
139 
 
The true purpose of the Green Paper was revealed in the report on the 
consultation: 
[T]he fundamental purpose of the measures [the regulatory proposals 
appearing in the Green Paper] is therefore to set off a dynamic process 
that will give the political, economic and social actors involved a better 
understanding of their own interests and will optimize their activities in 
the construction of the Community. [emphasis added]88  
At this early stage of telecommunications policy development, the Commission used 
consultative procedures to facilitate a wider understanding, and expected acceptance 
of its policies and proposals. The intention in creating a debate and appealing for 
comments was to ensure that the dialectic process would conclude with recognition 
on the part of political, economic and social actors of the rightness of the 
Commission’s proposals in relation to their own interests. The Commission seemed 
to consider this as the main purpose of public consultation, foreshadowing the view 
in the Governance White Paper of 2001 - where public consultations were 
characterized as a medium of education and persuasion for those who have not yet 
appreciated that the European policies are actually in their own interest when 
properly understood - and not a means for determining the public’s views on possible 
policies.89    
That the Commission expected to retain a close working arrangement with 
the advisory group used to develop the initial proposal for harmonization, that the 
Commission would determine the proposals resulting from their work that would be 
submitted to further public consultation, and that the results of the Commission’s 
appreciation of the comments received would be used to prepare and submit a 
legislative proposal to the Council for endorsement by the Member States reflect a 
regulator free to disregard opinion with which it disagreed.90 The Commission 
perhaps only inadvertently revealed its thinking here. By spelling out that it and the 
                                                
88 COM(88) 48 final, 10. 
89 An interesting Freudian slip appeared in the follow-up communication to the Green Paper that 
implied the Commission’s perception of a binary breakdown of liberalisation views. Reporting on the 
divergence of opinion received in the consultation on some of the positions defended in the Green 
Paper, the Commission noted that the views received, with respect to its suggestion that network 
infrastructure should continue to be subject to a national monopoly:  ‘the acceptance of the 
continuation of exclusive provision for network infrastructure...has met acceptance in most comments 
while receiving some criticism from both sides’. [emphasis added]. COM (88) 48 final, 13. 
90 COM(88) 48 final, 18-19. 
140 
 
advisory group would develop the conditions for open access and for technical 
requirements such as network security, submit these to public consultation and 
thereafter complete all of the necessary work by the end of 1989, it implied that the 
legislative process could be expedited.  
It should be recalled that the Commission had firmly anchored the 
telecommunications agenda into the overall programme to complete the single 
market by 1992. This is revealed by reading together a number of different 
comments in the Communication. On the conditions for access, the Communication 
stated ‘In the meantime [ie 1988, post-consultation and pre-legislative proposal], the 
[advisory group] has started to define the general approach to the concept [of the 
general requirements for use of the network]. In order to allow timely input to the 
Community-wide definition of fair access and usage conditions, it is suggested to 
concentrate on those issues most critical to provide competitive services and a 
competitive market environment and to work according to a stringent time 
schedule...’91 The stringent timetable proposed that all of the work that needed to be 
done to analyze and define the conditions for access would be completed by mid-
1989.92 The Commission clearly expected, in 1988, that all services other than voice 
telephony would be rapidly liberalized but that even the ‘cash cow’ of voice was not 
immune from future liberalization:  ‘By 1st January 1992, any remaining exclusive 
provision of services will have to be reviewed...’93 As noted above, the legislative 
process did not complete until 1990 and the ONP Directive once adopted changed 
the dynamic by precluding any automaticity of liberalization and also introduced 
time lags into the process of liberalization, as it was by then legislatively tied to 
harmonization. While the discourse of the need to achieve a general consensus via 
public consultation procedures among all concerned (‘including users, industry and 
potential service providers’94) seemed to be grounded in notions of transparency and 
access by the wider public to rule-setting, it more likely was intended, but failed, to 
operate as a ‘shield’ with which to deflect the resistance of the Member States to the 
momentum of forthcoming liberalization measures.  
                                                
91 ibid. 
92 COM(88) 48 final, 17. 
93 ibid 17. 
94 ibid 19. 
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The Communications issued by the Commission during the initial policy 
phase repeatedly referred to a ‘broad consensus’ in civic society that endorsed the 
policy that the Commission pursued in telecommunications.95 There is no record of 
the discussions with Member States, national Telecommunications Administrations 
and ministry experts, other than those filtered through the Commission’s 
pronouncements, which were used instrumentally to support its regulatory strategy. 
Whatever the views expressed in private meetings, the Commission constructed a 
narrative of consensus.  
The Green Paper of 1987 effected a compression of several stages of 
regulatory policy when compared to national regulators. The Commission defined 
and defended its own policy mandate and identified the scope of liberalization and 
regulation.96  What it did not do was to ensure transparency in respect of the next 
regulatory steps that would follow, relative to the Commission Directive, while 
lauding itself for the innovative use of public consultation procedures.97 Yet the 
Green Paper revealed that the Commission had spoken with some Member States 
about the measures under consideration.98 Member States would not necessarily have 
understood the equivocal language relating to the use of Treaty powers as 
announcing an intention unilaterally to act.99 
                                                
95 For example, in the 1988 report of the Green Paper consultation, the Commission noted ‘the 
[consultation] process has proved that, while respecting different national situations and perceptions, a 
broad consensus in this field can be developed in the Community’. ibid 11; also that there was ‘a 
broad consensus regarding the full liberalisation of the terminal equipment market’ and that there was 
‘a broad consensus on the liberalisation of value-added services’; and ‘full endorsement of the 
separation of regulatory and operational responsibilities’ and ‘strong support...to maintain or create 
Community-wide standards’ and ‘general acceptance of the need to apply the general rules of 
competition law to the operational activities of both [incumbents] and other private providers’ and 
‘general support for existing Community programmes...aimed at strengthening the long-term 
convergence and integrity of the network infrastructure of the Community’. ibid 12-13.  
96 For example, the Green Paper stated ‘“reserved services” are defined as services reserved for 
exclusive provision by the Telecommunications Administrations. Reserved services must be narrowly 
defined, in order to avoid restrictions or distortions of competition. They must be provided on a 
universal basis. “Competitive services” would include all other services, in particular “value-added 
services”’.  See COM(87) 290 final, 67. 
97 Reporting on its own public consultation in 1988, the Commission noted that the consultation on the 
Green Paper was the ‘very first time in the Community that an in-depth broadly based discussion 
between all actors involved in the future of the sector has taken place’. COM(88) 48 final, 11. 
98 Mention is made of the UK, the Netherlands and Germany and their respective policy preferences 
for avoiding ‘cream-skimming’ activities on liberalized infrastructure, as methodologies to safeguard 
the financial viability of the Telecommunications Administrations. COM(87) 290 final, 75. 
99 In the 1987 Green Paper, the Commission noted, conditionally, that is, using ‘could’ in the 
following statement:  ‘The transition towards a Community-wide competitive services market could 
therefore be substantially accelerated by Community Directives on Open Network Provision (ONP), 
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Chapter 2 above showed that due process can significantly enhance or reduce 
the normative legitimacy of a positive regulator. Because of the adjunct nature of the 
role of positive integration in the initial phase of telecommunications policy, the 
administrative procedures used by the Commission were largely those of an antitrust 
authority, and less the administrative procedures of a purely regulatory authority. 
Differences between these two types of authority are reflected in the different values 
that need to be served by the administrative procedures used in the adoption of 
definitive enforcement decisions for competition powers and the adoption of draft 
legislative regulatory measures.  
The values of openness, transparency and procedural due process require that 
formal administrative procedures contribute to legal, social, economic, and any other 
values intended to be served by the regulation. The procedures should ensure that 
these values can be validated. The Commission’s initial approach to due process 
reflected an imperfect awareness of the desirability of transparency, particularly in 
relation to the intended recipients of its most potent de-regulatory measure. The 
intention to adopt liberalization Directives under Article 106(3) TFEU should have 
been addressed more specifically to the Member States and national incumbents and 
not downplayed in the narrative. 
The normativity of procedural due process in regulatory governance lies in its 
value as a substitute for the mechanisms of accountability associated with democratic 
political processes.100 The association of due process with accountability is strong. 
The importance of procedural due process to a regulator’s legitimacy is linked to an 
ability to control the regulatory process in terms that are meaningful to democratic 
values. When procedural due process creates a positive association with 
accountability, regulatory legitimacy is enhanced. Thus, its legitimacy is enhanced 
when a regulator conducts regulatory practices according to normative standards of 
transparency and accessibility meaning that public participation in transparent and 
decision-making and rule-making procedures are accessible.  
                                                                                                                                     
based on Articles 100(A) [now art 114 TFEU] and 90(3) [now art 106 TFEU] for technical 
specifications and network access respectively.’ The Green Paper laid down three conditions for 
harmonised access, of which two were technical aspects. Having stated these three conditions, the 
Green Paper made no further statement as to the use of Community legal instruments. ibid 69.  
100 The next section addresses accountability. 
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The discourse and procedures of the Commission reflected a broad 
participation to validate its policy agenda but only privileged access to specific 
regulatory norms. The latter were considered in closed procedures, accessible only to 
those who were invited by the Commission or to representatives of the Member 
States. As a benchmark for constituting a legitimating factor in the regulatory 
process, such procedures lack considerable force. This analysis highlights the 
dynamic nature of regulatory legitimacy, the way in which specific circumstances 
and context can affect a legitimacy analysis, which is a phenomenon of both national 
and supranational regulators. Legitimacy is never definitive and is always a matter of 
degree.  
 
4.13. Accountability   
It will be recalled from national models examined in Chapter 2 that accountability 
involves regulatory oversight but that mechanisms of accountability could in practice 
undermine the level of independence needed to carry out a regulatory mandate 
effectively. At the market-creation stage of European integration, the value of 
regulatory independence was highly salient to the success of the regulatory strategy.  
Accountability can be controversial. In exercising its direct Treaty 
enforcement powers, the Commission is held to account by the institution to which it 
is answerable in Treaty terms, the Court of Justice. In terms of regulatory authority, 
however, the Commission’s rendering of account is primarily self-defined, such as 
its annual competition reports, the general reports of the activities of the European 
Communities and numerous communications, all of which are drawn up and 
published by the Commission itself.101 Such practices are laudable but no procedure 
exists for any institution or body to review and evaluate such reports.102 An 
                                                
101 As an example of the annual reports on telecommunications policy see 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/communications_reports/index_en.ht
m> accessed 15 January 2013. 
102 Under the Treaties, the Commission is formally accountable to the Parliament. The EP formally 
elects the president of the Commission. It also approves the appointment of the Commission as a 
whole. By adopting a motion of censure, the Parliament can force the Commission as a college to 
resign. These are significant powers but they do not constitute an accountability relationship with the 
Commission for the exercise of regulatory powers, nor have the Treaties created another body to 
perform the role of counterparty to which the Commission must render an account of its regulatory 
activities, and who has the authority to evaluate the Commission’s performance as a regulator. In the 
UK, for example, the annual reports of national regulators provide regular opportunities for 
parliamentary scrutiny if desired. See Baldwin and Cave (n 78) 287.  
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important element of normative regulatory discourse is thus absent.103 Various 
mechanisms to enhance accountability of national regulators have been identified 
and put into practice with variable success.104  
It is premature to argue at this stage that rigorous mechanisms to control the 
Commission’s exercise of its regulatory powers in the area of telecommunications 
should have been in place. In the initial phase of liberalization, the value of 
credibility and therefore of independence outweighed the need for oversight or 
control of the Commission-as-regulator, where pan-European market creation was 
the primary policy aim. This conclusion however highlights the tension within the 
criterion. For what is a regulator accountable, separately from the question to whom 
is it accountable? Furthermore, in the EU, the Commission’s Treaty mandate is not 
merely to identify measures to ‘establish’ an internal market but to propose 
harmonizing measures needed for its ‘functioning’, a goal which forms only one part 
of myriad Treaty objectives that have no inbuilt hierarchy.105 
It is difficult to detect if Member States were at all concerned with 
accountability in the harmonization process. Nor is straightforward to determine in 
what capacity, if at all, the Member States could be said to be part of an 
accountability relationship with the Commission. The Commission is institutionally 
independent in the EU architectural constellation and therefore it is contentious to 
attribute a duty on the part of the Commission formally to account to the Member 
States in any sense other than a general civic or political duty, no more than to other 
actors in wider society.  
An examination and analysis of the ways in which the Member States, or 
even the European Council, and the Commission might be deemed to have a 
principal-agent relationship is beyond the scope of the present research.106 The 
                                                
103 A national regulator will often be accountable to its national parliament or another elected 
institution to enhance the democratic value inherent in the criterion of control. ibid 79. 
104 Baldwin and Cave identified several categories of national mechanisms as follows: accountability 
to parliament; accountability to government; accountability to super-agencies; accountability to 
judges; and accountability to consumers. ibid 288-305. 
105 Art 114(1) TFEU. 
106 For a discussion of the nature of the relationship between the Commission and Member States as 
one of agent and principal, see eg H Kassim and A Menon, ‘The Principal-Agent Approach and the 
Study of the European Union: Promise Unfulfilled?’ (2003) 10 JEPP 121-39; and T Doleys, ‘Member 
States and the European Commission: Theoretical Insights from the New Economics of Organization’ 




legislative adoption procedures of the late 1980s offered little opportunity for 
understanding, and certainly none for intervention, in legislative negotiations which 
are not, in any event, the focal point of accountability relationships in regulatory 
governance. The value of accountability mechanisms in the context of regulatory 
governance is the creation of opportunities to verify how the public interest 
represented by the regulatory measures has been satisfied, as well as the extent to 
which the regulator has successfully balanced the different interests affected. 
Significantly, it creates a constructive feedback loop that allows regulatory priorities 
to be re-calibrated or clarified when conflicting regulatory aims cannot easily be 
reconciled. That no feedback mechanisms were present in the initial policy phase 
was not fatal, but it will progressively undermine regulatory legitimacy. 
Furthermore, analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 shows that this criterion continues to be 
weakly represented where the regulation increasingly consists of positive 
harmonization measures.  
 
4.14. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the creation of a European telecommunications regulatory 
policy beginning with competition policy enforcement powers as a primary tool, and 
moving rapidly into harmonization measures. The picture of the Commission that 
emerges from the early policy period is that of an intellectually pro-active and 
politically astute policy actor, building on other Community initiatives, willing to use 
its Treaty powers contentiously and precedent courageously.  
The outcome of the legislative process in 1990 confirmed that the 
Commission’s initial regulatory strategy gave way to the political interests engaged 
in the legislative negotiation process. The Commission accepted the loss of 
discretionary control over the elaboration of post-liberalization access conditions. 
Member States accepted a policy agenda and a timetable shaped but not unilaterally 
defined by the Commission. That the Commission was prepared to align its 
discretionary use of competition enforcement powers to the timetable laid down in 
the Council’s harmonization Directive also highlighted the political nature of the 
regulatory dynamic of the period. This fundamentally political role played by the 
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Commission nonetheless undercuts Majone’s argument that economic regulation 
should be independent of political influence. 
That the Commission’s regulatory discourse camouflaged this political policy 
game in no way disguises how differently from national contexts regulatory 
strategies were developed and pursued at the European level. The regulatory 
outcome of the legislative process had the effect of separating two aspects of 
regulatory strategy. The hybrid policy agenda had been identified by the Commission 
while the detailed implementation and timetable for implementation became part of 
the oversight apparatus constructed by the Member States to influence or control the 
regulatory process post-adoption. This uniquely European approach to regulatory 
strategy and regulatory governance has been repeated elsewhere.107 
The normativity of the regulatory governance practices was reasonably 
robust, given the circumstances that confronted the creation of an internal market in 
telecommunications. The Commission was willing to use negative and positive 
integration measures to achieve its policy objectives. Its regulatory governance 
measures were largely borrowed from those used in competition policy enforcement 
measures but nonetheless displayed an adequate level of normativity in overall terms, 
with significant weaknesses in relation to procedural due process, and significant 
strength in relation to achieving a robust regulatory mandate using high levels of 
expertise.  
Even if the normativity of regulatory governance was acceptable, this in no 
way suggests that there were no significant problems with the way that the 
Commission exercised its regulatory powers under the Treaty. A regulator’s 
normative legitimacy depends on a number of considerations related to the 
satisfaction of important qualitative criteria. That the regulator satisfied some of the 
criteria acceptably thus allows an argument to be made that, on balance, regulatory 
legitimacy should be attributed to the regulator’s performance during the policy 
period. However, this does not mean that the regulatory governance of the period 
                                                
107 Eg for tobacco products. See Council Directive 2001/37/EC of 5 June 2001 on the approximation 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the 
manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products [2001] OJ L19426. In 2001, the Commission 
established a comitology register to facilitate access to documents used with comitology committees, 
as part of the measures prescribed in Council Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L145/43. For 
the register itself, see <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=List.list>. 
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was without flaws. Legitimacy in regulatory terms is a matter of degree. The next 
chapter examines the second policy period in which the role of the Commission as 
regulator-in-chief comes to the fore and the role of regulation to achieve market 





Emerging Governance in Telecommunications, 1990-1999 
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyzes telecommunications regulatory governance between 1990 and 
1999 before the ‘digital revolution’ and convergence influenced policy 
development.1 It covers the period that achieved full liberalization and re-regulation.2 
During this time, further legislative measures were adopted as foreseen in the ONP 
Directive.3 Meanwhile, a trend emerged of relegating competition law largely to 
support for harmonized measures. The Commission abandoned its emphasis upon 
autonomous competition policy enforcement, broadly conforming to the role of 
executory regulator, to discharge the legislative mandate, which was appropriate and 
legitimate. However, its treatment of the most controversial measure (voice 
liberalization) suggested a problematic lack of transparency for sensitive measures.  
At the same time, the Commission sought and obtained new regulatory 
authority for further liberalization and harmonization not foreseen in its original 
strategy of 1987 or in the political consensus of 1990. In pursuing this new mandate, 
the Commission combined a range of regulatory governance skills with a dimension 
of political deference. This was problematic in principle because political influence 
over a regulator’s regulatory appreciation is considered to undermine the 
independence of the regulator. A fuller analysis in context suggests that this concern 
is more theoretical than real. But a risk for future cycles of review and re-regulation 
is clear.  
The first section of this chapter identifies the principal legislative measures 
adopted post-1990. I then describe post-1990 administrative procedures, focusing on 
                                                
1 Convergence in this instance means connecting computing and other information technologies, 
media content, and communication networks as the result of the development of digital technologies 
and popularization of the Internet. It created an economy of activities, products and services that have 
emerged in the digital media space. 
2 The term re-regulation referred to here is meant to highlight the fact that EU regulation replaces pre-
existing national rules. For an in-depth analysis of the various impacts on national legal systems of 
European internal market regulation, see G Menz, Varieties of Capitalism and Europeanization: 
National Response Strategies to the Single European Market (OUP 2005).  
3 Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for 
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision [1990] OJ L192 
(ONP Directive).  
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regulatory governance aspects that I evaluate against the normative standards 
modeled in Chapter 3 above.  
 
5.1. Regulatory Developments 
The picture of the telecommunications sector in the post-1990 period is complex.4 
The regulatory environment became one where the Commission, the EP and the 
Member States interacted as principal players and a complex new regulatory 
architecture developed. This regulatory architecture comprised both hard and soft 
law which was elaborated at EU level, overseen by the Commission, and executed at 
a national level.5 As it developed, so also did the broader notion of governance of the 
sector in relation to the EU institutions, their relationships, and the applicable rules. 
Important strands of regulatory discourse emerged, one of which de-emphasized 
competition law and adopted overtly political tones.  
The ONP Directive had established a principle of open access to public 
telecommunications networks and services.6 It was a ‘framework’ directive. The 
Council and EP adopted implementing measures throughout the 1990s, including the 
Leased Lines Directive,7 the Voice Telephony Directive,8 the Interconnection 
Directive,9 and the Licensing Directive10 that made up the ‘1998 package’, so-called 
                                                
4 For further analysis and discussion of telecommunications regulation during this period, see eg NT 
Nicolinakos, EU Competition Law and Regulation in the Converging Telecommunications, Media and 
IT Sectors (Kluwer Law 2006) ch 1. See also W Sauter, Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the 
EU (OUP 1997). Nicolinakos approaches the subject from a competition policy analysis while Sauter 
uses a primarily industrial policy approach. The present research differs from both by examining 
policy developments and practices from a regulatory governance perspective.   
5 By the end of twentieth century the Commission proposed to simplify and consolidate rationally. See 
Commission, ‘EU Financial Reporting Strategy: The Way Forward’ (Communication) COM (1999) 
359 final. I address this in ch 5 below. 
6 But not access to all services. Excluded from the scope were: voice telephony, telex, radiotelephony, 
paging and satellite services. See Directive 90/388/EC, ‘the Services Directive’ arts 1(2) and 2. The 
definition of voice services was very narrowly drawn (art 1). The Directive noted that opening voice 
services to competition would threaten the financial viability of the national incumbents. See Recital 
18.  
7 Council Directive 92/44/EC of 5 June 1992 on the application of open network provision to leased 
lines [1992] OJ L165/27 (Leased Lines Directive). 
8 Directive 95/62/EC of 13 December 1995 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony [1995] OJ L321/6. 
9 Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on 
interconnection and interoperability through operation of the open network provision (ONP) [1997] 
OJ L199/32. 
10 Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common 
framework for general authorizations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications 
services [1997] OJ L117/15. 
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for the reason that full liberalization of the sector was agreed for 1998. The package 
was intended to manage the transition from monopoly to competitive markets. 
National regulatory authorities were created at national level. The implementing 
measures charged both Member States and NRAs with enforcement and 
implementation responsibilities in general terms without benchmarks for assessment 
of performance or outcomes. It would take another decade before the Commission 
recognized the value of such assessments as examined in Chapter 6. Although 
problems arose with inadequate enforcement by national regulators,11 significant 
problems with inadequate transposition of EU legislation also existed, as noted in a 
1997 report: 
[T]he Commission considers that a number of provisions, contained in 
various directives which should already be transposed, are still not 
fully or adequately transposed in a significant number of Member 
States.... 
 
The Commission considers this situation is unacceptable both from a 
legal and from an economic and competition point of view.....[T]he 
Commission intends to take action under the infringement procedure.12  
Most Member States had put appropriate measures into place by 1999 by which time 
the Commission had undertaken a review as required by the legislation.13  
 Chapter 2 explained that regulatory activities comprise three dimensions or 
phases, ie standard-setting activities; (behavioral modification via) enforcement 
activities; and review activities, including information gathering, assessment and 
revision.14 In the 1990s, the Commission engaged primarily in setting standards and 
enforcing them using soft ‘reporting’ measures and its Treaty powers against 
Member States. Important strands of regulatory discourse emerged, one of which 
saw the Commission de-emphasizing competition law as a primary regulatory tool 
                                                
11 The Commission summarized the situation in 1997 as follows: ‘a number of reports concerning 
national measures which, although accurately transposing Community law, are not being applied 
correctly in practice, such as the incomplete liberalization of alternative infrastructure, long delays in 
granting authorisations, discouraging licensing fees, and interconnection fees leading to anti-
competitive price squeezes’. Commission, ‘The implementation of the telecommunications regulatory 
package: first update [Second report]’ (Communication) COM (97) 504 final, s 1.5. 
12 ibid s 1.4. 
13 Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending 
Council Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive 
environment in telecommunications [1997] OJ L295/23, art 2(12). 
14 M Lodge and L Stirton, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ in R Baldwin, M Cave and M 
Lodge, The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010) 358.  
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while adopting overtly political tones. In the standard-setting context, the 
Commission played two roles, to execute an existing mandate and to create a new 
one, and executed these unevenly. It broadly discharged its regulatory executive 
mandate that involved adopting draft legislation in accordance with good governance 
practices, albeit with singular exceptions, notably in relation to voice telephony. As 
to the second, ie broadening the scope of the original liberalization and 
harmonization mandate, it adopted a distinctly deferential discourse.  
5.2. The Regulatory Executor 
The Commission duly prepared proposals for adoption or endorsement by the 
Council to implement the ONP Directive.15 16 For the most part, it did so expertly, 
efficiently and transparently but the exception was notable. An example of good 
regulatory practice appeared in the Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the 
Commission’s 1991 proposal for a Council Recommendation on packet-switched 
data services, in which the Commission recapitulated the entirety of the regulatory 
procedures leading up to the proposal, including references to ad hoc advisory 
groups on which it had relied and the roles they played in norm-setting: 
Since the Commission deemed it necessary that the analytical work on 
public data networks was taken up as soon as possible... [p]reparatory 
work on the application of ONP principles to public data networks was 
therefore undertaken by the SOG-T (Senior Officials Group-
Telecommunications) and its sub-group GAP (Groupe d’Analyse et de 
Prévision) as early as 1989 [ie even before adoption of the ONP 
Directive]. 
 
SOG-T arranged for the participation of representatives of European 
industrial organizations, trade associations, service providers, 
telecommunications users, and telecommunications in general.... [P]ublic 
comments on the proposals of GAP were invited by notice in the Official 
                                                
15 See eg, Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Recommendation on the harmonlsed provision of a 
minimum set of Packet-Switched Data Services In accordance with Open Network Provision (ONP) 
principles’ COM (91) 208 final; Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on the application of 
open network provision to leased lines’ COM(91) 30 final [1991] OJ C58/10; Commission, ‘Proposal 
for a Council Directive on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony’ 
COM(92) 247 final. 
16 The ONP Directive additionally created some technical standard-setting prerogatives as part of the 
Commission’s regulatory role. For example, the Commission alone was authorized to create 
standardization mandates for European harmonization bodies such as the European Committee for 
Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs. ONP Directive, art 4(4).  
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Journal dated 6 April 199017 and two fora were organized in March and 
October 1989 for public discussion of the proposals.  
 
Subsequently, a draft of the proposal for a recommendation was 
discussed with the ONP [comitology] Committee.  
 
The present proposal...takes into account the results of a) the analysis of 
the GAP report; b) the comments received from interested parties in the 
course of the public comment process, and c) the comments received 
from the ONP committee.18 
 
The Commission explained its recourse to expertise, to public consultations, to the 
views of Member States and even indirectly made reference to the notion of 
efficiency by recalling its own self-defined need for rapid regulatory action in the 
area. Why the speed of action was not a problem here related to the efficiency value 
of engendering a liberalized telecommunications marketplace as quickly as possible. 
Delay in de-regulating sectors with high levels of dynamism translates into a slower 
transformation of monopolized markets into competitive ones. Here the Commission 
acting with speed was a positive factor of efficiency, but the Council’s legislative 
process delayed adoption of harmonization measures and introduced a slower 
timeframe than envisaged by the Commission.   
The proposal for the liberalization of voice telephony, which was the last to be 
agreed and the most contentious, lacked transparency, openness, and accessibility. 
The Commission followed the procedures laid down in the ONP Directive and 
submitted a detailed analysis to the advisory committee. The Commission duly noted 
in its proposal that the advisory committee’s opinion was reflected in an amended 
version of its analysis and that this had been published for comment.19 However, in a 
distinct departure from recapitulating the views received and how they impacted 
upon the outcome, the comments received were described and dismissed in the space 
of one paragraph:  
A number of comments called for additional features to be included in 
the proposed directive; others were concerned about over-regulation, and 
in particular that the obligations proposed should be in proportion to the 
desired effects. Balancing these submissions, the Commission took the 
                                                
17 Commission, ‘Announcement on the availability of the report on ONP for public data networks — 
Invitation for public comments’ [1990] OJ C88/3. 
18 COM (91) 208 final, 4-5. 
19 COM (92) 247 final, 8. 
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view that any over-regulation which placed an excessive burden on the 
sector and which could result in an imbalance in competitive conditions 
had to be avoided. While appreciating the calls for further provisions, it 
was decided not to extend the proposed directive beyond the minimum 
provisions originally contained in the Analysis Report.20  
What is noteworthy in the context of executing a regulatory mandate is how 
thoroughly the Commission described the basis for one early proposal, while 
minimizing the opinions that it had received on its most controversial proposal (voice 
liberalization), which should have received a higher standard of defensibility. I 
analyze this differentiation below. 
5.3. New Authority to Liberalize  
The Commission sought a new mandate in addition to the regulatory executor role. 
Its strategy was to orchestrate an inter-institutional dynamic and a public-private 
discourse, so as to reach consensus on infrastructure liberalization. The Commission 
adroitly threaded a number of policy strands together, beginning with the Presidency 
Conclusions of the Corfu summit of June 1994, as the basis for a Commission Action 
Plan on Europe’s Way to the Information Society.21 This was followed by the 
publication of two Green Papers.22  
In these communications, the Commission’s new stance as a politically 
dependent regulator is clear. The question of infrastructure liberalization under 
Article 106(3) TFEU fell within the interpretative authority of the Commission,23 yet 
the Green Paper conceded:  
Opening up telecommunications infrastructure to competition is the key 
issue which now requires a political decision. The High Level Group 
[composed of national regulatory officials and created by a Council 
Resolution of 1992 on telecommunications24] acknowledged this in its 
                                                
20 ibid 9. 
21 Commission, ‘Action Plan on Europe’s Way to the Information Society’ COM (94) 347 final. 
22 The Green Papers were divided into two parts. The first part addressed principles and timetables; 
the second, the issues to be addressed in future regulatory measures. See Commission, ‘Green Paper 
on the Liberalization of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks: Part One, 
Principle and Timetable’ COM (94) 440 final (Green Paper pt 1); Commission, ‘Green Paper on the 
Liberalization of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks, Part II: A 
Common Approach to the Provision of Infrastructure for Telecommunications in the European Union’ 
COM (94) 682 final (Green Paper pt 2). 
23 The Court had by now endorsed the Commission’s power autonomously to adopt directives 
specifying that Member States have an obligation to abolish monopoly rights. See Case C-202/88 
France v Commission [1991] ECR I-1233. 
24 Council Resolution of 17 December 1992 on the assessment of the situation in the 
telecommunications sector [1993] OJ C2/5. 
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first recommendation to the Member States to ‘accelerate the on-going 
process of liberalization of the telecoms sector by: opening up to 
competition infrastructures and services still in the monopoly 
areas’[emphasis in original].25 
 
The Commission willingly submitted the exercise of its Treaty powers to a political 
consensus. In contrast to 1987, the Commission now presented itself as a regulator 
responding to invitations from and encouragement by other institutions.26 The 
Commission duly obtained the endorsement of the Member States and the EP.27 The 
Commission had, as requested,28 ‘worked closely’ with the High Level Committee of 
National Regulatory Authorities.29 Having obtained its new mandate, the 
Commission linked it with the ‘1998 package’. For this exercise, the Commission 
used recognizable governance tools, political and popular endorsements for 
regulatory proposals. Public consultation followed political endorsement. Section 4 
below examines this within a regulatory governance framing. 
 
5.3.1 Enforcement: A Light Touch 
The Commission’s enforcement powers were broadly limited to a general duty of 
supervision over Member States who were charged with ensuring transposition.30 In 
                                                
25 Green Paper pt 1, 8. 
26 In Part One of the Green Paper on infrastructure the Commission referred to the call by the EP for 
the Commission to take action: ‘Parliament called on the Commission to adopt as soon as possible the 
necessary measures to take full advantage of the potential of existing infrastructure of cable networks 
for telecommunications services and to abolish without delay the existing restrictions in the Member 
States on the use of cable networks for non-reserved services, and to adopt measures to obtain 
optimum utilisation of the cross-border telecommunications networks of railway operators and 
electricity producers’. Green Paper pt 1, 13, quoting a Resolution of the Parliament of 20 April 1993. 
The Green Paper also referred to comments in the report of the High Level Group on the Information 
Society (the Bangemann Group).  
27 Council Resolution 93/C213 of 22 July 1993 on the review of the situation in the 
telecommunications sector and the need for further development in that market [1993] OJ C213. 
European Parliament Resolution of 7 April 1995[1995] OJ C109/310. The 1995 Communication on 
the Green Paper Consultation reported not just on the very broad set of interests represented in the 
contributions received, but also on the endorsements of the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Joint Committee on Telecommunications, as well as on the consultations at national level that were 
complementary to those at European.COM(95) 158 final, 4. 
28 Council Resolution 94/C 379/03 of 22 December 1994 on the principles and timetable for the 
liberalization of telecommunications infrastructures [1994] OJ C379/03.  
29 COM (95) 158 final, 5. 
30 An example of the legislative approach was: ‘Member States shall ensure that the national 
regulatory authority lays down the procedures whereby it decides, on a case-by-case basis and in the 
shortest time period, to allow or not telecommunications organizations to take measures such as the 
refusal to provide a leased line’. Leased Lines Directive,  art 8.  
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the Voice Telephony Directive, NRAs were directly assigned regulatory duties with 
no additional enforcement powers accorded to the Commission.31 The Commission's 
formal enforcement capacity was limited to one primary mode, that of initiating 
infringement procedures against a Member State for failure to transpose and 
correctly apply EU legislation.32 During this period, the Commission interacted more 
directly with the national representatives in comitology procedures and with Member 
States in proceedings before the Court. The Commission's institutional engagement 
with NRAs, its centralization of interpretative application of the rules, and recent 
creation of a European telecommunications agency, began in the post-2000 period 
and is examined in Chapter 6.  
 
5.3.2. Assessment and Review 
The Commission initially struggled to match its vigorous policy-setting role with a 
robust assessment role. In an early assessment of the legislation, it identified three 
regulatory priorities: to seek the full practical application of existing regulatory 
measures; to clarify the precise scope of some measures; and to pursue the rapid 
adoption of the implementing proposals then being submitted.33 While NRAs were 
singled out in some Member States for not being truly independent, no regulatory 
follow-up was identified. The effective application of regulatory measures remained 
the focus until 1999.34  
One of the most problematic areas of implementation related to tariffs where 
implementation was clearly failing35 While the principles of objectivity, transparency 
and non-discrimination applied to regulated tariffs, the ONP Directive provided only 
that such tariffs ‘must in principle be cost-oriented’, meaning that the setting of 
actual tariffs was outside of the scope of the Directive and squarely within the realm 
of national prerogatives.36 Deficiencies in implementation were barely commented 
                                                
31 See eg the ONP Directive, arts 4 and 5. 
32 Art 258 TFEU.  
33 COM(93) 159 final, 6. 
34 ibid.  
35 The consultation process confirmed the Commission’s perception that the level of charges within 
the EU exceeded by a considerable degree those elsewhere: ‘Almost without exception, users and 
service providers commented on the high level of charges in the Community, as compared with the 
price of similar services in North America’. ibid 10. 
36 ‘...tariffs must be based on objective criteria and especially in the case of services and areas subject 
to special and exclusive rights must be in principle cost-oriented, on the understanding that the fixing 
156 
 
upon, and remedial action proposed was rather mild.37 Notwithstanding the problems 
with implementation, the Communication argued that NRAs should continue to have 
the main responsibility for implementation at national level.38 Further examination of 
progress would follow.39 The Commission’s supervisory role over Member States 
was mild-mannered. It opted to use the infringement procedure principally for 
egregious cases. Moreover, infringement procedures could be drawn out, giving 
Member States a likely year or more before a Court decision on the merits which 
would only have endorsed the Commission’s finding, if successful. Realizing the 
weaknesses of infringement procedures, the Commission will begin to ‘name and 
shame’ Member States in other contexts.40  
When reporting on the functioning of the regulation in 1999, the Commission 
understandably wanted to present a picture of regulatory. Regrettably, in the absence 
of verifiable data, the Commission succumbed to the temptation of presenting 
estimates as empirical findings and drew conclusions that may or may not have been 
warranted and which were impossible to contest.  For reasons of economy and focus, 
the foregoing descriptions represent just a sample of the regulatory measures and 
practices dating from the 1990s. I have selected representative measures and 
practices that highlight differences and inconsistencies. These will be further 
analyzed below within the governance framing set out in chapter 3 above.  
The chapter has sketched an important period of regulatory transition. The 
Commission abandoned its earlier strategy of policy autonomy to adopt a more 
cooperative and deferential attitude towards the Member States and their preferences. 
The Commission discharged two regulatory roles during this period. It met the 
executory requirements of the ONP Directive by tabling the legislative measures for 
                                                                                                                                     
of the actual tariff level will continue to be the province of national legislation and is not the subject 
of open network provision conditions’. ONP Directive, annex 2.  
37 ‘In summary, there was general support that the Community’s efforts to encourage cost-orientation, 
and therefore tariff rebalancing, were necessary and should continue.’  COM(93) 159 final, 11. 
38 ibid 13. 
39 ibid 35. 
40 See the Commission’s annual Internal Market Scoreboard documenting the state of Member State 
transposition of single market Directives, and Commission infringement procedures launched in 
consequence, beginning in 1997 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/score/index_en.htm> accessed 
16 January 2013. Treaty provisions now foresee financial penalties on Member States for failure to 




liberalized markets. At the same time, it initiated a new regulatory cycle as a policy 
designer to enlarge the scope of its mandate. 
  
5.4. Analysis of Regulatory Governance in the 1990s 
This section evaluates the telecommunications regulatory governance of the 1990s 
using the standards identified in chapter 3. These were regulatory mandate, expertise, 
efficiency, procedural due process, and accountability.  The Commission will be seen 
to be an actor that significantly shaped its mandate, acted as an executor and 
controlled ex post assessments of the legislation. The regulatory governance picture 
that emerges is one of considerable strengths and weaknesses but which benefits 
from a robust normative legitimacy largely underpinned by the foundational 
normativity linked to market creation measures whether negative or positive. The 
analysis will be less forgiving when evaluating two cycles of policy development and 
when re-regulation predominates in the next decade, as examined in Chapter 6.    
 
5.4.1. Regulatory Executor 
The post-1990 Directives and their implementing measures were intended to manage 
the transition from monopoly to competitive markets and to create Europe-wide 
markets where they previously did not exist. The normativity of the regulatory 
mandate for implementation measures relied on the considerable authority which was 
conceived within the provisions of the Treaty for achieving a single market.41 The 
post-1990 measures can be regarded as a legislative extension of the Treaty mandate 
for economic integration and a legally necessary application of the legislative 
mandate.42 How does it affect the normativity of its regulatory authority that the 
Commission accepted a compromise date of 1998 rather than 1992 for completing 
the telecoms single market?43 And how does it affect regulatory authority for the 
                                                
41 The 1957 Treaty of Rome was amended by the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 which added 
the legislative procedure for adoption of measures ‘for the approximation of the provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market’(art 100a). The SEA defined the internal market 
as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.’  
42 See particularly arts 2 and 3(h) EEC. What these articles meant in terms of economic rights was 
elaborated in other provisions. For a fuller discussion, see chapter 1 above.  
43 In the 1987 Green Paper, the Commission identified 1992 as the date for completion of the internal 
market in telecommunications. See COM (87) 290 final, 27, 57, 130, 149. This aim was re-formulated 
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legislation to have done no more than identify a list of telecommunications services 
susceptible to harmonization,44 thus softening the legal effect of legislatively 
identifying the services to be harmonized? Was the legislative re-formulation 
problematic in legitimacy terms? An examination of the characteristics of the market, 
the legal premises for creating the mandate, applying a Scharpfian analysis, would 
suggest not. Articulating the case within a framing of modern regulatory governance, 
considerable normative regulatory authority for the approach can be found.  
Once the Maastricht Treaty introduced a broader set of regulatory and other 
aims into the legal system, the choice and form of positive integration measures 
became more contestable, for reasons seen above. That is not the case here. The use 
of positive integration measures at supranational level, throughout the 1990s, 
continued to be premised on the objective of securing basic economic rights that 
could not otherwise be assured except by harmonization measures. This is 
underpinned by reference to the nature of the problem, that is, the pre-existing legal, 
technical and commercial mismatches that gave rise to the need for an explicit 
regulatory mandate. The regulatory measures adopted directly targeted foundational 
Treaty objectives.  
The justifications for the adoption of positive regulation in a welfare 
economics framing of regulatory theory offer additional normative support.45 The 
geographic separation and the absence of contestability in monopolized markets 
made liberalization merely a prerequisite to creating a single market. The significant 
disparity of national regulatory regimes in the Community required a comprehensive 
regulatory mandate to reconfigure the national markets. It was seen earlier that an 
expected increase in economic welfare justified the introduction of competition into 
markets which required the ancillary measures of harmonization for effectiveness. 
The creation of positive integration measures was essentially a logical extension and 
                                                                                                                                     
in the ONP Directive. In annex I, the Directive described the telecommunications services susceptible 
to harmonised access conditions as ‘Areas for which open network provision conditions may be 
drawn up’, which considerably softened the legal effect of identifying the services concerned.  
44 For a fuller discussion of the Commission’s initial conception of post-legislative harmonization, see 
chapter 4 above.  
45 See eg, C Veljanovski, ‘Economic Approaches to Regulation’ in R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, 
The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010) 17-27 and R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding 
Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (OUP 1999) 9-11.  
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legislative expression of a political consensus as to achieving change through 
legislative action within the remit of the Treaty of Rome as amended.  
A Scharpfian analysis of the post-1990 positive integration measures would 
evaluate the validity of claims for regulatory authority by reference to the existence 
of a Treaty mandate and by reference to its constitutive effects.46 A positive 
integration measure does not innately suffer from impaired legitimacy when 
compared to a liberalization measure. Some positive integration is a necessary 
corollary of the process of achieving a desirable level of economic integration.47 
Scharpf acknowledged that some positive integration measures adopted alongside 
unilateral negative integration could be categorized as ‘“market-making” [measures 
to] liberalize hitherto protected, cartelized or monopolized national markets....to 
support the extension of negative integration’ [emphasis added].48 Thus there is an 
explicit endorsement of positive integration measures even within a narrow reading 
of the scope of legitimate positive integration provided they constitute market 
making measures.  
For the Commission as a regulator, the conditions surrounding the 
liberalization and harmonization of telecommunications regulations offered a 
regulatory ‘sweet spot’ where major theories of regulation converged. Regulatory 
authority for the measures required by the ONP Directive can be strongly associated 
with the Commission’s Services Directive. Similarly the authority of the mandate for 
adoption of positive integration measures was grounded in the rationale found in the 
Treaty in relation to the establishment of the common market and the resulting public 
welfare benefits.  
The high normativity of creating a market privileges the legitimacy of 
regulatory actions to achieve it. Yet it will be seen in the next chapter that regulatory 
measures which are intended to achieve another Treaty aim, that of harmonization 
for the functioning of the internal market, are associated with far less normativity and 
much greater contestability. Even with a legal mandate underpinned with sanctions, 
                                                
46 Recall that Majone’s economic theory identified market failure or excessive market power in a 
market as a justification for a regulatory mandate.  
47 ‘While all measures of negative integration should probably be classified as being market-making, 
measures of positive integration may be either market-making...or market-correcting...’ F Scharpf, 
Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP 1999) 45. 
48 ibid 70. 
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which some have suggested conveys legitimacy automatically to a transnational 
regulator,49 it can nonetheless be difficult for the Commission to achieve normative 
legitimacy for its mandate. The appropriate formulation should be that a legally 
underpinned mandate creates some, but not a definitive, regulatory legitimacy. That 
result requires an evaluation of the regulatory governance practices using several 
normative criteria. 
The next section analyzes the extension of the liberalization and regulatory 
agenda using a different regulatory strategy.  
 
5.4.2. New Mandate for Infrastructure Liberalization 
It was noted earlier that public telephony infrastructure was excluded from the initial 
scope of liberalization. In the mid-1990s, the Commission re-considered whether the 
exclusion was justified. It launched a new regulatory discourse in 1994 explicitly 
seeking a political mandate for liberalization of the public telephony network.50 
Differently from its approach in the 1987 Green Paper, the Commission did not 
behave as a ‘crusading’ initiator of policy. Several Commission communications 
prepared the ground.51 Rather than announce a definitive policy stance as previously, 
with argumentation based on Treaty interpretation and economic and technical 
considerations, the Commission acknowledged beforehand that a political consensus 
was needed before it pursued any regulatory activities, whether liberalization or 
harmonization.52   
The Commission now presented itself as a regulator/liberalizer seeking 
political endorsement. The Commission in 1988 was institutionally willing to 
exercise its autonomous authority without explicit political endorsement. Although it 
                                                
49 ibid.  
50 The regulatory strategy included liberalizing and harmonizing integration measures, ie competition 
policy enforcement and legislative harmonization.  
51 See eg, Commission, ‘Towards Europe-wide systems and services: Green Paper on a common 
approach in the field of satellite communications in the European Community’ COM(90) 490 final; 
Commission, ‘Towards the personal communications environment: Green Paper on a common 
approach in the field of mobile and personal communications in the European Union’ COM(94) 145 
final (Mobile Green Paper); Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament on satellite communications: the provision of - and access to - space segment 
capacity’ COM(94) 210 final; COM(94) 347 final.  
52 By 1994, the Commission’s discourse reflected political reality: ‘Opening up telecommunications 




remained theoretically possible for it to use Treaty powers autonomously in the mid-
1990s to adopt liberalization directives without political agreement, the Commission 
elected not to do so. Before acting, the Commission achieved consensus both for the 
exercise of Treaty liberalization powers and for the exercise of regulatory 
harmonization powers. It conceded that, as a regulator, it was dependent upon 
political judgment for its mandate, even where independence of Commission action 
was the mode envisaged by the Treaties. The Commission therefore effectively 
changed how it undertook its regulatory roles.53  
The discourse revealed an institutional shift in terms of the Commission’s 
relationship with the Member States. Rather than presenting itself as an institution 
with independent authority to exercise its own prerogatives, the Commission’s 
practice reflected an evolution in its governance approach. The shift was subtle but 
nonetheless reflected a regulatory governance architecture in which institutional 
relationships, practices and norms were in flux and evolving, as was the institutional 
view of its authority. The Commission’s practices reflected a need not only for inter-
institutional consensus, but also consensus within the private sector on the scope and 
timing of a wider liberalization, even when founded on basic Treaty objectives.54 The 
Commission waited for an unambiguous consensus to develop before concluding that 
it had the authority for liberalization and legislative harmonization.  
Taking these still-evolving norm-setting activities into consideration, from 
where did the Commission obtain its regulatory authority for the new remit and what 
was the normativity of that agenda? The strength of a regulator’s authority for 
regulation has a direct bearing on its legitimacy, that is, on the reasons for which its 
regulatory activities should be considered appropriate, rather than by subjective 
standards.55 In extending its regulatory mandate, the Commission’s strategy made no 
distinction between achieving further liberalization and harmonization, merging 
them into the same set of regulatory governance practices, effectively minimizing the 
                                                
53 The fact that liberalization of other utility sectors in the EU involved no Commission liberalization 
directives is a strong indication of the level of opposition by Member States to such measures. 
54 The Communication linked the Bangemann Report, the Action Plan and the conclusions of the G7 
summit, in Brussels in February 1995. It summarised the outcome of the consultation and the G7 
summit as: ‘Now on the basis of the consensus established through the consultation, it is possible to 
move forward at a national, Union and global level’. COM(95) 158 final, 1.  
55 See eg, D Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for 
International Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 AJIL 596, 612; Baldwin and Cave (n 44) 601-03.  
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role played by its Treaty powers of enforcement. In a normative framing of 
regulatory legitimacy, this practice strengthened the regulatory authority of the 
mandate but weakened its independence as an economic regulator. Thus, Majone’s 
argument that legitimacy in economic regulation must be linked to the regulator’s 
independence (and expertise) is relevant to a conclusion that the Commission 
undermined its legitimacy by compromising its independence.   
However, Scharpf’s argument that a regulator’s legitimacy is enhanced by the 
strength of the connection with democratic processes is relevant to a conclusion that 
the Commission also enhanced its legitimacy by ensuring a broad spectrum of 
political consensus prior to executing its autonomous powers of enforcement. There 
is nonetheless a problem that lies in disconnecting the consensual nature of obtaining 
a regulatory mandate from political actors from the normal democratic processes of 
electoral corrective feedback but it inheres within the system. There is no democratic 
step for European citizens to censure or give corrective feedback to political actors as 
part of the EU policy development process. This consideration highlights a point of 
dislocation in supranational governance with the controls available within classic 
regulatory governance theory. It is a weakness of a supranational regulatory system, 
when framed within a normative governance model that needs to be addressed at 
some point in the regulatory cycle in other ways than by recourse to democratic 
mechanisms that are not available.56 I will return to this in my chapter conclusions 
and in the concluding chapter. 
5.4.3. Expertise  
Chapters 2 and 3 showed that expertise can vary in meaning depending on the type 
of regulation engaged and its purpose.57 When ex ante market-intervention regulation 
is based on an economic welfare rationale, as in telecommunications, analytical 
economic expertise has a particularly strong association with normative regulatory 
governance and is a major premise of an economic theory of regulation and 
legitimacy. But when and where is it relevant and who should have it? An evaluation 
                                                
56 One such mechanism that has been suggested, but because of limits to the length of the thesis is not 
explored in this research, is the recently developed theory of global administrative law. This is an area 
where further research is needed. See in this regard, N Krisch and B Kingsbury, ‘Global Governance 
and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 EJIL 1; D Esty, ‘Good 
Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalising Administrative Law’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1490. 
57 See ch 2 above.  
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of the use of expertise takes into account the specific regulatory activity concerned 
set out below.  
 
5.4.4. Measures Required by the ONP Directive 
The 1990s legislation required norm-setting to be carried out at the EU level (by 
Commission with comitology committees), with enforcement at the national level by 
national authorities, that is, a ‘multi-level’ system.58 Under the ONP Directive, the 
Commission was charged with preparing the implementing legislative measures that 
were adopted by the Council initially and jointly by the Council and the EP from 
1993.59 The preparation of these measures of detailed application required technical 
expertise perhaps more than that required for the ONP Directive.60  
The Commission marshaled the resources needed to prepare the relevant 
proposals. In some instances, preparatory work began before the adoption of the 
1990 Directives.61 The provisions of the proposals submitted reflected technical and 
economic expertise. For example, the proposal for packet-switched data services 
summarized the technical difficulties that prevented intra-Community network 
interoperability from arising, observed the developments in pan-European services 
and explained why that was relevant.62 The proposal for a Council Directive on 
leased lines provided extensive explanation of the meaning and interpretation of the 
                                                
58 ‘Multi-level governance...can be understood as the exercise of authority and the various dimensions 
of relations across levels of government...’ OECD, Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial 
Development, Regional Development, Multi-Level Governance 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3746,en_2649_34413_36877643_1_1_1_1,00.html> accessed 
11 June 2012. See also eg, L Hooghe and G Marks, ‘Types of Multi-Level Governance’ (2001) 5 
European Integration Online Papers <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2001-011.pdf> accessed 12 June 2012. 
For an overview of the development and main issues in the study of multi-level governance, see I 
Bache and M Flinders, Multi-level Governance (OUP 2004). 
59 The Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993 and created co-legislative power for the EP. 
60 Annex II of the Directive prescribed a common framework for defining technical interfaces and 
service features, for defining harmonised supply and usage conditions, and for defining harmonised 
tariff principles. See ONP Directive, annex II.   
61 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Recommendation on the harmonised provision of a 
minimum set of packet-switched data services in accordance with Open Network Provision 
(ONP) principles’ COM (91) 208 final, 4 and Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
application of open network provision to leased lines’ COM (91) 30 final, 3. 
62 ‘The development and availability of international value added services to support the applications 
required by users is largely dependent on [packet-switched data services] because without such an 
adequate transeuropean transport service, higher value added services will be difficult to offer to users 
on a Community wide scale. Such services will flourish if, and only if, a high quality, reasonable 
priced, ubiquitous transport service is available.’ COM (91) 208 final, 3. 
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principles to be applied.63 Objectivity as to certain aspects such as technical 
interfaces as well as flexibility were reflected, an example being the principle of 
applying transparency in cost accounting:  
...the Commission proposal foresees the application of sufficiently 
transparent cost accounting system which allow the enforcement of the 
basic principles of transparency and cost orientation. The application of 
appropriate cost accounting systems is aimed at by the introduction of the 
principle of fully distributed costing which is qualified as a prominent 
example as a suitable cost accounting principle. In conformity with the 
principle of subsidiarity, the provisions leave sufficient room for 
application along the lines of national perspectives.64 
 
In terms of the use and application of technical knowledge, the Commission was 
building upon, if not relying primarily on, the expertise of the same ad hoc advisory 
groups, SOG-T and its sub-group GAP, as used prior to 1987.65  
But the Commission went beyond the advisory groups. Under the terms of 
the ONP Directive, the Commission was obliged to conduct a ‘detailed analysis’ in 
order to draw up a work programme, and then to consult the advisory committee.66 
The views of the standing committee on non-tariff barriers to trade were also 
required.67 This input consisted of technical and commercial information during the 
formulation of individual measures in application of the ONP Directive. All of these 
administrative steps were followed by a requirement to consult publicly prior to 
submitting proposals. This provided the Commission with considerable technical and 
                                                
63 On the principle of cost orientation the proposal stated: ‘Member States shall ensure that tariffs for 
leased lines follow the basic principles of cost orientation and transparency and comply with the 
provisions of this paragraph: a) Tariffs for leased lines shall be independent of the type of service 
applications which the users of the leased lines implement; b) Tariffs for leased lines shall normally 
contain the following elements: - an initial connection charge, based on the average cost in making the 
leased line connection; [and] - a periodic rental charge, ie a flat rate element; When other tariff 
elements are applied, these must be transparent and based on objective criteria. c) Tariffs for leased 
lines apply to the facilities provided between network termination points at which the user has access 
to the leased lines. For leased lines provided by more than one telecommunications organization, half-
circuit tariffs, ie from one network termination point to a hypothetical mid-circuit point, can be 
applied.....’ COM (91) 30 final, 20-21. 
64 COM (91) 30 final, 4.  
65 In two of its proposals, the Commission acknowledged that it had expedited the process of 
elaborating the implementation measures of the ONP Directive by pro-actively using the expertise of 
the formerly expert ad hoc advisory groups. See ibid 3 and COM (91) 208 final, 4. 
66 See ONP Directive, art 4(4)(a).  
67 This was the standing committee set up by Council Directive 83/189/EEC of 28 March 1983 laying 
down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations 
[1983] OJ L109/8. 
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economic input for drafting the implementation measures, and offered a broad 
perspective once drafted.  
 
5.4.4.1. Articulation and Balancing as Part of Expertise 
Elaborating technical implementation measures clearly required an ability to evaluate 
the views and recommendations of a range of interests, including those of technical 
experts. Nonetheless, the Commission failed to articulate and demonstrate where 
expertise was relevant, and how it was used to develop the standards proposed. This 
is regrettable but not devastating so long as the use of expertise is demonstrable. 
Some, but not all, communications adopted by the Commission throughout the 1990s 
in relation to an extensive range of issues in telecommunications, amply testified to a 
high level of expertise, both economic and technical. However, the Commission 
missed opportunities to disentangle any conflicting claims and to show how it had 
balanced any conflicting interests. Even if there were no such conflicts, it would be 
better to say so and dispel any doubts.  
Showing how different views on economic and social issues had been balanced 
was sometimes lacking. For example, in the proposal for the Leased Lines Directive, 
the Commission referred to ad hoc meetings convened by SOG-T with a variety of 
representatives of industry, trade unions and service providers while public 
comments on a proposal from an internal advisory group were solicited.68 The 
Commission explained how sharply diverging viewpoints on key policy issues had 
been accommodated in the following terms:  
The comments received supported the need for harmonization of open 
and efficient access and usage conditions....There were substantial 
concerns with respect to unjustified constraints on the use of leased lines 
e.g. for interoperability reasons, the potential for discriminatory 
treatment between the TOs [telecommunications organisations, ie, 
incumbents] and their competitors, insufficient emphasis on cost 
orientation in tariff principles and the future availability of state-of-the- 
art leased lines...[A] draft of the proposal for a directive was discussed 
with the ONP Committee [a comitology committee]. The present 
proposal for a Council Directive takes into account the results of a) the 
GAP analysis report, b) the comments received from interested parties in 
the course of the public comment process, and c) the comments received 
                                                
68 Invitation for Public comments on the GAP proposal [‘Proposal by the Analysis and Forecasting 
Group of SOG-T (GAP) on Open Network Provision (ONP) for Leased Lines in the Community of 11 
January 1989]’ Notice No 89/C58/04 [1989] OJ C58/5. 
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from the ONP Committee. At the same time, it takes account of the 
general principles which have been laid down in the Directives on 
competition in the market of telecommunications services and 
implements the ONP Framework Directive [emphasis added].69 
 
This constituted the entirety of the Commission’s articulation of how its proposal 
took account of those substantial concerns. The explanation barely reached one 
page, conveyed no thoroughness of analysis, and lacked any explicit reference to 
balancing. This is reflected in the comments on cost orientation: 
The Commission proposal foresees the application of sufficiently 
transparent cost accounting systems which allow the enforcement of the 
basic principles of transparency and cost orientation. The application of 
appropriate cost accounting systems is aimed at by the introduction of the 
principle of fully distributed costing which is qualified as a prominent 
example of a suitable cost accounting principle. In conformity with the 
principle of subsidiarity, the provisions leave sufficient room for 
application along the lines of national perspectives.  
 
The response to concerns about the risk of discrimination, a real and highly anti-
competitive risk for new entrants, was to refer to the recitals in the Directive: 
The proposed Directive refers in its recitals to some of the principles 
resulting from Community law. The operative part then specifies in detail 
how the Open Network Provision conditions are to be harmonized for the 
provision of leased lines in accordance with these principles.70 
 
As a matter of substantive norms, this offered little legal security. As a matter of 
expertise, it showed a substantial shortfall of normativity. Not only is it possible to 
doubt the substantive validity of such a norm, the underlying expertise used in 
defining the standard is also open to question.  
 
5.4.4.2. A Normative Alternative 
None of this establishes that the proposals were necessarily flawed. Viewed 
impartially, they may have represented a very high level of professional competence 
and neutrality. An examination of the specific provisions of a proposal by persons 
who are themselves experts should not be necessary to determine whether and how 
the expertise contributed or not to a regulator’s determination of the relevant norms. 
                                                
69 COM (91) 30 final, 3-4. 
70 ibid 4.  
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What the narrative did not explain adequately, however, was the manner in which the 
proposals correlated with the views, comments and advice that it had received and 
reviewed and how these had been taken into account.  
The texts concerned were those that would manage the transition from 
monopoly to competition in telecommunications. The Commission’s narratives 
largely failed to explain the role that expertise played in the detailed working out of 
the measures and missed the opportunity to demonstrate the input of an independent 
expert-led point of view. The relevance and application of expertise in the actual 
proposals were present by inference, rather than by explicit reference.  
When the use of expertise is not made transparent, proposals may be 
criticized as failing to represent a fair balancing of the interests at stake, or as being 
tainted with politically or ideologically bias. Majone’s major premise that, when 
economic regulation is carried out by apolitical expert technocrats, no bias is 
introduced into regulatory determinations and it is not universally shared, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 6 pursues this normative weakness more thoroughly 
in relation to impact assessment procedures where expertise is a crucial factor. The 
Commission’s shortfall will become even more evident in that context, but the seeds 
were already present.  
The critique from this period does not claim that expertise had no role, or 
even an inadequate one, in the norm-setting processes. Rather, the important value of 
professional and institutional independence, within a system of delegated authority, 
should be reflected in the use of expertise. Delegated authority should be exercised 
appropriately relative to the aims defined in the mandate. In the case of a US federal 
agency, for example, a decision would be criticized, or even overturned on appeal, if 
the record did not contain an explicit rationale in which the regulator explained how 
and why different views had been considered, balanced and taken account of in a 
final agency determination.   
In a technologically dynamic sector such as telecommunications, the 
complexity of the issues related to technology and economics means that expertise 
has particular importance for the quality of the norms proposed with a consequent 
impact on regulatory legitimacy. The Commission often missed the chance to use the 
normative technocratic value of independent expertise to re-enforce the legitimacy of 
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the positive integration measures of the ONP Directive. This was less problematic in 
the 1990s because the measures adopted genuinely began the process of establishing 
an internal market, and thus enjoyed the higher level of normativity that attaches to 
an explicit Treaty mandate of market creation. The lack of lessons learned during this 
period will be reflected in the analysis of regulatory performance of the twenty-first 
century, and will contrast with the attempt to use modern management techniques of 
ex ante policy analysis. Thus, having broadly done things well, in regulatory 
governance terms, before the watershed of the White Paper on Governance, policy 
development for the functioning of the telecommunications single market will take a 
normative nose-dive in the next century. This is described in Chapter 6 below.  
5.5. Expertise and Liberalized Infrastructure  
Rather than focus on Treaty interpretation as done earlier, the opening discourse to 
launch further liberalization in telecommunications emphasized the macro-economic, 
pro-growth arguments for further liberalization in a dynamic environment.71 Having 
started with claims for pro-growth effects of infrastructure liberalization, Parts One 
and Two of the Infrastructure Green Paper provided a structured, thorough and 
authoritative presentation of the context, the political background, and the economic, 
regulatory and legal issues to be considered, as well as proposals for how to 
approach them with suggested timetables and implementation measures.72 An 
example of analytical conciseness and thoroughness that characterized the Green 
Paper was:  
...[H]igh tariffs for and lack of availability of the basic infrastructure over 
which such liberalised services are operated or provided to third parties 
have delayed the widespread development of high speed corporate 
networks in Europe, remote accessing of databases by both business and 
residential users and the deployment of innovative services (such as 
telebanking, distance learning, etc.). Additionally the regulatory 
                                                
71 ‘To compete effectively today, one must have the means to access, to process, manipulate, stock 
and produce information quickly and effectively...Telecommunications infrastructures will form the 
fundamental platform upon which Europe’s society and economy will depend in the decades to come. 
...In a world economy that is increasingly globalised, European firms must be able to compete with 
their counterparts in other regional economic groupings. By reinforcing their competitiveness 
European companies will not only be able to retain their position in existing markets, but help ensure 
that they are well-placed to take advantage of new opportunities and win new markets...Information 
and communication technologies can make a significant contribution to helping improve productivity, 
which is essential to the creation of wealth and to competitiveness. By stimulating economic growth, 
competitiveness contributes to job creation.’ COM (94) 440 final, 3. 
72 Pt 1 of the Green Paper had 39 pages; pt 2 extended to 166 pages including three annexes.  
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restrictions in many Member Sates prevent the use of alternative 
infrastructure operated by third parties (such as the cable TV networks 
and networks owned by energy companies, railways, or motorways to 
meet their internal communications needs). Many large companies, 
employers groups and user associations stressed that European business 
is less competitive, that innovative services are more slowly deployed, 
and that the creation and development of pan-European networks and 
services is [sic] being delayed as a result.73   
 
Having carried out three studies, the Commission reported that the ‘basic findings’ of 
the studies emphasized the potential for responding to concerns expressed about 
delays in service offerings for liberalized services and the slower than expected pace 
of innovation.74 Furthermore, the studies detailed the structural anti-competitive 
barriers resulting from exclusive infrastructure provision and ‘indicated’ that the 
growth of liberalized services would be promoted by allowing additional 
infrastructure to enter the market for carriage.75 This reasoning was clear. 
Ten studies were carried out and cited by the Commission in relation to the 
Infrastructure Green Paper.76 The Commission also referred to OCED work.77 
Throughout the Green Paper, there were numerous references to the supporting 
arguments found in external studies:  
The basic findings of the studies undertaken emphasise the potential role 
for cable TV networks and alternative infrastructure networks in meeting 
the concerns raised about the slower pace of innovation and delayed role-
out of liberalised services.....The studies indicate that the growth of 
liberalised services would be promoted by widening the supply of 
infrastructures.78 
 
Studies carried out for the Commission indicate that the removal of 
current restrictions on infrastructure within satellite networks could 
stimulate use of satellite communications in the EU within corporate 
networks and closed user groups, without having a serious impact on the 
financial position of the TOs [Telecommunications Organisations].79 
 
                                                
73COM(94) 440 final, 12.  
74 ibid 14-15. 
75 The Communication also cited the studies and research done within the Member States on the issue 
which lent support to the arguments for rapid and selective liberalization of infrastructure such as 
electricity, railway, and cable TV networks. ibid 13-15.  
76 COM(94) 682 final, annex 2. 
77 ibid 50. 
78 COM(94) 440 final, 15. 
79 ibid 20. 
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The studies suggest that liberalization could be achieved without having 
a major financial impact on the provision of universal service....80 
 
The evidence base that the Commission was able to construct for further 
liberalization drew from broad and independent sources of data and analysis, on 
which the Commission explicitly relied in its own evaluation. Even if the 
Commission did not itself enjoy the expertise to gather and assess the data for the 
pro-competitive potential of infrastructure liberalization, it showed a capacity to seek 
relevant external expertise on which to rely transparently.   
 
5.5.1. Expertise: Summary of Key Findings 
Certain regulatory activities positively require the exercise of expert evaluation and 
judgment to be legitimate. As seen in chapter 3, expertise plays significant roles 
when regulators consider a number of options, the goals to be achieved, the interests 
or values at stake, and come to a balanced appreciation, before coming to a 
conclusion. This is especially true when the regulator must make its assessments in a 
context of change or where the available information is incomplete.81 When a 
regulator comes to a conclusion that is contentious, expertise can play the role of 
assurance whereby a regulator creates an inference that there are objective reasons 
that can withstand critical scrutiny for the conclusions drawn.  
This consideration affects, not only the expertise criterion as a measure of 
regulatory legitimacy, but an appreciation of the correctness and likely effectiveness 
of the measure. This interaction is a key reason why regulatory legitimacy is a 
construct of several values, which can overlap, but which can also subtract from each 
other. If it relies entirely on expertise for its claims of legitimacy, the regulator 
undermines the later stages of establishing a measure of regulatory assessment or 
accountability. As seen in Chapter 2, EU Treaties at present contain only weak 
institutional mechanisms for determining effectiveness. When it fails to explain how 
                                                
80 ibid 35. 
81 Baldwin and Cave noted the importance expertise where information is ‘shifting’ or ‘incomplete’. 
In such situations, they argued, a regulator may legitimately claim support on the basis of its expertise 
and the nature of the task at hand. Baldwin and Cave (n 44) 80.  Expertise plays a central role in the 
US administrative process. See eg, JO Freedman, ‘Expertise and the Administrative Process’ (1976) 




its judgment, decision, or conclusion has been shaped by considerations of expertise, 
a regulator undermines transparency and reduces legitimacy. The liberalization of 
infrastructure has benefitted from a robust use and demonstration of regulatory 
expertise and thus contributed to the normativity of the regulatory outcome.  
 When comparing the use of expertise in the process of elaborating 
implementation measures and creating a discourse for a broader mandate, the 
difference in the Commission’s use of expertise is striking, all the more so since the 
two regulatory activities were proceeding in parallel. What would explain this 
difference of approach in different regulatory discourses at the same time in the same 
area? A possible inference would be an effort to maximize the scope for political 
harmony when suggesting potentially contentious liberalization. Or perhaps a 
legislative mandate allowed a lower standard of evidence-based reasoning and 
balancing, in that expertise was less relevant.   
The reasons for the relative differences in the two processes are not directly 
relevant here. What is more important is the differential blindness on the part of the 
Commission. All economic regulatory choices and decisions involve consideration of 
interests, goals and options, as shown in Chapter 3. An inability to recognize the 
importance of articulating interests, aims, options and differences of view, and 
explicitly to balance these, before drawing conclusions, is problematic for the 
legitimacy of a positive regulator. In this regard, the Commission’s practice post- 
1990 would not meet a modern standard of administrative practice or even the 
Commission’s own future standard, as will be seen in the next chapter.  
5.6. Efficiency 
In the realm of what is only theoretically possible and what is realistically and 
politically feasible, the value of efficiency engages with the empirical rather than 
with considerations of what could have been.82 Genuinely political choices are not 
questioned. Rather, the value of efficiency takes political choices as a constant and 
seeks to evaluate the regulatory system as a given construct using information related 
to the operation of the system in practice. A meaningful evaluation of efficiency 
requires reliable information. This concerns the input costs directly associated with 
                                                




the regulatory process and implementation of the regulatory mandate without which 
productive efficiency cannot be evaluated. Any cost-benefit analysis of the 
regulatory regime without empirical evidence would be analytically weak. When a 
regulation has not yet been implemented, an analysis of efficiency is difficult, if at all 
meaningful, and contributes little to an appreciation of regulatory governance. Some 
efficiency-framed questions about inputs and costs nonetheless can be posed.  
5.6.1 Efficiency of Directives as Inputs 
Was the use of directives to convert Treaty aims into the achievement of a pan-
European telecommunications market a regulatory choice that responded to the value 
of productive efficiency in the regulatory process? Arguably yes, for the following 
reasons. Pre-1990 national telecommunications markets and national regulatory 
systems for telecommunications varied widely and were embedded within national 
legal systems and institutions. The starting conditions for transforming disparate 
national markets and rules into a single pan-European market required marshaling 
regulatory resources on an order of magnitude beyond the capabilities of the 
Commission alone to oversee and enforce.   
The changes that had to be introduced into national market structures and 
regulatory systems by public actors and incumbents were such that national 
authorities were better positioned to assure the application of the rules. The 
alternatives, of creating an EU regulatory authority with enforcement powers, or of 
using Commission liberalization measures alone, were not even under consideration. 
It is therefore possible to conclude that the efficiency value of the cost aspects, of 
using directives and related soft law measures to achieve regulatory objectives, 
contributed significant normative weight to regulatory legitimacy. The second aspect 
of efficiency is more problematic due to the inadequacies of implementation 
throughout the period. This is discussed immediately below.   
 
5.6.2. Efficiency in Reaching Public Welfare Goals  
Another value that is associated with regulatory efficiency relates to the allocative 
and dynamic efficiencies of regulation.83 Economic regulation is based on the 
                                                
83 Baldwin and Cave define allocative efficiency as a characteristic of regulation wherein it would be 
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expectation that economic development and consumer welfare will be enhanced with 
market interventions that encourage both market entry and innovation, which in turn 
promote competitiveness.84 Thus this aspect of efficiency deals with empirical 
market and consumer welfare outcomes.   
Efficiency is a factual determination relative to specific regulatory measures. 
Market outcomes are evaluated and distributional effects are detected to see how 
efficient economic regulation has been. The Commission issued a first report on the 
state of implementation of telecommunications regulatory measures in 1997.85 This 
report detailed the state of transposition and the considerable shortfalls of Member 
States. The Commission’s second report stated that most Member States had 
managed to set up a national regulator but serious shortfalls remained.86 
The Commission issued a report using estimated figures and statistics in 
1999.87 Full liberalization had taken place a year previously. It did not provide data 
comparing pre-liberalized and post-liberalized markets. A lack of empirical data on 
markets and consumer welfare might have been expected, given the widespread 
transposition difficulties catalogued in the Commission’s several reports.  
Also in 1999, the Commission published its ‘Sixth Report on the 
Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package’.88 This provided a 
great deal more factual information about the impact of liberalization on previous 
market structures. The Communication claimed that the sector was a ‘significant 
driver’ for macro-economic growth in the EU generally, stating: 
The national markets for telecommunications services will be worth an 
estimated € 191 billion in 2000; the value of national markets is growing 
by an average of 9%, an increase in the growth rate of two percentage 
                                                                                                                                     
impossible to redistribute goods to make at least one consumer better off without making another 
consumer worse off. They define dynamic efficiency as a characteristic of regulation that encourages 
desirable processes and product innovation within a system that responds flexibly to demand. Baldwin 
and Cave (n 44) 81.  
84 See eg, OECD, Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries: From Interventionism to Regulatory 
Governance (OECD Publications 2002) 28. 
85 Commission, ‘The implementation of the telecommunications regulatory package’ 
(Communication) COM (97) 236 final.  
86  Commission, ‘The implementation of the regulatory package: first update’ (Communication) COM 
(97) 504 final, 4-5.  
87 Commission, ‘Fifth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package’ 
(Communication) COM (99) 537 final. This report consisted of a Communication plus four annexes.  
88 Commission, ‘Sixth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package’ 
(Communication) COM (2000) 814 final. This Communication had six annexes.  
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points over 1999. Data and leased lines services grew by 8%, while voice 
telephony increased by around 4%.89   
 
Figures for end 1999 confirm the general downward trend of incumbent 
operators’ market shares in the voice telephony market. The rate at which 
new entrants are taking over market share varies from one market 
segment to another, and is higher for international and national long-
distance calls than for local calls.90 
 
The aggregate of the number of operators actually offering long-distance 
calls is now 461, up from 244 in 1999; 468 for international calls, up 
from 281 in 1999; and 388 for local calls, up from 223 in 1999. An 
aggregate of some 1215 operators are now authorised to offer public 
voice telephony, an increase of 35% over 1999, following an increase of 
42% in 1999 over 1998.91 
 
[A]s a consequence of tariff rebalancing, which has seen EU average 
monthly rentals increase by 12% over the period 1997 to 2000, and local 
calls by 7.5% for a ten-minute call and 15% for a three-minute call, the 
EU average price of ten-minute long-distance and international calls has 
declined steadily over the same period, by 40% for long-distance and 
international calls (near EU) and 49% for calls to the US. It should be 
borne in mind that these prices are for the services of incumbent 
operators; many new entrant operators offer services at significantly 
lower tariffs.92 
 
The average monthly bill for residential users of the incumbents’ services 
is now below that of the incumbent in Japan and of Verizon in the 
USA.93 
 
The empirical evidence presented a seemingly unambiguous case of industrial 
expansion, economic growth, greater consumer choice and falling prices. However, 
there was no evidence supporting the macroeconomic claims. While it may have 
been true that the rate of growth of the total value of the industry between 1999 and 
2000 was 2%, implying that regulation was responsible, there was no evidence to 
correlate this growth to the effects of regulation.  
Nor did the report explain what would have been a valid basis of comparison 
with that figure. Rather than traditional telecommunications services, which were the 
                                                
89 ibid 6. 
90 ibid 8. 
91 ibid 2. 
92 ibid 9. 
93 ibid 10. 
175 
 
implicit message, what might have caused the growth of the sector were mobile 
communications, which were rapidly and widely adopted in the EU:  
Mobile services remains the fastest growing sector, with average growth 
in terms of value of around 20% and penetration rates up from 36% in 
August 1999 to 55% in August 2000.94 
 
This is not to call into question the premises of economic regulation. Mainstream 
economic theory supports the premise that the introduction of competition into a 
formerly monopolized sector such as telecommunications promoted allocative 
efficiency.95 As an empirical determination, regulatory efficiency effects may have 
been positive as early as 1999. The point here is not to conduct an evaluation of the 
allocative efficiency of the regulatory measures in question, but to note the manner in 
which the Commission as a regulator made use of the second value of efficiency, 
related to a fact-based assessment of public welfare outcomes, as a basis for claiming 
regulatory success, efficiently achieved.  
Putting aside the empirical weakness of the data and the factual claims made 
by the Commission for macroeconomic effects, it is nonetheless the case that the 
Commission engaged explicitly, even if unknowingly, with an important criterion for 
the legitimacy of economic regulation. The Commission claimed that overall 
economic welfare, the raison d’être for economic regulation, had been enhanced as a 
result of the measures introduced. While the Commission could claim that 
telecommunications was a ‘significant’ driver of growth in the EU, the further 
inference that this was necessarily due to regulation was not warranted.   
The Commission implicitly claimed regulatory legitimacy based on an 
empirical argument of allocative efficiency. When the Commission’s implied claim 
for enhanced macroeconomic growth as a result of telecommunications regulation is 
assessed by reference to a normative standard of efficiency, it is clear that the 
Commission is claiming indirectly that the regulation satisfied the second, allocative, 
value of efficiency which is widely recognized in economic theories of regulation. 
                                                
94 ibid 24.  
95 O Boylaud and G Nicoletti, ‘Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in 
Telecommunications’ (2000) OECD Economics Department Working Paper No 237 < 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=238203> accessed on 18 June 2012; TH Oum and 
Y Zhang, ‘Competition and Allocative Efficiency: The Case of the US Telecommunications Industry’ 
(1995) 77 Review of Economics and Statistics 82.  
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But the Commission as a regulator had not yet recognized the usefulness of a formal 
and rigorous approach to the use of efficiency as a criterion in regulatory 
governance. This normative weakness would be exacerbated when it comes to 
conduct regulatory impact assessments in the next decade.   
The implicit claim by the Commission also raised issues of output-oriented 
legitimacy, which Scharpf endorsed for measures of economic integration, with the 
caveat that economic integration could be justified by output legitimacy but only up 
to the point that it does not become excessively invasive of national prerogatives. At 
this stage of establishing the common market in telecommunications, the weight of 
output legitimacy was considerable, given the starting point. As shown in chapter 1, 
output legitimacy was a major theoretical underpinning for the creation of a 
European single market. It is therefore unsurprising that the Commission used an 
apparent regulatory success story to enhance its legitimacy as a regulator.  
Even so, the measures of positive integration adopted to date can reasonably 
be associated with considerable efficiency. In future, the Commission would need to 
grapple with more analytically nuanced issues related to adaptation of existing 
regulatory measures, where a broadly positive presumption in favor of positive 
regulatory measures to establish an internal market will cease to apply. This question 
is addressed directly in Chapter 6, which examines the period during which two re-
regulatory cycles occur and where policy is not directed to creating a single market 
but to re-regulating the market.       
5.7. Procedural Due Process 
In this section, I examine the regulatory procedures related to two regulatory 
contexts: implementing the ONP Directive and creating a new regulatory mandate. 
Regulatory legitimacy in traditional governance theory results from a combination of 
input and output legitimacy.96 The former consists of an electoral mechanism of 
                                                
96 It is now fashionable to create a variety of legitimacies for analytical purposes, mixing different 
contexts of evaluation, depending on the school of thought. Putting things differently, the questions 
that a political scientist pursues are different from those of an economist or a jurist. For legitimacy 
analyzed as a regulator’s attribute, resource or endowment, in terms of functional, systemic, 
democratic and normative challenges see J Black, ‘Legitimacy and the Competition for Regulatory 
Share’ (2009) LSE Working Papers 14/2009 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1424654>. Beetham and Lord 
identify political legitimacy as a multi-dimensional concept, comprising legality, normative 
justifiability and legitimation. D Beetham and C Lord, ‘Legitimacy and the European Union’ in M 
Nentwich and A Weale (eds), Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, Constitutional 
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control while the latter forms part of an evaluation of effectiveness, ie whether the 
regulation achieved the aims sought.97 Chapter 2 found that regulatory due process in 
EU policy development offered the wider public no more than a consultative role in 
regulatory policy development.98 This effectively left output legitimacy as the sole 
basis for supranational regulatory legitimacy for the Commission. Despite the 
difficulties with ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, broader participation by civil 
society in regulatory governance was not considered as a means of addressing 
concerns about legitimacy.99 Regulatory due process has several important 
operational facets that the Commission will only begin to address in the period 
beginning after 2001.  
5.7.1. Due Process in Implementing the ONP Directive 
The ONP Directive prescribed procedures and timelines for producing draft 
instruments before their adoption.100 The Commission had anticipated some of the 
major implementation requirements. Thus, it had prepared draft measures in the 
perspective of achieving harmonization rapidly. However, carrying out the 
regulatory mandate according to the terms of the legislation slowed the adoption 
process.101 Here, some tension between efficiency and due process may be observed.  
                                                                                                                                     
Choice and Citizenship (Routledge 1998) 15. Even de Burca falls into the trap of lumping together the 
democratic deficit linked to a transnational scope of powers accorded to regulators (like the EU) with 
the different problem of the non-consensual approach to evaluating the use of the Commission’s 
foundational economic integrationist powers. For so long as this is the case, it will be difficult to find 
a broadly agreed approach to the use of regulatory governance in pursuit of the internal market.  See G 
de Burca, ‘Developing Democracy beyond the State’ (2008) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 
101.  
97 Scharpf neatly summarised the two dimensions of what he termed democratic self-determination: 
input-oriented authenticity (government by the people) and output-oriented effectiveness (government 
for the people), but warned that such determination existed in a ‘precarious symbosis with the 
capitalist economy’ and ‘dynamics that transcend the given boundaries of any political system. 
Scharpf (n 64) 2.  
98 Prior to 2001, EU telecommunications regulation was one of the few policy areas for which public 
consultations related to policy development were systematically conducted and reported on; this was 
equally true for the extension of the initial regulatory mandate. 
99 B Finke, ‘Civil Society Participation in EU Governance’ (2007) 2 Living Reviews in European 
Governance 4 < http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2007-2/> accessed 12 June 
2012.  
100 ONP Directive, arts 3-4, 9-10. 
101 The ONP Directive was adopted in June 1990. The draft directive on leased lines was submitted to 
Council in February 1991 and the draft directive on packet-switched data services on June 1991. See 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on the application of open network provision to leased 
lines’ COM(91) 30 final and Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Recommendation on the 
harmonised provision of a minimum set of Packet-Switched Data Services In accordance with Open 
Network Provision (ONP) principles’ COM(91) 208 final. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, US administrative processes are lengthy. Judicial 
review, hearings and appeals potentially extend the period for concluding any federal 
norm-setting activity into a matter of years. Some similarity can be seen with the 
implementing rules of the ONP Directive. Not only did the ONP Directive impose 
procedures that lengthened the time for adopting implementing measures, the 
measures adopted themselves introduced further delay.102 How legitimate were such 
processes and such delays? How legitimate was the change from the Commission’s 
initial completion date of 1992 for liberalization of the sector to 1998? These 
questions are ones of degree. There is no normative standard for constructing ideal 
regulatory processes. What the value of due process should reflect is regulatory 
transparency, fairness, and accessibility.  
The Commission’s performance in relation to the implementing measures 
foreseen in the ONP Directive was mixed in relation to these values. Legislative 
proposals for leased lines, licensing and interconnection showed considerable 
transparency and procedural fairness in putting forward all of the views on record 
and addressing them even-handedly, with explanations for the balancing of the 
interests at stake and reasons for the conclusions drawn. The Commission created the 
impression that in some cases all views were given due weight and evaluated before 
reaching a decision, which was itself rationally motivated.  
For the sensitive area of voice telephony, the views of the external experts 
were neither reviewed nor remarked upon, nor did explanations draw upon expert 
external studies. The Commission presented an overall appreciation of the comments 
received and its regulatory conclusion, but anyone outside of the process would not 
have been aware of the balancing that the Commission claimed. This shortfall in 
observing important aspects of due process diminished the values of accessibility and 
openness and undermined. The Commission was not able to show that it had reached 
a conclusion taking all views into consideration as objectively as possible before 
reaching a definitive view, and did not demonstrate an objective rationale for the 
outcome reached. 
                                                
102 As an example, the Leased Lines Directive was adopted in June 1992, or almost one and a half 
years after the Commission’s draft proposal was submitted. The transposition date for Member States 
was June 1993. This was the case for an implementing measure that the Commission had anticipated, 
and had therefore previously prepared a draft legislative instrument.  
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When a regulator’s reasoning, explanations, and arguments are minimalist to 
the point of intransparency, as was the case in some instances, it impairs the 
legitimating value of public participation in the rule-making process. When a 
regulator truncates the reasoning for its decisions without explaining the views 
received from experts, the wider public and national representatives and how these 
were taken into account, the process lacks transparency and the regulator undermines 
its legitimacy. That the procedures followed were entirely in accordance with 
legislative requirements does little to mitigate the lack of normative due process for 
the most contentious proposal. When developing its proposal for politically sensitive 
measures, the Commission misjudged the needs of procedural legitimacy.103 The 
Commission’s failure to provide greater detail and reasoning did not appreciate the 
level of explanation and justification appropriate to an exercise of its discretion. The 
Commission as a transnational regulator plays a role in the creation of its 
legitimacy.104 Conformity with procedural due process would now be framed as a 
requirement and command a broad consensus, in what can be called a 
‘compensatory’ (ie compensating for a lack of democratic credentials) approach to 
transnational regulatory legitimacy.105  
In regulatory governance terms, it is therefore regrettable that the 
Commission failed to appreciate the potential for strengthening its regulatory 
legitimacy that a fuller articulation of how comments were evaluated, on what basis, 
and the grounds for its final conclusion, all the more so since the proposal was the 
most contentious of all. Where regulatory decisions are contestable, transparent due 
process that enhances the normative quality of the decisional process contributes 
significantly to regulatory legitimacy. I will return in the conclusions chapter to the 
issue of due process within a supranational regulatory system. A distinction in due 
process standards between supranational and national regulators relates to the levels 
of participation of the public in the decisions of regulators, in what capacities, and 
with what instruments of ex ante and ex post control. For some authors, control is 
                                                
103 Thatcher and Stone Sweet find that procedural or decision-making legitimacy of transnational 
regulators, which they associate with transparency, legality and stakeholders’access, is normatively 
better than opaque deliberations of governmental ministries and go so far as to suggest it as a 
substitute for electoral accountability. M Thatcher and A Stone Sweet, ‘Theory and Practice of 
Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions’ (2002) 25 West European Politics 1, 19. 
104 Black (n 95) 23. 
105 De Burca (n 95) 121. 
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more important that procedural legitimacy.106 This is characteristic of structural 
analyses from a political science perspective. Attempts to address regulatory 
legitimacy through purely technocratic or procedural models (procedural legitimacy) 
is typically rejected for the reason that the range of issues linked to EU governance 
cannot all be addressed with such analytical tools.107 Even if true, that does not mean 
that some regulatory governance issues cannot be so addressed.  
Legitimacy is not simply a matter of control. For the exercise of foundational 
regulatory powers, particularly regulation necessary for the single market, a 
combination of analytical tools and models can meaningfully contribute to 
constructing a normative form of regulatory legitimacy. I will return to the analytical 
‘toolbox’ for constructing a defensible form of normative regulatory governance in 
chapter 6. 
 
5.8. Infrastructure Liberalization and Due Process 
In its regulatory role of seeking a broader harmonization mandate, the Commission 
reflected extensive procedural engagement. It separated different aspects of the new 
mandate for consultation; it analyzed these and variously considered several factors 
before drawing up a specific regulatory strategy and mandate. Once the consultation 
processes were concluded, the Commission presented its conclusions with arguments 
for regulation and liberalization but made no attempt to precipitate a mandate by 
presenting Member States and EP with a fait accompli of a Commission Directive. A 
transnational regulator's legitimacy is enhanced but not established by consultative 
procedures that offer a broad participation in setting norms.108 
Within an evaluative framing, the Commission decision on the strategy to 
follow was defensible, having showed that it identified the interests at stake, that it 
understood the Treaty and regulatory goals, that it considered reasonable alternatives, 
and that it engaged in a balancing of interests before reaching a conclusion. Perhaps 
the elaborate procedures were no more than window dressing for a previously 
                                                
106 C Scott, ‘The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi-Level Control’ (2002) 8 
ELJ 59.  
107 ibid 76.  
108 The Commission’s own Governance White Paper in 2001 paid particular attention to the related 
notions of participation and openness. A broad consensus exists as to the general proposition that 
legitimacy and participation are correlated, and fall within an evaluation of the quality of the 
decisional processes of transnational governance. See de Burca (n 95) 122.  
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determined regulatory outcome. If so, the Commission showed remarkable skill in 
concealing it. From the evaluative perspective of regulatory governance, the creation 
of the new mandate satisfied a normative standard of due process.  
The Commission used uneven or inconsistent standards of transparency in 
proposing norms for drawing up legislation and for establishing a new regulatory 
mandate. This was seen in the politically sensitive subject of voice liberalization. By 
contrast, the creation of a new liberalization mandate was normatively balanced, 
although the introduction of a political dimension into the use of Treaty powers 
undermined two other normative values of expertise and independence. Again, this 
highlights the value of a cumulative use of criteria which avoids over-reliance on 
only one dimension of regulatory governance. Variation within a broadly normative 
spectrum of due process does not significantly diminish the legitimacy of the 
process. However, a distinctive shortfall in due process norms that related only to 
politically sensitive proposals is problematic.  
The next section addresses accountability which attracts as much academic 
interest as a subject of analysis as European regulatory governance.109  
5.9. Accountability 
At what point in the regulatory cycle should accountability, as a criterion of 
evaluation and a legitimating normative value for a supranational regulator, be 
required? Scharpf's premise - that the foundational task of establishing a common 
market laid down in the Treaty of Rome carried an innately high normativity - would 
imply that those positive regulatory measures adopted and implemented pursuant to 
the ONP Directive required relatively little in terms of subsequent democratic 
accountability mechanisms. What should be demonstrable was a meaningful 
movement towards greater intra-Community trade in the sector.  
The establishment of an initial common framework in telecommunications 
was indeed effected by the implementing measures of the 1990s but these were far 
                                                
109 Different approaches can be discerned in various academic communities. See eg Arend Lijphart, 
Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (Yale 
UP 1984); G Majone,‘Temporal Consistency and Policy Credibility: Why Democracies Need Non-
majoritarian Institutions’ (1996) European University Institute /Robert Schuman Centre Working 
Paper 96/57; Scott (n 105); Thatcher and Stone Sweet (n 102); GA Hodge and K Coghill, 
‘Accountability in the Privatized State’ (2007) 20 Governance 675; RB Stewart, ‘Administrative Law 
in the Twenty-First Century’ (2003) 78  New York Univ LR  437; AM Slaughter, ‘The Accountability 
of Government Networks’ (2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 347.  
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from universally transposed and applied. The short period in which the rules were in 
force attenuated, but did not eliminate, the need for rigorous ex post control and 
feedback mechanisms: this was reflected in the Commission’s reporting practices. 
The Commission first reported on implementation of telecommunications regulation 
in 1997,110 and published an overall assessment of remaining barriers in 1999.111 The 
Commission’s use of discourse appealed indirectly to notions of accountability by 
reference to the achievement of the single telecommunications market: 
...it is clear that the liberalised regimes in place in the Member States are 
driving growth in all sectors of the market, large increases in market 
entry...[and] large decreases in the cost of national and international 
leased lines...[L]ess than two years after full liberalization, overall 
implementation of the telecoms regulatory package has been and 
continues to be a success.112  
 
This discourse drew upon a functional rationale which Scharpf would have 
recognized as an implicit claim of ‘output legitimacy’. 
Even unilaterally, the exercise of rendering an account carried a positive 
normative value, in terms of due process, and contributed to transparency. 
Nonetheless, merely providing information, while important, constituted an 
incomplete level of accountability.113 The reports created a legitimacy claim in which 
the Commission formulated or implied successful regulatory outcomes by reference 
to macro-economic effects and micro-economic statistics.114 Output legitimacy is 
based on empirical determinations. A short re-examination of the Commission’s 
basis for this claim is needed.  
A significant weakness in the empirical data was that many of the statistics 
relied upon were estimated.115 Information on which claims for successful outcomes 
                                                
110 COM (97) 236 final.   
111 A 1999 report assessed the state of transposition of the harmonization measures into national law; 
analyzed the application of the national rules; provided an overview of the status of the 
telecommunications services markets in the Member States; and identified the major remaining 
barriers to the achievement of a single telecommunications market. COM(1999) 537 final, 1. All 
implementation reports can be found at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/communications_reports/index_en.ht
m> accessed 11 June 2011. 
112 COM(1999) 537 final, 27, 31. 
113 D Curtin, ‘Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account’ (2007) 13 
ELJ 523, 532. 
114 COM(1999) 537 final, annex 4, s 4.1.  
115 ibid annex 4.  
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are based should be empirically verifiable. Otherwise, a regulator’s claim for 
regulatory effectiveness cannot be validated and this undermines its credibility.116 An 
inability to check the empirical basis for success independently weakened the 
normativity of the claim. This is not to say that the claim was unwarranted. Since no 
consensual standards for evaluating regulatory outcomes existed, the Commission 
was not held to any standard of verifiability. The reports in question were prepared 
by those responsible for policy development who had good reasons for presenting 
their measures as successful.   
As will be seen in chapter 6 this lacuna became acute in the 2000s. I will 
argue in the thesis conclusions chapter that there is now a pressing need to introduce 
a normative form of regulatory governance for the EU regulatory regime for internal 
market regulation and an accountability mechanism. This is particularly urgent given 
the broad perception that the Treaty and jurisprudential limits to the exercise of 
regulatory discretion for positive harmonization measures are illusory.117 Relatedly, 
what will become problematic in the 2000s is the Commission’s monopoly 
constructing the official legitimacy discourse and in responding to the claims of 
different legitimacy communities. Majone and Scharpf provide two major examples 
of this. I will argue that regulatory governance as currently practiced is a tool that 
should be improved to construct a more robust form of supranational regulatory 
legitimacy. 
5.10. Concluding Remarks 
Two dimensions of the Commission as a regulator emerged throughout the 1990s, as 
an executor of policy and as a policy designer for a broader mandate. The 
Commission discharged the legislative requirements of the ONP Directive, following 
the administrative processes prescribed. Superficially, those activities seemed 
appropriate and proportionate. Analysis shows that important values of regulatory 
legitimacy were under-served, that important proposals were under-explained, and 
that professional expertise was inadequately reflected in sensitive proposals. But 
when designing a wider mandate, the Commission used expertise, transparency and 
                                                
116 R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, Understanding Regulation, Theory, Strategy, and Practice (2nd 
edn, OUP 2012) 71. 
117 S Wetherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How 
the Court’s Case Law has become a “Drafting Guide”’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827. 
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due process more effectively. Expertise became increasingly important in policy 
development but was used even less effectively for even more contentious proposals 
in future, including the creation of a European telecommunications agency.   
For norm setting or mandate creating activities, the Commission’s practices 
reflected the extent to which its inter-institutional discourse deferred to political 
consensus which can impair the exercise of professional judgment of an independent 
regulator. At a minimum, it conveys a lack of independent institutional determination 
whereby compromises result in sub-optimal measures. Without empirical methods of 
accounting for regulatory outcomes, there is little scope for corrective regulatory 
feedback.  
A much more difficult governance challenge arose when questions relate to 
removal or adaptation of existing measures.118 By 2000, commercial conditions, 
market structures and the regulatory landscape in telecommunications had changed 
with indications of even greater changes to come. By 2007, further changes in 
market structures were found. At the same time, at the beginning of the 2000s, the 
Commission was about transform its regulatory governance procedures and policies. 
The next decade of telecommunications policy development thus coincided with the 
adoption of a White Paper on Governance and implementation of a formal regulatory 
governance policy. The regulatory landscape at the EU level and as practiced by EU 
institutions was about to be transformed. The changes begun in 2001 will have major 
repercussions which will be analyzed in the next chapter.    
 
                                                
118 As seen in Ch 1, the effect of negative integration is to remove a national barrier to trade. Once 
removed, no further measures may be needed to be effective. The same is not true for positive 





Telecommunications Governance in the Twenty-First Century 
 
Introduction 
This Chapter examines the period from 2000 to 2009, which was marked by re-
regulation in the context of the Lisbon Agenda.1 Technological and market 
developments, of which convergence2 and the spreading use of the Internet were the 
two most significant, carried clear implications for telecommunications regulation 
even by the end of 1999.3 While convergence did not come as a surprise to 
regulators, policy analyses had missed the development of the Internet. The iterative 
approach to liberalization and harmonization of networks and services had resulted 
in more than twenty legislative instruments. Simplification was necessary. Consumer 
protection more generally entered the frame and ensuring more effective competition 
became a priority.4   
The intended market-making effects of earlier liberalization and 
harmonization had not yet produced either a pan-European or a competitive market. 
Investment was discouraged by a low level of harmonization of national licensing 
regimes,5 but also in relation to interconnection pricing norms which were weakened 
by the incumbents' cost accounting methodologies.6 Serious problems existed with 
diverging application of harmonized rules while some national regulatory 
                                                
1 Also known as the Lisbon Strategy, adopted in 2000, it was an action plan for the development of 
the information-based economy in the EU between 2000 and 2010. A 2010 initiative was 
subsequently adopted, which has now become the Digital Agenda for Europe. See 
<http://ec.europa.eu/digitial-agenda/> accessed 14 December 2012.  
2 ‘The convergence of the telecommunications, broadcasting and IT sectors is reshaping the 
communications market; in particular the convergence of fixed, mobile, terrestrial and satellite 
communications, and communication and positioning/location systems. From the point of view of 
communications infrastructure and related services, convergence makes the traditional separation of 
regulatory functions between these sectors increasingly inappropriate and calls for a coherent 
regulatory regime.’ Commission, ‘Towards a new framework for electronic communications 
infrastructure and associated services: The 1999 communications review’ (Communication) COM 
(1999) 539 final (not published in OJ). 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/l24216_en.htm>. 
3 Commission, ‘The result of the public consultation on the 1999 Communications Review and 
orientations for the new Regulatory Framework’ (Communication) COM (2000) 239 final.   
4 ibid. 
5 ‘In respect of licensing regimes, wide differences exist in procedures, periods of validity, fees, 
classifications of operators with which they are faced, not to mention the difficulty of submitting 
applications in the eleven official Community languages.’ COM(1999) 539 final, 5.  
6 ‘There appear to be major weaknesses in the regulation of this issue by some NRAs which have led 
to price squeezes in a number of Member States.’ ibid.  
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environments were highly non-transparent.7 The regulatory measures intended to 
facilitate market entry were not producing satisfactory outcomes.  
Prior to 1999, the Commission had painted regulatory failure with a national 
shortfall brush: regulatory outcomes and national disparities in implementation had 
patently been unsatisfactory.8 Yet, much more discretion for national regulators was 
said to be needed going into the twenty-first century.9 The regulatory principle that 
enforcement of regulation should, as much as possible, occur as closely as possible 
to the activities being regulated led the Commission to conclude that for the future:  
Primary responsibility for achieving objectives set out in sector-specific 
[telecommunications] Community legislation should rest with the 
independent national regulators...The natural counterpart of such 
delegation is greater co-ordination....[emphasis added]10 
Either the Commission believed in the capabilities of national regulators to learn to 
apply regulatory norms or it suggested considerable belief in its institutional capacity 
to oversee national regulators and avoid disparities between national approaches. 
Having rejected the creation of a formal European regulatory authority,11 the 
Commission found that the discretionary powers of the NRAs needed to be 
compensated by direct ex ante Commission control of national decisions.12 With 
appropriate legislative revision, competition in telecommunications markets would 
become more fully established, and the ‘focus of concern’ would turn to the 
commercial behaviors of market players, giving traditional competition rules applied 
to undertakings an increasing importance, with increased surveillance of the sector 
                                                
7 ibid.  
8 See Commission, ‘Fifth Report on the implementation of the telecommunications regulatory 
package’ (Communication) COM (1999) 537 final. 
9 ‘The Commission considers that an effective way of introducing much-needed flexibility into the 
new regulatory framework can be via the increased use of Recommendations and Guidelines. It 
recognises the legitimate concerns of stakeholders about transparency, effectiveness, legal certainty 
and democratic control in respect of such measures [emphasis in original].’ COM (2000) 239 final, 
20.  
10 COM (1999) 539 final, 14. 
11 A new European regulatory authority would not add sufficient value to justify the additional layer 
of bureaucracy that would be created: ‘...issues concerning disparity of interpretation and application 
of Community legislation...are best dealt with by improving co-ordination and co-operation between 
NRAs...’ibid 8-10. 
12 ‘Since the rules at EU level will be more general than at present, there will be a need for 
mechanisms to ensure that NRAs apply the objectives and principles set out in the directives in a way 
which safeguards the integrity of the internal market.’ ibid 53. 
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by competition authorities.13 Legislation was adopted with entry into force in 2003 
(‘the 2003 Framework’).14 
In 2006, a Commission review of the 2003 Framework found insufficient 
consistency in the application of ex ante remedies.15 It concluded that ‘[a]lthough 
progress has been made, an internal European market for electronic communications 
and for radio equipment is not yet a reality’ and therefore further measures were 
needed.16 This review included an impact assessment. The major proposals foreseen 
were to reform radio spectrum policy and to streamline the procedures for 
conducting market analyses.17 In 2007, legislative proposals were tabled that 
included a draft regulation for a European telecommunications authority; the addition 
of the ex ante remedy of ‘functional separation’ of network assets and services (as 
BT was required to do by Ofcom under its competition authority) as an obligation 
available for NRAs to impose on undertakings with market power; and additional 
veto powers for the Commission over ex ante obligations.18  Legislation was adopted 
in 2009 and entered into force in 2011.19  
                                                
13 ibid 18.  
14 The legislation consisted of one consolidating art 106 TFEU directive, five art 114 TFEU 
harmonization directives and one art 114 TFEU decision. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services (Framework Directive) [2002] OJ L108; Directive 
2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of 
electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) [2002] OJ L108; 
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal 
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal 
Service Directive) [2002] OJ L108; Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks 
and associated facilities (Access Directive) [2002] OJ L108; Directive 2002/58/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications) [2002] OJ L201; Decision 676/2002/ EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European 
Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) [2002] OJ L108. 
15 Commission, ‘On the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework’ (Communication) COM (2006) 
334 final, 8. 
16 ibid.  
17 ibid 11. 
18 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council  amending 
Directives 2002/12/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks 
and services, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and 
services’ COM (2007) 697 final. 
19 Council Directive 2009/136/EC of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on 
universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, 
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) 2006/2004 on cooperation between national 
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The chapter examines two full cycles of policy development between 2000 
and 2011 and concludes overall that, despite the formal adoption of normative 
regulatory governance practices, the Commission’s actual practices failed to satisfy 
the criteria defined in Chapter 3. The chapter is organized as follows. First, I recap 
regulatory governance developments since 2001.20 The next section describes the 
main elements of two cycles of re-regulation in telecommunications. In the final 
section, I analyze the regulatory governance practices for the two policy cycles. 
Impact assessment procedures were used in 2006-2007. The analysis shows that 
there is still considerable work to be done in achieving a normative level of European 
regulatory governance, even as the Commission defines it, despite the regulatory 
governance ‘learning curve’ displayed by the Commission throughout the 2000s. 
 
6.1.	  The	  Governance	  White	  Paper’s	  Progeny	  	  
As drafted, the Governance White Paper was meant to address misperceptions and 
lack of popularity of the EU and to complement the forthcoming enlargement of the 
EU with a distinctly political message.21 In its follow-up to the Governance White 
                                                                                                                                     
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws [2009] OJ L337/11; Council 
Directive 2009/140/EC of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC 
on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services [2009] OJ L337/37; Council 
Regulation (EC) 1211/2009 of 25 November 2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office [2009] OJ L337/1. 
20 See the discussion in ch 3 for details.  
21 Speaking to the EP in 2000, the President of the Commission explained that the Commission 
services were preparing a governance paper as a reflection of a new political reality: the process of 
European integration would no longer consist primarily of an economic project to complete the single 
market but would be an ‘increasingly political process’. With respect to furthering a political process 
of integration, the President stated: ‘This is not a matter of choice, it is a necessity: Europe’s political 
integration must advance hand in hand with its geographical enlargement....’ R Prodi, ‘2000-2005: 
Shaping the New Europe’ (European Parliament, Strasbourg,  February 2000) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/00/41&format=HTML&aged=1
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>accessed 28 July 2012. For an example of commentators who duly 
evaluated the White Paper as a political intervention, see eg, D Wincott, ‘Looking Forward or Harking 
Back: The Commission and the Reform of Governance in the European Union’ (2001) 39 JCMS 897: 
‘Whatever model of the EU lies behind it, the White Paper’s emphasis on institutions focusing on 
their core tasks gave the Commission the opportunity to take a much more radical step. The 
Commission could have identified activities and tasks in which it is currently engaged, which fall well 
outside its core role. Had the Commission identified a number of such tasks and announced its 
intention to give them up, it would have placed itself in a strong political position to invite other 
institutions to reflect on how they might change their own practices. Its failure to engage with 
powerful actors and interests inside the Commission raises questions about the authority of the 
governance initiative and team within that institution...[T]he White Paper gives the impression of 
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Paper, the Commission acknowledged the challenges of the democratic deficit 
critique, but expected this to be addressed by the forthcoming constitutional 
convention and inter-governmental conference, distinguishing challenges that it and 
other institutions faced in relation to achieving good governance in the discharge of 
regulatory authority.22 
The Commission published a summary of the negative views expressed in the 
governance consultation. The candor suggested transparency: the Commission 
revealed that its suggestions were contentious and that the views expressed reflected 
considerable disagreement. Comments had endorsed the ambition of better policies 
and regulation in principle. However:  
...the response also shows the need to reconcile two concerns. On the one 
hand, there is the view that alternative regulatory models and non-
legislative instruments have often proved to be more efficient and 
effective than traditional legislation. On the other hand, there is the 
opinion that improved efficiency cannot justify a transfer of decision-
making competence to interested parties [ie the Commission] who would 
not be democratically accountable.23  
  
Thus, the Commission articulated a difficult and sensitive issue related to regulatory 
delegation, that is, the contestability of delegated powers to third parties, such as 
itself. It would be another decade before the Commission began actively to explore 
an accountability mechanism for EU regulation.24 The Commission’s emerging 
recognition that mechanisms of accountability serve important governance interests 
                                                                                                                                     
having been written with the existing power structure of the Commission itself very much in mind...’ 
[emphasis in original] 909-10. 
22 For another report of the acute criticisms submitted during the period of public consultation on the 
GWP, and an idea of the inspiration for a plethora of governance measures subsequently adopted by 
the Commission, see European Governance: A White Paper, Working Summary of the Public 
Response (nd) <http://ec.europa.eu/governance/docs/comm_results_en.pdf> accessed 1 August 2012.  
23 Report from the Commission on European Governance (Governance Report) (2003) 36 
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/docs/comm_rapport_en.pdf> accessed 1 August 2012.  
24 Until 2010, the Commission’s governance approach, while ambitious in some respects, reflected 
little recognition or acknowledgement that a mechanism for accountability was essential to its own 
regulatory legitimacy. In 2010, the Commission proposed to conduct ex post evaluations of regulatory 
policies, but to do so itself, thus self-reverentially, and contestably. I examine this briefly below and in 
Chapter 7. For the initial Commission proposal to conduct ex post evaluations of EU legislation, see 
COM(2010) 543 final; more recently, the Commission launched a public consultation on, inter alia, 
improving stakeholder involvement in  ex post evaluation of EU legislation. See ‘Stakeholder 
Consultation on Smart Regulation in the EU, Follow Up to the 2010 Communication on Smart 
Regulation’ (2012) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/smart_regulation/consultation_2012/docs/consultati
on_en.pdf> accessed 19 August 2012. To date there has been no follow-up. 
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is welcome and merits further analysis, both for economic and general public interest 
regulation, once operationalized.25  
6.1.2. Regulatory Impact Assessments 
In 2002, the Commission undertook to conduct impact assessments26 for the purpose 
of ‘guarantee[ing] and justify[ing] the validity of its legislative proposals’.27 This is 
not the place to review all of the Commission’s better lawmaking and better 
regulation measures initiatives in detail.28 Regulatory impact assessment procedures 
have attracted widespread use, analysis and comment.29 Not all are relevant to the 
present research. However, such a regulatory design tool, if applied properly, and its 
results interpreted correctly, could constitute a qualitative governance measure,30 
                                                
25 The Commission explained that ‘Smart regulation’...requires constant attention to the achievement 
of objectives as well as to the associated costs...giving as much importance to the evaluation and 
improvement of existing legislation as to the design of new legislation...[and] involves efficient 
mechanisms to monitor results, collecting evidence and using it to inform political decisions. It 
demands a comprehensive approach to all the costs and benefits of legislation...that systematically 
identifies all opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of legislation throughout the 
policy cycle.’ Stakeholder Consultation (n 24) 3. 
26 It is said to be the practice of performing economic analyses of possible regulation to show whether 
the benefits are likely to exceed its costs and whether alternatives to that regulation are more effective 
or less costly. Impact assessments originated in the US beginning in the 1970s, with requirements, 
variously, for a ‘quality of life’ assessment, an ‘inflation impact’ assessment and, finally, an 
‘economic assessment’, which remains the standard in force at present. See  JB Wiener, ‘Better 
Regulation in Europe’ in J Holder and D McGillivray (eds), Taking Stock of Environmental 
Assessment: Law, Policy and Custom (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 78; and RD Morgenstern, ‘The 
Legal and Institutional Setting for Economic Analyses at EPA’ in RD Morgenstern (ed), Economic 
Analyses at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (RFF Press 1997) 10-12.  
27 COM (2002) 278 final, 7. 
28 The Commission website on better law making, better regulation and smart regulation can be 
accessed at <http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm>. Even scholars who 
specialize in regulatory governance studies are selective in the measures that are analyzed within a 
single work. ‘[T]his study addresses in more detail the main components of Better Regulation - impact 
assessments and administrative simplification - and advocates the adoption of several institutional 
improvements. Other aspects of regulatory reform in Europe.....are mentioned here but are not the 
focus.’ Wiener (n 26) 67.  
29 See eg, A Alemanno, ‘The Better Regulation Initiative at the Judicial Gate: A Trojan Horse within 
the Commission’s Walls or the Way Forward?’ (2009) 15 ELJ 382; CM Radaelli and ACM Meuwese, 
‘Better Regulation in Europe: Between Public Management and Regulatory Reform’ (2009) 87 Public 
Administration 639; CM Radaelli ‘Regulating Rule-making via Impact Assessment’ (2010) 23 
Governance 89; R Baldwin, ‘Better Regulation: Tensions Aboard the Enterprise’ in S Weatherill 
(ed), Better Regulation (Hart 2007); J Torriti, ‘Impact Assessment in the EU: A Tool for Better 
Regulation, Less Regulation or Less Bad Regulation?’ (2007) 10 Journal of Risk Research 239; J 
Wiener, ‘Better Regulation in Europe’ (2006) 59 Current Legal Problems 447; and CM Radaelli and 
ACM Meuwese, ‘Better Regulation in the European Union: The Political Economy of Impact 
Assessment’ <http://centres.exeter.ac.uk/ceg/research/riacp/documents/The Political Economy of 
Impact Assessment.pdf>. 
30 One commentator summed up the Better Regulation programme as ‘a set of centrally imposed rules 
designed to structure the key stages of regulatory process (from rule formulation, via [regulatory 
impact assessments], to the simplification of existing rules and the removal of administrative burdens) 
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particularly the evidence-based cost-benefit analysis within the IA process.31 I 
describe the use of this policy tool in section 6.3 below and evaluate its use in the 
analysis of section 6.4.  
The Commission now systematically conducts stakeholder consultations and 
IAs.32 It publishes internal and external cost-benefit analyses. How it develops 
regulatory policy generally has changed. It is nonetheless far from self-evident to 
assert, as the Commission has, that these practices have increased accountability.33 
They do not by themselves generate accountability or even credibility. As argued in 
Chapter 3, it requires an evaluative framework to assess regulation ex post and 
independently of the regulator.  
 The 2002 commitment34 included an intention to use IAs: 
as a tool to improve the quality and coherence of the policy development 
process. It will contribute to an effective and efficient regulatory 
environment....[The process of conducting an] Impact Assessment 
identifies the likely positive and negative impacts of proposed policy 
actions, enabling informed political judgments to be made about the 
proposal and identif[ies] trade-offs in achieving  competing objectives. It 
also permits to complete the application of the subsidiarity and 
proportionality protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.35  
 
Further:  
Within the general objective of ‘better regulation’, the aim of the impact 
assessment process is that the Commission bases its decision on sound 
                                                                                                                                     
with the aim of achieving certain improvements in regulatory performance (eg targets of burden 
reductions, cost-effective regulation, increased reliance on market-friendly alternatives, etc)’. Radaelli 
and Meuwese (n 29) 196. 
31 See, eg Radaelli (n 29); N Lee and C Kirkpatrick, ‘Evidence-Based Policy-Making in Europe: An 
Evaluation of the European Commission Integrated Impact Assessments’ (2006) 24 Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal 22; Wiener (n 26); Alemanno (n 29); C Radaelli, ‘Desperately 
Seeking Regulatory Impact Assessments: Diary of a Reflective Researcher’ (2009) 15 Evaluation 31; 
RW Hahn and RE Litan, ‘Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons for the US and the EU’ 
(2005) 8 Journal of International Economic Law 473; CM Radaelli, ‘Diffusion Without Convergence: 
How Political Context Shapes the Adoption of Regulatory Impact Assessment’ (2005) 12 JEPP 924.  
32 IAs started from 2003. These can be found at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/cia_2012_en.htm> accessed 31 July 2012.  
33 ‘Stakeholder consultations and impact assessments...have increased transparency and 
accountability.’ COM(2010) 543 final, 2. 
34 ‘In this communication the Commission establishes a new integrated method for impact assessment, 
as was agreed at the Göteborg and Laeken European Councils...Most recently, the Commission made 
commitments at the Laeken Council to implement better regulation principles including a regulatory 
impact assessment mechanism.’ COM(2002) 276 final, 2.  
35 ibid 2. 
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analysis of the potential impact on society and on a balanced appraisal of 
the various policy instruments available.36 
 
In broader terms, IAs were part of the pursuit of the Lisbon Agenda.37 Other 
countries such as the UK and the US, had adopted IAs.38 If done correctly, IA reveals 
the economic, social and environmental impacts of a proposed policy initiative and 
these objectives in adopting IAs were explicitly endorsed by the Commission.39 
Costs and benefits should be quantified and monetized, if possible.40   
A recurrent issue in the scholarship focuses on the quality of IAs, both 
national41 and supranational.42 The comparative merits of regulatory IAs in different 
jurisdictions and the experience of cross-border policy learning are also examined.43 
This is not the place to offer an evaluation of the IAs conducted by or for the EU, 
which others have begun to examine.44 They constitute a tool for developing 
technical and complex regulation that is suitable for purpose, but they must be 
                                                
36 ibid 5 
37 The Lisbon Agenda - now re-labelled the Lisbon strategy - focused on growth and jobs across 
Europe with the intention of pursuing a sustainable development strategy. See Commission, ‘Working 
together for growth and jobs: A new start for the Lisbon Strategy’ (Communication) COM (2005) 24 
final. 
38 ‘It should be noted that the BCA [benefit-cost analysis] in the US addresses all types of costs and 
benefits-including economic, social and environmental-and thus is comparable to the “Integrated 
Impact Assessment” conducted in the EU.’ Wiener (n 26) 463; the OECD, US and EU approaches to 
impact assessments set out broadly the same standards for conducting such assessments. See eg, 
Wiener (n 26). In the 1980s, an Enterprise and Deregulation Unit was created; impact assessments 
were introduced on proposed Westminster regulations that could impinge upon businesses. According 
to Margaret Thatcher, deregulation was one of the basic Conservative principles of the 1980s. See A 
Dodds, ‘The Core Executive’s Approach to Regulation: From “Better Regulation” to “Risk-Tolerant 
Deregulation”’ (2006) 40 Social Policy & Administration 526, 529. 
39 Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC(2009) 92, 31-32.  
40 See R Hahn and others, ‘Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to 
Comply with Executive Order 12866’ (2000) 23 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 859, 864. 
41 See eg, TO McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the  Federal 
Bureaucracy (CUP 1991); GR Baldwin and C Veljanovski, ‘Regulation by Cost-Benefit Analysis’ 
(1984) 62 Public Administration 51; OECD, Evaluation of Regulatory Impact Assessments, 2006-
2007 (Stationery Office and National Audit Office 2007). See OECD, Regulatory Impact Analysis: 
Best Practices in OECD Countries (OECD Publications 1997) 
<http://www.oecd.org/governance/regulatorypolicy/35258828.pdf>. 
42 CM Radaelli and ACM Meuwese, ‘Hard Questions, Hard Solutions: Proceduralisation through 
Impact Assessment in the EU’ (2010) 33 West European Politics 136; Radaelli (n 29). 
43 See eg, Wiener (n 26) 65-130; and C Cecot, RW Hahn and A Renda, ‘A Statistical Analysis of the 
Quality of Impact Assessment in the European Union’ (AEI-Brookings Joint Centre for Regulatory 
Studies, Working Paper 07/09)<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984473>. 
44 Lee and Kirkpatrick (n 30); Radaelli (n 29); Radaelli and de Fransceso examine measures of better 
regulation as a public policy itself. Such measures ‘define, identify and operationalize quality...[but 
they find that] this process of definition and operationalization has not started yet’.  See CM Radaelli 
and F de Francesco, Regulatory Quality in Europe (Manchester UP 2007) 184. 
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conducted properly.45 For that to happen, economic and technical expertise is 
required. IAs thus form part of the expertise criterion of the regulatory governance 
model. What has emerged thus far in the literature is a broadly negative view of the 
quality of Commission IAs. Since initial adoption, the Commission has tried to 
improve its use of IAs.46 
In the next section, I examine the legislative trajectory of positive 
harmonization from 2000 to 2010.  
6.2. Twenty-first Century Legislation  
Because of the trend towards and expectation of technological convergence of 
historically separate services such as telephony, broadcast media and IT, regulation 
of transmission services needed to be conceptually horizontal, irrespective of the 
types of services carried.47 This translated in policy terms into a regulatory 
framework covering all communications (transmission) infrastructure.48   
6.2.1 Legislation and Innovation 
Legislation adopted in 2002 consolidated and partially repealed the painstakingly 
constructed legislative mosaic of the 1990s.49 The principle of significant market 
                                                
45 Ample scholarship testifies to the longstanding problem of trying to ensure that regulation is done 
properly in terms of problem definition, identification of policy options and relative assessment of 
norms and outcomes. See eg, BM Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing 
and Removing Regulatory Forms (Columbia UP 1980); Wiener (n 26); RB Stewart, ‘The Reformation 
of American Administrative Law’ (1975) 88 Harvard  LR 1669; RB Stewart, ‘US Administrative Law: 
A Model for Global Administrative Law?’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 63. 
46 According to the Commission, the Guidelines for conducting IAs were revised in 2009 based on the 
experience of the Commission services in preparing impact assessments; experience of the 
independent Impact Assessment Board since it was created in late 2006; inputs from the High Level 
Group of National Experts on Better Regulation; an external evaluation in 2006/2007 of the 
Commission's impact assessment system, and a public consultation on the Impact Assessment 
Guidelines held in mid-2008. The Guidelines replaced the previous Guidelines 2005 and also a 2006 
update. <http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission_guidelines/commission_guidelines_en.ht
m> accessed 14 March 2013. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid. Information Society services are defined as ‘any service normally provided for remuneration, 
at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services’. Art 1(2) of 
Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a 
procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations as 
amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998 
amending Directive 98/34/EC [1998] OJ L217, 18–26. 
49 The legislation consisted of one consolidating art 106 TFEU directive, five Article 114 TFEU 
harmonization directives and one Article 114 TFEU decision. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services (Framework Directive) [2002] OJ L108; Directive 
2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of 
electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) [2002] OJ L108; 
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power to impose ex ante obligations was introduced, while the Commission acquired 
direct but limited veto rights over the exercise of regulatory powers by national 
regulators.50 The Commission centralized regulatory discussion on implementation 
by creating an informal network of national regulators, the European Regulators 
Group.51 Soft law measures followed, as legislatively prescribed, such as the 
recommendation on relevant markets.52 ‘Telecommunications’ became ‘electronic 
communications’ to reflect its broader scope.53 Negative integration measures were 
retained as a framework of legally binding measures for newly acceding Member 
States with telecommunications monopolies.54 
Conceptually, the only markets to be regulated were those structurally 
lacking in competition, defined according to competition law economic analysis, and 
identified in soft law as being susceptible to regulation.55 The framework anticipated, 
and regulatory discourse predicted, the progressive removal of regulation, as and 
when competition became effective and sustainable.56 Yet, a decade later, regulatory 
                                                                                                                                     
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal 
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal 
Service Directive) [2002] OJ L108; Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks 
and associated facilities (Access Directive) [2002] OJ L108; Directive 2002/58/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications) [2002] OJ L201; Decision 676/2002/ EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European 
Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) [2002] OJ L108.    
50 Framework Directive, art 14(2) and art 7(4). 
51Decision 2002/627/EC of 29 July 2002 establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services [2002] OJ L200/38.  
52 Council Recommendation 2003/311/EC of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance 
with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European  Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communication networks and services [2003] OJ L114/45 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/recomm_guidelines/relevant_mar
kets/en1_2003_497.pdf> accessed 24 July 2012.  
53 Framework Directive, art 1(a) and (c).   
54 At this stage, the application of art 106 TFEU no longer played a significant role in the 
determination of regulatory provisions or obligations; the art 106 TFEU directive adopted in 2002 was 
largely legally superfluous, given that no exclusive or special rights in the telecommunications sector 
subsisted in any Member State at that time, although the directive would have been relevant for the 
countries that were candidates for accession to the EU.  
55 Recitals 5, 6 and 8. Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and 
service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services [2003] OJ L114. 
56 See COM(1999) 539, 5.  ‘Regulation implemented as a proxy for competition will be reduced as 
markets become more competitive.’ 
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discourse still referred to transitioning markets from monopoly to competition, when 
an unfolding regulatory failure scenario was arguably emerging, as will be seen 
below.  
Macro-economic and political objectives of the regulatory framework were 
tied into the broader aims of the Information Society and the ‘Lisbon Agenda’.57 This 
can be seen as a form of ‘re-branding’ of the 1992 Single Market regulatory narrative 
that connected wider economic and political objectives and the need for a more 
competitive and dynamic economy to the new telecommunications regulation. Some 
have called this a ‘single market cum back-to-the-future’ phenomenon.58 
Harmonized sector-specific policy objectives, ie to promote competition, consolidate 
the internal market for electronic communications and benefit consumers and users, 
were legislatively laid down, to guide NRAs in making regulatory determinations.59  
To encourage consistency of approach, the Commission created the European 
Regulators Group.60 The group was meant to ‘advise and assist’ the Commission, to 
provide an interface between NRAs and contribute to the functioning of the internal 
market and to consistent application of the 2003 Framework.61 When the 
Commission reported in 2006 on the working of the market assessment procedure, it 
noted that, out of 229 national market assessments, it had used its veto powers only 
four times.62  
In 2006, the Commission found that market reviews had ‘led to more 
consistent regulation...ensured that regulation is based on a thorough economic 
analysis and [wa]s strictly limited to markets in which there is persistent market 
failure. This has resulted in better regulation....[A]ll NRAs follow a common 
methodological approach based on EC competition law principles’.63 Consistency 
had been achieved with market definitions and market power assessments, but less so 
                                                
57 Framework Directive, Recitals 4 and 10. 
58 Professor A Scott, University of Edinburgh, School of Law, via email.   
59 Framework Directive, art 8. 
60 Commission, ‘Decision of 29 July 2002 establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services’ [2002] OJ L200/38. An earlier informal network of national 
regulators had been set up by the NRAs themselves (the so-called ‘Independent Regulators Group’). 
61 ibid art 3. 
62 Commission, ‘On market reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework consolidating the internal 
market for electronic communications (SEC(2006) 86)’ COM(2006) 28 final, 6. 
63 ibid 9. 
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with regulatory obligations.64 The Commission insisted that it was ‘working with 
NRAs to ensure that their discretion with regard to remedies [ex ante obligations] is 
exercised in a consistent manner’.65 Nothing in the preparatory documents published 
prior to the 2006 review suggested that the oversight mechanisms of the 2003 
Framework needed significant revision, and certainly not a European regulatory 
authority. The Commission fixated on consistency, without clarifying the dimensions 
of the problem, relative to overall market assessments, or to the impact on the single 
market. This made it difficult to appreciate the true nature of the problem.    
The upbeat 2006 evaluation is replete with assertions that are fundamentally 
about regulatory outcomes.66 Little evidence or analysis was produced to support 
them. Claims for successful results were made by referring to generic statistics, such 
as the comparative percentages of revenue invested by new entrants and by 
incumbents, but a deeper analysis of how such macroeconomic statistics related to 
achieving regulatory objectives was absent.67  
 
6.3. Another Review/Another Revision: 2007 
As required by the terms of the 2002 legislation, a review of the regulatory regime 
was carried out in 2006.68 It found that radio spectrum management needed attention 
and the procedural burdens of conducting market analyses should be streamlined.69 
Of secondary importance, the review also found a need to ‘consolidate the single 
market’.70 Among the items linked to this were concerns about the appropriateness of 
obligations imposed by NRAs.71 The 2006 review concluded briefly that ‘To secure 
the benefits of the internal market, it is proposed to extend Commission veto powers 
to cover proposed remedies [ie ex ante obligations].’ The problem with this 
conclusion was the lack of concrete evidence, other than the Commission's opinion, 
                                                
64 ibid. 
65 ibid. 
66 ‘The current regulatory framework has produced considerable benefits...’;  ‘Market players are 
facing new competitors and are seeking new business models in the face of imminent changes to the 
electronic communications market of today’; ‘All of this will lead to new and innovative services for 
users...’ COM(2006) 334 final, 6.  
67 SEC(2007) 817, 25-26. 
68 COM(2006) 334 final. 
69 ibid 6.  
70 ibid 7.  
71 ibid 8. 
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cited in the review to support this proposal. The 2007 review amplified these remarks 
adding a few further strands of analysis:  
[A] number of inconsistencies have emerged between the remedies 
imposed in a given market situation by  different NRAs...Given the fact 
that market players generate around one third of their revenues in 
Member States other than their own, further cross-border growth would 
be enhanced if greater consistency were achieved.72 
 
An external study found that the internal market was fragmented,73 suggesting the 
primary goal of harmonization, to establish an internal market, had not been 
achieved, on which the Commission commented as follows:  
Although progress has been made, an internal European market for 
electronic communications and for radio equipment is not yet a reality...74 
 
Experience with national decisions under the centralized vetting procedure, using 
advice from the ERG, gave rise to the following assessment: 
Regarding the choice of remedies [ie ex ante obligations], the 
Commission observes less consistency across the EU than has been 
achieved in market definition and SMP analysis [where the Commission 
had veto powers]. Differences in remedies were not always justified by 
diverging market conditions or other notified specificities. In addition, 
not always the most efficient remedy was chosen.75 
 
The Commission concluded that further veto powers were needed over NRA 
decisions:  
Many comments made by the Commission on draft measures of NRAs 
have related to the appropriateness of the remedies proposed. The 
Commission has voiced concerns in particular regarding remedies that 
solved only part of the competition problem identified, remedies that 
appeared to be inadequate and remedies that might have produced 
effective results too late. To secure the benefits of the internal market, it 
                                                
72 Commission, ‘European electronic communications regulation and markets 2006 (12th  report) 
(SEC(2007) 403)’ (Communication) COM(2007) 155 final, 15. 
73 Hogan & Hartson and Analysys, ‘Preparing the Next Steps in Regulation of Electronic 
Communications: A Contribution to the Review of the Electronic Communications Framework’ 
(2006) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/ext_studies/next_steps/regul_of_e
comm_july2006_final.pdf>accessed 3 February 2013. 
74 COM(2006) 334 final, 8. 
75 COM(2007) 401 final, 6. In analytical terms, this criticism focused on sub-optimal harmonization of 
regulatory results rather than harmonization of methods. 
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is proposed to extend Commission veto powers to cover proposed 
remedies.76 
 
The 2007 legislative proposals included: (1) a Commission veto over national ex ante 
obligations;77 (2) Commission powers to require NRAs to impose a prescribed 
obligation;78 and (3) Commission powers to require an NRA: (a) to designate an 
undertaking as possessing significant market power; and (b) to impose a specific 
obligation, if NRAs failed to meet deadlines for market analyses.79 Simultaneously, 
the Commission tabled a draft regulation to establish a European Electronic 
Communications Market Authority.80 Nothing in the 2006 review suggested a need 
for a regulatory agency. Legislative proposals in 2007 were accompanied by an IA 
that largely reproduced the policy analysis of 2006, in terms of defining problems 
and identifying policy alternatives.81 The 2007 impact assessment recorded the 
extensive consultation processes that had been conducted, beginning in 2005 with a 
call for input82, two public workshops in 2006, two public consultations, along with 
discussions with Member States and regulatory authorities.83  
The IA constituted a thorough exercise in extensive box-ticking.84 The 
requirements of the ‘Better regulation’ action plan were found to be satisfied; the 
synergies of the proposed measures were described; a link with the i2010 initiative 
was made;85 the recommendations of the Impact Assessment Board were mentioned; 
                                                
76 COM(2006) 334 final, 8. 
77 Proposal for a Directive amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, 
electronic communications networks and services, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic 
communications networks and services COM(2007) 697 final, art 7(5). 
78 ibid art 7(8). 
79 ibid art 16(7). 
80 Commission, ‘Draft regulation for establishing the European Electronic Communications Market 




81 SEC(2007) 1472. 
82 Working Document of DG Information Society & Media, Call for Input on the forthcoming review 
of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications and services including the review of 
the Recommendation on relevant markets, 25 November 2006 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_consult/review/comments/
511_25_call_for_input_comp.pdf>. 
83 COM(2006) 334 final, 10. 
84 The document was 150 pages. 
85 Commission, ‘i2010 – A European Information Society for growth and employment’ 
(Communication) COM(2005) 229 final. This has been overtaken by the ‘Digital Agenda for Europe, 
a Europe 2020 initiative’. See http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/>. 
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the results of the public consultations were included; an annex on the administrative 
costs involved followed the model of the Commission Impact Assessment 
Guidelines; and an evaluation of the costs and benefits of the European Authority in 
Electronic Communications was included.86 Although the outward appearance 
suggested meaningfully qualitative regulatory governance methods, some of the key 
policy measures of the 2007 proposals turn out to have a weak analytical basis, when 
the governance measures are examined carefully.   
 
6.3.1 Soft Law: a tool of better regulation or a Trojan horse? 
The 2007 review found that soft law instruments provided ‘deregulatory 
flexibility’.87 In practice, this allowed the Commission to adopt regulatory norms, 
with limited judicial oversight, and which NRAs for the most part observe. A 
particularly problematic aspect of soft law in telecommunications regulation inheres 
to the decisive roles that informal measures, and Commission positions based 
thereon, play in the NRAs’ application of economic regulation. A failure to 
acknowledge the issue reflects either a willful blind spot or a lack of expertise. I 
return to this issue in the analysis of regulatory expertise. 
                                                
86 Commission, ‘Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment accompanying document to the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending European Parliament 
and Council Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC and 2002/21/EC Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council amending European Parliament and Council Directives 
2002/22/EC and 2002/58/EC Proposal for a Regulation of the  European Parliament and the Council 
establishing the European Electronic Communications Markets Authority’ SEC(2007) 1472. 
87 ‘The system of defining markets in a Recommendation provides further scope for deregulatory 
flexibility.’ Commission staff working document - Impact Assessment - Accompanying document to 
the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending European 
Parliament and Council Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC and 202/21/EC - Accompanying 
document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending 
European Parliament and Council Directives 2002/22/EC and 2002/58/EC - Commission Staff 
Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying Document to the Proposal for Directive 
amending European Parliament and Council Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC and 2002/21/EC, 
Proposal for a Directive amending European Parliament and Council Directives 2002/22/EC and 
2002/58/EC, Proposal for a Regulation establishing the European Electronic Communications Market 
Authority SEC(2007) 1472, 20.  
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6.4. 2009 Legislation88 
 
6.4.1 Commission Veto and a European Telecommunications Authority 
To recap, the last review produced proposals for several radical changes to the 
regulatory framework, including a new regulatory agency, a Commission veto over 
the entirety of economic regulation, and the introduction of ‘functional separation’ of 
networks and services, an ex ante obligation which had never formed any part of 
telecommunications regulation. The proposal for a regulatory agency was 
transformed in the legislative process, in terms of its composition, role and tasks, but 
no impact assessment was conducted.89 Two Directives and one Regulation were 
adopted in 2009.90 A Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(‘BEREC’) was created,91 having a largely advisory role, in which the Commission 
participates as an observer.92 BEREC incorporated the tasks previously undertaken 
by the ERG and the European Network and Information Security Agency (‘ENSIA’), 
both advisory.  
                                                
88 As was the case in 2002, the entirety of substantive legislative measures adopted cannot be 
reviewed here. Arguably, the most significant related to the adoption of a regulatory framework for 
radio spectrum management that introduced important regulatory principles of service neutrality, 
technological neutrality and transferability of rights of use. See Decision No 676/2002/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio 
spectrum policy in the European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) [2002] OJ L108/1. 
89 The Council, EP and Commission agreed that impact assessments - of Commission proposals and 
substantive amendments by European Parliament and Council - should consider potential impacts in 
an integrated and balanced way across the social, environmental and economic dimensions. See 
‘Common approach to Impact Assessment’ (November 2005)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/documents/ii_common_approach_to_ia_en.pdf>acc
essed 8 February 2013. 
90 Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 November 2009 
establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the 
Office [2009] OJ L337, 1; Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 November 209 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
consumer protection laws [2009] OJ L337, 11 and Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and Directive 
2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services [2009] OJ 
L337, 37. 
91 Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009. 
92 ibid art 4(9). BEREC will disseminate best practice on the implementation of the regulatory 
framework; provide assistance to NRAs on request; deliver opinions on draft regulatory documents; 
issue reports and deliver opinions to the EP and Council; and assist the European institutions in 
relations and exchanges with third parties, including assistance with disseminating best practice to 
third parties. ibid art 2. 
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The proposal for the Commission to have veto powers over ex ante 
obligations was rejected. However, the compromise that was agreed significantly 
blurred the boundary line between hard and soft law, while the exact legal nature of 
the Commission's decisional powers is far from clear. If the Commission considers 
that a proposed measure on ex ante obligations could create a barrier to the single 
market or may be incompatible with Community law, the Commission may adopt a 
recommendation ‘requiring’ that the draft measure be withdrawn or amended.94 On 
its face, the procedure appears to be merely cooperative, persuasive rather than 
coercive.95 Where the NRA in question decides not to amend or withdraw its 
measure, notwithstanding the Commission’s ‘recommendation’, it must provide a 
‘reasoned justification’.96 If the NRA provides such a reasoned justification, the 
absence of any further procedural provision implies that the Commission has no 
further authority over the NRA and would be obliged to initiate an infringement 
procedure, if it deemed the measure incompatible with Union law.  
The suggestion that this opaque procedure will achieve consistency in 
regulatory obligations can be doubted. The lack of clarity and legal security of such a 
provision sets a problematic legal precedent for the legal value of hard and soft law, 
and may offer little judicial control over the latter.97 I return to this point in the 
analysis of regulatory expertise.  
	   6.4.2. Additional ex ante obligations 
The 2009 legislation amended the 2002 ‘Access Directive’98 to introduce ‘functional 
separation’ of networks and services as an additional - but exceptional - obligation 
                                                
94 Directive 2002/21/EC as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 November 2009 [2009] OJ L337/37, art 7a. 
95 This may be contrasted with the formal powers of the Commission legally to require change or 
withdrawal of a market definition or market power assessment. ibid art 7(4). 
96 ibid art 7a. 
97 Under the 2003 Framework, the General Court (GC) found in Case T-109/06 Vodafone España and 
Vodafone Group v Commission [2007] ECR II-5151 and Case T-295/06 Base NV v Commission of the 
European Communities [2008]  ECR II-28 that undertakings could not appeal such ‘decisions’ of the 
Commission. The GC reasoned that the Commission’s comments do not have a legally binding effect 
unless they are formal Commission veto decisions (under Directive 2002/21/EC, art 7(4)). A formal 
decision by an NRA to impose ex ante obligations will be fully susceptible to appeal. The GC 
observed: ‘if the Commission exercises its right of veto under Article 7 (4), the procedure does not 
lead to a national decision, but to the adoption of a Community act having binding legal effects and an 
action may be brought before the Court of First Instance’ Vodafone (n 97), para 103.  
98 Directive 2002/19/EC of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) [2002] OJ L108/7. This 
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that NRAs could impose.99 Three conditions must be fulfilled beforehand.100 Adding 
this provision has been criticized from the point of view of dynamic efficiency, as 
well as risking over-regulation and ‘perpetual’ regulation.101 According to the annual 
reports on the implementation of the regulatory framework, competition has 
developed.102 Many markets have become sustainably competitive.103 For some, ex 
ante regulation of markets is going in the wrong, expansionary, direction with the 
trend showing little signs of deregulation in practice.104 Furthermore, there seems to 
be a mismatch between the rhetoric of withdrawing regulation and the increasingly 
heavy administrative measures and machinery for implementation.  
                                                                                                                                     
Directive laid down the powers of NRAs, the rights and obligations of undertakings, and the list of 
possible ex ante obligations that NRAs could impose.  
99 ‘Where the national regulatory authority concludes that the appropriate obligations imposed under 
Articles 9 to 13 have failed to achieve effective competition and that there are important and 
persisting competition problems and/or market failures identified in relation to the wholesale 
provision of certain access product markets, it may, as an exceptional measure, in accordance with the 
provisions of [the consultation mechanism] impose an obligation on vertically integrated undertakings 
to place activities related to the wholesale provision of relevant access products in an independently 
operating business entity.’ Directive 2009/140/EEC, art 2, amending art 13 and inserting art 13a; 
Access Directive. 
100 They are: (1) other ex ante obligations including price caps must have failed to redress the 
problem; (2) NRAs must provide impact assessments of investment incentives; and (3) the 
Commission must approve the measure in advance The proposal must contain a significant level of 
detail on the nature and level of separation, the legal status of the entity, which assets which are to be 
subject to functional separation, as well as governance, transparency and monitoring arrangements 
and compliance provisions. Access Directive, art 8 (2) and (3) (ii). 
101 L Waverman and K Dasgupta, ‘Mandated Functional Separation: Act in Haste, Repent at Leisure?’ 
(unpublished paper 2007); J Whalley and A Henten, ‘Functional Separation: Experiences from 
Telecommunications and Other Infrastructure Based Industries’ (2010) 34 Telecommunications Policy 
351; R Cadman, ‘Means not Ends: Deterring Discrimination through Equivalence and Functional 
Separation’ (2010) 34 Telecommunications Policy 366; A Nucciarelli and BM Sadowski, ‘The Italian 
Way to Functional Separation: An Assessment of Background and Criticalities’ (2010) 34 
Telecommunications Policy 384.  
102 ‘…the state of competition is improving and new technologies are being taken up…’ 
Progress Report on the Single European Electronic Communications Market 2008 (14th Report) COM 
(2009) 140 final, 18.  ‘The fact that there are now 23.5 million unbundled lines, compared to 11.6 
million resold and 6.0 million bitstream lines, suggests that new entrants are climbing the investment 
ladder.’ COM(2008) 153 final, 10.   
103 Compare the annex of Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and 
service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communication networks and services (2003/311/EC) [2003] OJ 
L114, 45; with that of Commission Recommendation of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and 
service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (2007/879/EC) [2007] OJ 
L344, 65. 
104 ‘The increase of regulation does not match the de-regulatory rhetoric...’ See A de Streel, ‘Current 
and Future European Regulation of Electronic Communications: A Critical Assessment’ (2008) 32 
Telecommunications Policy 722, 726. 
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Creating a new European regulatory authority that largely replicates the ERG 
also raises concerns. The tasks of BEREC are advisory, ie to ‘to deliver opinions on 
draft measures or draft recommendations’,105 ‘to be consulted on draft decisions and 
measures’,106 ‘to provide assistance to NRAs’107 and ‘to monitor and report’108 on the 
sector. The opinions of BEREC bind neither the Commission nor NRAs, which 
‘shall take the utmost account’ of BEREC’s opinions or recommendations.109 
Converting the informal ERG into a formally constituted body with legal personality 
but no meaningfully different role seems contradictory, if the real intention is 
ultimately to withdraw regulation.  
 In other words, BEREC was the answer to the wrong question. Public 
comments on the principle of creating European agencies reflected a high degree of 
skepticism which the Commission chose to disregard in adopting its Communication 
on agencies.110 Moreover, it is questionable whether BEREC will even be able to 
fulfill the objectives assigned to it, particularly the objective to correct the lack of 
consistency in applying ex ante obligations, to a greater degree than the ERG.111 
Given the nature of its duties and the legal effect of its opinions, it is questionable 
whether BEREC is the right measure for achieving consistency. As with functional 
separation, there is an apparent contradiction between the rhetoric and the measures 
that have been adopted, the latter of which risks to increase the national and 
European administrative and procedural burden without offering significantly better 
outcomes.  
 
                                                




109 ibid art 3(3). 
110 Commission, ‘The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies’ (Communication) 
COM(2002) 718 final.  
111 L De Muyter, ‘Does Europe Need a Single European Telecom Regulator?’ (2008) 4 European 
Competition Journal 516, 580. Even more problematically, De Muyter argues that all the issues to be 
addressed by BEREC that were identified by the Commission in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Draft Regulation [(i) fixed/mobile termination, (ii) geographic segmentation, (iii) data roaming and 
(iv) voice over IP] were likely to be ‘solved by the ERG’ well before the adoption of the regulation. A 
recent controversy between BEREC and the Commission (March 2013), relating to network access 
regulation, corroborates concerns of BEREC’s incapacity to create consistency. See 
‘Radiobruxelleslibera Telecoms Blog’ 
<http://radiobruxelleslibera.wordpress.com/2013/03/11/european-commission-berec-and-broadband-
behind-the-happy-family-picture/ - comments> accessed 13 March 2013. 
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6.4.3. Mismatch between regulatory incentives 
A regulatory feature of telecommunications that the scholarship has increasingly 
criticized relates to measures to reconcile the conflict between the regulatory 
objectives of encouraging investment in new infrastructures and ex ante regulatory 
obligations for cost-based access, in other words, between facilitating competition at 
the low investment service level and encouraging capital-intensive investment at the 
network level.112 Doubts about the quality of the policy analysis have emerged in the 
scholarship,113 and the Commission has recently begun to respond.114 I return to this 
in analyzing regulatory expertise below. 
 
6.5. Governance Analysis 
6.5.1. Regulatory Mandate 
Obtaining political endorsements from the EP and the Council before conducting the 
public consultations gave the Commission's 1990s policy interpretations and 
regulatory mandate greater political authority,  which was needed to overcome 
national resistance during the initial period of adopting positive integration measures. 
Obtaining a regulatory mandate from 2000 became much more an exercise in re-
regulation of a sector that was liberalized and harmonized.  
The Commission conducted public consultations, published its conclusions 
and, in 2000, tabled its legislative proposals. An explicit political endorsement of the 
                                                
112 See, eg JM Bauer, ‘Regulation, Public Policy, and Investment in Communications Infrastructure’ 
(2010) 34 Telecommunications Policy 65; J Huigen and M Cave, ‘Regulation and the Promotion of 
Investment in Next Generation Networks: A European Dilemma’ (2008) 32 Telecommunications 
Policy 713; M Cave, ‘Encouraging Investment via the Ladder of Investment’ (2006) 30 
Telecommunications Policy 223.  
113 N Garnham, ‘Contradiction, Confusion and Hubris: A Critical Review of European Information 
Society Policy’ (European Communications Policy Research Conference, 2005) 
<http://www.cprsouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/garnham-debate.pdf> accessed16 August 
2012; N Garnham, ‘Europe and the Global Information Society: The History of a Troubled 
Relationship’ (1997) 14 Telematics and Informatics 323; A de Streel, ‘Current and Future European 
Regulation of Electronic Communications: A Critical Assessment’ (2008) 32 Telecommunications 
Policy (2008) 722; JM Bauer, ‘Regulation, Public Policy and Investment in Communications 
Infrastructure’ (2010) 34 Telecommunications Policy 65; J Huigen and M Cave, ‘Regulation and the 
Promotion of Investment in Next Generation Networks: A European Dilemma’ (2008) 32 
Telecommunications Policy 713; C Cambini and Y Jiang, ‘Broadband Investment and Regulation: A 
Literature Review’ (2009) 33 Telecommunications Policy 559; M Cave, ‘Encouraging Infrastructure 
Competition via the Ladder of Investment’ (2006) 30 Telecommunications Policy 223.    
114 See Nellie Kroes, ‘Enhancing the Broadband Investment Environment’ (Midday Briefing, 





proffered regulatory mandated followed:  the Lisbon European Council of March 
2000 urged rapid legislative adoption during 2001.115 These proposals were broadly 
incremental in regulatory policy terms relative to earlier harmonization, reflecting a 
broad consensus that both a consolidation of legislation and a re-calibration upwards 
of the threshold for ex ante regulation were needed.116  
By 2006, when the Commission began to solicit input and to prepare a review 
of the operation of the 2003 Framework, several Better Regulation initiatives had 
been adopted along with a Commission-drafted framework for the creation of 
European regulatory agencies. The Commission had also adopted guidance on using 
external expertise. The measure with real normative force was the practice of 
conducting IAs as part of the Better Regulation action plan. The introduction of IAs 
made a qualitative difference in terms of establishing regulatory mandates. Impact 
assessments convey more normative weight in regulatory governance than public 
consultations. The criticisms of positive integration measures seen in the scholarship 
in Chapter 1 do not offer much of a basis on which to evaluate the authority of the 
regulatory mandate in this context. The contestability of the locus of policy 
development for telecommunications is modest: there is broad public, private and 
academic agreement that the telecommunications sector requires a European 
definition of policies.  
Scharpf’s view that some positive integration is necessary for the 
establishment of the internal market supports this analysis. With the second 
generation of legislation, when the Commission is fine-tuning, streamlining, and 
updating the existing regulatory regime, Scharpf’s criticism that positive integration 
measures risk creating unintended excessive intrusion into the national prerogatives 
of Member States cannot be discerned. Up until the 2007 legislative revision, EU 
regulation of telecommunications could just about be justified entirely by reference 
to the establishment of the internal market. Most of the economic regulation of 
                                                
115 ‘The European Council calls in particular upon....the Council and the European Parliament to 
conclude as early as possible in 2001 work on the legislative proposals announced by the Commission 
following its 1999 review of the telecoms regulatory framework’.  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm> accessed 26 August 2012.   
116 It is probable that the consolidation and simplification of the earlier legislation would have 
occurred even without the Commission’s adoption of an official simplification strategy which was 
part of the Lisbon strategy. See Commission, ‘Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: A 
Strategy for the Simplification of the Regulatory Environment’ COM(2005) 535 final.  
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2002/2003 either simplified or modernized existing policy. The exception to this was 
the creation of a central veto power over the analyses of national regulators with the 
introduction of a review procedure. Such a review procedure was unique to 
economic regulation in the EU and was only adopted with the strong support of the 
EP such was its contentiousness.117 The Member States regarded the implementation 
of regulation as a national prerogative subject to Commission oversight under the 
terms of the Treaty. The Parliament considered that the need to ensure the 
achievement of the single market required the Commission to have the power to veto 
draft measures at the national level. The Council ultimately conceded authority to the 
Commission to veto market analyses within the legislative conciliation phase of the 
co-decision procedure under Article 294 TFEU.118 
Here, the criticisms of excessive centralization may appear to have some 
merit but, under closer scrutiny, are not well-founded. The endorsement by the EP 
conveyed an important aspect of political legitimacy to the measure. In the policy 
framing of 2000, some measure was required to deal with the identified problem with 
the variations in the application of the rules by NRAs. The weakness of the 
Commission’s approach in its 2000 proposals was its reliance on centralization and 
the creation of direct powers over NRAs in a manner not foreseen in the Treaties and 
which simultaneously made use of soft law instruments. If a more thorough 
assessment of the policy problems and options had been made in 2000, alternatives 
to this approach might have been identified and considered, and weaknesses could 
have been addressed with compensatory measures, or at least acknowledged. Perhaps 
the lack of analytical thoroughness reflected the appreciation of the period that such 
measures would be transitional. The measure was intended to facilitate the 
development of competition that would render the imposition of ex ante regulation 
                                                
117 The draft legislation proposed to create a right for the Commission to veto any draft national 
measure. See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services’ 
COM(2000) 393 final, art 6(4). In its second reading, the EP endorsed the proposal to give the 
Commission powers to oversee market analyses and require NRAs to withdraw draft regulatory 
measures where considered to create a barrier to the single market which the Council sought to 
remove. 2000/184 (COD). See the legislative history of the 2003 Framework 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2000/0184(COD
)> accessed 7 February 2013. 




unnecessary.119 Some momentum had been created in facilitating market entry, albeit 
in the low investment end of the spectrum. Rather than adopt more onerous 
regulation and construct elaborate regulatory machinery at the EU level, the 2003 
Framework aimed to make as much economic regulation as possible ultimately 
redundant.120 When the 2006 analysis proposed heavier obligations and the 
establishment of a European telecommunications authority, the third generation of 
legislation seemed to be moving into a longer-term ex ante regulatory perspective 
than initially was the case.   
The 2009 legislation duly adopted more stringent ex ante regulation and 
created a regulatory authority. The continuum of ex ante regulation was evolving as 
if competition were less fully developed in 2006 than in 2000. The creation of such 
an agency implied little expectation of removing ex ante regulation. The claim that 
such regulation was temporary and only meant to manage the transition to 
competition until markets became fully competitive is seen as just that: an 
unsupported claim. Whether or not in good faith, it was simply wrong in theoretical 
terms because it lacked an understanding of the true nature of regulatory challenges 
of the future. Thus viewed, it confirms the assessment that telecommunications 
policy makers:  
...do not well understand the processes they are analysing and exaggerate 
the possible scope of the understanding, but are unwilling, maybe 
congenitally unable, to accept either the very limited scope of their 
powers or admit to their failures.121 
 
If sustainable competition has not developed, analysis should examine why, despite 
many years of regulation, expected developments have not occurred. If competition 
has ‘not yet’ developed in the sector, then further analysis of the problem is 
appropriate, rather than merely suggesting that the sector is still in transition from 
monopoly to competition. Either the earlier analyses were in some sense inadequate, 
or there is a case of regulatory failure.122 If policy developers have not analytically 
                                                
119 See COM(1999) 539 final, 3 where the Commission explains the intention to use ex ante regulation 
to manage the transition to full competition and to remove regulation in function thereof.  
120 The second type of regulation, that which was designed to meet general interest objectives, was 
never intended to be repealed. On the contrary, it was expected to be adapted to ensure its 
effectiveness in an evolving sector. ibid. 
121 Garnham (n 113) 7. 
122 Some of the literature on regulatory failure was considered in ch 2. Regulatory failure can occur 
for many reasons. The norms to be applied may be qualitatively high, but applied imperfectly. The 
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isolated the ‘why’ or ‘why not’ of regulatory outcomes, then a re-regulatory exercise 
is unlikely to produce a convincing regulatory mandate. The link with expertise gains 
additional importance to the establishment of an authoritative regulatory mandate. 
Expertise may be shaped by public expectations, which tie into the notion of a shared 
perception of the public interest. An ability to interpret technological developments 
is also part of the composition of expertise as is an appreciation of the actual and 
likely behaviors of market participants. These factors should be part of the problem 
definition and analysis and contribute to the regulator’s analysis when making 
regulatory claims.  
While no further veto powers emerged, a political compromise created 
significant legal uncertainty, potentially until the Court clarifies the meaning of a 
Commission ‘recommendation’ that a national regulator is ‘required’ to follow but 
from which it can deviate with a reasoned opinion.123 When the Commission seeks to 
strengthen its powers of direct regulation in more intrusive ways, the case for such 
changes should be robust and capable of independent evaluation. Absent such 
justification, the criticism of excessive centralization would appear to have 
considerable force, undermining the authority for claiming such a regulatory 
mandate.  
For features of the legislative framework that lacked a convincing analytical 
and empirical foundation, the Commission’s authority for the regulatory mandate 
was considerably diminished, and thus impaired its regulatory legitimacy. The 
Commission’s policy analysis may be driven in part by the incentives Majone 
identified.124 When the Commission engages in problem solving, it has limited 
                                                                                                                                     
norms may be misaligned with the regulatory objectives to be achieved and applied correctly, thus 
distorting the conditions of the markets and the relative position of undertakings or consumers in the 
market. Or regulators may be captured by their industry. Majone summarized the US experience as 
‘Just as the market fails in certain circumstances to serve the public interest, so does public 
regulation....[R]egulatory failure may have more serious consequences than market failure’. Majone 
identified numerous forms of regulatory failure. G Majone, Regulating Europe (Routledge 1996) 17-
18. See also RB Horwitz, The Irony of Regulatory Reform: The Deregulation of American 
Telecommunications (OUP 1989) ch 2.  
123 The legal interpretation may follow the holding in Vodafone España, where the GC found that the 
legal effects of Commission comments to the Spanish NRA in a market analysis procedure were not 
such as to create a reviewable act within the meaning of art 263 TFEU [ex-art 230 TEC], nor did the 
undertaking whose interests would be affected once the NRA took a decision have standing to contest 
such Commission comments. Vodafone (n 97) paras 162 and 167.  
124 Majone observed that the real costs of most regulatory programmes are borne by the firms and 
individuals who must comply with them. By comparison, the resources needed to produce the 
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options in terms of policy solutions to propose. Majone suggested that it is difficult 
to overstate the significance of the structural difference between the Commission and 
national administrations that militates in favor of the Commission producing 
regulatory policy proposals in which the economic, political and administrative costs 
are borne by Member States. While the predictions of the rise of the regulatory state 
are borne out in practice, the analytical observer must draw the conclusion that 
normative authority is weakened when all problems are deemed to resolve around the 
law of the harmonizing instrument or Maslow’s hammer.125 
In the next section on expertise, it will be seen that the evidence base put 
forward by the Commission for these two features of the 2006 legislative proposals 
was analytically and factually weak. Thus the criticisms of excessive centralization 
that undermine the validity of positive integration measures have some force here. 
Conducting a normative regulatory analysis, as well as an analytically sound impact 
assessment, has a direct bearing on the regulatory authority of the Commission and 
thus on its credibility as a legitimate regulator. Being required robustly to defend its 
policy proposals using credible and policy analyses would force the Commission to 
re-consider how it defines its policy options and thus its regulatory mandates. The 
quality of the policy analysis is essential to establishing the justification for the 
regulatory mandate requested; if the quality of the analysis is impoverished, the 
problems identified and the policy options to address them will be analytically 
impaired. This is examined further in the section on expertise. 
The fact that services and content available via the Internet have become a 
major contributing factor in the development of transmission networks should figure 
largely in the evaluation of the interests at stake and the public interest in regulating 
the telecommunications sector. With the explicit link to the Lisbon agenda, the 
policies underpinning telecommunications regulation are meant to serve both the 
interests of the sector as well as the broader interest of society in an Internet-enabled 
environment. Some commentators have identified a source of regulatory illegitimacy 
within the US administrative law system which is equally true of the Commission: 
                                                                                                                                     
regulations are trivial. G Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’ in W Müller and V 
Wright (eds), The State in Western Europe, Retreat or Redefinition? (Frank Cass 1994) 87. 
125 Maslow wrote ‘I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything 
as a nail’. AH Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Renaissance (Maurice Bassett 1966) 15.  
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‘the lack of development of a robust and conceptually independent construct of 
public interest within the regulatory context and the polity more generally’.126 The 
values upon which the EU was founded are undermined when there is ‘a failure to 
establish and articulate with adequate clarity a construct of public interest’.127   
The 2006 review invoked the well-worn notion of creating an open and 
competitive internal market that promotes growth and jobs, but it did not articulate 
how the regulation would in future serve the evolving markets and a much broader 
class of related, but not regulated, Internet-mediated stakeholders. Nor did it explain 
how telecommunications regulation would contribute to the social aims of the Lisbon 
strategy for society as a whole; or how the Lisbon strategy generally would be 
served, while making numerous assertions on growth and jobs.128 These conceptual 
omissions reveal analytical deficiencies in identifying a credible version of the public 
interest to be served which can impact on the quality of the resulting regulatory 
mandate and the credibility of the Commission as a regulator.  
The lengthy analysis above demonstrates the relative importance of different 
governance criteria in different regulatory phases and contexts. As 
telecommunications regulation went through a second and third re-regulatory cycle, 
the Commission’s right to identify appropriate European regulatory mandates, and 
thus to validate its institutional authority, needed to be, perceived as legitimately 
exercised. A governance analysis casts considerable doubt on the quality of its 
analysis calling into question the robustness of the ensuing mandate. Thus the 
Commission’s authority to pursue that mandate was impaired, at least with respect to 
the provisions that created a formal European regulatory authority, a legally 
ambiguous co-operative regulatory procedure, and the heavily burdensome ex ante 
obligation of functional separation.  
At this advanced stage in the re-regulatory cycle and in the proliferation of 
related Internet-based markets, the criterion of expertise has acquired considerable 
significance, and has developed a much richer meaning for policy development in 
                                                
126 M Feintuck, ‘Regulatory Rationales beyond the Economic’ in R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010) 54. 
127 ibid. 
128 One commentator has been consistently scathing in criticizing the incoherence of the bundle of 
competition, industrial, research and social policy objectives embedded in the EU concept of an 
Information Society. See Garnham (n 113); and N Garnham, ‘Europe and the Global Information 
Society: The History of a Troubled  Relationship’ (1997) 14 Telematics and Informatics 323.  
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the sector, by virtue of the better law-making and smart regulation initiatives. Being 
required to articulate and defend its policy proposals robustly using credible policy 
analyses ought to oblige the Commission to re-consider how it defines its policy 
options and thus its regulatory mandates. The quality of the analysis is essential to 
establishing a credible justification for the regulatory mandate requested. 
6.5.2. Regulatory Expertise 
Regulatory expertise can be seen in three cycles of policy development. At the 
beginning of the liberalization period in the 1980s, expertise related to identifying 
the structural problems in telecommunications in the internal market that were 
incompatible with general Treaty provisions and aspirations. The major problems 
identified were exclusive national rights and divergent national policies for network 
development. From 2000, telecommunications policy development required an 
analysis of the context considerably changed from that of the 1980s or the 1990s. In 
other words, the regulatory expertise needed to come to an accurate definition of the 
problems to be addressed by regulation related not to structural measures of the 
Member States but to the reasons for continued market failures despite ex ante 
regulation. 
In this section, I examine the expertise reflected in the first regulatory 
revision (2002-2003). Then I examine the expertise reflected in the second revision 
including the use for the first time in telecommunications of a regulatory impact 
assessment procedure. Two assessments were published, one in 2006 and a second in 
2007, to accompany draft legislative proposals. The 2007 assessment largely 
reproduced the analytical elements of an earlier assessment. Impact assessments have 
a long history in other jurisdictions, notably the US but also the UK and Australia, 
and now are used in most OECD countries. In regulatory governance, they are 
particularly important to an analysis of expertise, inasmuch as such assessments 
essentially constitute a vehicle for demonstrating the expertise of the regulator, or a 
lack thereof.  
 
6.5.2.1. First Revision  
Having successfully introduced competition into the sector by 1999, the next phase 
was to create regulatory incentives for markets to become more sustainably 
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competitive, using competing networks. Regulation needed to retain economic rules 
that facilitated service-based competition but that progressively brought about 
infrastructure-based competition. In trying to create regulatory incentives that 
achieved such a transition, conflicting aims for regulation were laid down, ie to 
facilitate competition by making market entry easy using existing infrastructure, and 
to encourage investment in new network infrastructure.129  
A political consensus to create a harmonized competitive internal market in 
telecommunications was well established when the 1999 review of 
telecommunications legislation took place, a consensus that was strengthened by 
being linked to the Lisbon Agenda. The Commission’s analysis made reference to 
considerable information and feedback obtained through public consultations and 
external studies.130 The Commission consulted and reported widely on its analysis of 
technological evolution and convergence, market developments, regulatory 
principles to guide regulators and policy makers, and on its proposals for regulatory 
measures.131 The review in 1999 noted the phenomenon of technological 
convergence of IT, media and telecommunications and concluded that the new 
measures should have both pro-competitive economic welfare objectives and 
safeguard public and consumer interests not served by competition (eg universal 
service, data protection).  
                                                
129 In addition to competitive tension between two opposing regulatory objectives, the Lisbon strategy 
related to high speed broadband rollout added industrial policy objectives. For an early and consistent 
criticism of the perennial tensions between industrial, competition and research policies in the EU, see 
Garnham (n 113).   
130 There were 16 studies linked to the 1999 Review. These were available online. COM(1999) 539 
final, Annex II. The Commission had consulted widely on technological convergence. See 
Commission, ‘On the convergence of telecommunications, media and information technology sectors 
and the implications for regulation towards an information society approach’ (Green Paper) COM 
(97) 623 final. 
131 Commission, ‘On the further development of mobile and wireless communications’ 
(Communication) COM (97) 21; COM (97) 623 final; Commission, ‘Results of the public 
consultation on the Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and 
information technology sectors’ (Communication) COM (99) 108; Commission, ‘Action plan: 
Satellite communications in the information society’ COM (97) 9; Commission, ‘Strategy and Policy 
Orientations with regard to the further Development of Mobile and Wireless Communications 
(UMTS)’ COM (97) 513; Commission, Final Annual Report on progress in implementing the action 
plan for the introduction of advanced TV services in Europe’ COM(98)44; Commission, ‘On radio 
spectrum policy in the context of European Community policies such as telecommunications, 
broadcasting, transport, and R&D’ (Green Paper) COM(98)596; Commission, ‘Satellite 
communications in the information society: Recent activities, present situation and outlook’ 
(Communication) COM (99)108; Commission, ‘Towards a new framework for electronic 
communications infrastructure and associated services: the 1999 communications review’ 
(Communication) COM (1999) 539 final (Review Communication). 
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When presenting its regulatory conclusions, the Commission explained how 
it had taken comments into account, both those which received broad support and 
those which had not.132 The Commission re-stated the views of those who endorsed 
its proposed approach to ex ante regulation and those who expressed concerns and 
identified problems.133 The Commission distinguished between those policy options 
which had been widely endorsed and those which had not. The Commission reported 
‘In all but one area, the Commission has decided to maintain the original proposal 
(of its Review Communication)’.134 In this respect, the Commission acknowledged 
that it had changed its policy position on an important regulatory measure by 
abandoning its initial two-threshold approach to imposing ex ante obligations.135 
However, its analysis of an important aspect of regulation, that of using soft law in 
the interpretation and implementation of legislative norms, was underanalyzed. 
Intending to cater for dynamic market conditions when imposing ex ante 
obligations, the Commission found that:  
an effective way of introducing much-needed flexibility into the new 
regulatory framework can be via the increased use of 
Recommendations and Guidelines. It recognises the legitimate 
concerns of stakeholders about transparency, effectiveness, legal 
certainty and democratic control in respect of such measures [emphasis 
in original].136 
 
While flexibility is a regulatory desirable for dynamic markets, it may be doubted 
that the Commission truly recognized such concerns. This bland statement 
effectively ignored such concerns. The Commission may have believed at that time 
that such soft law measures would be removed in line with removing ex ante 
regulation as competition increased or it may have assumed that such measures were 
justified since they were frequently used in the application of competition law, even 
                                                
132 COM(2000) 239 final, 20-26. 
133 ibid 18. 
134 ibid 20 
135 ‘[T]here were divided views in the public consultation as described in chapter 2 of this 
Communication. In all but one area, the Commission has decided to maintain the original 
proposal...[T]he Commission has decided not to introduce two thresholds for ex-ante obligations in 
respect of access and interconnection. Instead, it proposes a new approach in this area, which is 




in telecommunications.137 Having articulated these concerns, the Commission failed 
to show if and how it had taken them into account.  
The Commission did, at least, reflect the role of expertise in its consultation 
documents. For example:  
This [Review] Communication presents the main elements of the 
Commission’s policy proposals for a new regulatory framework...This 
responds to a key message of the consultation on convergence of the 
media, telecommunications and information technology sectors that there 
should be a more horizontal approach to regulation of communications 
infrastructure. This Communication also takes into account the key 
messages of a number of other recent consultations, reports and 
independent studies, in particular the Communication on the consultation 
on the Radio Spectrum Green Paper, the Report on the development of 
the market for Digital Television in the European Union, and the fifth 
report on the Implementation of the Telecom Regulatory Package.138 
 
The Communication summarized the conclusions reached by consultations that were 
linked to the review process and noted seventeen external studies commissioned to 
examine regulatory issues relevant to evaluating earlier regulation.139 The studies 
were listed in annex II and accessible online. Prior to adopting draft legislation, the 
Commission set out its conclusions based on an assessment of the views that it 
received. It distinguished between those proposals that received broad support, those 
where there were divided views and proposals not originally included in its earlier 
review.140 The Commission acknowledged that the proposals for regulating access to 
infrastructure were not universally or unequivocally supported but that the majority 
of respondents agreed that this was the key issue for the forthcoming framework.141  
Achieving a ‘regulation-free’ sector was the explicit goal, and the 
forthcoming legislation was meant to ‘set the path to move from the current sector-
specific regulation in the telecommunications sector to reliance on the competition 
rules’.142 The use of an economic market analysis and soft law would provide the 
necessary flexibility for NRAs ‘to fit the regulatory framework to its national 
                                                
137 See Notice providing guidance on the application of the competition rules in Articles 81 and 82 
(ex-85 and ex-86) [now arts 101 and 102 TFEU] of the Treaty to access and interconnection 
agreements, 98/C 265/02 <http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/comm-
en.htm> accessed 10 February 2013. 
138 COM(2000) 239 final, 3. 
139 ibid 16. 
140 ibid 20. 
141 ibid 10. 
142 ibid 22. 
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situation while maintaining the integrity of the single market through strong 
coordinating procedures at European level’.143   
However the Commission revealed an aspect of its analytical weakness when 
explaining its assessment of the issues of legal certainty and flexibility using soft 
law. The Commission argued that (1) putting the list of ex ante obligations available 
to NRAs and (2) defining national administrative processes for assessing these 
obligations into EU legislation, ‘hard law’, would provide legal certainty. NRAs 
would need to act in a transparent manner and justify their decisions in relation to 
case law and Commission guidelines in order to ‘minimise the need for discretionary 
decisions by regulators’.144 But the instruments to be used and applied in these 
definitional processes would be soft law measures adopted by the Commission.  
The Commission had established a need for legal certainty and flexibility in 
principle. There was an explicit intention to remove ex ante regulation in future. In 
effect, the Commission wished to impose binding regulatory processes on NRAs in 
reaching decisions, with informal measures for itself. While the aim of establishing a 
single market justified ex ante regulation, the argumentation used to justify the use of 
hard law and formal procedures for NRAs and soft law for the Commission needs to 
be considered further. What was missing from this approach to legal certainty and 
flexibility was recognition of the risks to a regulator’s credibility and to regulatory 
legitimacy created by the use of soft law and a proper analytical evaluation of the 
benefits and disadvantages with a reasoned opinion justifying its use notwithstanding 
its risks. That task was undetected.  
Given the use of legislative instruments as implementing measures in the 
earlier framework, a switch to soft law ought to have provoked some deeper analysis 
of the cost-benefit arguments in using such non-binding measures especially in light 
of concerns expressed about transparency, effectiveness, legal certainty and 
democratic control. For reasons that are not given, the analysis failed to do this. The 
choice to use soft law may have been linked to the switch of using the competition 
law concept of ‘dominance’ as a threshold for imposing ex ante obligations, defining 
markets and assessing market power on the basis of economic analysis. Since 
                                                
143 ibid 22. 
144 ibid 23. 
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European competition authorities routinely use soft law measures for guidance, the 
concerns expressed may not have registered as they ought to have.145 Thus lip service 
was paid to these concerns but they were effectively overridden.  
What the Commission failed to recognize and acknowledge in its analysis 
were the differences in the legal positions and rights of undertakings in the two 
policy areas, in relation to how the Commission discharges its institutional 
responsibilities. When using such informal procedures to give guidance to NRAs in 
implementing the rules on ex ante regulation, the Commission’s decisions are not 
reviewable unless they are formal veto decisions taken by the Commission.146 Yet 
they are routinely followed by NRAs and undertakings lack the power to appeal the 
Commission measure unless a formal veto decision is taken by the Commission.147  
An appeal will lie from a decision of the NRA which might be regarded as a 
sufficiently justificatory argument for the use of soft law measures and informal 
guidance. But it is ironic that, at the same time as EU competition policy 
enforcement was responding to the normative criticisms directed to the use of soft 
law in enforcement practices,148 the Commission concluded that soft law measures 
were normatively acceptable for imposing ex ante obligations. Even the arguments of 
pragmatic necessity and time-limited regulation might have contributed to a 
justification. But the Commission did not make this or any other argument because it 
did not address the issue.  
The normativity of the Commission’s overall regulatory expertise needs to be 
considered in context. It identified the interests to be served, the regulatory goals to 
                                                
145 Practices involving some soft law measures in competition policy enforcement cases had been 
widely criticized in the scholarship. Comfort letters, used by the Commission in the period of the 
previous administrative system of competition law, were criticized as a fundamental flaw in the 
system and its enforcement. See, eg L McGowan and S Wilks, ‘The First Supranational Policy in the 
European Union: Competition Policy’ (1995) 28 European Journal of Political Research 141. The 
Commission no longer has recourse to comfort letters following the change in approach to notifying 
agreements, as reflected in Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [now arts 
101 and 102 TFEU] [2003] OJ L1/1. 
146 In the cases of Vodafone España and Vodafone Group v Commission (n 97) and Base NV v 
Commission of the European Communities (n 97) the General Court found that undertakings could not 
appeal Commission decisions addressed to NRAs on the basis that the Commission’s opinions do not 
have legally binding effects until they are adopted by NRAs under the administrative procedure laid 
down for imposing ex ante obligations by NRAs.  
147 De Muyter (n 111) 572. 
148 See Commission, ‘On Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty’ (White Paper) COM No 99/027 
<http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com99_101_en.pdf> accessed 8 February 2013. 
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be specified, and reached a defensibly balanced judgment on the basis of comments 
received and external studies. Although the Commission did not mention the use of 
expertise, it provided its reasoning and justification for the measures that it endorsed, 
with few exceptions. By providing information and explanation by way of 
background, reporting extensively on views expressed and disagreements, the 
Commission provided a basis for assessing to what extent its decisions and policies 
reflected appropriate expertise. That basis suggested that its regulatory expertise was 
sufficiently normative to contribute considerably to the legitimacy of its policy 
conclusions. 
Yet even regulatory expertise can have a political aspect where tensions 
between different interests are resolved in an unconvincing manner, which they were 
in respect of the introduction of soft law into ex ante regulation, which is not 
objectionable as a matter of principle. However, since it would apply to a key feature 
of economic regulation the Commission ought to have addressed and resolved the 
serious normative concerns identified. Where such normative concerns are present as 
in the 2003 Framework and beyond, there is a need for the other criteria of regulatory 
governance, such as accountability and due process to be sufficiently robust as a 
matter of complementarity. This was not well recognized in 2000 or in the next 
regulatory cycle, which I analyze in the next section. 
 
6.5.2.2. Second revision: the last regulatory cycle 
By 2006, many direct and indirect links had developed with other sectors and 
services, some of which are regulated (eg broadcasting) and some of which are not 
(eg Internet service providers, websites). This section evaluates the expertise 
reflected in policy development of the last re-regulatory cycle when the complexity 
of markets and technology and, correspondingly, the importance of regulatory 
expertise, had grown.  
Diverse even opposing interests needed to be considered and balanced along 
with an understanding of the patterns of new technologies and their implications. 
Conflicting regulatory objectives related to static and dynamic efficiency had to be 
catered for, all of which rendered the identification of appropriate regulation 
extremely challenging. Thus the introduction of IAs at this point should have 
218 
 
contributed significantly to establishing a robust case for regulatory expertise but this 
was not the case. Assessments identified only a narrow range of those who were 
considered the primary stakeholders in the sector, including NRAs.149 The analysis 
did not recognize or analyze explicitly that policy development in 2007 should 
reflect the new Internet-mediated environment. The earlier emphasis on whether and 
how to regulate dominant incumbents in their relationships with new entrants 
continued.150    
By explicitly requiring regulators to (1) define the problem to be solved, and 
(2) identify the context and interests to be served before possible options are 
identified, evaluated and compared, IAs inform the evaluative process better than 
mere communications.151 The latter need not conform to any analytical structure or 
framework of policy analysis. In significant respects, the regulatory IAs conducted 
for the 2007 review fall short of a normative standard. Space does not permit an 
exhaustive analysis of IAs, although weaknesses can be seen in the use of external 
studies and engagement with relevant scholarship, with the definition of the 
problems to be addressed, and with the identification and evaluation of possible 
alternative policy options.  
In this section, I analyze the expertise reflected in the assessment of two 
regulatory objectives, encouraging innovation and investment and achieving 
consistent regulatory outcomes, with ex ante obligations. These were selected for 
their relevance to establishing the legitimacy of economic regulation. As it happens, 
the analysis suggests a surprising lack of skill and judgment. The analysis was taken 
from the 2007 IA that accompanied the draft proposals for legislation.152  
 
6.5.2.3 Conflicting objectives of regulation 
In the context of global competition, the analysis noted an overall performance gap 
between the US and the EU due to lower investments in and less efficient use of ICT 
                                                
149 The key players affected by the review proposals were operators, service providers, broadcasters 
and others. This is not a homogeneous group: its members may often have conflicting interests; and 
NRAs. COM(2007) 1472, 7.  
150 For a criticism of the narrowness of telecommunications policies, see Editorial, ‘From 
Telecommunications Policy to Internet Governance’ (2012) 36 Telecommunications Policy 449. 
151 SEC(2009) 92, 21-48. 
152 SEC(2007) 1472. 
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in the EU.154 The challenge was to determine to what extent the regulatory system in 
the EU encourages investment and innovation:  
[T]he question for this review is whether in this sector where 
technologies develop quickly and demands for higher speed and capacity 
of networks are always on the rise, the current EU framework has found 
the right balance between encouraging investment and innovation and 
promoting price-orientated service competition.155 
 
The analysis found that the situation in most Member States reflected a lack of 
competition in relation to the markets for fixed (as opposed to mobile) access by 
users. These fixed access markets broadly correspond to the primary connection 
available to much of the public for high speed broadband services.156 This 
connection is typically provided over the copper telephone network, which was 
installed under monopoly conditions and constitutes a bottleneck resource in a static 
efficiency framing. It can also be provided by cable TV networks and by wireless 
technologies to a fixed location.  
Some analysis was formulated in a manner suggesting the analytical model 
used was one of static efficiency:  
[E]x ante regulation should be targeted on those areas where there are 
enduring bottlenecks that determine access to the marketplace ... 
regulatory measures should...make market entry possible for operators 
that are willing to invest in providing services, whilst safeguarding the 
long-term economic sustainability of the dominant network providers.157  
 
 But the regulatory context is not static, and the long-term aim of regulation is to 
achieve sustainable competition in the form of network competition. Regulation 
needs to avoid encouraging misaligned investment in new access networks that the 
analysis characterized as follows:  
  
In policy terms, the issue is to strike a regulatory balance between, on the 
one hand, allowing incentives for investors in new core and access 
networks – in the face of considerable uncertainty over the evolution of 
demand for these services – and, on the other hand, avoiding the 
                                                
154 SEC(2007) 1472, 21. 
155 ibid 23. 
156 At the moment, high speed mobile access to broadband connectivity is not yet widespread across 
the EU but is emerging. This dynamic aspect of technology is one of the variables within a complex 
set of features of electronic communications markets. 
157 SEC(2007) 1472, 27. 
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immediate foreclosure of new markets by sanctioning the reassertion of 
monopoly privileges by the dominant market players over these new 
infrastructures.158 
 
But there was a lack of consensus on how to achieve the aim: 
 
The literature on regulation, investment and innovation has not yet been 
able to confirm an unambiguous empirical relationship between the 
current framework and investment....159  
 
Nonetheless, it had been found that: 
[A] better performing regulatory regime, as measured by the OECD 
index,160 does contribute to higher levels of investment...Other factors 
that have an important positive influence on company investment levels 
are GDP per capita; the land area and population density of the country 
in which they operate; and the size of the company, as measured by total 
asset value of the company [footnote omitted, emphasis added].161  
 
An external study had confirmed the OECD’s findings. The Commission reported:  
...[A]n econometric study, commissioned to support this impact 
assessment, has been able to provide estimates of the level of 
eCommunications investment in the EU and to examine its main 
drivers.....the results suggest that effective national regulation under the 
EU framework is associated with higher levels of investment in the 
sector alongside other positively correlated factors such as GDP per 
capita, market scale and population density [footnotes omitted]162 
 
Clearly, in the factors that shape network investment choices, there are significant 
demographic factors at work, as well as regulatory factors.  
New entrants argued that mandated access was essential to maintain as part of 
the regulatory framework to encourage market entry that would allow progressive 
                                                
158 ibid. 
159 ibid 23-24.  
160 The OECD regulatory index measures the level of restrictions on market entry, level of public 
ownership and market structure. See 
<http://www.oecd.org/eco/regulatoryreformandcompetitionpolicy/indicatorsofregulationinenergytrans
portandcommunicationsetcr.htm> accessed 7 February 2013.  
161 An assessment of the regulatory framework for electronic communications – growth and 
investment in the EU eCommunications sector, London Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2006 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/ext_studies/assessmt_growth_invs
t/investment.pdf> accessed 13 February 2013. 
162 SEC(2007) 1472 final, 23-24. 
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upward investment in the value chain. The well-known arguments of new entrants 
were that (1) removal of access obligations would inhibit the emergence of 
infrastructure competition and that (2) ex ante access obligations were ‘strongly 
correlated’ with increased investment and innovation.163  
The analysis identified three policy options, the first two of which would 
readily be seen to be inappropriate even without recourse to an impact assessment: 
(1) to adopt an automatic access regime (‘open access’) for all new infrastructure; (2) 
to remove all ex ante access regulation (‘regulatory holidays’); or (3) to maintain the 
current model of regulation (but with significant adaptations in relation to 
Commission powers).164 The first two options exactly corresponded to the respective 
positions of the new entrants (using a service-based business model) and to that of 
incumbents (who argued that freedom from regulation was required to justify their 
new investments). The analytical outcome could have been predicted without reading 
the analysis. However, the analysis of the options was drafted in a manner suggesting 
that at least part of the intention underlying the analytical approach was to introduce 
an exceptionally intrusive new ex ante remedy (of functional separation of networks 
from services) ‘through the back door’, that is, by setting it up as a ‘straw man’ 
option to be rejected for ‘open access’ (option 1), but re-introducing it as an 
amendment to the ‘no change’ (option 3) in the conclusions. Before considering the 
analysis of these options, it is worth re-stating that the focus of analysis was on three 
possible approaches to the regulatory challenge of creating suitable incentives to 
encourage investment that leads to innovation and service variety, rather than 
service-based competition that largely involves reselling existing services at prices 
facilitated by regulated access prices.  
6.5.2.3 (a) Option 1: ‘Open access’ in three flavors  
This section reveals how analyses that seem to be credible can actually be deeply 
flawed when carefully examined. The first option (for trying to create both network 
investment incentives and low-price competition) related to ‘open access’. The 
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analysis incorporated a significant number of assumed premises which were not 
expressed or addressed.165  
Open access was defined as the separation of infrastructure provision from 
service provision.166 When network facilities are ‘non replicable assets’ and 
constitute ‘natural monopolies’, behavioral remedies (transparency, non-
discrimination, pricing measures) available in ex ante regulation may not be 
satisfactory because network operators may discriminate in practice. The analysis 
found that alternative ways were needed to correct persistent discriminatory 
behavior. That behavioral problems are meant to be addressed by competition law 
was not mentioned.  
Three types of separation remedies were identified: accounting, functional 
and structural separation. The first could not remedy problems with non-price 
discrimination that might arise with delays or differences in service quality. This 
option was rejected with the remark that measures must remove the ‘incentives to 
discriminate’, which both functional and structural separation would achieve.167  
Structural separation would make the coordination of investments in 
infrastructure and service development complex such that regulators would have 
difficulty in deciding where to separate network operations from other services. The 
remedy would involve heavy costs for undertakings and would be virtually 
irreversible once implemented. Shareholder value could be destroyed rather than 
created. Prices could even rise, rather than fall. Whether it would create public 
welfare outcomes was doubtful. So ‘very significant benefits...would have to be 
demonstrated for it to be a suitable remedy’.168 Unsurprisingly, the analysis 
concluded that this solution would be difficult to justify against the costs.169 
Functional separation remained. 
Functional separation was found to have several advantages over structural 
separation, in the efficiency aspects of being a generic remedy for many markets and 
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The analysis entirely failed to address the possible problems with the Treaty rules on ownership of 
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ultra vires, and/or disproportionate. The self-evident proposition of political implausibility was also 
not considered.  
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in respect of the ease of enforcement.170 It could remove the tactic of delaying 
investments in network upgrades. But the risk was that network competition could be 
weakened when functional separation was imposed because it then becomes more 
attractive to ‘rent’ access rather than invest in infrastructure.171 Network investment 
may be delayed or even abandoned. The solution to overcome this was regulatory: by 
controlling the rate of return allowed to the network operator, the regulator could 
avoid either under or overshooting the incentives to invest. Success using this option 
would depend on the ‘skill of the regulator’.172 This conclusion may have been 
intended to underpin the false ‘no change’ option which the analysis would 
ultimately endorse. Functional separation should be ‘reserved for situations where 
there is an enduring problem of behavioral price-discrimination that cannot be 
otherwise resolved’.173 Thus an ‘open access’ option (option 1) could not be 
considerable a viable policy option per se, although the analysis clearly implied that 
functional separation might be a reserve measure when all else failed, which 
constituted precisely the argument made in the IA, in respect of option 3, 
misleadingly labeled ‘no change’.  
 
6.5.2.3 (b) Option 2: ‘Regulatory holidays’ 
The second option would have exempted certain investments from regulation 
(perhaps only temporarily). A disadvantage of regulatory holidays was the risk of 
disrupting the playing field between market players at different levels of the value 
chain which could harm consumer welfare without a reliable indication that it would 
lead to more investment. ‘The mere installation of new technology or new 
infrastructure does not merit “regulatory holidays” and cannot in itself change 
existing access obligations’.174 They yield primarily short term benefits rather than 
sustainable investments. The suggestion that a suspension of regulation is a necessity 
to justify capital investments can be countered by a suitable alignment of pricing 
obligations that recognizes the higher risk premium of investing in a new network to 
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provide a greater return on capital.175 The existing provisions of the 2003 Framework 
provided this flexibility.176 This conclusion set up a favorable analysis for option 3.  
The argument that such a measure would have provided greater regulatory 
predictability - and thus given network operators a clear financial incentive for 
investing in new infrastructures - was rejected by asserting that the option would 
undermine the pro-competitive intent of the existing regulatory system. This has 
been a consistent Commission position for several years.177 However, the review was 
an opportunity to evaluate this position, to engage with the analysis of the 
scholarship within which there is a vigorous debate on the subject.178 The analysis 
failed to do so, as well as failed to capture the opposing interests and conflicting 
incentives of the different measures, thus conveying the impression that the option 
was underanalyzed. 
 
6.5.2.3 (c) Option 3: ‘No change’  
‘No change’ meant a continuation of the system of ex ante obligation that avoided 
technology-specific rules and applied neutral economic analysis to structural 
problems of competition whatever the actual or potential competition in the 
market.179 Comments were less analytical than complimentary: continuity would be 
preserved; flexibility would be maintained. Future regulation could build on past 
achievements and regulation could be tailored by national regulators to take account 
of the realities of each market to introduce measures to foster ‘both infrastructure and 
service-based competition’.180   
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177 See, eg ‘From Service Competition to Infrastructure Competition: The Policy Options Now on the 
Table’ (ECTA Conference, Brussels, November 2006) 
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G Knieps, ‘Telecommunications Markets in the Stranglehold of EU Regulation: On the Need for a 
Disaggregated Regulatory Contract’ (2005) 6 Journal of Network Industries 275.    
179 SEC(2007) 1472, 39. 
180 ibid 40. 
225 
 
As for market data, three types of competition were cited,181 none of which 
involved investment in new access infrastructure but which nonetheless constituted 
some form of network competition.182 New entrants would need to make varying 
levels of investments in equipment to provide their services. Progressively, copper-
based access networks were likely to be replaced with fiber networks. Intermediate 
and alternative technologies are complex and include varieties of hybrid usages, such 
as point-to-multipoint fiber infrastructures, Very High Speed Digital Subscriber 
Lines (VDSL), 183 and Gigabit Optical Passive Networks (G-PON)184 that involve 
fiber networks wherein a single fiber line is shared between several users which 
cannot easily be unbundled or shared with new entrants.  
Rather than focus on each regulatory objective separately, the analysis 
jumped between the two opposing objectives when initial conditions differed in 
different Member States. The experience of Member States with pre-existing sets of 
networks (usually cable TV and copper-based) that could be upgraded to achieve 
high broadband penetration were a validation of the pro-investment aims of 
regulation while the outcomes in other Member States, such as France and the UK, 
that achieved greater broadband penetration using access to the incumbent's network, 
also constituted successful regulation and validated the service-based competition 
                                                
181 These were (1) resale and re-labelling of incumbent's broadband service, eg ‘Virgin Broadband’; 
(2) re-using and reselling incumbents’ broadband services with added services, such as voice, 
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uses optical splitters to serve multiple premises with a single optical fibre. 
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objectives.185 The analysis did not appreciate that it was selectively linking 
regulatory aims that accorded with specific Member State outcomes, rather than 
asking whether the right regulatory incentives were in place to encourage investment 
where two sets of pre-existing networks did not exist.  
The Commission argued that maintaining the current regulatory framework 
would give national regulators flexibility to develop appropriate measures but, 
elsewhere, the proposal was to remove all discretion from NRAs when imposing ex 
ante obligations, by giving the Commission a veto over the entire procedure, thus 
undermining the argument here. This revealed the logical inconsistency of various 
analyses. In the concluding remarks of the analysis of these options, the Commission 
found that the flexibility of the regime carried a danger of ‘heterogeneous’ 
implementation of ex ante remedies resulting in regulatory inconsistency. This was 
presumed to hamper to emergence of pan-European services. This proposition was 
contestable on several grounds because the absence of pan-European services might 
be explained by factors other than regulatory outcomes. The analysis also failed to 
mention that a variety of regulatory outcomes can be explained by reference to other 
factors. 
However, the intention was to lay the ground for the suggestion to introduce a 
‘more appropriate’ modified ‘no change’ option in which mandatory functional 
separation would be added as a measure available to the NRA’s ‘regulatory 
toolkit’.186 In the conclusions on the three options, the analysis found that the 
addition of such a remedy could:  
 ...enhance competition in an environment where standard remedies were 
insufficient to improve market failure and where there was little prospect 
of infrastructure competition within a reasonable timeframe.187  
 
6.5.2.4 Conclusion to policy analysis of conflicting aims 
The quality of the regulatory expertise that was reflected in the analysis sketched 
above left much to be desired. Analytically the suggestion that discriminatory 
behavior required such a structural remedy should have been better explained and 
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analyzed. The analysis was confusing. Including a vertical separation model in the 
‘open access’ option allowed the Commission to introduce a highly sympathetic 
treatment of a measure, functional separation of networks and services, in a context 
in which it was initially rejected, without explicitly signaling that it would be taken 
up in the context of option 3. When the measure is re-introduced in the context of a 
no change option, there is psychological and cognitive surprise but less logical and 
normative resistance to the proposal. This approach smacks of disingenuousness. 
Thus the analysis here should be seen as a form of analytical incapacity 
possibly even dishonesty. Genuinely defensible policy options were not identified 
and analyzed. The introduction of functional separation as an ex ante remedy was 
also analytically unsound. It tried to create an association of reasonableness with a 
measure that is fraught with difficulties of application and contradictions with the 
long-term aims of ex ante regulation. Despite the Commission guidelines for impact 
assessment explicitly calling for an identification and quantification of costs and 
benefits, very little of the analysis brought in quantified costs and benefits and trade-
offs, and in places where the trade-offs were mentioned they were generally well 
known in advance thus adding little to an evaluation. However, the fundamental flaw 
in the overall approach was the patent attempt to simulate three policy options that, 
however analyzed, amounted to two paper tigers and one pre-established regulatory 
policy choice. The next section examines the combined regulatory agenda of creating 
a regulatory authority and creating Commission veto powers over ex ante 
obligations.  
 
6.5.3 The Regulatory Objective of Consistency in Implementation188 or 
‘going for the full veto’  
Once again, examination of the Commission’s analysis reveals a regulatory expertise 
shortfall. The analysis found that the Commission’s exercise of its review and veto 
                                                
188 The impact assessment relevant to this objective included two other objectives, ie 1) to encourage 
pan-European services; and 2) to improve the effectiveness of national appeal procedures. These seem 
to have been added to pad out the case for a European regulatory authority but do not withstand much 
assessment. The first is a category of non-existent services whose non-appearance may be explained 
by reference to factors other than those credited, and the second would effectively have transferred 
judicial powers of reviewing national regulatory decisions to a European telecommunications agency, 
along the lines of the European Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, based in Alicante, 
Spain.  In addition, the external cost-benefit study did not address the third objective. Neither of these 
objectives is analyzed here.  
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powers over ex ante obligations had already strengthened the single market.189 
However, the framework in which NRAs decided on the obligations to impose on 
undertakings with SMP had raised questions as to whether an ‘optimum degree of 
regulatory consistency’ had been achieved using the existing model. Defining the 
problem in that manner, rather than whether the objectives of the ex ante regulation 
had been achieved, focused the policy analysis on the wrong question and allowed 
policy proposals to be considered that favored a specific approach and analytical 
outcome.190 As with the analysis of the aim of encouraging innovation and 
investment, some rather extreme suggestions were presented.  
The first option was the creation of a European regulatory agency with 
discretionary decisional powers that would have involved a transfer of national 
regulatory powers to the European level. The second option was the creation of an 
authority with no decision-making powers designed primarily to assist the 
Commission and NRAs in exercising their discretionary decision-making powers. 
The third option was simply to improve co-ordination between the Member States on 
an ad hoc basis. A major weakness of the analysis of the agency was a failure to 
acknowledge the highly speculative nature of the activities to be undertaken by it. 
The external cost-benefit study on the creation of such an agency explicitly 
mentioned this significant aspect of the policy option confirming its speculative 
nature.191 Such an omission did not reflect well on the transparency of the assessment 
process or on the expertise of the Commission.   
What was the evidence of the problem for which these options were credible 
solutions? According to the Commission, a significant degree of consistency had 
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the Internal Market in Electronic Communication: Final Report’ (2007) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/ext_studies/cba_teec_eecma_pdf_
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already been achieved by 2007.192 The problem was the analytical failure to identify 
the harm to the single market caused by such lack of consistency. There may have 
been valid reasons that different remedies were imposed by different NRAs. The 
NRAs were meant to use similar methods but were not required to reach similar 
conclusions because market conditions in different Member States were not 
identical. The argument that the Commission did not make and which would have 
made sense was that NRAs reached different conclusions and imposed different 
obligations in similar circumstances.  
The analysis seemed to be more concerned with harmonization of results 
rather than harmonization of methods. The problem definition was vague and 
anecdotal: ‘market players particularly continue to complain about regulatory 
inconsistency, that there are differences in approach of national regulatory authorities 
in different countries’.193 The formulation of this was:  
A number of inconsistencies have emerged in the remedies imposed in a 
given market situation by different NRAs...non-discrimination remains 
unenforced [Was there an infringement procedure?]...there are 
considerable variations between MS in applying certain regulatory 
obligations such as scope of access obligations and price control.194  
 
The difficulty with this problem definition is a lack of clear delineation of the 
dimension of the problem, ie whether the extent of different national factors affected 
these outcomes. Using the same method, NRAs might well adopt different 
obligations based on the differences in costs of the undertakings involved. Nor did 
the analysis offer an explanation of attempts at resolving these problems, or what 
results good or bad had been achieved with existing powers.  
To correct this under defined problem, the analysis identified two extreme 
options and one moderate option. The extremes were, respectively, (1) transfer and 
centralization of national powers of ex ante regulation a European regulatory agency, 
or (2) ‘no change’. The third, obviously preferred, option was to leave the NRAs 
with the formal power of imposing ex ante regulation but to give the Commission 
full ex ante veto control over the national decisional process. It would be assisted by 
an advisory European Regulatory Authority. The defined aim was to ensure 
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consistency across the EU in applying remedies195.  Elsewhere, the analysis had 
argued in favor of greater flexibility for NRAs but the preferred option in this context 
was to remove it.  
The analysis is simplistic, as if standardization of remedies is a desirable 
outcome in its own right. National and regional differences would be expected to 
require differences in regulatory obligations. But, if not, then why not? The 
analytical weakness of the usage of the concept of inconsistency or the generality of 
the arguments allowed the Commission to make several assertions that were intended 
to be taken as evidence of the problem, but which in fact they were not, some 
examples of which were:  
Consistency in regulation at the wholesale level is particularly important 
as it provides input to retail services for customers.196 
 
Services of cross-border nature or potential would also benefit from a 
more consistent regulatory approach.197 
 
The ability to access consistent EU-wide wholesale offers is becoming 
increasingly important with the shift to internet-based services...198 
 
Regulatory consistency across the EU is particularly important for 
providers of services to international business users.199 
 
Procedural problems with judicial appeals from national decisions required more 
consistency, as did problems with telephone numbers and frequency assignment 
procedures in Member.200 But these problems were either of an inconsequence not to 
support the case for an agency, ie in the European Telephony Numbering Space,201 
                                                
195 In effect, the Commission wanted to see a standardized set of regulatory outcomes, but the 
assessment doesn't identify or engage with the questions of whether and to what extent underlying 
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or they could not realistically be addressed with a European agency for reasons 
discussed below.   
The creation of a European regulatory agency with decision-making and 
appellate review powers was highly improbable. The precedent set in the Meroni 
case202 called into question any suggestion of creating an agency with discretionary 
powers, and thus would have encountered insurmountable legal constraints of which 
the Commission would certainly have been aware but which were not mentioned. 
Again this reflected either lack of transparency or lack of expertise, the latter of 
which was unlikely. However, as part of its analysis, the Commission used 
arguments related to the potential for less effectiveness in outcomes if such powers 
were created:  
some stakeholders fear that the European authority might be too far 
removed from the markets and therefore less effective than NRAs, thus 
rendering the full-fledged authority option unviable from the point of 
view of subsidiarity.203  
 
Thus, a political concession to subsidiarity and a normative one to effectiveness 
could appear to be made when the reality was more likely to be one of legal 
impediment.  
The analysis of the options of creating a federal-like agency or doing nothing 
could reliably be predicted to come to the conclusion that only the middle way option 
of creating an authority to assist the Commission with its increased powers would be 
appropriate.  Like the baby bear’s porridge in Goldilocks and the Three Bears, the 
analysis eschewed the ‘too much’ of a full-blown agency and the ‘too little’ of 
simply doing nothing, to conclude that the optimal choice was the creation of a 
regulatory authority to assist the Commission in exercising its veto powers, assuming 
that a veto over ex ante obligations would be added. At least the external cost-benefit 
analysis acknowledged the uncertainties involved and the assumptions made. It 
reported that, out of the hundreds of draft decisions submitted to the Commission for 
vetting, only seven had been vetoed; it estimated that a maximum of no more than 50 
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per year would require in-depth review, of which only one or two might be vetoed.204 
The analysis ought to have engaged more specifically with the nature and dimension 
of the problem so that it could be appreciated what the evidence revealed about the 
problem for the single market and the proportionality of creating the regulatory 
agency.  
The Commission wished to see improvement in the consistency of remedies 
but it offered no statistics on the level of problematic cases related to remedies and 
no identification of the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ or a cost-benefit analysis. The Commission 
could have elaborated in its analysis on the comments that it had made to NRAs, 
which were not binding, but which could have revealed more clearly and explicitly 
the nature and the dimension of the problems with consistency. Someone outside of 
the process of Commission reviews of draft national measures would not be in a 
position to evaluate the claims made in an analytical fashion or to contest the 
Commission’s assessment of the evidence. 
There were significant flaws at the levels of problem definition and analysis 
of policy options. The level of assumptions, the speculative nature of the work to be 
undertaken by the agency and the incompleteness of the data used for the analysis 
necessarily had the effect of significantly undermining the accuracy, authority and 
persuasiveness of the analysis. This diminished the Commission’s claim for 
regulatory expertise and undermined its authority for the measure proposed.  
Nor were significant problems with the quality of the analysis emerging for the 
first time in the review process. The Commission’s own internal evaluation board 
had noted numerous problems in an initial draft of the impact assessment, 
particularly the absence of any evaluation of a European regulatory authority.205 The 
Recommendations of the Board were far reaching. They were qualitative and 
emphasized that the impact assessment needed in several respects to better explain 
what the changes would be and why. There needed to be a clearer explanation of the 
relationship between the proposed policy actions in five different problem areas. An 
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explanation was also needed for why all of the actions were bundled into one impact 
assessment.206 
 
6.5.4. Conclusions on expertise in early 2000s 
What conclusions can be drawn about the level of expertise of the second regulatory 
cycle and its contribution to regulatory legitimacy? In 2000, the Commission broadly 
identified and articulated the interests concerned, and including the larger Internet 
community. The implications of technology had been thoroughly researched and 
reported upon prior to the review of the regulation from the 1990s. The policy 
conclusions as to the overall approach to ex ante regulation were largely sound, 
justified by reference to the policy objectives that catered for different interests, i.e., 
the pro-growth ambitions of the Lisbon Agenda and the consumer protection aspects 
of providing services and protecting personal data.  
The judgment to raise the threshold for imposing ex ante obligations in light 
of greater competition of markets, given the broad consensus to this effect, reflected 
a balance that took account of the evolution of the sector and the level of market 
entry. The Commission correctly identified the trends of dynamism detected in 
market structures as a result of technological progress and noted that this was 
expected to continue. It appreciated that this needed to be catered for by means of in-
built regulatory flexibility while retaining national implementation.  
At this stage of policy development, the Commission continued to 
demonstrate a robust level of regulatory expertise for most of its policy proposals. 
There was no apparent conflict between views of experts. The neutrality of its 
regulatory discourse did not suggest that it alone was sufficiently knowledgeable to 
come to sound policy decisions. Rather, it revised a key policy proposal following 
public consultation. When reporting on the outcome of its policy processes, the 
Commission broadly explained its reasoning, in understandable terms.  
Nonetheless the blind spot, with respect to the choice of using 
recommendations and guidelines for important aspects of regulation, was significant. 
In and of itself, the use of soft law measures is not normatively problematic. The 
basic conclusion that flexibility was needed in principle to regulate dynamic markets 
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was sound. But their use needed to be explained and justified when concerns of a 
serious nature were expressed. That this did not happen suggested that the 
Commission did not possess the regulatory expertise needed to appreciate and 
respond to such normative concerns. The use of soft law measures was perhaps 
assumed to be justified because of the time required to adopt Union legislation and 
the delay that would have meant for implementation in a dynamic environment. Also 
the Commission may have associated the use of such soft law with informal 
measures interpreting EU competition law, eg in the form of Commission notices, as 
a means of guidance for enforcement.207 There have been normative issues of lack of 
justification with the use of ‘comfort letters’ and ‘Article 6 letters’ that were deemed 
to be non-binding and non-reviewable acts of the institution.208  
But the Commission failed to respond meaningfully to concerns that were 
expressed about such measures, and which it acknowledged were legitimate. A better 
approach would have analyzed the nature of concerns expressed, identified the risks 
and benefits, and drawn upon other values important to the regulatory process such 
as the effectiveness of regulation. A refined analysis would have brought out the 
formally non-binding legal nature of the measures and explored the nature of 
authority they contained, recognizing that they may in practice become de facto 
binding. The analysis could have pointed to the authority of the legislative mandate 
to adopt such measures, which therefore conveyed considerable authority and 
legitimacy. The analysis would have identified and evaluated more globally the 
normative strengths and weaknesses of the use of soft law before coming to a 
conclusion. On this occasion, there was no analysis, no identification or analysis of 
normative issues and no conclusion.  
Pragmatically, the Commission could have indicated that the intention was to 
withdraw soft law measures coincident with dismantling ex ante regulation, as an 
explicit signal of its expectation that such informal measures and ex ante obligations 
would be temporary, and as an indication that the concerns expressed were taken 
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seriously. This lack of willingness to engage with either the practical or the 
theoretical and normative weaknesses in the use of soft law for key aspects of 
applying ex ante regulation diminished the Commission’s regulatory legitimacy in 
this policy area. The failure to do more than acknowledge these concerns reflected a 
lack of requisite expertise and ultimately poor regulatory judgment in addressing an 
important and politically sensitive issue. This shortfall significantly diminished but 
did not fatally undermine its regulatory expertise overall. 
Given the crucial role that soft law measures will play in the application of ex 
ante regulation going forward, it was remiss of the Commission not to deal with this 
aspect of soft law. The issue would come back to haunt the Commission when 
criticisms emerge later of the use of such measures.209 
The next section draws conclusions in respect of regulatory expertise 
reflected in the third regulatory cycle in relation to the policy proposals examined. 
 
6.5.5 Conclusions on expertise ‘2007’ 
Since telecommunications liberalization had begun in 1988, expectations of positive 
policy outcomes by 2006 were not unreasonable and had indeed been claimed in 
annual reports, reviews and communications. In expertise terms, an understanding 
was needed of the deeper implications of how the regulation of telecommunications 
impacted well beyond the immediate sector itself, particularly the relationship of the 
sector with the Internet and services provided over it. But did the analytical expertise 
of the Commission in developing policy for the sector evolve accordingly? There is 
considerable room for doubt.  
 In respect of the establishment of a European regulatory authority, the 
analysis was unconvincing and lacking in transparency. Problem definition was weak 
and slanted towards a specific conclusion. The objective was elaborated as requiring 
removal of persisting inconsistencies in implementation with respect to application 
of regulatory remedies, to which were added two further and entirely speculative 
objectives not considered in an external cost-benefit analysis. Having sketched a 
problem definition in vague terms, the usual extreme options were identified: (1) a 
federal-like, centralized authority with discretionary decision-making powers; (2) a 
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‘tame’ regulatory agency without decision-making powers to advise and support a 
re-enforced EU oversight procedure (with Commission veto); or (3) no legislative 
change but better ad hoc co-ordination between the Member States. 
The relationship of the so-called persistent inconsistencies in implementation 
and the dimension of the problem relative to the internal market were difficult to 
appreciate given the lack of statistics or metric by which to judge the orders of 
magnitude of the problem. It would have been relevant to know the level of 
disruption to the single market that gave rise to such a significant institutional 
proposition. This would have allowed the three options to be considered against the 
dimension of the problem. The majority of national decisions, it turns out, were 
unproblematic from the point of view of the internal market. So it was important to 
explain why there was nonetheless a need to create further institutional solutions for 
what might seem like a problem that could be solved with a less institutional 
approach and a more proportionate solution, if the intention was genuinely to create 
an ex ante regulatory framework that could be reasonably easily dismantled.  
 By 2007, some commentators had begun to observe that no empirical 
evidence could be found to show that the policy instruments of the previous twenty 
years had produced the results for which the regulation had been adopted.210 Others 
were expressing similar sentiments in more diplomatic terms, but clearly urging a 
significant adaptation in approach notably in respect of balancing the tension 
between the conflicting regulatory aims of encouraging investment and achieving 
short-term competition.211 
The options considered in the policy assessments fell below a normative 
standard of policy conception. The construction of ‘straw man’ policy options is not 
a serious policy analysis. This undermined the credibility of the relevant analysis. 
Majone’s model would identify this as a major deficiency in conferring regulatory 
legitimacy on economic regulators. Regulatory design tools such as impact 
assessments are not box ticking exercises. They require cognitive and analytical 
capacities that must be demonstrated, not taken for granted. This means that, for 
impact assessments to be considered sufficiently justificatory, and especially for 
contentious proposals, the accompanying policy analyses need to reflect a 
                                                
210 Garnham (n 113); de Streel (n 104).  
211 Bauer (n 112); Cave (n 112).  
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sufficiently normative level of expertise in conducting a qualitative analysis, and not 
just in satisfying the process rules for assessment. Moreover, they need to contain the 
elements of analysis that show whether a measure's benefits are likely to exceed its 
costs. Both benefits and costs should be quantified if not monetized. Equally they 
should show whether alternatives are more effective or less costly. None of the above 
features was included in the 2007 analyses.  
Bureaucratic tendencies militate against the application of a high level of 
‘regulatory craft’,212 that is, against the application of the kind of expertise that 
focuses on problem solving with no reference to an existing regulatory paradigm. 
Given the institutional investment already made in the telecommunications 
regulatory regime, as well as the career disincentives, the unwillingness and inability 
to engage in such agnostic thinking imply that the ‘better regulation’ programme 
offers little realistic prospect of genuine regulatory improvement, unless success can 
be demonstrated, and this implies a determination of outcomes.    
For the Commission to introduce functional separation an ex ante obligation 
at this stage of liberalization, and to seek complete veto powers over national 
regulatory decisions, suggested an inability to think independently and conceptually. 
Telecommunications policy analysis in 2007 was effectively stuck in an analytical 
rut. The Commission interpreted sub-optimal empirical outcomes, not as regulatory 
failure, but as providing an evidence-base to do more of the same. In this re-
regulatory context, the authority of the regulatory mandate and the expertise of the 
Commission are innately inter-twined. A minimally desirable level of regulatory 
expertise seemed to be lacking.    
 After competition has developed but even before markets are fully 
competitive, policy analysis needs to shift gears, and become more ‘agnostic’ in its 
orientations. The Commission’s measures in the area of better regulation, such as the 
Guidelines for impact assessment and the smart regulation programme, endorse this 
approach. Better regulation is about choosing less interventionist, less prescriptive, 
and less coercive measures, yet the policy analysis in telecoms went in the opposite 
direction even as the number of regulated markets declined. This was incongruent.  
                                                
212 M Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft, quoted in R Baldwin, ‘Is Better Regulation Smarter 
Regulation?’ (2005) Public Law 485, 503 n 87.  
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Has the Commission lost its right to be the arbiter of public interest for 
economic regulation in telecommunications? Such a broad-brush claim would be 
unmerited as this analysis has focused narrowly on only a few specific policy 
proposals out of many. But the measures analyzed are fundamental to the economic 
regulation of the telecommunications. The measures were selected in full recognition 
of their contentiousness. It is just such measures that require normative justification. 
These selected policy measures deserve further research, as does the question of how 
impact assessments can contribute to the regulatory legitimacy of the Commission.213 
The point to be emphasized here is the importance of compliance with both 
substantive and process requirements of regulatory governance in preparing policy 
analyses. One without the other will impair the normativity of the entire exercise. 
That in turn will diminish legitimacy. I return to this in my conclusions.  
It has now been seen in the analysis of regulatory authority and expertise that 
the quality of a regulator's ability to demonstrate or reflect the values inhering in 
normative regulatory governance criteria can decline as the regulatory cycle evolves. 
Thus, while the authority for and credibility of the Commission’s ongoing 
telecommunications regulatory mandate in general terms may be relatively intact, 
the authority and expertise for the more contentious features of recent re-regulatory 
harmonization were markedly impaired, notably when the expertise associated with 
policy design of these features did not demonstrably reach a level of suitable quality. 
 
6.6. The Criterion of Efficiency 
It was seen in chapter 2 that efficiency for a supranational regulator has links with 
the principle of proportionality. Efficiency and proportionality both relate to two 
aspects of regulatory governance: the challenge on the part of the regulator to 
achieve its mandate with a minimum of costs and the ambition on the part of the 
legislator to adopt the minimum of measures needed to achieve the objectives of 
regulation.  Efficiency avoids over-regulation.  
Even in a well-established and non-contentious regulatory policy area such as 
telecommunications, it is possible to craft regulatory measures that are inefficient 
                                                
213 For an early exercise in regulatory stock-taking and analysis of the tools of ‘better regulation’, see 
Radaelli and De Francesco (n 43); for a critical appreciation of the added value of impact assessments, 
see Radaelli (n 28). 
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and disproportionate relative to the aims for which regulation was adopted. The two 
cycles of policy developments reviewed in this chapter provide a strong contrast in 
terms of efficiency. For economic regulation, an evaluation of efficiency may find in 
terms of allocative efficiency that resources have been optimally distributed as an 
outcome of regulation or that a cost-benefit test is satisfied by reference to the gains 
exceeding the harm done by regulation.214 From the 2000s, economic regulation was 
premised on market failure. No formal or legal impediments to competition existed 
in the sector, merely economic ones.  
 
6.6.1. The efficiency of the regulatory cycle 2000 
The efficiency of consolidating, streamlining and modernizing the twentieth century 
legislation was considerable. Reducing the number of legislative measures and 
creating a forum for regulatory cooperation were efficient measures. It should also be 
acknowledged that the adoption of soft law measures also represented considerable 
efficiency, creating a much-needed element of regulatory flexibility that could not be 
provided using legislative instruments of implementation as was done in the ‘1998 
package’.  
The use of studies to identify and analyze important regulatory issues was an 
efficient use of resources as the regulatory context had become broader and no less 
complex. The use of procedures for extended consultations also constituted an 
efficient mechanism for policy development and the Commission conducted 
numerous such consultations before undertaking an overall assessment of the 1998 
legislative package. Was the same true for the 2007 exercise?   
 
6.6.2. The efficiency of the regulatory cycle 2007 policy for innovation 
and investment 
The regulatory incentives for sustainable competition to develop in the 
telecommunications sector are well known. They relate to investment in further 
innovation, in infrastructure. This was clearly acknowledged by the Commission. 
Yet the concrete regulatory measures that it devised and which were adopted, in 
trying to achieve the long term ambition of sustainable competition, appear to thwart 
                                                
214 See Baldwin and Veljanovski (n 40).  
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an important regulatory objective of this sector. The efficiency value of creating a 
European regulatory authority with legal personality, an office in Riga, Latvia and an 
EU budget (of €4.6 million215) may be doubted. Why?  
The inter-institutional agreement on better regulation provides that an impact 
assessment should be carried out on legislative proposals that have been amended 
before they are adopted. In the case of the telecommunications measures adopted in 
2009, the original proposals of the Commission underwent significant amendment.216 
No assessment was made of the relative advantages and disadvantages, or costs and 
benefits of the amended proposals. If this had been done properly, the assessment 
would have re-considered the added value of creating a European regulatory 
authority as compared to re-enforcing the ERG status and powers.   
The Commission claimed that the creation of a European regulatory authority 
would achieve the objective of regulatory consistency and harmonization. In the 
Commission’s framing, this was an efficient measure for the single market. That 
argument was premised on the existence of veto powers that would be exercised 
under the advice of BEREC. The legislative compromise was not to give the 
Commission veto powers but broadly to retain the status quo for Commission powers 
while creating an elaborate but inconclusive administrative cooperation procedure 
and a European regulatory authority. It is arguable that the measures have achieved 
the opposite of efficiency. Moreover, this seems to have been borne out in a recent 
case in which the Commission expressed serious concerns with the remedies 
described in draft ex ante measures of the Czech NRA.217 When asked for its opinion 
of the Commission’s evaluation, BEREC rejected the Commission’s view.218 This 
                                                
215 Budget available at 
<http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec_office/budget_of_the_office/ann
ual_budget_of_the_office/1072-transfers-by-the-administrative-manager-in-berec-office-budget-
2012-between-21-sept-and-1-nov-2012> accessed 12 February 2013. 
216 The draft proposals not only would have given the Commission the power to veto the obligations 
chosen by NRAs but also the power to require NRAs to impose a specific remedy in some 
circumstances (Draft Framework Directive, art 7(8)) and to require NRAs to designate certain 
undertakings as having the equivalence of dominance (significant market power)  and impose 
remedies upon them in some circumstances (Draft Framework Directive, art 16(7)). The Commission 
obtained none of these powers in the legislation adopted. 
217 The Commission’s letter can be found at <https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/d/591e4d39-3582-48f8-
993a-0fc71f1029fc/CZ-2012-1392-1393 Adopted_EN.pdf>. 





case highlights the scope for legal uncertainty, conflict of authority, sub-optimal 
institutional outcomes and inconsistency, all of which undermines efficiency in 
empirical terms. 
What about the measures adopted to encourage innovation and investment? 
Recall that this is meant to be an empirical determination in Baldwin and Cave’s 
framing. Regulatory efficiency relates to resource conservation while achieving 
results, preferably according to independently defined criteria. Empirical 
determinations of the extent to which regulation can be seen as the causal factor in 
achieving sustainable competition are either unavailable or are empirically 
contestable. In the Commission’s analysis, there were ample statistics on the extent 
of broadband penetration in Member States and on those Member States where 
construction of new networks had occurred. There was even robust evidence that an 
effective regulatory framework is associated with higher investment in IT. But the 
uncertainty of a causal link between EU ex ante regulation and investment makes the 
efficiency of regulatory design measures difficult to determine without some ex post 
evaluation. I return to this issue of ex post evaluation in the section on accountability 
and in my conclusions chapter.     
In practice, efficiency evaluations of regulatory design features challenge 
even the best regulators. Recognizing the difficulties of determining a causal 
relationship between regulatory obligations and network investment, some literature 
has begun to suggest a different and more dynamic methodology to evaluate some of 
the inefficiencies attributed to the regulatory framework currently in force.219 Recent 
indications from the Commission also suggest that controversial new measures to 
encourage network investment are now being considered that respond to some 
criticisms of approach and take account of the broader picture in which 
telecommunications networks operate.220 As some have called for, the Commission 
                                                
219 Huigen and Cave (n 112); C Cambini and Y Jiang, ‘Broadband Investment and Regulation: A 
Literature Review’ (2009) 33 Telecommunications Policy 559. 
220 ‘...regulated wholesale access prices should get the “buy or build” signals right’. ‘...give other 
operators a clear incentive to build out their own networks, and so to use their own assets to drive 
infrastructure-based competition’. Possibly signalling a departure from past practice, the 
Commissioner said: ‘...regulation should address investment risks by aiming at full cost recovery...’; 
more precisely, where new entrants enjoy access to the legacy network, or where a second network 
infrastructure exists, ‘NRAs need not apply cost orientation directly to NGA [‘next generation 
access’] wholesale access products’. Kroes (n 114). 
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may accept the value of pursuing only one over-riding regulatory objective above 
all.221 That is not yet the reality. 
As designed and as adopted, the policy choice of establishing a European 
telecommunications regulatory agency raises significant efficiency concerns.  The 
impact assessment and the accompanying cost-benefit analysis fell below a 
satisfactory level of quality. Better regulation measures are meant to improve the 
design and results of EU regulatory measures so as to contribute more efficiently and 
effectively to social well-being and public welfare. Whether or not this is achieved 
depends on an evaluation, not just of impact assessments and the associated cost-
benefit studies, but also on the types and quality of resources used in policy 
development, the administrative structures and rules that are used, and the actual 
regulatory decisions adopted.222  
The notion of efficiency in which a regulator uses a minimum of resources to 
implement its mandate cannot in any sense be validated with respect to the 
establishment of a telecommunications regulatory agency, on the basis of the factors 
outlined above. The impact assessment and cost-benefit study were only able to 
evaluate the agency in theoretical conceptual terms using numerous assumptions, 
many of which turned out to be unwarranted. Even making such assumptions, the 
case for an efficient achievement of the aim of consistency and harmonization was 
contestable on the basis of the absence of meaningful, quantified, data and the extent 
of the extrapolations that were inferred from assumptions made. Very little of the 
analysis used quantified cost and benefit data, but relied largely on assumptions that 
were unproven, such as, the assumption that ex ante regulation creates public welfare 
benefits and that cost savings in allocating frequency of pan-European services 
would be generated. The latter function attributed to the agency was a matter of pure 
speculation and could not be validated. The first proposition was far too broadly 
drawn.  
The legislative outcome on the regulatory authority, in conjunction with 
Commission powers, raises another problematic feature from an efficiency angle. 
There was no evaluation of the comparative efficiency of re-using and re-structuring 
                                                
221 See, eg de Streel (n 104) 733, who called for establishing the sole objective of telecommunications 
regulation that of maximizing the long-term public welfare.  
222 Wiener (n 26) 460. 
243 
 
the existing ERG network. While it is theoretically possible that such an evaluation 
would have concluded in favor of creating an advisory telecommunications authority 
rather than adapting the ERG forum, no such evaluation was made. The inter-
institutional agreement explicitly engages the three legislative institutions to conduct 
both ex ante and ex post impact assessments.223 Such evaluation would assist an ex 
post assessment of the arguments, analysis and efficiency considerations that were 
used in reaching a legislative conclusion.  
The value of efficiency in the policy measures examined for the 2007 review 
was rather limited. But a weakness in one criterion can be offset by others and 
regulatory legitimacy can be established cumulatively. Regrettably, with respect to 
the regulatory measures adopted in 2009, other criteria examined thus far offer rather 
little normative weight. Even accepting that each regulatory context merits a specific 
combination of weighted regulatory governance criteria, an assessment of efficiency 
suggests that a satisfactory level of normativity was not met, with a consequent loss 
of authority and credibility in relation to the measures adopted.   
6.6.3. The Criterion of Due Process 
Some important normative parameters for due process were established in chapter 3. 
A policy process was deemed to be legitimate when certain values are satisfied. Due 
process concerns focused on the scope for sub-optimal decision-making and 
impairment of regulatory expertise and judgment. The use of procedural due process 
does not guarantee that procedures will actually address the policy issues properly; in 
fact, it may distort the development of expertise and the exercise of expert judgment. 
Where there is a high level of transparency, such distortions become apparent more 
readily.  
 In the regulatory cycle of 2000, the Commission acted transparently. It 
conducted and reported on public consultations of many kinds.224 It elected to 
                                                
223 European Parliament, Council, and Commission, ‘Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-
Making’ [2003] OJ C321/1 para 30.  
224 Prior to conducting a review of the 1998 package, the Commission had examined and reported on 
several issues adjacent to telecommunications such as convergence and radio spectrum usage in 
telecommunications, broadcasting, transportation and R&D. See, eg Results of the Public 
Consultation on the Green Paper on Convergence, COM (1999) 108 final; Commission, ‘Next Steps 
in Radio Spectrum Policy: results of the public consultation on the Green Paper’ (Communication) 
COM(1999) 538 final. 
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commission numerous external studies and it published them.225 The legislative 
measures that it intended to propose were set out in a comprehensive communication 
that articulated principles to follow in developing and applying regulation, identified 
the regulatory aims to be achieved and followed a clearly reasoned line of argument. 
After consulting extensively, the Commission published a comprehensive résumé of 
the views received, by what respondents, and stated its conclusions. It noted the 
proposals where consensus did and did not exist and identified the measures about 
which it had changed its views as a result of the views expressed. It described the 
substance of the forthcoming legislative proposals that were subsequently adopted. 
There was considerable transparency and coherence in the way the Commission had 
conducted the entire policy development process. Thus the value of procedural due 
process of the 2000 policy development procedures carried a significant level of 
normativity.   
 Another regulatory cycle began in 2006 with a call for input and a publication 
of a first IA. A second assessment was published in 2007 together with draft 
legislative proposals. An external cost-benefit analysis was published examining the 
added value for the creation of a European telecommunications agency. All of the 
above reflected a high level of transparency of procedure. But transparency of 
reasoning is also an important consideration. Some of the methods used in the 
Commission’s analysis of the policy measures examined here do not reflect 
positively on the value of transparent reasoning within a regulatory policy analysis. 
Such transparency links directly to the indirect mechanisms of accountability for 
modern regulators.226 The introduction of the ex ante obligation of functional 
separation and the creation of a European regulatory authority did not enjoy a 
                                                
225 The studies examined a breadth of issues, eg submarine cable landing rights, tariff transparency, 
fees for licensing, the scope of universal service, number portability, costing models and emerging 
services delivered over the Internet. See COM(1999) 539 final, annex I.   
226 R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (2nd 
edn, OUP 2012) 340. The authors note that some models of accountability via due process offer a 
continuum of mechanisms for controlling discretionary decision-making, including a participatory 
approach called ‘regulatory democracy’ that resembles the US approach. See also M Lodge and L 
Stirton, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ in R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, The Oxford 
Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010) 351-58. They note traditional ways to take account of concerns 
about the exercise of regulatory discretion, such as cost-benefit analyses, judicial reviews and 
parliamentary oversight but note that polycentric regulatory settings provide difficult cases in which 
to design devices for regulatory accountability that capture the values of transparency, justifiability 
and reasonableness the latter of which I would characterize as expertise.  
245 
 
sufficiently transparent and normative analysis in governance terms. The 
distinctively unpersuasive analysis of these measures owed a great deal to the logical 
sleight of hand used in creating an aura of plausibility.  
 Whether or not such presentational tricks were intended to hide a weak case 
for their adoption is immaterial. Seen from a procedural due process perspective, 
they do not reflect a robust standard of independent verification and do not create 
confidence in the analytical outcomes. What is important to an evaluation of 
transparency in the policy development process is not whether the analyses support 
the policy conclusion, but whether the wider public is able to access the information 
sufficiently to identify the elements of analysis to determine whether the standard has 
been satisfied in order to justify the conclusions drawn by the regulator.  
 This is not to argue that due process will guarantee good results. It cannot. 
The point relates to the ability on the part of external ‘observers’227 and the wider 
public to evaluate how well the policy process has been conducted, and how the 
regulator has defended its reasoning in reaching a conclusion, on the basis of 
evidence that can be independently confirmed. Having required the Commission to 
structure its analysis in a defined manner for review by public scrutiny, the areas 
where normative weaknesses may have arisen can more readily identified. If some 
normative weakness is identified, as was the case for the use of soft law measures, 
there is an institutional need transparently to respond to these on the merits in an 
open manner. The Commission did not do so. Moreover, the area of regulation to 
which these weaknesses related was not trivial, and touched upon central aspects of 
regulation. The Commission to date has still not acknowledged that it understood the 
true nature of the problem with the concerns expressed in relation to soft law.    
The picture of procedural due process in the 2000s is a bit mixed. While there 
is a high level of institutional procedural due process that has consistently included 
the use of normative regulatory design tools, the most recent cycle of policy 
development suggests that, in contrast to that at the beginning of the century, at least 
                                                
227 Moeller as a political scientist develops a construct of an ‘observer’, or an evaluator, outside of 
regulatory processes but part of the structure of regulatory governance analysis. ‘Public governance is 
an output oriented concept that pays particular attention to efficiency and economic 
success....Democratic accountability...could annihilate the expertocratic criteria as well as the external 
observing perspective.’ See C Möllers, ‘European Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept’ 
(2006) 43 CMLR  313, 317, 320.  
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some of the structured procedures for policy design may have become box ticking 
exercises rather than a reflection of genuinely cognitive and analytical processes.  
6.6.4. The Criterion of Control and Accountability 
The period examined has begun to show the limited ability of other governance 
criteria to contribute to regulatory legitimacy. Robust mechanisms to verify the 
relationship between regulatory measures and real world outcomes were not 
available. Although the Commission has continued to refer to telecommunications 
regulation as a success story, and has re-branded telecommunications as electronic 
communications, many commentators have challenged the assessment, not in 
relation to the regulation generally but in relation to the core economic objectives for 
adopting regulation for the single market. Not only has the case not been established 
that telecoms regulation has led to economic welfare outcomes of higher investment 
and innovation, the system for adopting regulation even with modern policy design 
tools can be flawed in practice and result in contestable outcomes that do not have a 
robust evidence-based rationale.  
Paradoxically, the use of ‘better regulation’ techniques for policy 
development has produced some of the most contentious policy proposals adopted in 
the area of telecommunications. This showed that even qualitative design tools do 
not guarantee a quality outcome. This finding also fits with the observation that the 
use of normative procedural due process methods for compiling an evidence base for 
policy measures does not guarantee quality outcomes either. Thus measures can be 
adopted, for example, in the creation of a European regulatory authority or in 
introducing a burdensome ex ante obligation of functional separation that is highly 
contestable because the evidence base relied upon to propose and adopt them was 
normatively unsatisfactory. It is precisely because of the mechanism of structured 
policy analysis that it is possible to detect the weaknesses in regulatory governance, 
such as a shortfall in regulatory expertise.  
Once regulatory measures have been adopted, despite their contestability, 
further mechanisms are needed to evaluate their relationship to outcomes. The 
Commission has not yet proposed a specific ex post evaluation tool for EU 
regulation. For the moment, evaluations of regulatory outcomes are conducted by the 
Commission - which has an institutional bias in terms of wanting to show the 
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effectiveness of its measures - and by private typically industry bodies who have no 
obligation to be independent or neutral in their analysis. In the absence of an 
authoritative mechanism of accountability for the wider public, the assessments 
made by both types of policy actors above will be contestable. The need for an 
instrument of accountability is becoming acute because of the extent of EU 
regulation already adopted and in light of the expansive remit for adopting EU 
regulation in future.  
Once regulations are adopted to re-regulate rather than create markets, an 
even greater need exists and for a strong evidence-based rationale for regulatory 
measures and for a sound system of supranational accountability for normative and 
democratic reasons. Scharpf and Majone would agree that regulation that 
demonstrably corrected market failures and created greater economic welfare 
rationale would enjoy normative and output legitimacy. For regulators to focus on 
demonstrating appropriate outcomes, a mechanism that determines the impacts of 
regulation independently is needed and was missing. Without some effective system 
of wider accountability for EU regulation, few incentives exist for the supranational 
regulators to engage in efficient and effective problem-solving that can be 
established by reference to verifiable outcomes.228 As a regulator, the Commission 
seems to have confused policy process with outcome, and thus may have ignored the 
risks as well as the signs of policy failure.229 The irony of ‘better regulation’ in 
telecommunications is that the tools for ensuring a higher quality of efficient and 
effective regulation have achieved a seemingly more contestable outcome than 
previously. This is not necessarily an indication of systemic failure. The reasons may 
be related more to the nature and contestability of re-regulation rather than to 
measures for market creation. But the point is that a robust evidence-based case is 
needed for market-intervening regulatory measures, both in design and in output. 
Qualitative modern policy design tools can and do lead to unconvincing measures.  
Nonetheless the Commission’s reputation as a regulator of the sector is intact 
for the most part and for most observers.230 Overall there is a significant level of 
                                                
228 G Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by 
Stealth (OUP 2009) ch 6. 
229 ibid. 
230 For two strident doubters, see de Streel (n 104) and Garnham (n 113).  
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regulatory legitimacy associated with the EU telecommunications regime, which 
likely relates more to the perception that it is based, correctly and in contrast to the 
US, on technologically neutral regulatory principles and uses a sophisticated 
economic model of analysis to determine a need for regulating undertakings in the 
market.  But there is no room for complacency. I return to the need for further 
accountability in my conclusions.  
 
6.6.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed governance practices in telecommunications against 
European governance norms and the governance model of Chapter 3. The 
Commission’s governance practices underwent a radical evolution in the 2000s and 
were brought into the analytical framework. The Commission is still learning in 
regulatory governance terms. A consultation was launched in mid-2012 on the 
practical aspects of measures for evaluating regulation ex post.231 No follow-up has 
been reported. The Commission may have accepted the principle that regulation has 
consequences and that, as a regulator, it should seek to determine how well or badly 
the regulation worked in practice. This does no more than bring the Commission’s 
aim into line with other established, albeit national, regulators, such as Australia, the 
UK and the US. 
The latest iteration of telecommunications legislation in the Union raises 
difficult questions as to the nature of the true trajectory that the policy is taking and 
about the use of regulatory governance more generally. Some new features in the 
arrangements for imposing ex ante obligations mean that existing cooperation 
procedures between NRAs and the Commission have become more formalized and 
bureaucratic with the creation of an independent European regulatory body with 
legal personality. Mutual consultation procedures have become somewhat heavier in 
consequence. The addition of functional separation as an ex ante obligation, which is 
a much more intrusive regulatory obligation than those previously included, is a 
                                                
231 The consultation document bears no identifying institutional number, or document label, eg staff 
working document, communication, etc. It stated:  ‘The consultation will run as an internet 
consultation open to all citizens and stakeholders from 27 June to 21 September [2012]. All 
contributions will be published on the “Your Voice in Europe” website, and we will produce a 
summary report and the Commission’s response’. Stakeholder Consultation (n 24).  
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measure that is fraught with complexity and uncertainty.232  Constructing and 
supervising the arrangements for functional separation will involve considerable 
governance costs to be borne by the NRA.233 This measure is controversial even as a 
sanction in competition law. It was not contemplated for purposes of economic 
regulation until 2006 and it is all the more surprising that it has been adopted after a 
long period of full liberalization.234 235  
The trends do not suggest that European telecommunications markets are 
moving towards competition. That, in turn, implies regulatory failure or significant 
impairment in achieving the regulatory goal of sustainable competition and 
withdrawal of regulation. This calls into question whether the policy design is 
credible.  
The creation of a formally constituted regulatory authority with legal 
personality was not persuasively supported with an evidence-based analysis, was not 
evaluated when modified during the legislative process, and also seems 
contradictory, when a major regulatory objective is ultimately to withdraw ex ante 
regulation. At a minimum, it gives cause for doubt as to the expectation and therefore 
likelihood of withdrawal any time soon.    
The Commission’s practices of developing proposals to address the problems 
encountered with re-regulation need considerable improvement. What should change 
                                                
232 M Cave, ‘Six Degrees of Separation: Operational Separation as a Remedy in European 
Telecommunications Regulation’ (2006) 64/4 Communications & Strategies 1. 
233 ERG, ‘Opinion on Functional Separation’ (2007) 44 ERG 3.  
234 In a speech on 27 June 2006, Commissioner Reding referred to ‘the policy option of structural 
separation’ as a solution for ‘many’ of the competition problems European markets that needs to be 
discussed intensively in the forthcoming months. V Reding, ‘The Review 2006 of EU Telecom Rules:  
Strengthening Competition and Completing the Internal Market’ (Annual Meeting of BITKOM, 
Brussels, June 2006) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/422&format=HTML&aged=
1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>. 
235 The precedent for this remedy was the functional separation by BT of its wholesale business 
whereby BT Group plc set up a new and operationally separate business which is now responsible for 
BT’s local access and backhaul telecoms network.  What is notable is that BT offered undertakings 
which were accepted by Ofcom in September 2005 under UK national competition law, the National 
Enterprise Act 2002, and not under national or European telecommunications regulation. Breaches of 
the undertakings would create the possibility for fines against BT and for legal action by private 
parties.  One commentator observed: ‘Much of the UK case in favour of operational separation 
rest[ed] on the proposition that BT had the means and the motive to practise non-price discrimination 
in relation to such products as unbundled loops, wholesale line rental, and bitstream, and had in fact 
done so…’ Cave (n 2321) 3. Karen: This is footnote 237 so presumably need to switch the 
references?].For a fuller account of the case, see ‘Final Statements on the Strategic Review of 
Telecommunications, and Undertakings in Lieu of a Reference under the Enterprise Act 2002’ 
(Ofcom 2005) <http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/statement_tsr/>. 
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is the quality of the analytical case, that is, the evidence-base of the Commission’s 
problem definition, coupled with an agnostic approach to policy alternatives and a 
quantified cost-benefit analysis. These are appropriate standards of analysis which 
are moreover called for by the Guidelines on Impact Assessment. The failure of the 
Commission's internal assessment board to ensure that relevant institutional 
standards are complied with indicates that the use of internal control systems is 
inherently weak and ineffective. All this, coupled with the absence of any ex post 
assessment mechanism demonstrate that the weaknesses of the institutional 
arrangements examined in Chapter 3 remain in place. 
That the Commission has adopted well-recognized qualitative regulatory 
governance standards, as have other regulators, is to be welcomed but it has 
struggled to be able to put them into practice as intended.237 Thus, the Commission’s 
ongoing adaptations of its governance offer, but have not yet delivered, a basis for 
attributing normative regulatory legitimacy to economic regulation in 
telecommunications. For a supranational regulator whose raison d’être is founded on 
output legitimacy, the signs of an uptake in robust regulatory tools are encouraging 
but the shortfall in achievement needs urgently to be addressed before EU regulatory 
governance can be transformed into an effective tool in constructing and defending 
the Commission’s supranational regulatory legitimacy. 
An evaluation of impact assessments by the Court of Auditors identified a 
number of weaknesses in the Commission’s current approach to preparing such 
assessments. One criticism related to the Commission’s approach related to ex post 
evaluations of regulatory measures:  
A public intervention (and its actual impact) should be assessed through 
ongoing monitoring and ex post evaluation to improve further 
development of interventions. To enable learning and feedback for future 
initiatives, ex post evaluations would need to collect relevant information 
on compliance with legislation and the effectiveness of the rules as 
compared with the envisaged results initially set out in the impact 
assessment. 238  
 
                                                
237 For global standards of excellence in regulatory governance, see OECD (n 159).  
238 European Court of Auditors, Impact Assessments in the EU Institutions: Do They Support 
Decision-Making, Special Report No 3 (European Court of Auditors 2010) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/coa_report_3_2010_en.pdf>accessed 12 October 2012.  
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Thus the Court of Auditors recommended an examination ex post of regulatory 
measures on their merits. It identified the use of impact assessments and their follow-
up as part of a cycle of administering and managing the annual legislative work 
programme of the Commission. Such an approach if applied appropriately could 
contribute to a positive validation of EU regulation directly by reference to 
outcomes, and thus enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the Commission and 
other EU institutions indirectly. To this end, the Commission needs urgently to 
address the question of follow-up, of completing the regulatory cycle with 
appropriate and verifiable ex post regulatory outcomes alongside the continued use 
of modern regulatory governance techniques. 
On balance, the value of accountability within the policy development processes 
of the EU has not yet been adequately represented notwithstanding the governance 
measures adopted since 2000. That said, the current indications and the overall trend 
that the Commission seems to be on a ‘learning curve’ offer some positive 
perspectives for the future. Overall, the picture that emerges from the 2000s suggests 
that there is a certain irony in observing that the introduction of regulatory 
governance tools like IAs correlates positively with a decline in the quality of the 
regulatory measures, or at least with a decline in the regulatory case that was made 
for the measures. Institutionally, the Commission has wrong-footed itself: it has 
formally recognized that governance practices for regulation need to reflect 
qualitative practices but failed to deliver. At the market building stage, having no 
formal regulatory governance policy, the normative quality of regulatory governance 
was robust. After the Commission as an institution recognized their importance, its 





This research has attempted to dis-entangle the question of how well the Commission 
performs as a regulator from the much-debated and widely-held proposition that the 
EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. Much of the debate has failed to identify the 
useful query of whether the Commission’s performance as an economic regulator for 
the single market satisfies a standard of regulatory governance sufficiently well to be 
considered credibly legitimate. 
A strong democratic normativity exists for the remit to create a single 
European market. Even from eurosceptics, there is little disagreement as to the 
desirability of a single market. But views vary on the extent to which regulatory 
measures for the internal market are needed and, even where consensus exists that 
something is needed, opinions will vary on what specific regulatory measures are 
appropriate. So the normativity of the Treaty mandate does not automatically 
legitimate the exercise of the powers conferred by the Treaties. The exercise of those 
powers should satisfy a different normative standard, that of normative regulatory 
governance. My approach to constructing a model of evaluation was to examine 
some of the scholarship on national regulatory regimes and regulatory theories of 
regulation, and to compare these with the analyses of two prominent scholars of 
European regulatory governance in particular (Majone and Scharpf), the models of 
which are largely mutually exclusive. My research demonstrates that neither school 
of thought provides a satisfactory model for constructing a normative framing on its 
own.  
The elements of the supranational regulatory governance model proposed 
here were derived from established theories of regulation and governance from 
which I selected five qualitative criteria, i.e. authoritative regulatory mandates; 
regulatory expertise; regulatory efficiency; procedural due process; and 
accountability. These criteria provided the analytical elements by which to evaluate 
the legitimacy of the Commission’s discharge of its Treaty remit to establish a single 
market and ensure its proper functioning. For empirical testing, I used a case study in 
the field of telecommunications regulation, which spans a twenty-three-year period 
within which three complete cycles of regulatory policy development took place, and 
during which a monopolized sector was entirely liberalized and re-regulated; and 
253 
 
where regulators face considerable challenges in responding appropriately and 
effectively to changing technology and competitivity.  
In my model for transnational regulators, I adapted the substantive meanings 
normally attributed to the criteria in existing scholarship and EU policy documents to 
take greater account of an absence of democratic regulatory processes at the EU 
level. For example, the criterion of an authoritative regulatory mandate for a national 
regulator relates to the typically legislative origin of its authority to act. But the 
Commission's authority to regulate the single market is Treaty-based and requires the 
Commission to interpret a broad Treaty mandate, rather than to achieve specific 
regulatory goals. Another criterion that I adapted to the specific regulatory profile of 
the Commission was that of regulatory due process, again because there is no 
democratic mechanism to review the manner in which the Commission discharges its 
regulatory remit in the Treaty. I used the values inherent in due process, such as 
transparency, accessibility and non-discrimination, as an overlay with which to 
assess the normativity of the decision-making procedures and methods of EU 
regulation. I found that there is a considerable shortfall at present that should be 
redressed, as elaborated below. While there is considerable overlap between the five 
criteria typically applied to evaluate national regulatory models and the one used 
here, there are also qualitative differences in my model that allow a more meaningful 
analysis to be conducted and conclusions to be drawn in respect of the normativity of 
a transnational regulator’s performance. My claim is that the added value of my 
research offers an improvement over available models of evaluation and a robust 
approach to determinations of regulatory legitimacy. 
My key findings can be summarized as follows. First, effectiveness of 
policies – outcomes – on its own is insufficient as a claim for normative regulatory 
legitimacy, because means and methodology are as important as outcomes and this is 
so to satisfy democracy-based norms of what constitutes a legitimate exercise of 
public authority. That is not the same as arguing that legitimacy always requires 
democratic institutions to be involved before the exercise of delegated regulatory 
authority may be deemed legitimate. The delegation of authority and the exercise of 
authority may be evaluated by different standards both of which withstand normative 
democratic analysis. Thus, as an alternative analysis to traditional political science 
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arguments of democratic participation, a regulatory governance framing provides an 
instrumental or purposive use of normative criteria and principles within regulatory 
processes to act as proxies for systems of control seen in participatory democracies.  
 Second, constructing and defending regulatory legitimacy on the part of a 
supranational regulator should neither consist of, nor be evaluated as, a broadly 
political process, even if establishing normative regulatory legitimacy necessarily 
forms part of a larger set of complex political processes. For a transnational regulator 
such as the Commission, I suggest that a normative form of legitimacy could and 
should be constructed by means of broadly recognizable qualitative criteria relating 
to the use of regulatory powers that were democratically delegated by Member 
States. Such an approach is entirely without prejudice to the construction of social or 
popular legitimacy using mechanisms of discourse described by sociologists. Nor 
does it preclude the ambition to create genuinely democratic EU legitimacy, which is 
an entirely political matter. For regulatory legitimacy to be normative, the emphasis 
should shift away from politics to institutional practices, administrative procedures 
and mechanisms of ex post evaluation. To some extent this has been achieved but 
more needs to be done. A supranational regulator such as the Commission needs a 
meaningful form of normative legitimacy as a separate consideration from any 
question of a systemic democratic deficit. Legitimacy is attributed, or not, to a 
regulator on the basis of an evaluative process of its regulatory governance. Such 
legitimacy can be constructed by the quality of the regulatory governance involved in 
the design and adoption of regulatory measures, with governance defined as the 
administrative procedures comprising the processes of policy development.  
Third, and turning to the case study more specifically, I analyzed the extent to 
which regulatory governance contributed to the Commission’s regulatory legitimacy 
for the single market in telecommunications. Different criteria within the analytical 
model carried different levels of weight throughout the period examined. I found 
regulatory legitimacy to be high when the regulation was directly linked to the 
establishment of a single market in telecommunications. It remained reasonably 
robust but somewhat impaired during the first revision. Normative weaknesses in 
regulatory governance emerged clearly in the most recent legislative revision despite 
the use of modern regulatory design tools, which confirmed that the use of the tools 
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alone does not guarantee a reliable regulatory outcome. Some of the developments in 
the last policy development cycle suggest that Majone may have been close to the 
mark in relation to institutional incentives that result from the limited resources 
available to the Commission to engage in regulation. While this may be a validation 
of Majone’s point, it also highlights the necessity for a normative standard of policy 
making, particularly regulatory expertise that allows the regulator properly to 
conduct impact assessments and interpret the results correctly. The threshold for 
evidence-based policy making should be set as high as possible, given the in-built 
tendency towards regulatory expansion and power accretion. To enhance regulatory 
legitimacy at the supranational level, regulatory governance should be distanced as 
much as possible from the explicitly political processes and institutions that create 
political legitimacy. The Commission has taken a major step in that regard, and now 
uses regulatory governance design measures.   
 But there are several reasons why regulatory reform in policy development is 
no panacea for the criticisms of scholars such as Scharpf and Majone, albeit in 
different respects. Even if the qualitative flaws of Commission impact assessments 
could be overcome, EU legislators may not take account of such assessment. Thus, 
over-regulation or under-regulation can still arise when the message of the 
assessment is lost or ignored by legislators. The Commission, with only limited 
resources, may prefer legislative solutions in which it has more institutional control, 
and this may negate the positive effects of regulatory reform. If an impact assessment 
identifies a non-legislative regulatory solution, the Commission may not necessarily 
endorse that solution, although subsidiarity would militate against it. Another reason 
why self-defined governance reform is an incomplete answer for regulatory 
legitimacy may be that analyses are not founded on hard data, thus unwittingly 
undermining the evidence base, as was the case for the study conducted on a 
European telecommunications regulatory agency. 
 Recent European governance practices have created scope for enhanced 
legitimacy in policy development processes. That measures such as impact 
assessments are now systematically conducted on EU policy proposals significantly 
contributes to the value of the criteria of an authoritative mandate, expertise, 
efficiency and due process in the regulatory design process. Such indicia of 
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competence and transparency can enhance regulatory legitimacy. When modern 
regulatory tools are used properly, policy development processes are transparent, and 
thus capable of being evaluated by the wider public.    
 With re-regulatory cycles that characterize the telecommunications sector, 
such evaluations and comments can be seen as, and assimilated into, a feedback 
mechanism that would accord with ex post evaluation mechanisms at the European 
level, if ever adopted. Even without an explicit mechanism of ex post accountability, 
the scholarship has begun to identify the mismatches between policy objectives and 
regulatory methodologies in telecommunications. A continued application of and 
improvement in using regulatory assessment tools in policy design processes should 
correspond to regulation that reflects the values of the regulatory governance model 
of chapter 3. Now that twenty-plus years of regulatory experience can be examined, 
it is possible to observe and evaluate regulatory processes in evolutionary terms. 
That some scholarship has also begun to examine the empirical outcomes in 
telecommunications regulation, by reference to how it is conceived and constructed, 
is welcome. Also welcome is the emergent scholarship on regulatory governance as 
such that examines the quality of the Commission’s practices and outputs. Thus far, 
findings suggest that problems with quality of outputs exist. 
In the 2010 Communication on its ‘smart regulation’ concept, the 
Commission emphasized the Governance White Paper (2001) aim of widening 
access to the policy development process. Smart regulation targets the whole policy 
cycle, from the design of legislation to implementation, including enforcement, 
evaluation and revision. Nonetheless, Commission control over the regulatory design 
process remains, even if it is attended by more bells and whistles. The Commission's 
public consultations on regulatory measures should now reflect the Treaties' wider 
remit in a meaningful way. If the Commission were to frame its consultations both 
more broadly and agnostically, seeking the views obtained in wide consultations, it 
could give rise to a more satisfactory, and more normative, conception of optional 
policy measures. This has yet to be discerned. The Commission also needs to give 
attention to re-regulatory challenges. Although the Commission has engaged with the 
idea of an ex post evaluation of legislation, it has yet to operationalize this. The 
related 2012 consultation on ex post evaluations suggested making such evaluations 
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an integral part of smart regulation, in which the effectiveness and the efficiency of 
EU regulation are evaluated. However, an evaluative body, independent of European 
and, specifically, Commission regulatory processes, has not emerged.  
 The Commission has thus recognized that regulation is a dynamic process, 
that regulatory impact assessments have limitations, that a regulatory cycle exists and 
that it must be catered for in terms of good regulatory practices. The question 
becomes, of course, whether the Commission gets its policy measures right. But 
what is right? There is scant experience with the smart regulation approach. Perhaps 
it is another case of re-branding. It is too early to make a meaningful assessment of 
success or failure of smart regulation and regulatory quality. Nonetheless, the 
Commission’s discourse over the past few years suggested an awareness of 
regulatory practices and a willingness to embrace them. But the 2012 consultation 
had no follow-up. It will not be the first time that the Commission’s discourse 
suggests a positive evolution in normative governance. Nonetheless, the search for 
methods to validate important measures of market intervention that affect the 
functioning of markets, the success of undertakings and the investments in 
innovative technology, thus ultimately affecting all EU citizens, should continue. 
The legitimacy of the regulator and the regulation may depend upon it.    
 Finally, and noting in particular that the Eurozone crisis continues to unfold, 
the wider value of my research seems clear. The analysis developed in this thesis 
resonates strongly with the current regulatory crisis in the Eurozone that forms part 
of a bitterly divisive period in the EU. While there are many national and non-
national actors involved, the activities of an independent and politically 
unaccountable central banking authority are increasingly called into question. The 
dimensions of political influence in financial regulation and the absence of normative 
governance have been revealed in all their tawdry detail. Ever closer union to some 
citizens now means that German politicians and banking regulators can dictate the 
terms of another Member State’s financial policies. Although the use of regulatory 
governance tools, as in telecommunications, does not guarantee good policy results, 




 Moreover, the purpose of creating supranational European regulatory 
authorities was to moderate political influence in decision-making, not to concentrate 
it within a single Member State. The situation requires another approach even if it 
seems that catastrophic failure may take place before there is a recognition of the 
need for a change. Had those regulators been held to a high standard of regulatory 
governance, they may have been required to defend their policy propositions against 
a broader community of interests. They may have needed to articulate the problems 
to be solved and identify all of the interests to be served, before proposing policy 
options. Had the criteria used in this research applied, the greater transparency of the 
process should have considerably reduced the extent of closed-door negotiation and 
political horse-trading. Undue political influence within the regulatory process 
creates possible consequences for moral hazards. In particular, when politicians in 
one Member State can unilaterally shape the measures to be applied in another, there 
is no reason for them to take account of the interests of citizens in the Member States 
affected. Scharpf identified the democratic unacceptability of this outcome fifteen 
years ago. In the participatory democracies of the EU Member States, this situation 
should not be tolerated.  
 All of this underscores the point that regulation has critical real world 
consequences and dimensions that should not be relegated to secondary importance 
in order to serve political or ideological purposes. Regulation is a form of public 
authority and that authority, under democratic theory, derives not from governments, 
but from people. Ultimately, regulation should serve society and the people. 
Regulators wielding delegated sovereign powers must be subject to democratically 
acceptable forms of practice and accountability, without which their actions should 
not be considered legitimate or appropriate. The current financial crisis underscores 
the inherent tensions in a system intended to ‘create Europe through concrete 
achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.’ Once again, the EU proves the 
point that output legitimacy is limited in its substantive reach while input legitimacy 
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